

# ***A Critical Inquiry into the Foreign Policy of Pakistan (1947-51)***

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## **ABSTRACT**

*This paper critically inquires into the foreign policy of Pakistan during the period (1947-51). British divided India into two sovereign states in August, 1947. Mainly, Indian National Congress spearheaded the independence movement in the Indian subcontinent on the basis of Indian [Hindu] nationalism. The Indian Muslims contested the Congress claim of One Nation Theory. The Muslims presented their own brand of counter Muslim nationalism called the Two Nations Theory. The basic assumption of Two Nations Theory was that India politically, unlike European nation states, was a heterogeneous society. There were two major nations in the subcontinent—Hindus and Muslims. Resultantly, both Hindus and Muslims had a birthright to self-determination and separate states. For about fifty years, the Congress seriously contested, both theoretically as well as politically, the genuineness of the validity of Two Nations Theory. The Congress never accepted the theory. It called the Muslim demand of a separate state “a vivisection” of India and would never agree to it. Fortunately, the British did*

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*not accept the Congress argument. The Congress did her best to prevent the creation of Pakistan, however, thanks to British fairness, the Indian subcontinent was divided. Then out of utter frustration and revenge, the Congress resorted to 'Policy of Strangulation' to undo Pakistan. The researcher has come up with a non-traditional concept that Pakistan in the early phase suffered from an economic existential threat rather than military. Understandably, the foreign policy-makers of Pakistan overplayed the presumed military threat to its existence. However, for the better and realist foreign policy, Pakistan survived the immediate existential economic threat in the early phase. Pakistan confronted the deadly economic context during her infant years.*

### **Introduction**

The main theme presented in this research paper is that though the Indian National Congress generally did not recognize the modern Muslim theory of nationalism and self-determination known as the Two Nations Theory, still India was partitioned, on this premise, into two sovereign and independent states—India and Pakistan—by the British in August, 1947. For many deep-rooted reasons—historical, religious, political, psychological—Indian National Congress summarily rejected the concept of Two Nations Theory and, consequently, India was divided into two states on the basis of political expediency. For the British rulers, in the post-World War II era, no other viable and political alternative was left. Understandably, the Indian National Congress, being politically stronger than the All India Muslim League in the contemporary Indian political matrix, tried her best to make Pakistan a very weak state in her early years. Indian leadership, through their policies, created an existential threat to the newly independent state of Pakistan. After the Congress leadership failed to prevent the partition of the subcontinent, now, it resolved to undo Pakistan by keeping it as weak as possible, through various political, social, economic and military strategies.

Despite existential domestic problems, and Indian obscurantists designs, Pakistan survived as a sovereign state. It was largely a function of successful Pakistan's foreign policy during the formative years (1947-51). It was also a function of Western, particularly, the US economic and political assistance to Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> Pakistan's survival, despite the existential danger of being collapsed, was partially a function of the US assistance.<sup>2</sup> It is interesting to note that American President Richard Nixon, in his report to the US Congress, gives figure of four billion dollars of assistance over a long period of time.<sup>3</sup> The United Kingdom (UK) did not give any economic assistance to Pakistan at this critical juncture of history because the former's economy had become weak due to involvement in the Second World War.

The foreign policy of a state is defined as an aggregate of the 'official external' relationship conducted by a state in the international political system.<sup>4</sup> Foreign policy of a state is a function of 'multitude of factors' ranging from material to emotional interests. Pakistan's foreign policy during its early years mainly was determined by its precarious economic base, a "weak industrial and technological settings."<sup>5</sup>

### Theoretical Framework

The theory which best explains this research paper is realism, particularly, its neoclassical variant propounded by Hans J. Morgenthau in 1948. The theory states politics, whether domestics or international, is "governed by objective laws rooted in human nature" whereas the human nature

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- 1 Stephen P. Cohen, "US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", *Pacific Affairs*, (Spring 1976): 49-69.
  - 2 Richard Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs* (New York: Harper & Row for The Council of Foreign Relations, 1966), 211.
  - 3 Richard Nixon's, *Third Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress*, February 9, 1972, 12.
  - 4 Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), 3-4
  - 5 Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Geostategic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993), vii.

has remained “fixed”. It has not changed “over time” since the creation of man on this earth. The foreign policy of a state can be properly explained and understood through the concept of “national interest defined in terms of power.” All states, whether big or small, “pursue power” because this pursuit of power is wedded in “human nature.” The international political system is based on “anarchy.” War is a legal instrument of statecraft in this anarchic world. The topmost interest of a state is its “security” which can be ensured only through “self-help.” Universal “moral values” have no role to play with the foreign policy of a state whatsoever. International politics is the “struggle for power” among states.<sup>6</sup>

Foreign policies of all states, big or small, can be explained by this theoretical model of realism. Pakistan, during the early phase, by utmost struggle ensured her existence through many economic and political policies. By the same token, in accord with India’s national interest, India did her utmost to strangle Pakistan by pursuing deadly steps; from the East Punjab massacres to cutting-off water supplies to Pakistan in 1948 etc. etc. Similarly, the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) exactly followed the dictates of power politics during the Cold War era according to the assumptions of neoclassical realist theory. Same goes true for the foreign policies of the Muslim states. They were not positively attracted by Pakistan’s enthusiastic ideological overtones. They responded exactly according to their own respective national interests rather than to Islamic cause of Pakistan. In sum, it can be safely said, there had been a close-fit between the foreign policies of all these states, most specifically Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and the Muslim countries, and the theoretical model of this research paper.

