

Political Economy of Party Politics in Hybrid Regime: Evidences from Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

Political economy of party politics in hybrid regime is a complex relationship which leads to political inclusion and exclusion of social groups. The institutional infrastructures and ideological state apparatuses provide ground to hybrid party politics. Political economy of party politics determines mode of electoral participation and representation to counter collective struggle. The material conditions set the stage for subsequent socio political cleavages taking place. Party politics in hybrid regime tend to fade away class based political mobilization. The neo-liberal norms reflect in the rise of electoral populism. Dialectics of populism in hybrid regimes seem a missing link to explore a rising wave of populism in party politics. This paper is theoretically utilizing concepts from Gramsci's work by taking evidences from Pakistan. The study attempts to highlight factors that how electoral rhetoric is being construed/ misconstrued in controlling the base structure (voter) of electoral sphere and constructing electoral superstructure? In addition, it is also elaborated how one electoral rhetoric gives way to another electoral rhetoric constructed by a new interest group within or outside a

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political party to herald a shift in the electoral politics. The paper elaborates the nature of populism of party politics in hybrid regimes by uncovering the tactics of hegemonic group's covert leaders to have an effective influence over a ruling political party for a long time. In this study, the tactics are described as set of maneuverings that are undertaken by ideological hegemony. Therefore, the reason for designing such tactics is a strategy of political elite or the powerful interest groups to set up (or influence) a political party that serves the interests of powerful groups more effectively in a hybrid political environment.

Introduction

The semi-democratic¹ and semi-authoritarian² trends of hybrid regime are at the foundations of populism³. The concept of hybrid regime was propagated in 1990s along with the rise of neoliberalism. Hybrid regime termed with different nomenclatures including delegated democracies, defective democracies, illiberal democracies⁴, limited democracies, defective and semi-authoritarian democracies.

Hybrid regime reproduces unevenness and causes hegemonic control⁵ over resources through super structural formation of electoral politics by the most powerful interest groups. Being main pillars of electoral politics, political parties have an important role in the formulation of a hegemonic

1 Hootan Shambayati, "Courts in Semi-democratic/authoritarian Regimes: The Judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian) Politics," In *Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes*, 283-303. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

2 Andreas Schedler, "Electoral Authoritarianism," *The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics* (2009): 381-94. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 51-65. Marina Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-authoritarianism* (Carnegie Endowment, 2013).

3 Manuel Anselmi, *Populism: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2017).

4 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* (1997): 22.

5 Daniela Donno, "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): 703-716.

political system and its dialectical relationship⁶ with populism. The purpose of this paper is to give an account of the political economy of party politics in hybrid regime by taking account of sets of maneuvering from hegemonic power in hybrid regime.⁷

The duality of dialectical contradiction and dialectical unity of hegemonic power with political vehicles by maneuvering to keep hegemony insulated from any possible challenge of collective action (mass mobilization). The electoral arena with diverse political vehicles had a relationship of dialectical contradiction and dialectical unity with hegemonic power in cyclical mode. Lately, the hegemonic power became suspicious about certain political actors because they became privy to operations/machinations of hegemony. Now the society is facing rapid urbanization-pushed-commercialization and resultant capital accumulation's economic hardships adverse effect. Thus, high middle class and large swathe of low income population are pushed into big wheel of electoral rhetoric from hegemonic power. This led to an establishment of populist rhetoric of 'change' through newly formed political vehicle i.e., Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). This is reinforced through "magnet iron particle practice" that picked up several politicians who seek dialectical unity with all powerful hegemonic power. So, the rise of PTI in another way is an interplay of neo-liberal *marketism* and urban middle class aspirations in shape of consumerist subjectivities resulting political populism in hybrid regimes. Therefore, a move of hegemonic power to consolidate its power by engaging into duality of dialectical contradiction and unity at the same time.

The broad spectrum of party politics in hybrid post-colonial state like Pakistan may be understood from a point that how party competitions assume character of dialectical contradiction among multiple parties. This staged dialectical

6 Ben Stanley, "The Thin Ideology of Populism," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13, no. 1 (2008): 95-110.

