

Anti-One Unit Movement 1955-1969 through the Lens of Nonviolence: The Role of Sindh Province, Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

The Anti-One Unit Movement launched by the people of Sindh is the query. It mainly focuses the role of the people of Sindh province in the Anti-One Unit Movement. Main concern is to see how the people of Sindh province outraged against perceived injustice? An attempt has been made to analyse the movement from the perspective of non-violence theory. The aims and objectives of movement to save the identity, status, value and integrity of smaller provinces are mainly discussed here. The Anti-One Unit Movement has been explored as an ethno-nationalist movement in terms of tactics of ethno-nationalism theory. No scholar of this domain has yet analysed the movement as nonviolent movement in terms of tactics of nonviolence theory. In fact, the devices of nonviolence suggested by Gene Sharp were used by the movement leaders to succeed the movement. The movement leaders did not harm opponents and they worked non-violently to gain the aims and objectives of movement. However, the government used tactics to defuse

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the movement. The One-Unit Scheme was an attempt to merge federating units of Pakistan into One Unit. The scheme was a formidable geo-political move that necessarily affected the significance and identity of smaller provinces of Pakistan. As a consequence, the people of smaller provinces stood against the merger of provinces of Pakistan into One Unit and they played their due role in the movement non-violently. To remain in the scope and limitation of academic research, this study tries to explain the role of Sindh province in Anti-One Unit Movement to see how far the movement was nonviolent in terms of tactics of nonviolence theory?

Introduction

Amongst the Muslim states of developing world, Pakistan is one where movements have taken against perceived injustice despite ethnic, social class, religious cleavages, strong authoritarian tendencies, enduring political disorder and prolonged military dictatorship in Pakistan.¹ Moreover, preference was given to the parliamentary democratic system under the federal state. The people of Pakistan have shown their strength just not to reject the military dictatorship but also stood against the perceived injustice through non-violent mass movements. Most of the political movements in the history of Pakistan were aimed to oust the existing system of governance due to emerging injustice in the country.²

The social scientists from abroad and Pakistan have not yet paid scholarly attention towards regional movements which were launched against the perceived injustice. Thus, regional movements such as "Save Karachi Movement" and "Anti-One Unit Movement" remained unexplored. However, the imperative of this article is to study the Anti-One Unit Movement through the lens of non-violence theory and as an

1 Babar Ali, "Sind and Struggle for Liberation," *Economic and Politically Weekly* 22, no. 10 (March 7, 1987): 402-405.

2 Khalid Bin Saeed, "Pakistan in 1983: Internal Stresses More Serious than External Problem," *Asian Survey* 24: 02 (February 1984): 219-228.

ethno-national movement. In this research paper, an attempt is made to explore Anti-One Unit Movement through the lens of non-violence theory.

The history of nonviolent movements in Sindh against injustice began in 1947 in post-partition era when central government decided to isolate Karachi from Sindh province. The mega city of the province was, eventually, fused into federal territory. As a consequence, the people of Sindh province perceived this decision of the federal government as unjust, and they finally reacted with outrage against federal government's decision regarding isolation of Karachi from Sindh province. To stop the isolation of mega city of the province, public, civil society, nationalist and political leaders decided to launch a nonviolent movement which was called as "Save Karachi Movement".³ In a similar vein, the people of smaller province objected the announcement of federal government regarding merger of provinces of western wing of Pakistan into the West Pakistan. The people of smaller provinces perceived the One Unit Scheme as injustice, and they stood against perceived injustice. Eventually, they planned to wage an unarmed struggle against the scheme and their major demand was restoration of value, identity and status of their provinces.⁴

One Unit Scheme

One Unit Scheme was not only seen as a huge geo-political change but also perceived as injustice by the people of smaller provinces of Pakistan.⁵ The scheme demolished the status and identity of smaller provinces of Pakistan. On July 23, 1954, the leadership of Muslim League called for a meeting where the idea of fusion of four provinces of the

3 Amir Ali Chandio, *Politics of Sindh under Zia Government an Analysis of Nationalists Vs Federalists Orientation* (Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, 2009).

4 Malik Rizwan, *The Politics of One Unit 1955-1958* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Punjab, 1988), 50.