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6 Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1997), 4-17.

### Indian Subcontinent? The Diverging Context of Islam and Hinduism

What were the basis of this divergence between the foreign policies of these two states? It was during the Second Indian Round Table Conference in London in 1931, M. K. Gandhi said that the "Hindu-Muslim quarrel is not old," it owed its origin with the British arrival in the subcontinent. You will see that all the communities of the subcontinent "will all live together as one man."<sup>7</sup> Commenting on Gandhi's opinion, Coupland wrote that there was only "half a truth in them." The open quarrel which was seen today in India was not "possible under Mughal" period. For multiple reasons, the situation has been different under British rule.<sup>8</sup> However, several centuries before the British advent in India, a Muslim scholar coming to India from foreign land made a very piercing and thought-provoking assessment on this subject. While commenting on Indian social environment, Al-Beruni wrote that Hindus were totally different from Muslims. They differ in "every respect". They differ in religion. Muslims do not "believe in which they believe." Hindus see foreigners as "mleccha" means impure. They do not intermarry with them. So much so, they "neither eat nor drink" with them. It is because they think that by doing this they "would be polluted."<sup>9</sup>

R. C. Majumdar further affirms that Al-Beruni was totally right in his observation of the Indian scene in the 11th Century. His observation holds "almost equally true" at the beginning of the 19th Century.<sup>10</sup> The British conquered India because of our own faults and weaknesses. It is the inevitable result

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7 Nicholas Mansergh, ed., *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952*, Vol. 1, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 230.

8 R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Part 1, *The Indian Problem, 1833-1935* (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 35.

9 Edward C. Sachau, translation *Alberuni's India* (Lahore: Government of West Pakistan, 1, 1962), 19, 22, 240-241.

10 R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Vol. 1 (Calcutta: Firm a K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962), 37, 52.

of our “failures, stupidity, factions, and disruption in our country.”<sup>11</sup> We, the Indians, could not put a blame on them for this fault of ours. It must not be a source of “surprise” for it. Just ignore it.<sup>12</sup>

There were cultural and linguistic differences between Hindus and Muslims of India. Hindi was the language of Hindus while Urdu was considered as the language of the Muslims of India. In 1867, the Hindus of Benaras started Hindi-Urdu controversy and demanded from the British that Urdu should be replaced by Hindi as the official language because they considered Urdu as the language of Muslims. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was so much influenced by the attitude of Hindus during the controversy that he presented his famous Two-Nation Theory in 1868 and declared that the two nations of Hindus and Muslims were totally different from each other.

Islam and Hinduism are “antitheses” of each other, to borrow S.M. Burke’s concept.<sup>13</sup> Islam remains “the youngest of the great religions of the world.”<sup>14</sup> Islam stands on its’ two basic pillars of belief; the belief in One Allah Almighty and the Prophethood of Muhammad (S.A.W.), the last prophet of Allah. In the words of Muhammad Iqbal, the Islamic faith is based on two basic propositions “that God (Allah) is one, and Muhammad (S.A.W.) is the last prophet.”<sup>15</sup> Muslims do not believe in the two barriers of “race and geography”. On the other hand, Hinduism “is not a religion at all” in the strict sense of a religion. It is rather impossible to define

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11 Nehru, *Indian Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. V, August 4,5, 1950, 375.

12 Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London: Bodley Head, 1958),136.

13 S. M Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975), 10.

14 Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*, 10.

15 Shamloo, ed., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1948),117. (Shamloo is the pseudonym of Latif Ahmad Sherwani).

Hinduism “whether it is a religion or not, in the usual sense of the word.”<sup>16</sup>

Nehru further writes, it was “no definition at all.”<sup>17</sup> It is pertinent to note that Hinduism has said to “adopt polytheism, monotheism, and pantheism as well as the belief in demons, heroes, and ancestors...”<sup>18</sup> Hinduism consists of almost 330 million gods.<sup>19</sup> The followers of Hinduism do not gather around a central theme which could unite them into a one dimensional single whole. Hindu society consisted of four major castes and approximately more than three thousand sub-castes. There is no room for converts in the Hindu faith. A convert to Hinduism remains an “outcaste and untouchable” whereas Islam represented universal brotherhood. For a convert, it is sufficient to believe in the unity of Allah and the finality of Prophethood of Muhammad (S.A.W.). A convert to Islam is entitled to equal rights whatsoever without any discrimination. In the words of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Hinduism represented a system of “social discrimination and arrogant inequality” human history has ever evolved.<sup>20</sup>