7 Miles Larmer and Alastair Fraser, "Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia's 2006 Election," *African Affairs* 106, no. 425 (2007): 611-637.

contradiction among different parties set the wheel in motion that pushes all political parties' top elite vie for achieving dialectical unity with hegemony. The question remains how certain rhetoric acquires form of populism at some election scenario? And how an old rhetoric being successful populism gets redundant draws attention to understand the nature of party politics in hybrid regime.

Party Politics and Rise of Populism in Hybrid Regime

According to Google Trends, global interest in populism is four times greater today than it has been, at least, in the past decade.⁸ This interest in populism began to grow in the summer of 2016 before the Brexit vote⁹ and seemed to have peaked in January 2017, the month Donald Trump¹⁰ took office as the country's 45th president. In political science, populism is the idea that society is separated into two groups at odds with one another – 'the pure people'¹¹ and 'the corrupt elite'¹². The sizable literature carries debate over populism centered upon mostly shifts in neo-liberal capital accumulation¹³ leading to dislocations in middle class of advanced economies. However, the present concept upon hegemony and dialectics of populism is largely missing from the available literature on populism.¹⁴ Moreover, some scholars have attempted to connect populism with

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- 8 Kenneth Roth, "The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on Human Rights Values," *Journal Of International Affairs* (2017): 79-84.
 - 9 John Clarke and Janet Newman, "'People in this Country have had enough of Experts': Brexit and the Paradoxes of Populism," *Critical Policy Studies* 11, no. 1 (2017): 101-116.
 - 10 Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-nots and Cultural Backlash," (2016).
 - 11 Cas Mudde, "Are Populists Friends or Foes of Constitutionalism?" (2013).
 - 12 Conard Ziller and Thomas Schübel. "'The Pure People' versus 'the Corrupt Elite'? Political Corruption, Political Trust and the Success of Radical Right Parties in Europe," *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 25, no. 3 (2015): 368-386. See also, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
 - 13 Marcus Taylor, "Evolutions of the Competition State in Latin America: Power, Contestation and Neo-liberal Populism," *Policy Studies* 31, no. 1 (2010): 39-56.
 - 14 Yannis Stavrakakis, *et al.*, "Populism, Anti-populism and Crisis," *Contemporary Political Theory* 17, no. 1 (2018): 4-27. See also, William Davies.

liberalism. Interestingly, Jan Werner Muller (2016)¹⁵ argues that the core of populism is a rejection of pluralism.¹⁶ Similarly, another set of scholars including Guillermo O'Donnell 2018,¹⁷ S. Pühringer 2018,¹⁸ K. M. Robert 1995,¹⁹ T Voss 2018²⁰ and others connect populism with neo-liberalism. This study is an effort to build upon the worthy work of the world's top minds in order to understand the forces behind this 'great regression'²¹. Writers from across disciplines and countries, including Paul Mason,²² Pankaj Mishra,²³ Slavoj Žižek,²⁴ Zygmunt Bauman,²⁵ Arjun Appadurai,²⁶ Wolfgang Streeck,²⁷ and Eva Illouz,²⁸ grapple with our current predicament, framing it in a broader historical

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- 15 Jan-Werner Müller, "Trump, Erdoğan, Farage: The Attractions of Populism for Politicians, the Dangers for Democracy," *The Guardian* 2 (2016).
 - 16 Marc F. Plattner, "Democracy's Past and Future: Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 1 (2010): 81-92.
 - 17 Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, "Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives," (1986): 64-84.
 - 18 Stephan Pühringer and Walter O. Ötsch, "Neoliberalism and Right-wing Populism: Conceptual Analogies," *Forum for Social Economics* 47, no. 2, (2018): 193-203.
 - 19 Kenneth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: the Peruvian Case," *World Politics* 48, no. 1 (1995): 82-116.
 - 20 Tanya Voss *et al.*, "The Threatening Troika of Populism, Nationalism, and Neoliberalism," *Journal of Human Rights and Social Work* 3, no. 3 (2018): 109-111.
 - 21 Nancy Fraser, "Progressive Neoliberalism Versus Reactionary Populism: A Hobson's Choice," *The Great Regression* (2017): 40-48.
 - 22 Jacqueline Ross, "What is Populism?" (2018): 754-756.
 - 23 Pankaj Mishra, "Impasse in India," *The New York Review of Books* 54, no. 11 (2007): 48-51.
 - 24 Slavoj Žižek, "Melancholy and the Act," *Critical Inquiry* 26, no. 4 (2000): 657-681.
 - 25 Zygmunt Bauman and Mark Haugaard, "Liquid Modernity and Power: A Dialogue with Zygmunt Bauman," *Journal of Power* 1, no. 2 (2008): 111-130.
 - 26 Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," *Theory, Culture & Society* 7, no. 2-3 (1990): 295-310.
 - 27 Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Ann Thelen, eds., *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
 - 28 Eva Illouz, *Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism*. Polity, 2007.