5 Gammad Bhatti, *Sindhi ante Zulm Keesaitan* [Sindhi: Up to what Time Oppression on Sindhis] (Larkano: Publisher Atal Sindhi, 1991).

western wing into the West Pakistan was negotiated.⁶ The Chief Minister of Punjab, Feroz Khan Noon supported the concept of One Unit Scheme whereas Abdul Sattar Pirzada, the Chief Minister of Sindh, rejected the scheme.⁷ Apart from Pirzada's opposition, Bengali members of the committee such as Khwaja Nazimuddin and Noor-ul-Amin also opposed the plan. Abdul Qayyum Khan, from NWFP rejected the central government's policy of destroying regional identities of the existed provinces.⁸ The supporters of the scheme claimed that equality and balance between both the wings of the country would prevent provincialism and strengthen federalism in Pakistan.⁹

In Sindh, peaceful opposition to the policy led to the dismissal of Pirzada from the Chief Ministership of the province. Ayub Khuhro, a supporter of the federal government's policy was made the Chief Minister of Sindh for the second term.¹⁰ This unilateral decision by the central government resulted in the tug of war among the federating units of Pakistan.¹¹ G. M. Sayed had argued that One Unit Scheme would destroy the separate linguistic entity and status of Sindh and other small provinces of Pakistan.¹² Furthermore, he explained that the scheme is not only against Pakistan Resolution but also the Independence Act of 1947.¹³ The people of small provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP had perceived it as usurpation of

6 Chandio, *Politics of Sindh Zia Government*, 24.

7 Fazal Suleman Kazi, *Sobai Khudmukhtiarain Markzi Siasat* [Sindhi: Provincial Autonomy and Federal Politics] (Karachi: Sindhi Adabi Academy, 2004).

8 Rizwan, *The Politics of One Unit 1955-1958*.

9 Rizwan, *The Politics of One Unit 1955-1958*.

10 Kazi, *Sobai Khudmukhtiarain Markzi Siasat*.

11 Azad Kazi, *Sindh Mein Dhari Abadkari Ain Masailo* [Sindhi: Foreign Population in Sind and Problems] (Karachi: G.M. Sayed Literary Society, 1998), 54.

12 G.M. Sayed, *Puhanji Kahani Puhanji Zibani* [Sindhi: My Story, My Narration] (Sann: G.M. Sayed Academy, 1988).

13 G.M. Sayed, *Sindh Gaalhai Thee* [Sindhi: Sindh Speaks] (Karachi: Naen Sindh Academy, 1993).

their provincial status. The supporters of the scheme claimed it as strong element to dilute the dispute between the Western and the Eastern wings of Pakistan.¹⁴ As a result, the policy created problems among the federating units and fuelled provincialism and regionalism in future decades.

The political leaders of Baluchistan, Sindh and NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) did not support the scheme fearing that the plan would diminish their regional identity and autonomy.¹⁵ In this connection, the opponents collectively launched an unarmed movement, gathered a large number of people to protest. Hundreds of protesters were sent to jail.¹⁶ The members of provincial and federal legislatures such as Ghulam Mustafa Bhurgari, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Noor-Ul-Amin and Abdul Qayyum Khan did also not lag behind in opposing the government and passed a resolution against the scheme.¹⁷ The central government used force to suppress the dissent and stymied the mass mobilization.

Despite opposition, Khuhro had the support of the majority of the provincial legislatures. Hamida Khuhro claimed that 100 out of 110 members supported the scheme whereas four members opposed it and six were absent.¹⁸ Sayed states that members of the assembly were pressurized at gunpoint to pass the One Unit Bill.¹⁹ Ali Muhammad Rashidi expressed in a speech that if anyone who dared to comment against the scheme would be treated sternly.²⁰ Despite threats and intimidation, the civil society, poets and

14 Hamida Khuhro, *Mohammad AyubKhuhro: Life of Courage in Politics* (Karachi: Feroz Sons, 1998), 497.

15 Meer Alam Mari, *Qaumi Tehreek Jo Mukhtasar Taaruf* [Sindhi: Short Introduction of National Movement] (*Sanghar*: The National Academy, 2004).

16 Sayed, *Puhanji Kahani Puhanji Zibani*.

17 Rizwan, *The Politics of One Unit 1955-1958*, 49.

18 Khuhro, *Mohammad Ayub Khuhro*, 497.

19 Ghulam Murtaza Sayed, *The Case of Sindh* (Karachi: Naeem Sindh Academy, 1995), 134.

20 Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan at Cross Currents of History* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2004).

academicians resisted the federal initiative and expressed strong disapproval of it in their writings.²¹

The political leadership of other provinces such as Sardar Attallah Mengal, Noraiz Khan, Khan Ghaffar Khan, Mian Mohammad Iftikharuddin, Hussain Shaheed Saharwardi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman decried the imposition of the scheme. Consequently, the creation of the eastern and the western wings of the country gave birth to the sentiments of Bengali separatist movement and Sindhi nationalism in the years to come.²²