In 1930 Allama Muhammad Iqbal said, Islam has been bestowed on Muslims of India “as a free gift.”<sup>21</sup> Iqbal argued further, Islam does not recognize differences of “race and nationality.” The real basis for unity in Islam is religion. The nationhood for Muslims would not be determined by “birth, marriage, domicile, or naturalization.”<sup>22</sup> For Iqbal, Islam was a “community, a nation.”<sup>23</sup> For him, nationalism was a “subtle

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16 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Discovery of India* (London: Meridian, 1960), 63.

17 Nehru, *Discovery of India*, 63-64.

18 S. Radhakrishnan, “Hinduism” in *The Legacy of India*, ed., G. T. Garrat (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 68.

19 Radhakrishnan, *The Legacy of India*, 276.

20 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), 268.

21 Shamloo, ed., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, 31.

22 Syed Abdul Wahid, ed., *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), 59-60.

23 Wahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, 50.

form of idolatry” and it was against the “eternal mission” of Islam.<sup>24</sup> Iqbal argued that there were two communities in the world: one of believers (Muslims) and other of all non-believers (Non-Muslims) taken collectively.<sup>25</sup> A famous historian of 20th Century, Arnold Toynbee, argued that the differences between Muslims and Christians were “insignificant” despite a “long history” of conflict between these two peoples. They basically came from the “same cultural division of mankind.”<sup>26</sup>

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan argued that the Hindus and the Muslims differed in all fields of life. The difference remains even after death. The dead body of a Muslim is buried while that of a Hindu is burned. The concept of life hereafter is also different.<sup>27</sup> Those who converted to Islamic faith were totally transformed.<sup>28</sup> A well-known Hindu scholar has also argued that both the religions, “Buddhism and Jainism” did not make the “inassimilable elements” but Islam was not like those two, it “split Indian society” into two in toto. Resultantly, in the contemporary political phraseology, the two distinct and separate nations came into existence from the very beginning of this process.<sup>29</sup>

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, a well-known untouchable leader of India argued that there had been no commonalities between Hindus and Muslims, and the Muslims of the subcontinent constituted a separate nation. Right from the beginning of the 20th Century, many attempts were made for evolving a

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24 Javed Iqbal, ed., *Stray Reflections: A Notebook of Allama Iqbal* (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1961), 26.

25 Shamloo, ed., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, 234.

26 Arnold Toynbee, *The World and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), 45.

27 M. Rafique Afzal, ed., *Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan, 1941-51* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1966), 216.

28 Mumtaz Hasan, “The Background of the Partition of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent,” in *The Partition of India*, ed., C. H. Philips and M. D. Wain Wright (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), 325.

29 K. M. Panikkar, *A Survey of Indian History* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1960), 130-131.



common nationality between Hindus and Muslims but all ended in failure. Even men of the stature of Aga Khan and Gandhi could never dare to advocate such a real fusion of two communities.<sup>30</sup>

On Gandhi's role during the Khilafat Movement, a Hindu writer of India made significant comments. The author argued that Gandhi's role was one of "self-deception" during these years.<sup>31</sup> The post-Khilafat period witnessed serious communal riots in India on an "unpredicted scale" followed by the birth of extremist communal movements such as "Shuddhi", Sangathan", Tabligh" and "Tanzim". In the year 1935, Gandhi was sad to accept his defeat on the communal issue in India, "I have owned defeat on that score."<sup>32</sup>

The great Muslim leaders of Muslim political movement in India such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Allama Iqbal, Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Muhammad Ali Jinnah etc. entered into Indian political horizon as staunch Indian "nationalists", but subsequently all of them became disillusioned and ultimately ended up as great Muslim nationalists. Panikkar indicated that the caste system degenerated into uncountable castes and subcastes. It became a barrier in the way of evolution of a common Hindu community even.<sup>33</sup>

The case of Europe has been different from India's. Europe inherited two common strands from the past—the language of Latin and religion of Christianity. There had been no deep-rooted "social inequality" as did the caste system in India whereas in India, Islam and Hinduism are two antithetical religions. Majumdar argued that the muchfloated argument

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30 Aga Khan [Sultan Muhammad Shah], *India in Transition* (Bombay: Bennett Coleman, 1918), 251.