context, discussing possible future trajectories and considering to combat this reactionary approach.

Ever since living through a period of dramatic political changes that could be connected to global circulation of capital facilitated by neo-liberal market. Brexit, the election of Trump, the rise of extreme right movements in Europe and elsewhere, the resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia²⁹ and a concerted assault on the liberal values and ideals associated with cosmopolitanism³⁰ and globalization could be few examples. Suddenly, we find ourselves in a world that few would have imagined just a few years ago; a world that seems to move backwards too eagerly.

Making sense of above mentioned dramatic developments and formulating the responses to these and other possible such developments could be the most important research question of our times. However, the purpose of this study is to analyze the worldwide rejection of liberal democracy³¹ and its replacement with various versions of populist authoritarianism³² as understanding the causes is one of the most important roads to the formulation of solutions.

A true populist leader claims to represent the unified 'will of the people'.³³ He stands in opposition to an enemy, often embodied by the current system. Such a leader wants to 'drain the swamp'³⁴ or tackle the 'liberal elite'³⁵. Usually Populist candidates pitch public against the elite by exacerbating already

29 Cas Mudde, "The Far Right and the European Elections," *Current History* 113, no. 761 (2014): 98-103.

30 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Towards an Agenda," *Development and Change* 37, no. 6 (2006): 1247-1257.

31 Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, "Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy," *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 1 (2000): 58-86.

32 Kurt Weyland, "Latin America's Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist Left," *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 18-32.

33 Margaret Canovan, "Trust The People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," *Political Studies* 47, no. 1 (1999): 2-16.

34 Brink Lindsey and Steven M. Teles, "Trump Made the Swamp Worse. Here's How to Drain It," *New York Times*, 26.

35 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America," *Government and Opposition* 48, no. 2 (2013): 147-174.

existing distrust of the current system by declaring distrust as cause of current frustration/discontent. Whether those claims are real or imagined usually matters little to the supporters because they are sentimentally attracted to the self-projection of this populist candidate as a symbol of change.

The strength of political contradictions through populist rhetoric usually lies in consequences of neoliberal market driven consumerism³⁶ as everyday reality. The overarching public realities (or influence) of neoliberal markets lead a large number of people subjectivities³⁷ especially in urban and semi-urban low income sections. When people find that their usual political party 'lacks solutions and is responsible to social decline and economic decline, they look elsewhere.'³⁸ They tend to associate with any party that makes promises around their subjectivities.³⁹ The perception of voters' disadvantage or dissatisfaction about their individual needs and quality of services they receive make it easy for voters to locate a set of enemies within a system who are making politics a 'zero-sum game for the voters. The voters believe that they are losing this game and others are winning.'⁴⁰ 'A populist leader who gets into power is 'forced' to be in a permanent campaign to convince large mass of people that he is outside establishment - and will never be part of it.'⁴¹ It is argued that populist content is 'made of negatives', whether it is anti-politics, anti-intellectualism, or anti-elite even anti-development in some cases. The recent electoral rise of the PTI makes similar reference in Pakistan's case that how Imran Khan termed mega development as mega corruption — a core of his populist rhetoric. Here lies one of the populism's strengths - it is

36 Darren Lilleker and Richard Scullion, eds., *Voters or Consumers: Imagining the Contemporary Electorate* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009).

37 Fabián Echegaray, "Voting at the Marketplace: Political Consumerism in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* (2015): 176-199.