To G.M. Sayed, the Governor General was a supporter of the plan, but the constituent legislature was against the scheme in its recommendations.²³ Furthermore, the new elected Constituent Assembly passed One Unit Bill in its first meeting held in July 1955.²⁴ The bill was moved forward by Sardar Amir Azam Khan and discussion on Bill began on August 23, 1955. After a very heated debate and arguments, the bill was finally passed on September 30, 1955. The scheme was implemented on October 14, 1955.²⁵ Sayed had criticized that forcefully imposed scheme was an attempt to preserve the vested interests of Punjabi political elites. The One Unit policy neglected the cumulative interests of the smaller provinces of Pakistan and threatened their regional identity.²⁶ Thus, Anti-One Unit movement took a literary form to develop pressure on the federal government for the annulment of One Unit.²⁷

21 Sayed, *Sindh Gaalhai Thee*.

22 Bhatti, *Sindhian Te Zulum Keesaitan*.

23 Sayed, *Azadi Chho Ain Cha Lai*, 35.

24 Rizwan, *The Politics of One Unit 1955-1958*, 56.

25 Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 178.

26 Sayed, *The Case of Sindh*, 136.

27 Sayed, *Azadi Chho Ain Cha Lai*, 35.

Theoretical Framework: Principled and Pragmatic Nonviolence

The Principled Tradition of Nonviolence

Gandhi's approach to nonviolence involves "principled nonviolence" which is also called Gandhian tradition of nonviolence.²⁸ Principled non-violence depends on idealism and believers of the concept think that the use of violence against opponents in even difficult circumstances is wrong.²⁹ Gandhi never allowed violence against political adversaries on moral grounds. Moreover, the followers of principled non-violence deny practicing violence even in critical conditions. For instance, principled nonviolent activists deny joining armed forces, no matter how worthy cause it is. In fact, principled nonviolent activists also know the importance and effectiveness of violence, but they deny using violence on moral grounds and choose their tactics of non-violence carefully.³⁰

Principled nonviolent activists usually believe that the use of violence does not convert the opponent's concept of truth, but it increases pressure on him to behave in a manner that is against his vision, principle as well as sincerity.³¹ Moreover, violence also generates pressure on opponents to violate his moral integrity. Gandhi discovered and tried out his method of principled non-violence when he launched his movements against racial discrimination in South Africa and kept perfecting during his struggles against the British rule in India and unjust practices of the society.³²

28 Dennis Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

29 Gene Sharp, *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

30 Bose Nimal Kumar, *Selection from Gandhi* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948), 233.

31 Bhikhu Parekh, *Gandhi: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 68.

32 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamic of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Connecticut, Westport: Praeger, 1994), 19.

Ahinsa

Joan V. Bondurant observes Ahinsa from Gandhi's point of view that Ahinsa is an antonym to violence.³³ Ahinsa is a Sanskrit term which denies use of violence in an acute condition. Moreover, Ramchiary describes the term that Ahinsa never allows violence against political adversary.³⁴ The follower of Ahinsa is known as Ahinsawadia that works to bring political revolution without destruction and bloodshed, instead by a peaceful transition.³⁵ Ahinsawadi stands in opposition to perceived justice in the society.

Richard B. Gregg was a contemporary political theorist of Gandhi who was highly inspired by the Gandhi's concept of principled nonviolence. Both the nonviolent thinkers refuse to use violence against rivalries in politics on moral grounds.³⁶ Martin Luther King Junior was also the follower of principled non-violence who sustained Gandhi's logical hope to eliminate social evil in the society. He led the Civil Rights Movement in United States and brought social change in the American society without destruction.³⁷

The turn-the-cheek concept explains that during a movement if the follower of Ahinsa is slapped or beaten on the one side of his cheek, he should offer his other cheek for slap or violence it would affect the soul and heart of attacker. Gandhi's developed concept of the "turn-the-cheek" attracted King, who became a follower of the principled non-

33 Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), 23-24.

34 Arpana Ramchiary, "Gandhian Concept of Truth and Non-Violence," *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 18, No. 01 (November-December 2013): 67-79.

35 Mahatma Gandhi, *Nonviolent Resistance (Satyagraha)* (New York: Schocken Books, 1916).

36 Glyn Richards, *The Philosophy of Gandhi: A Study of his Basic Ideas* (United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1991).

37 Martin Luther King Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1958).

violence.³⁸ However, realism in the concept of principled tradition of nonviolence was largely missing and it was idealistic tradition of non-violence. Thus, it was restricted idealistic approach to nonviolence than realistic approach to non-violence. Despite flaws in the concepts of principled nonviolence, it was used in the movements of different countries such as Salt March in India, Indian Freedom Movement and The Civil Rights Movement in United States.³⁹

The principled approach to non-violence was considered as a strong tactic used by the unarmed activists to bring political and social change with harming opponents.⁴⁰ King perceived the Christian concept of love by Gandhi's approach to non-violence. He was rationally convinced by Gandhi's writings on non-violence. Apart from this, Gandhi's belief in bearing violence without answering with violence, suffering and self-suffering were eminent approaches for King. King was struggling within a democratic society, with an aim to black integration into American society. Thus, King used the principled tradition of non-violence in his own launched movement.⁴¹