31 Sasadhar Sinha, *Indian Independence in Perspective* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 65.

32 H. S. L. Polak, H. N. Brailsford and Lord Pethic Lawrence, *Mahatma Gandhi*, (London: Odhams Press, 1949), 219.

33 K. M. Panikkar, *Hinduism and The West* (Chandigarh: Punjab University Publication Bureau, 1964), 13-14.

of the “ancient political unity” made during the nationalist struggle of 20th Century was but “facile”.<sup>34</sup>

## **Domestic Context of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy**

### **(i) The Economic Conditions**

In the late 1945, two distinguished Indians, an important businessman and a leading economist, Sir Homi Modi and Dr. John Matthai, published the results of an important study they had conducted titled *Memorandum on the Economic and Financial Aspects of Pakistan*. The conclusion of the study was that the prerequisite of any partition of the Indian subcontinent must be preceded by the provision of “effective means” of communication and “cooperation” between the two successor states, if need be. The cooperation would be necessary for the “safety and economic stability” of the separating states. The Congress believed that Pakistan’s collapse could be hastened through “antagonistic policy.”<sup>35</sup> The major British achievement in the development policy had been the establishment of three great ports named “Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras.”<sup>36</sup> All these three major ports were located in Indian Dominion. The raw materials, most specifically the agriculture based, of these areas were transported to the industrial centers located in other regions of the British India. It was probably for this reason that Sardar Patel entertained the idea of eventual economic collapse of Pakistan during its formative phase (1947-51).<sup>37</sup>

The British India had monopoly over raw jute during the colonial period in the world. The territory which became part of East Pakistan approximately produced 75 percent of raw jute. Unfortunately, there had been no jute mill in East Pakistan. The entire jute produced in East Pakistan was

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<sup>34</sup> A. K. Majumdar, *The Advent of Independence* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963), 38.

<sup>35</sup> Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 332-333.

<sup>36</sup> Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 332-333.

<sup>37</sup> Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase*, Vol II (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 83).

almost transported to Calcutta to produce finished products. Similar was the case in West Pakistan. Cotton enjoyed the comparable position in the West Pakistan as did the jute in the East Wing. It produced 40 percent of the entire raw cotton of the British India. The cotton based textile industry was the biggest one in the British India. On the eve of partition, there were 394 cotton mills in India, but unfortunately, only 14 out of them were situated in Pakistan. This raw cotton was transported to the industrial units in Ahmedabad and Bombay where cloth was produced. Approximately 87 percent of the population of Pakistan lived in villages. The deadly problem Pakistan confronted during these years was the rehabilitation of refugees.<sup>38</sup>

Pakistan had no mercantile fleet as well. There was a big deficiency of coal in Pakistan. West Pakistan produced some inferior quality coal and small quantity of oil in its initial years. Resultantly, a severe economic problem took over Pakistan in 1949. It was in September 1949, Britain “decided to devalue” her currency approximately by 30 percent. India and Pakistan belonged to the same currency area of sterling. India followed British suit but Pakistan did not. Pakistan refused to devalue her currency. India stopped buying jute from Pakistan and this Indian act led to a big fall in the jute prices, a big source of foreign exchange for Pakistan. It ruined millions of jute cultivators of East Pakistan.<sup>39</sup> It is noteworthy that during this period Pakistan did not receive any foreign aid from the West. Pakistan had to survive on its own under the harsh iron law of realism what is known as self-help. It was a period (1947-51) of deadly economic hardships for Pakistan.<sup>40</sup>

## **(ii) The Administrative and Political Conditions**

The most serious administrative problem Pakistan faced during her infancy was the acute “shortage of competent and

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38 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 335-337.

39 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 354.

40 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 355.

experienced officers.”<sup>41</sup> The conditions in East Pakistan were even worse. Surprisingly enough, East Bengal, on the eve of partition, had only one officer in the Indian Civil Service. The differences over national language became one of the big obstacles in the way of national integration of Pakistan.<sup>42</sup> After independence, Quaid-i-Azam made an important public speech at Dacca on March 21, 1948, wherein he advised Pakistanis about the problems of national integration. He warned the people of Pakistan in the following words:

Our enemies have failed to prevent the establishment of Pakistan. Now, they want to disrupt the nascent state of Pakistan. So, they are sowing the seeds of provincialism, most specifically, in East Pakistan. Now you are an independent nation and have your own separate territory. The state of Pakistan does not belong to a “Punjabi, or a Sindhi, or a Pathan, or a Bengali; it is yours....Therefore, if you want to build up yourself into a nation, for God’s sake give up this provincialism.”<sup>43</sup>

The background to this bad situation of provincialism came from language controversy in Pakistan during the formative phase. Urdu had been universally accepted as the national language during the Pakistan Movement. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, just made a declaration to this effect. Urdu remained the *lingua franca* of the Muslims of India. While addressing the students of Dacca University, Quaid-i-Azam said, “There can, however, be only one *lingua franca*, that is, the language for inter-communication between the various provinces of the state, and that language should be Urdu and cannot be any other...a language which ... embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition....”<sup>44</sup>

For the time being, the issue was subsided but it remained alive. In later years, it took a formidable turn. While Jinnah, in his ‘farewell message’ to the people of East Pakistan

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41 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 356.