38 Morris P. Fiorina, "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics," (1980).

39 Marshall Berman, *Why Modernism Still Matters* (na, 1992).

40 Iain McLean, "Rational Choice and Politics," *Political Studies* 39, no. 3 (1991): 496-512.

41 Nadia Urbinati, "The Populist Phenomenon," *Raisons Politiques* 3 (2013): 137-154.

versatile and 'extraordinarily powerful because it can adapt to all type of situations.'⁴²

Another common thread among populist leaders is that they tend to dislike the 'complicated democratic systems'⁴³ of modern government — preferring direct democracy like referendums for policy preferences.⁴⁴ The emergence of populist parties in Europe could be seen in the early 2000s, but they remained small for several years. The swelling support seemed to happen 'from 2008 - and particularly from 2011, when the banking crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis.'⁴⁵ It was a rare occasion when an elite class⁴⁶ (the wealthy bankers) could be identified as more or less directly responsible for a crisis which affected the majority of society in Europe. This crisis was used by populist leadership to attain public attention and public approval against political establishment in the countries like USA and UK.

Populist leadership also has possible links to authoritarianism, a lack of trust in the established system gives rise to desire for a 'strongman'. The PTI's populist slogans are referential point here *Umeed ki Akhri Kiran Imran Khan*, (Last Hope Imran Khan), *Hum nahi tu Kon*⁴⁷ (If we are not then who?). Ultimately, the leader promotes the impossibility of any strongman in traditional democracies, who happens to respect democratic norms, democratic procedures and rule of law. That sentiment is perhaps best embodied by the late left-wing Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who once said: "I am not an individual

42 Shiraz Sheikh, "The Promise of 'Naya' Pakistan and the Rise of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf," *Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations* 108.

43 Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, "New Avenues in the Study of Political Corruption," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 27, no. 3-4 (1997): 169-183.

44 Bull and Newell, "New Avenues in the Study of Political Corruption".

45 Bull and Newell, "New Avenues in the Study of Political Corruption".

46 Suzanne Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (Routledge, 2017).

47 Azhar Waqar, "Populism in Power and Democracy's Fate in Pakistan, (2018); Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad, "Electocracy and Public Policy Paradoxes? Elections, Austerity and Anti-Corruption Strategies in Pakistan," *CPS Quarterly*: 11; Siegfried O. Wolf, "Imran Khan – A Twist in the Tale?" *The Independent*, April 19 (2013): 14-14; Salman Yousaf, "Political Marketing in Pakistan: Exaggerated Promises, Delusive Claims, Marketable Development Projects and Change Advocacy," *Journal of Public Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2016): 140-155.

— I am the people.”⁴⁸ Such thinking can lead people towards restructuring the political space in a new and scary way.⁴⁹ After all, if you are not with the people, then you must be against us kind of situation is promoted by such politics.

Therefore, populist leaders are often viewed with suspicion by saner members of a society. Therefore, the term is often considered a type of insult for a politician who promises too much to please the actual and potential supporters. It is usually called ‘irresponsible bidding.’⁵⁰ In order to garner support, they are quicker than the established party to make offers, or to promise to change beliefs of their infallibility⁵¹. Thus, ‘Populism is the considered manifestation of problems with democracy.’⁵²

Conceptualizing Hegemony

The ‘Hegemony’ is rich theoretical concept derived from Gramsci’s work. It points to narrow and hidden power consensus with access to capital and economic allies to control major economic resources. The research tacitly references to power wielders such as powerful surveillance state system, politicians and many career bureaucrats for power maneuvering. The ‘Hegemony’ is a lens that offers clear understanding of party politics in hybrid regime.

Hegemonic Power Maneuverings: Evidences from Pakistan

As per Freedom House Index,⁵³ Pakistan is included in hybrid regime. For exploring political economy of party politics in hybrid regime of Pakistan, evidences have been taken from politics of

48 John Carey, “Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century,” *Americas Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (2013): 101.

49 Slavoj Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation,” *Critical Inquiry* 32, no. 3 (2006): 551-574.

50 Francis Fukuyama, “Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy: The Latin American Experience,” *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4 (2008): 69-79.