Moral Jiu-Jitsu

Richard B. Gregg constructed the concept of moral jiu-jitsu from Japanese martial art jiu-jitsu. It is technique of self-defence in the martial art which is used to transfigure the assault of attacker in the support of defender.⁴² The concept explains that in struggles, nonviolent activists use jiu-jitsu technique to convert the assault of government in the support of nonviolent movement. Gregg places analysis that when an individual beats other individual and beating force is

38 G. Ramachandran T.K Mahadevan, *Nonviolence After Gandhi: A Study of Martin Luther King Jr.*, (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1968).

39 Thomas Weber, *On the Salt March: The Historiography of Gandhi's March to Dandi* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1997).

40 Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi*.

41 Richards, *The Philosophy of Gandhi: A Study of his Basic Ideas*, 50-55.

42 Brian Martin, *Non-violence Unbound* (Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2015).

answered with violence by the defending force, it means like attacker, defender is also committed to violence, and he accepts violence as justified source of action.⁴³

In a similar vein, when the defending individual denies responding with violence and bears violence, physical torture or beatings without violent reactions, it eventually causes attacker or beating force to lose physical balance what Gregg calls moral jiu-jitsu.⁴⁴ Moreover, Gregg explains that nonviolent response during the assault by defending force influences the psychology of attacking force. He also points out the connection between the non-violence response and psychology of beating force. Resultantly, it creates supportive and sympathetic atmosphere for bearer of violence from attacker's point view and Gregg calls influence and impact as moral jiu-jitsu effect. However, Gregg could not prove the concept from practical, realistic and rational perspectives.⁴⁵ Brian Martin places analysis on the concept of moral jiu-jitsu that the problem with concept was that there was no existence of evidence to support it practically and rationally. Thus, Gregg's constructed concept was not a plausible description which could prove a connection between effectiveness of non-violence and the psychology as well as physical balance of beating force.⁴⁶

Limitations of Ahinsa and Moral Jiu-Jitsu

Weber assessed the Salt March to investigate the impacts of principled non-violence on the psychology of attackers. However, he found out flaws in Gregg's suggested concept of moral jiu-jitsu.⁴⁷ Furthermore, he explains that nonviolent

43 Richard B. Gregg, *A Discipline for Non-violence* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1941).

44 Richard Gregg, *The Power of Non-Violence* (New York: Schocken, 1966), 56.

45 Gregg, *A Discipline for Non-violence*.

46 Brian Martin, *Backfire Manual: Tactics against Injustices* (Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2012).

47 Thomas Weber, "The Marchers Walked forward until Struck Down: Nonviolent Suffering and Conversions," *Peace and Change* 18, 02 (1993): 267-289.

activists of Salt March were beaten brutally by police, they bore violence in peaceful manner, they tolerated torture, and they did not respond with violence. But nonviolent response did not significantly affect the psychological as well as physical balance of beating forces. Apart from this, on the absence of resistance by defenders, some police became more energetic to beat nonviolent activists without fear.⁴⁸

Moreover, non-violence does not realistically influence the soul and heart of dictators in this modern era. Glyn Richards⁴⁹ and Bhikhu Parekh⁵⁰ highly criticized principled non-violence from realistic perspectives. They suggested Gandhi's approach is far from realism to gain practical aims and objectives of any movement or struggle. They proposed that Gandhi's approach towards self-suffering is also far from reality. Thus, it is questionable to conclude that Gandhi's idealistic principled non-violence can resolve political and social problems practically.

Weber explains that there is no connection between non-violence response of defender and psychology as well as physical balance of attacker as suggested by Gregg.⁵¹ Similar assessment is also proposed by Martin and Sharp that non-violence does not necessarily affect the psychology of beating force. However, they suggest that there is connection between nonviolence of activists and observer or onlooker (public).⁵² Furthermore, Martin adds that when nonviolent activist or movement leader come under assault during a movement or struggle and he does not answer with violence it creates supportive atmosphere for bearer of violence. However, he rejects any connection among heart,

48 Robert J. Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996).

49 Richards, *The Philosophy of Gandhi*.

50 Parekh, *Gandhi*, 13.

51 Weber, "The Marchers Walked forward until Struck Down".

52 Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publication, 1973).

soul, and psychology of attacker and nonviolent response of activist.⁵³

Pragmatic Nonviolence

Gene Sharp is considered the world's most prominent nonviolence scholar who enunciated the pragmatic tradition of nonviolence. He discovered hundreds of methods of nonviolent action. He made scholarly contributions to enrich the field of nonviolence.⁵⁴ Sharp believes that nonviolence is effective than any other option specifically highly effective as compared to violence.⁵⁵ Furthermore, he suggests that when unarmed protesters are attacked and they maintained the discipline of nonviolence it puts attacker in bad light what he calls political *jiu-jitsu* or pragmatic non-violence.⁵⁶ In other words, nonviolent action is effective to get the desired objectives of the movement without destruction. Like principled nonviolent activists, the followers of pragmatic nonviolence are also committed to nonviolence, and they work to gain the objectives of their movement without harming adversaries.