42 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 364.

43 Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, *Speeches as Governor General*(Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1963), 58.

44 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 90.

on March 28, 1948, said, "cohesion and solidarity amongst all its citizens...is essential for its progress, nay for its survival...if we begin to think of ourselves as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, etc., first and Muslims and Pakistanis only incidentally, then Pakistan is bound to disintegrate...."<sup>45</sup> Another deadly political disease gnawing at the nascent state of Pakistan was factionalism in the ruling political party—Pakistan Muslim League.<sup>46</sup>

Due to negative attitude of India, the office of the Supreme Commander was closed before its due date i.e. April 1, 1948. It was closed down on November 30, 1947. Auchinleck's prediction proved true and India did not deliver to Pakistan her legal and rightful share.<sup>47</sup> The issue of the property of the refugees which they had left over in India was another gigantic task before Pakistan. The issue of evacuee property was another depressing problem. This created a big tension between the two neighbours.<sup>48</sup>

The devaluation of Indian Rupee in 1950 also created a big economic trouble in the domestic environment of Pakistan. This issue affected Pakistan in three ways. Pakistan's trade relations with India had been permanently affected. Pakistan developed the port of Chittagong on emergency basis as an alternative to Calcutta. Secondly, this issue of devaluation of Indian rupee directly led to the communal riots in West Bengal and East Pakistan. The issue of communal violence gave rise to a sort of war between Pakistan and India in 1950. Consequently, the jute cultivators in East Pakistan suffered from great economic hardships.<sup>49</sup> Thirdly, this issue became the basis of good start with China. Pakistan sold her raw cotton to China and in turn China started supplying coal

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45 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 104.

46 Khalid Bin Saeed, *Political System of Pakistan* (Lahore: Peace Publication, 2015), 62-63.

47 Major General Fazal Muqem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 40.

48 Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 11).

49 Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 15.

to Pakistan which India had stopped to supply. Pakistan badly needed coal supplies to keep running railways and other industries.<sup>50</sup> In the formative years, Pakistan's economic resources were very limited, and at the same time had possessed pathetically "weak industrial and technological base." These aspects constituted the "domestic context" of Pakistan's foreign policy in those years and even today's world.<sup>51</sup>

### **The Contemporary Global Context**

States are the most important actors in the international political system. All the states make their choices of foreign policy strategy in the system. The most important and fundamental difference between international system and internal (domestic) political systems of states is the one based on the nature of both. International political system is based on 'anarchy'. It means there is absence of a central government/central authority in the system. This concept of the international system took its origin from the 17th Century British thinker Thomas Hobbes and his famous treatise, *Leviathan*. The philosopher saw international relations as a "war of all against all." According to him, there existed no central authority in the system. There existed no ultimate authority "to govern the international system."<sup>52</sup>

During the period of the Cold War (1945-1991), the two super states—the USA and the USSR mainly were concerned with nuclear deterrence. In such a system, realists like Kenneth Waltz are of the view that structure of the system is very "deterministic" in order to understand behavior of states.<sup>53</sup> The states, whether small or great, base their foreign policies on their national interest. It cannot

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50 *The Economist*, December 2, 1961

51 Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and The Geostrategic Environment* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993), vii.

52 Robert J. Lieber, *No Common Power: Understanding International Relations* (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1988), 5.

53 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979), 72.

be ignored whatsoever. They can ignore it but only at their perils.<sup>54</sup>

The great powers in the system play vital role in it. They try to “shape the system according to their interests and values.”<sup>55</sup> They “fear each other” and consequently “compete for power” in the system. Their ultimate objective is to “dominate” the system. They try their best to dominate the system because for great powers dominance ensures their survival. In the words of John J. Mearsheimer, “strength ensures safety and the greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety.”<sup>56</sup> The great powers, like the USA and the USSR, that are confronted to such a scenario are “fated to clash” because they compete for relative advantage over the rival power.<sup>57</sup> The states follow the dictates of the system based on self-help. Indeed, it could be safely said that the international political system, in ultimate analysis, gives rise to feelings of “insecurity, distrust, suspicion, and fear.”<sup>58</sup> In the post-World War II environment, the two superpowers—the USA and the USSR, represented two antithetical ideologies, capitalism and socialism, respectively, and were locked in a struggle for power and dominance in the system.

It was in February, 1945 that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met at Yalta, the Russian Black Sea resort. The “big three” wanted to shape the post-World War II future of the world. Ultimately, on the issue of Poland, the “Declaration of Liberated Europe” was rendered meaningless and Roosevelt accepted it.<sup>59</sup> For many reasons, Stalin still had refused to

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54 Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, “*The Concepts of National Interests: Uses and Limitations*,” in *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1980), 217-218.

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56 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2001).

57 Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, xi-xii.

58 Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 15<sup>th</sup> ed., (Washington D.C., CQ Press, 2000), 6.