51 Steven Griggs and David Howarth, “Populism, Localism and Environmental Politics: The Logic and Rhetoric of the Stop Stansted Expansion Campaign,” *Planning Theory* 7, no. 2 (2008): 123-144.

52 Sheri Berman, “Populism is not Fascism: But It Could be a Harbinger,” *Foreign Aff.* 95 (2016): 39. Sheri Berman, “The Pipe Dream of Undemocratic Liberalism,” *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 3 (2017): 29-38.

53 Freedom House Index 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/> accessed on November 11, 2019

maneuverings include judicial activism, media malaise against certain political actors, legal and constitutional instrumentation, project execution critique and bureaucratic delaying procedures are few that may be referred appropriately. Currently, due to the recent urban expansion in *Pothohar*⁵⁴ region of Pakistan, a great portion of public and private lands is occupied by logging companies and corporate ranchers. In addition, politicians willingly handed the public's airwaves to powerful broadcasters and large corporate interests who do not pay their dues to public treasury (or any relevant institution). The partners of big projects are usually giving profiteering a new dimension as they get corporate contracts without any competitive bidding, e.g., The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority's (PEMRA) bidding controversy on awarding license to news channels and pretending that government will receive millions from such award of licenses.

The environmental degradation in the name of profit-making is justified by the government legislation. It is presented as investor-friendly legislation. However, public services face financial constraints due to lower rates of taxes on major corporations. The big corporate multinational companies enjoy special facilities from government under Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). These constraints lead to lack of resources for many basic public services. Consequently, a lot of public schools look like jails while some private schools resemble modern shopping malls. This kind of disparity is highlighted by some situations where at times public school teachers find themselves hard pressed to get revenues for their schools by adopting market ways and values.

As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday life decisions, big government is disparaged as either incompetent or threatening to individual freedom. Also, there are suggestions all over media that power should reside in markets and corporations rather than in governments (except for their support for corporate interests and national security) and citizens. Citizenship has increasingly become a function of consumerism.

54 Gavin Shatkin, "The Real Estate Turn in Policy and Planning: Land Monetization and the Political Economy of Peri-urbanization in Asia," *Cities* 53 (2016): 141-149.

The restructuring of politics in the image of corporate excellence means that 'corporations have been increasingly freed from social control through deregulation, privatization, and other neoliberal measures.'⁵⁵

Corporations increasingly design not only the economic sphere but they also shape legislation and policy at all levels of government. This grim situation is contributing to the emergence of a vast political economic field which generates miseries and inequalities on a large scale. Therefore, the consumerist culture is the major structure behind formation of subjectivities of large numbers of people. These subjectivities become instrumental for populist rhetoric in electoral arena.

The Pakistani experience offers opportunities to understand hegemony and dialectics of populism from another angle. The hegemony in hybrid regime has been maneuvering to contain public populist tendencies through a range of political instruments.

There are multiple paradoxes that we come across while analyzing hybrid regimes. If we begin from last military coup in October 1999, General Musharraf replaced fluid dominant party PMLN and immediately started working on a number of measures to consolidate control over power.⁵⁶ The matter was taken to the Supreme Court to nullify the *coup*. However, the then Supreme Court Chief Justice Irshad Khan validated the *coup* and granted General Musharraf full authority to amend and frame the constitution to "effectively" run the state affairs. General Musharraf announced his seven point agenda and chalked out Legal Framework Order (LFO)⁵⁷ for necessary legal cover. A number of constitutional institutions were set up like National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and National

55 William K. Tabb, "After Neoliberalism?" *Monthly Review* 55, no. 2 (2003): 25-34.

56 Ashok K. Behuria, "How Military Dominates the Political Space in Pakistan: A Study of Musharraf's Rule (1999-2008)," *Journal of Peace Studies* 16, no. 1-2 (2009): 76-102. Amin Saikal, "Musharraf and Pakistan's Crisis," In *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics* (Routledge India, 2012), 37-55.