Gene Sharp, a pragmatic nonviolence political thinker has discovered 198 methods of non-violence such as boycotts, strikes, public demonstrations, slogans, banners, posters, leaflets, books, pamphlets, displayed communications, protests, protesting songs, marches, processions, religious processions, parades, political mourning, civil disobedience, student strike, total person non-co-operation, protest emigration *hijrat* (migration), nonviolent interjection, nonviolent hindrance, nonviolent obstruction as well as sit-ins and other such methods which are used to get public support for movement without harming opponents.⁵⁷

53 Martin, *Nonviolence Unbound*.

54 Martin, *Backfire Manual*, 27.

55 Martin, *How Nonviolence Works*, 296.

56 Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 62.

57 Sharp, *Politics of Nonviolent Action*.

Political Jiu-Jitsu

Gene Sharp derived an idea from the principled tradition of nonviolence theory. He was highly inspired from the life style as well as way of thinking of Gandhi, whose principled tradition of non-violence denies the use of violence even in difficult circumstances.⁵⁸ Despite inspirations from Gandhi's life style and the way of thinking, Sharp developed a pragmatic approach to non-violence which differed from Gandhi's approach to non-violence.⁵⁹ Sharp also reviewed Gregg's conceptual approach to nonviolence (moral *jiu-jitsu*) and introduced pragmatic approach to nonviolence (political *jiu-jitsu*).

Furthermore, Sharp in his approach to nonviolence rejects a connection between the psychology of striking force and nonviolence. He draws a considerable scholarly attention towards the effectiveness of the discipline of nonviolence.⁶⁰ In other words, Sharp's concept of political *jiu-jitsu* is mainly focused on the effectiveness of nonviolence which influences the third parties.⁶¹ According to Gregg's philosophy, moral *jiu-jitsu* effect influences the psychology of striking forces whereas political *jiu-jitsu* effect often generates pressure against opponent forces through the third parties.⁶² Gregg's approach to non-violence is idealistic in nature while Sharp's approach to nonviolence political *jiu-jitsu* is realistic in nature. Thus, there is overlap between both the models to nonviolence.⁶³

58 Gene Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960), 115.

59 Martin, *Nonviolence Unbound*, 17.

60 Brian Martin and Iain Murray, "The Parkin Backfire", *Social Alternatives*, Vol. 24, No. 03 (Third Quarterly 2005): 46-49

61 Brian Martin, "Paths to Social Change: Conventional Politics, Violence and Non-violence", <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/peace.html> (Accessed 02/05/2017, 07:55)

62 Gene Sharp, *Social Power and Political Freedom* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1980).

63 Brian Martin and Iain Murray, "The Parkin Backfire", *Social Alternatives* 24, No. 03 (Third Quarterly 2005): 46-49

Political *jiu-jitsu* is a major element in the mechanism of nonviolent action which points out how nonviolent action operates. Moreover, political *jiu-jitsu* is a particular phenomenon which is the signifier of nonviolent attitude of protesters during violent repression.⁶⁴ It is associated with nonviolent discipline, solidarity and commitment of activist to non-violence. Apart from this, in political *jiu-jitsu* process, nonviolent activists cause the violence of opponent's repression to be exposed in the worst way.⁶⁵ This, in turn, may lead to changes in views and then to change in power relationships advantageous for nonviolent activists.⁶⁶ These changes increase support for nonviolent activists and the withdrawal of support from the users of violence. Sharp's scholarly contributions are helpful to reduce dilemmas in the field of non-violence and provide a ground to understand the theory and practice of nonviolent action.⁶⁷

Political *jiu-jitsu* process shows the effectiveness of nonviolent action as Sharp claims that nonviolent action is more effective than violence.⁶⁸ Movements involve violent or nonviolent techniques are conceived as attempts to gain public support. Moreover, violence usually tries to get support while destroying, harming, beating and controlling opponents.⁶⁹ Consequently adversaries accept the imposed will of opponents in most of the cases. Unlike violence, in the process of non-violence, nonviolent activists attempt to get support through commitment to non-violence. In other words, the strength of nonviolence is associated with its discipline that supports the victory over the users of violence.⁷⁰

64 Sharp, *Social Power and Political Freedom*.

65 Martin, *Backfire Manual*, 31.

66 Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*.