59 FRUS: Yalta: 234, 677-78, 668-669, 898.

accept the Atlantic Charter until Articles III and IV were amended.<sup>60</sup> It is to be noted that by 1944-45, the Soviet military forces had occupied Eastern Europe. Poland became an important point of discord between the USA and the USSR. The Soviet dictator, Stalin, rejected US president Truman's arguments on Poland by reasoning that the USSR had made no claims on Belgium and Greece where the US and London made unilateral decisions without any regard to the Soviet interests.<sup>61</sup> The US wanted to open Poland to equal opportunities both for the east and west.<sup>62</sup>

In World War II, the Russians had terribly suffered. The war had ruined 1700 Soviet towns, 70,000 villages and left 25 million homeless. The soviet death toll was 20 million; and 600000 were "starved to death" just in Leningrad.<sup>63</sup> By the end of World War II in 1945, the USSR approximately had occupied and absorbed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. Germany was also partitioned into two occupation zones. Finally, Soviet Union installed pro-USSR regimes in the entire Eastern Europe. The end of the world war was signified by the ever-increasing distrust among the major players-victorious powers.<sup>64</sup>

The US secretary of Commerce, Hennery Wallace said, "The tougher we get, the tougher Russians will get."<sup>65</sup> This most important answer came from George F. Kennan, an American diplomat at US embassy in Moscow. In a long

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60 Martin F. Herz, *The Beginnings of the Cold War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), vii-viii.

61 FRUS, 1945, V (Washington, 1967), 263-264.

62 FRUS, *The Conference of Berlin* (Washington, 1960, 1): 262-264

63 Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1990* (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc, 1991), 18.

64 Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Emergence of Contemporary International System: A Historical Overview," in *World Politics: Trends & Transformation* (Thomson and Wadsworth, 2004), 97-133.

65 Henry Wallace, "The Way to Peace," in *Selected Works of Henry A. Wallace* (New Deal Network, October 1, 1946), 738-741.



telegram from Moscow Kennan summed Soviet leadership's view of the West. The outside world was hostile and it was their duty to overthrow it. They saw the world as enemy. From this basic antagonism, there flowed certain distinct characteristics of Soviet foreign policy: "the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the war suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose."<sup>66</sup> This struggle with the US will be long drawn. While knowing Soviet sense of "historic inevitability," they were not in haste. Until achieved, the Russian objectives and strategy world remain constant.<sup>67</sup>

There was no escape to war as long as capitalism remained on this earth. We must be ready for a "replay" of 1930s. Stalin declared further that there "would be no peace" whatsoever either internally or externally. This was an eternal struggle.<sup>68</sup> George F. Kennan's recommendations were converted into policy what is known as US Policy of Containment. The Truman doctrine declared that "...it must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjection by armed minorities or by outside pressures..." If the US would fail to provide assistance to Greece and Turkey at this crucial hour of time it will greatly affect the interests of the West.<sup>69</sup> The US gave 400 million Dollars to these two countries. The entire Europe laid in ruins. The US was the only country in the West who could provide the required leadership to protect the West against the imminent danger of "historic inevitability" global socialist revolution.<sup>70</sup>

During the 1920s, the US isolationism had provided room for the expansionism of Germany and Japan. In following

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<sup>66</sup> Wallace, "The Way to Peace."

<sup>67</sup> This long telegram was later reprinted in the famous "X article" entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947.

<sup>68</sup> J. V. Stalin, *Speech delivered by J. V. Stalin at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral Area of Moscow* (February 9, 1946). {Washington, Embassy of the U.S.S.R, March, 1946}.

<sup>69</sup> Bruce W. Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., (New York: WW Norton, 2006) 101.

<sup>70</sup> Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy*, 100.

George Kennan's advices, the US created structures transforming the Theory of Containment (Communist) into practical policy.<sup>71</sup> The policy of containment took a global turn. The collapse of China in 1949 weakened the US options in Asia. The US introduced an economic plan for the democratic reconstruction of Western Europe known as Marshall Plan in 1948.<sup>72</sup>

In the early 1946, in response to Stalin's challenge, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a famous declaration what is known as "iron curtain" speech. He declared that "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent."<sup>73</sup> Stalin warned, it was but a challenge to "war" with the USSR.<sup>74</sup> Another important development occurred which intensified the Cold War. In March 1946, President Truman announced a plan for the international control of atom—the nuclear energy. This was the era of American monopoly of nuclear weapons. Moscow responded by demanding the total "destruction" of nuclear bombs. Washington rejected this plan of "zero option" and the plan failed.<sup>75</sup>

Without any exaggeration, the US had emerged not only as defender of Western Europe and Western liberal democracy but also as protector of capitalism worldwide. But it was not without cost. In February 1948, Czechoslovakia was engulfed by the USSR, and in June the same year Stalin took a very provocative step by blocking the Allies corridor to West Berlin and rendering 2.4 million besieged Germans helpless to be starved to death. It was the test of American

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<sup>71</sup> Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 15<sup>th</sup> ed., (Washington D. C., CQ Press, 2000), 54-56

<sup>72</sup> Hook and Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*.