57 Legal Framework Order (LFO) was proclaimed by General Musharraf to legitimate his rule.

Reconstruction Bureau (NRB). General Musharraf immediately devised a rhetoric that acted populist slogan which had appeal to large expanding layers of urban middle class. The rhetoric “*Sab se Pehle Pakistan*” (Pakistan First) was carved out with an intention to start populist politics for hegemonic leadership. The NAB became institutional arrangement that led to purging of old school politicians and forcing many politicians to join the General Musharraf-led political party. The persistent attempt to extirpate the opposition parties’ challenge to the political dominance through the manipulation of set of rules and threat of coercive means. The third tier non-party local body election provided good ground upon which dominant party was created and maintained with coercive power. The dominant party in making was largely based upon stick and carrot principle that selectively patronized old politicians and coerced intransigent old politicians.⁵⁸ This led to the creation of PML(Q) under the protection and patronage of coercive or repressive apparatus of state. The President General Musharraf charisma started to penetrate in quite a large urban middle class by advancing argument that leadership and party can make country prosperous, unified, and protected from any external threat. It went on till General Musharraf’s friction with Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry started.⁵⁹ The formidable challenge was posed to Musharraf and it weakened his control over power. The repeated invocation of emergency was an indication of weakening grip over government. General Musharraf removed his uniform and handed over military command to General Ishfaq Kiani.⁶⁰ The subsequent election of 2008 resulted in a dramatic outcome in which Musharraf’s patronized PML (Q) secured third position in the parliament and it gave way to inter-party dialectical contradiction that

58 David C. Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

59 Shoaib A. Ghias, “Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf,” *Law & Social Inquiry* 35, no. 4 (2010): 985-1022.

60 Anatol Lieven, “All Kayani’s Men,” *The National Interest* 107 (2010): 58-65.

pushed all parties to seek dialectical unity with hegemony. The PPP-PML (N) formed coalition government in the Center and respective provinces. The desire of becoming hegemonic party in power remains major political faultline that stimulates hegemony to reach a deal. The other important political development was 'charter of democracy' between major political parties that outlined the principles of political competition between major power contenders. This outcome was an alarm bell in the ears of powerful military leaders, and therefore, this pushed them to adopt new political strategy. The parties in power soon found out that the judicial activism was on the rise and dictated major actor in power where other power contender again swayed with political ambitions and tacitly sided with hegemony. The judicial verdict disqualified the elected Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani⁶¹ — a move likened to a 'judicial dictatorship'.⁶²

The legal manoeuvring adds to political uncertainty when the government was mired in an array of crises, including unrest over electricity outages and strained relations with America over policy preferences. The judicial role in hegemonic manoeuvring through lacunas of constitutional interpretation, 'The Supreme Court [Pakistan] has edged one step closer to a judicial dictatorship of sorts.'⁶³ "The constitution is very clear about how the disqualification process is supposed to work and the court has brushed all of that aside, it enters in a new phase of making up rules of the game as it goes along."⁶⁴ In a way the constitution assumes character of judicial constitution through legal maneuverings.

This expression of dialectical contradiction with one political party and dialectical unity with other power holder resulted

61 Rao Imran Habib, Naureen Akhtar, and Atia Madni, "Relationship of Superior Judiciary and Executives during Democratic Regimes in Pakistan: An Analytical and Historical Study," *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences* 39, no. 1 (2019).

62 Habib, Akhtar, and Madni, "Relationship of Superior Judiciary and Executives During Democratic Regimes in Pakistan".

63 William J. Quirk and Randall Bridwell, *Judicial Dictatorship* (Routledge, 2017).

64 Quirk and Bridwell, *Judicial Dictatorship*.

into further powerful position of hegemony. The term from 2008 to 2013 witnessed two prime ministers giving tacit sense of hegemony being powerful. The fresh election brought other party in power that again witnessed exactly similar fate as it happened in last term. The term 2013-2018 witnessed two prime ministers again and this time ground was ready to create third power contender in the form of another party who was filled with selective old school politicians that wanted to reach dialectical unity with hegemony. These politicians came under the umbrella of newly formed Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). This party is struggling to become fluid dominant party but hegemony with ever more political resources holding policy jockeys in its control. Now we can explain hypotheses about hegemonic power behind (hegemonic) party building process.