67 Martin, "Paths to Social Change".

68 Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*.

69 Martin and Murray, "The Parkin Backfire".

70 Sharp, *Social Power and Political Freedom*.

Gandhi claims that *Satyagraha* never fails to gain fruitful outcomes⁷¹ whereas Sharp believes that nonviolent action is more effective than violence.⁷² It does always not remain in victorious position to defeat a brutal opponent, is a realistic approach which overlaps Gandhi's idealist approach.⁷³ Rather, Sharp argues that nonviolent action will be highly effective against an authoritative, brutal adversary like Stalin and Hitler. Violence can be and was, used against these attackers.⁷⁴ Sharp suggests that non-violence against these autocrats could be highly effective as compared to violence.⁷⁵ Moreover, non-violence could put above mentioned authoritative and brutal rulers in the worst situation. Martin adds that the phenomenon of political *jiu-jitsu* influences the third party or grievance group that influence what Sharp calls political *jiu-jitsu* and Martin calls that effect on the third parties as backfire.⁷⁶

The Concept of Backfire and its Dynamics

The synthesis of different theories on the subject explains what happens when a nonviolent activist comes under the violent assault. In case, he maintains the discipline of nonviolence and does not respond with violence, resulting in greater support of the third party for peaceful protester. This effect or public support as well as reaction was called political *jiu-jitsu* by Sharp which also puts attacker in awkward situation. Sharp's contributions have broadened the theory of nonviolence.⁷⁷ Despite rich scholarly contributions, a few flaws are also recognized in Sharp's pragmatic tradition of nonviolence. Brian Martin, a pragmatic

71 Rao, *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi*.

72 Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 65.

73 Sharp, *Gandhi as a Political Strategist*, 117.

74 Martin, *How Nonviolence Works*, 297.

75 Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 67.

76 Brian Martin, "From Political Jiu-Jitsu to the Backfire Dynamic: How Repression can Promote Mobilization," in *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle*, ed., Kurt Schock (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 145-167.

77 Martin, "Paths to Social Change".

nonviolence theorist, describes a few cases where political *jiu-jitsu* remained valueless to influence the third parties in support of peaceful protesters. It also fails to increase public reaction against attackers.⁷⁸ Indonesian invasion on the East Timor caused little impact internationally. This case greatly inspired Martin to broaden the pragmatic tradition of nonviolence research. In its result, he constructed the concept of backfire as an expansion of political *jiu-jitsu* and its tactics of decreasing or increasing of public reaction on perceived injustice.⁷⁹

The Nonviolent Strategies of Anti-One Unit Movement

The mainstream political leadership who opposed One Unit Scheme launched an unarmed movement against it under the umbrella of Anti-One Unit Front.⁸⁰ The regional political parties of Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan joined hands in the drive against Anti-One Unit.⁸¹ Hyder Bukhsh Jatoi, the president of *Hari* Committee, G.M. Sayed, Rasul Bukhsh Palejo, Sobho Giyanchandani and other nationalist leaders of Sindh remained active.⁸² Furthermore, Jatoi, Sayed and Palejo determined to use the techniques of nonviolent actions such as protests, strikes, demonstrations, resolutions, press releases, pamphlets and conventions against One Unit. The Sindhi comrades were put behind the bars for a long time.⁸³ However, nonviolent activists continued resisting peacefully till the cancellation of the scheme.

On August 22, 1955 the Sindh *Hari Committee* called All Sindh Convention at Nawabshah (Benazirabad) to demonstrate and draw an attention towards the issue. On

78 Martin, *Backfire Manual*, 29.

79 Martin, "From Political Jiu-Jitsu to the Backfire Dynamic.

80 Rizwan, *The Politics of One Unit 1955-1958*, 55.

81 Chandio, *Politics of Sindh Zia Government*, 37.

82 Ashique Hussain Solangi, *Sindh Hari Committee: Tarekhaen Jedhojehd* [Sindhi: Sindh Famer Committee: History and Struggle] (Larkana: Lab-i-Dariya Historical Society, 2007), 30-31.

83 Sono Khan Chandio, *Interview*, May 19, 2016, Dadu.

August 27, 1955, another meeting called at Karachi where all anti one unit leaders participated.⁸⁴ The Anti-One Unit West Pakistan Convention and Sindh Provincial Anti-One Unit Committee were formed and a Consultative Committee was constituted to draw further line of action.⁸⁵ In this convention, Abdul Wali Khan, Abdul Samad Achakzai, Arbab Sikandar Khan, Shamim Jan and other Anti-One Unit political leaders of NWFP and Balochistan participated to call for the annulment of One Unit.⁸⁶ The activists struggled to restore the past status of their respective provinces. However, government was adamant on dividing the country into two wings.⁸⁷