<sup>73</sup> Hook and Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*.

<sup>74</sup> Stalin's interview in *Pravda*, reprinted in The New York Times, March 14, 1946.

<sup>75</sup> Bernard M. Baruch "Memorandum of Meeting on June, 7, 1946, with the President and J. F. Byrnes." Truman file, Atomic Energy, Baruch Papers.

resolve to defend Western Europe against Soviet danger. The Soviet pressure on Berlin straightway led to the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April, 1949, a defense pact of 12 nations. An invasion of one NATO country would amount to aggression against all.<sup>76</sup> These were the days of American nuclear monopoly. The weapons could be used against Moscow.

The West was shocked by the USSR's nuclear explosion in 1949. The US never expected it at least in 1949. President Truman asked the USNSC (United States National Security Council) to review the evolution of the US policy towards the socialist world. The investigation resulted into the production of a very secret military document called NSC-68, in April 1950. Meanwhile, in June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea with the objective of forcible unification of two Koreas. The NSC-68 called for worldwide "offensive" against the USSR and other socialist countries. It also asked for the "development of hydrogen bomb", supported by further expansion of the US and her Western allies' conventional military capabilities.<sup>77</sup> The Korean War and the production of NSC-68 directly led to the militarization of the US Policy of Containment against the Communist bloc. The US provided both military and economic help to the countries of Western Europe, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan among others as an expression of Policy of Containment of Communism.

Pakistan, like rest of the countries of global south, recognized during its early phase that isolation in the contemporary and complex world was not possible. Pakistan was constrained to have interaction with other actors in the system in order to serve her national interest, most specifically, its territorial sovereignty and to get international aid and support for "domestic socio-economic development."<sup>78</sup>

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76 William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World: An International History* (New York: Oxford University, 1984), 282.

77 Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World*, 287.

78 Rizvi, *Pakistan and The Geostrategic Environment*, 8-9.

### Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy during the Formative Phase

Pakistan, as an ideological state, came into existence in August, 1947 and is located in South Asia in the vicinity of three big states the USSR, China, and India. The Persian Gulf is also near to Pakistan. Since the very beginning, Pakistan's foreign policy confronted with hard options. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding-father of Pakistan, laid the basic parameters of its foreign policy in a broadcast wherein he addressed the American people. He said:

Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fairplay in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world... upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.<sup>79</sup>

The following factors fundamentally shaped Pakistan's foreign policy in her infant years. They included very "limited economic resources" along with a "weak industrial and technological" foundation. The ideological factor was another one, and lastly, the ever-increasing interdependence on other states in the world political system.<sup>80</sup>

The important events which contributed in shaping the foreign policy of Pakistan during its formative phase included also the inhuman Muslim massacre in East Punjab in India, the India's occupation of Muslim majority princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, and the devaluation of Indian rupee, and consequent trade war with India.<sup>81</sup> During his visit to the US, Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan, identified

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79 M. A. H. Ispahani, "The Ire of Pakistan," in *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, ed., Hameed A. K. Rai (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1985), i.

80 Rizvi, *Pakistan and The Geostrategic Environment*, vii.

81 Rai, *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, iv-v.

the basic interests of Pakistan as the “integrity of Pakistan”, the culture and history of Pakistan, and finally the “economic development” as the part of real national interest of Pakistan.<sup>82</sup> Due to Indo-Afghan factors, security of Pakistan had been one of the greatest concerns. For the decision makers in Pakistan, the country faced an existential threat in its infancy. For them, India and Afghanistan were the real adversaries, and these two neighbours wanted to undo Pakistan. The Indian leadership was extremely unhappy on the issue of the partition of the Indian subcontinent and saw it as a vivisection of mother India. The issue of Pakhtunistan was another danger for the survival of Pakistan. But, for the policymakers in Pakistan, by and large, India was the biggest security threat to its existence. In this regard, the statements of Jawaharlal Nehru, M. K. Gandhi, Congress Working Committee’s Resolution, Hindu Mahasabha and Sardar Patel etc., were cited as the empirical evidence of Indian intentions. All these statements have been well-documented in this paper, but the researcher, on the basis of empirical evidence, does not agree with mainstream thinking. This is suffice here to say that the process of decolonization accelerated in 1947, in the post-World War II period. The British giving independence to India and Pakistan, and after that, decolonization process of the world proceeded with great speed. The age of imperial military adventurism was over. The contemporary international / global political system, infected with Cold War, was not conducive to military conquests of foreign lands. The system was characterized by rigidity of bipolarity based on ideological incompatibility between the USA and the USSR. The two superpowers were very sensitive to such an irresponsible attitude, if any, on the part of any state.<sup>83</sup>

The Indian occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was another important factor which shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy. Since the beginning, the element of ideology

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82 Rai, “*Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*,” 7-8.