The 1999 *coup* removed fluid dominant PML (N) party from government and replaced by General Musharraf who appointed himself as Chief Executive of the country with special powers conferred by the Supreme Court. General Musharraf was aware of political dissidents challenge to his power, therefore, he established two strategic institutions like the NAB and the NRB.⁶⁵ These performed two functions: one, coerced political dissidents and resultantly many changed their political loyalties towards General Musharraf and second the NRB outlined complete blueprint of third tier local political network that prepared ground for future political party. The personalized power of General Musharraf pushed the PML (Q) more like a paper organization or personal political machine.⁶⁶ The global political scene and regional security conditions influenced socio-political conditions that favoured building of nationwide political party, because a large number of civilian elite joined its ranks. The persistent threat from eastern neighbour India and rise of internal security threat from militant organization provided an effective opportunity to

65 Jai Kwan Jung and Christopher J. Deering, "Constitutional Choices: Uncertainty and Institutional Design in Democratizing Nations," *International Political Science Review* 36, no. 1 (2015): 60-77.

66 Daniel Markey, "A False Choice in Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* (2007): 85-102.

mobilize large population and control of society. Relatively low level of social mobilization in initiating building dominant party and when party architect did not face independent social forces that prevented them from manipulating and penetrating large society. In addition, Musharraf and his close associates led the PML (Q) by achieving formidable economic growth while their stay in power. This gave people confidence in the party leadership that could be utilized to enhance party roots at mass level. However, these conducive conditions could not translate the PML-Q's hegemonic aspiration into reality. The country's political history is replete with serious problems of creation of effective mass party inspired with hegemonic aspirations. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) under Field Marshall Ayub Khan evolved and became prominent on political horizon but collapsed soon after his ouster from presidency. The 'official'⁶⁷ government parties appeared civilian organizations which devised extensive plans to forge different political parties system, frequent manipulation of electoral rules and coercive control of dissident politicians. Here another interesting aspect of government party is that its secondary role under military leadership due to peripheral position. The division of government party into multiple factions in some cases accelerate the downfall of military leadership as well. The major factors that hinder creation of stable authoritarian regimes under hegemonic party take place under peculiar conditions of a variety of political, socio-economic, and cultural environment.

Conclusion

The hybrid regime props up a kind of political populism which deepens existing disparities and leads to hegemonic control over resources through electoral manipulation. The electoral manipulation includes all types of hegemonic manoeuvrings. The political parties in an electoral politics have a key role in the formulation of a hegemonic political system. The study

67 Robert Barros, "Dictatorship and the Rule of Law: Rules and Military Power in Pinochet's Chile," *Democracy and the Rule of Law* 5 (2003): 188. James Loxton, "Authoritarian Successor Parties," *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 3 (2015): 157-170.

tried to provide an account of political parties turning towards populism in a hybrid regime due to rapid urban expansion which in turn plays an important role shaping electoral rhetoric. The electoral rhetoric works as an instrument of securing control over voters.

The continuous electoral shift in political field replaces existing electoral rhetoric with a fresh electoral rhetoric designed to attract the voters in order to win elections. Thus, the electoral rhetoric could possibly persecute political opponents through politically expedient alliances and gagging of media in certain instances (stopping of on air interviews of opposition parties political leaders) are used to keep hegemony insulated from any possible challenge from collective action.

Usually under such hegemonic control, political parties are kept under an emancipation illusion through various manipulative tactics such as diverse political parties' promoting their narratives like pro-poor, pro-development and pro-change are few examples. The political parties could be used to influence and press voters for desire of seeking unity with a hegemonic group. As a result those political parties which succeed in wielding power through achieving unity with hegemony learn the manipulative tactics of the hegemony they serve initially in order to exercise similar manipulative tactics for their own purposes. Similarly, this learning of manipulative tactics devolves down to common voters who use them for hegemonic purposes. However, the parties out of power remain in competition with each other. But the top elite of these parties could use this competition for self-serving reasons to join with hegemony. This is a centuries old formula perpetually practiced particularly in South Asian context. Consequently, it perpetuates a cyclical set of political contradictions in an overarching political system.

The analysis highlights that creating an effective mass party remains secondary objective under a personalized hegemonic political leadership. The hegemony in hybrid regime carries out a set of facilitating and constraining strategies which are used to realize duality of dialectical contradiction and dialectical unity with political parties.