Anti-One Unit West Pakistan Convention called a conference under the presidentship of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (a nonviolent activist and the founder of nonviolent movement called *Khudai Khidmatgar*) October 8, 1955 at *Hyder Manzil* Karachi where different resolutions were passed to press the government to restore old status of the provinces.⁸⁸ A joint meeting of Sindh Anti-One Unit Front was held on October 30 1955⁸⁹ where they agreed unanimously. It was also decided that nonviolent protests, demonstrations, rallies, marches, and processions would be held across the country to protest the policy. Later on, the Anti-One Unit Front was merged into the Azad Pakistan Party named the National Party on November 30, 1956.⁹⁰ The Awami League Sindh branch supported the Awami National Party in its nonviolent struggle for the annulment of One Unit.⁹¹ However, the Azad

84 Mari, *Qaumi Tehreek Jo Mukhtasar Taaruf*.

85 *Weekly Hari Haqdar* (Weekly Farmer Righter), 24th October 1956.

86 Solangi, *Sindh Hari Committee*, 115.

87 Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, 185.

88 Madhulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unnamed* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, 2000), 101.

89 Solangi, *Sindh Hari Committee*, 116.

90 V.F. Ageef, *Sindh Tareekh Ke Aaine Mein* [Urdu: Sindh in the Mirror of History] (Karachi: Danyal Press, 1989), 35.

91 Solangi, *Sindh Hari Committee*, 59.

Pakistan Party could not survive longer and it also failed to resolve the issue.

The indirect elections at provincial level were held in the West Pakistan. The electorate of the West Wing comprised of the members of former provincial assemblies of Sindh, NWFP and Punjab. It also included Khairpur and Bahawalpur states according to the West Pakistan Act 1955.⁹² The union of Muslim League political parties got majority and Iskandar Mirza retained Dr. Khan Sahib as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan.⁹³ The claim made by the then opposition that Khan was just supported by 57 members out of 310. However, the opposition did not bring no-confidence move against him.⁹⁴

After the indirect elections, a resolution against One Unit was presented by Ghulam Mustafa Bhurgari, a member of the National Party on September 17, 1957 which was supported by the National Awami Party and the Republican Party simultaneously.⁹⁵ Moreover, the Muslim League neither opposed nor backed the resolution against One Unit.⁹⁶ The President Iskandar Mirza and the Prime Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy issued a joint statement clarifying that they had no intention of dissolving the One Unit scheme.⁹⁷ Despite immense opposition to One Unit, the supporters were determined to continue with the scheme disregarding the demand for its abrogation.⁹⁸

92 Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, 180-185.

93 Bhatti, *Sindhian Te Zulum Keesaitan*, 23.

94 Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, 187.

95 Chandio, *Politics of Sindh Zia Government*, 40-42.

96 *Pakistan Times*, September 18, 1957.

97 Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London: Hurst & Company, 1988), 117.

98 Weekly *Hari Haqdar* [English: Weekly Farmer Righter], October 24, 1956.

The Application of Backfire as an Expansion of Political Jiu-Jitsu on the Anti-One Unit Movement

In the light of Sharp's suggested 198 tactics, standards, parameters and conditions of non-violence, Anti-One Unit Movement was a peaceful struggle in terms of tactics and strategies of non-violence theory.⁹⁹ The authoritarian regimes usually use several methods to reduce public outrage over their harsh treatment of movements whereas protest leaders use methods to counter dictator's tactics.¹⁰⁰ In this case, it would be explained how did the government worked to defuse the public outrage and controlled the Anti-One Unit movement in Pakistan? The focus is to find out a connection between the theory and practice of non-violence in case of the Anti-One Unit struggle.

Politicians and regional leaders were protesting on the One Unit when Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan on October 7, 1958 which changed the political scenario of the country. Political activity and parties were banned.¹⁰¹ Freedom of speech and press was restricted. Assemblies were dissolved, and newspapers were censored.¹⁰² The dictators usually try to legitimize their unconstitutional policies while declaring nonviolent activists as anarchists and terrorists. Similarly, the nonviolent activists of Anti-One Unit Movement such as Jatoi, Sayed, Giyanchandani and others were accused of spreading anarchy in the country.¹⁰³ Later on, the mainstream leaders of movement were arrested, and charge sheets were filed against them to suppress opposition. Jatoi was charged for writing pamphlets against One Unit.¹⁰⁴ In this case, Ayub regime used several tactics to dampen public reaction against One Unit Scheme. It also tried to discourage public participation in the Anti-One Unit

99 Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*.

100 Martin, *Backfire Manual*, 10.

101 Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 117.

102 Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, 178.