83 Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf, “Emergence of Contemporary International System,” 187-222.

(Islam) played an important role in Pakistan's foreign policymaking. Same was the case with Communist countries. In Pakistan's foreign policy, the element of ideology, translated into practical policy, meant "preference for the West and dislike of Communism."<sup>84</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the national poet of Pakistan, long before the creation of Pakistan had declared that "to hold Bolshevik views, in my opinion, is to place oneself outside the pale of Islam."<sup>85</sup> Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, during his visit to the USA in April, 1950, asked American leadership to encourage the idea of Indo-Pak alliance, "which would keep out the potential menace of Communism."<sup>86</sup> It was in 1954 that *Dawn* (Pakistan's leading newspaper) argued in its editorial that "Kremlin Bosses" were unbelievers of God, that was why they were devoid of "all moral codes."<sup>87</sup> Maulana Maududi, an Islamic scholar of Pakistan and the founder of Jammāt-e-Islami declared that "Socialism based on the ideas of Marx... is un-Islamic."<sup>88</sup>

The precarious economic conditions of Pakistan during the formative phase, in the view of the researcher, were the most important determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy. It was on the economic front, not on security issue, that Pakistan faced existential threat in early years. The Congress leadership, unable to stem the creation of Pakistan, resorted to a well-planned design to hasten the economic collapse of Pakistan. The Congress did everything in her armory to economically undo Pakistan. On account of the Congress' policy what is known as "Policy of Strangulation", Pakistan severely suffered.

India committed largescale human massacre in East Punjab and the Sikh Princely States. This tragedy created untold

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84 Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 91.

85 Iqbal's letter (in Urdu) dated June 23, 1923 to the *Zamindar*, Lahore, reproduced in *Guftar-i-Iqbal*, 6.

86 *New York Times*, April 13, 1950.

87 *Dawn*, March 31, 1954.

88 *Morning News*, Karachi (Pakistan), May 8, 1967.

largescale economic problems of rehabilitation of refugees. There is no denying the fact that India also had problems of refugee rehabilitation arising from partition-related violence and mass migration but in comparison to Pakistan, India was a resourceful and economically stable country and consequently she was in a better position to handle the refugee rehabilitation. India unwarrantedly delayed Pakistan's share in cash reserves; Indian leadership unjustly forced Supreme Commander's headquarters to be closed well before the stipulated time; India did not provide Pakistan her share of arms, ammunitions, and vehicles her due and owing to the tribal invasion of Kashmir, India compelled Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to India when he demanded Indian military support in order to counter the tribal invasion. Consequently, Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession and Indian military came to the rescue of Kashmir. The Indian government also pledged to hold a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir in order to give an opportunity to the Kashmiri people whether they wish to join India or Pakistan, and India, notwithstanding international law stopped/ cut-off water supplies to Pakistan (west Punjab and Sindh) in April, 1948. Water was the life-blood of Pakistan without which, Pakistan could not survive. India devalued her currency and stopped the coal supply to Pakistan creating a serious energy crisis in Pakistan, and she also refused to buy jute from Pakistan etc. All these events and developments belonged to the formative phase of Pakistan. They were really part of India's policy of economic strangulation against Pakistan. The avowed Indian objective against Pakistan was to economically make Pakistan as weak as possible so that it could not survive as an independent state. The Congress leadership wanted to teach the All India Muslim League (AIML) a bitter lesson why it had asked for partition? Indian's military occupation of Pakistan, for many reasons, was not possible under the prevailing contemporary conditions of international/global system.

## **Conclusion**

The early phase of Pakistan's foreign policy was very important, because during this phase, Pakistan learned through hard experience that Islamic ideology was not to play any significant role in power politics of the post-World War II era characterized by Cold War politics between the two conflicting ideologies—capitalism and communism—represented by two contemporary super powers—the USA and the USSR respectively. Secondly, Pakistan also learned that religion based foreign policy in 20th Century was not in consonance with modern ideologies and politics even among the Muslim states. Pakistan was disillusioned with the attitude of the Muslim world. Thirdly, Pakistan cold shouldered the USSR. This offended Moscow a lot. Resultantly, Moscow used veto power on Kashmir issue in the United Nations Security Council. For many reasons, Pakistan preferred Washington over Moscow. In return, Pakistan got some economic, military, political and diplomatic support of the USA. The US support to Pakistan played some role in its survival. Pakistan also extended moral support to struggling people for their independence in the United Nations. Another important conclusion was that Pakistan's policymakers overplayed the Indian security threat as it was not the age of military imperialism, at least for India. It was the age of decolonization. India and Afghanistan would not leave any opportunity to downplay or damage Pakistan in future. However, Indian propaganda of immediate collapse of Pakistan was falsified as the latter survived due to her resilience.