103 Bhatti, *Sindhian Te Zulum Keesaitan*.

104 Solangi, *Sindh Hari* Committee, 119.

Movement. Violence was used against the supporters of the movement. However, the government covered-up the violent events and devalued movement leaders while declaring them anti-state actors. Ayub intimidated activists to call off the protests, as suggested by Martin. Despite strict measures, Sindhi literary class raised their voice against One Unit by composing poetries, stories and writings against the regime.¹⁰⁵

In this mechanism of increasing and reducing of public outrage, governments use the tactics to defuse public outrage whereas movement activists use the tactics to increase public outrage including exposing repressive events, validating themselves and facing intimidations with bravery.¹⁰⁶ In this case, unarmed activists failed to expose the brutal events of government at national and international level and they did not validate themselves. Resultantly, their voice was suppressed for the time being and the Sindhi newspapers were not given sponsorships.¹⁰⁷ The military regime successfully curbed mass mobilization against One Unit in its inception. However, the military government could not silence the voice of people forever.

Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan explains that Sindhi nationalism owes its genesis to One Unit Scheme and the creation of West Pakistan.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, an agreement was also signed before the implementation of One Unit, according to which local population would be preferred for jobs particularly lower services would be reserved for them.¹⁰⁹ Later on, the local population was ignored and population from other provinces was settled in

105 Khaki Joyo, *Sindh Men Urdu Abadi Jo Mustaqbal* [Sindhi: Future of Outsider Population in Sindh] (Hyderabad: Sanjah Publication, 2001).

106 Martin, "Paths to Social Change".

107 Tariq Rehman, *Language, Education and Culture* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 98.

108 Benazir Bhutto, "National Problem in Sindh and its impacts on Federation," *Sindh Quarterly* XV, 2 (Spring 2001): 77-88.

109 Chandio, *Politics of Sindh Zia Government*, 43.

Sindh.¹¹⁰ Apart from jobs, the local people of Sindh province were ignored at the time of distribution of land of Guddu Barrage.¹¹¹ Farmers of Sindh were also neglected, in government's tractor schemes and other *Hari* (farmer) benefits.¹¹² An agreement was not implemented. The neglecting and uncaring attitude of the federal government led to the birth of provincialism and Sindhi nationalism in the province.¹¹³

Due to the strict measures of Martial Law regime and the lack of united leadership, the Sindh Anti-One Unit Front remained inactive for a few years. It was reactivated after signing the Tashkent Accord when a mass mobilization re-emerged against Ayub regime.¹¹⁴ In 1969, the Sindh Anti-One Unit Front was reactivated, and the Anti One Unit Conference was called under the president-ship of Sheikh Abdul Mujeeb Sindhi. The conference was attended by political leaders of Sindh who strongly demanded the annulment of One Unit.¹¹⁵ The nonviolent struggle of farmers, workers, students, authors, political leaders and the Anti-One Unit organizations of all provinces except Punjab developed huge pressure on Ayub government for the cancellation of One Unit.¹¹⁶ However, peaceful struggle could not gain success during the Ayub regime.¹¹⁷ Later on, General Yahya Khan abolished the One Unit on November 28, 1969 before holding the general elections in the country.¹¹⁸

110 Khuhro, *Mohammad Ayub Khuhro*, 435.

111 Feroz Ahmed, *Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 87.

112 Chandio, *Politics of Sindh under Zia Government*, 69.

113 Ahmed, *Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan*, 88.

114 Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, 179.

115 Solangi, *Sindh Hari Committee*, 120.

116 Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*.

117 Khuhro, *Mohammad Ayub Khuhro*, 437.

118 Muhammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1994), 243.

Conclusion

In post-partition era, the civilian political leadership imposed unilateral and illegitimate policies that disregarded the provincial autonomy as enshrined in the Pakistan Resolution. The geographical underestimation of the federating units of the country pushed the federal government into crisis of regionalism. In this regard, genesis of unarmed struggles against perceived injustices in Pakistan are outlined to 1947 when the Government of Pakistan announced to merge Karachi into the federal territory without taking the political parties of the provincial assembly into confidence. Resultantly, the political leadership of the province protested the decision and had launched 'Save Karachi Movement' to protect the regional integrity of the province. The activists of the movement demanded immediate annulment of the central government's decision. However, the movement failed to sustain momentum for a long time but had laid the foundation of a modern history of unarmed struggles in Pakistan.

The government introduced One Unit Scheme which aimed at merging four provinces of the country into the West Pakistan and Bengal province into the East Pakistan in 1955. The people of smaller provinces did not accept the scheme and demonstrated against the government. The political leadership in Sindh such as G.M. Sayed, Hyder Bakhsh Jatoi, and Abdul Sattar Pirzada made a meaningful contribution to gain the aims and objectives of the Anti-One Unit Movement. The nonviolence theory helps to understand the campaign by Anti-One Unit Movement, highlighting the tactics used by the movement and the tactics used by the government to repress it.