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BRITAIN IN MALAYA: A STUDY OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN PERAK FROM 1875 TO 1895

I

The closing years of the fifteenth century should be regarded a landmark in the history of European expansion in the direction of east and west both. This had been possible due mainly to the discovery of new routes leading in turn to the occupation of new lands. The discovery of the New world in 1492 by Colombus (1447-1506) paved way for the colonisation of lands in the Western hemisphere. Finding of a sea-route in 1498 via the Cape of Good Hope by Vasco da Gama (1460-1524) with the help of Ahmad ibn Majid, an Arab Muslim mariner,* opened the flood-gates for European adventurers and merchants alike to compete with each other for their fortunes to as far as in the East. The Portuguese, Spaniards, English, French, the Dutch, Danes and Swedes all queued in a row at different intervals for obtaining colonial and commercial possessions in the East. Eventually the British, French and the Dutch proved most enterprising and successful in the race over their other adversaries. However, among the three of them the British got the lion's share. The British colonial and commercial possessions reached to the greatest expansion from New Zealand in the Pacific to South Asia lying East of the Suez, leaving small pieces of territories here and there in between to their rivals, the Dutch and French. This paper mainly attempts to study the pattern of British Colonial Administration in a part of the Malayan peninsula, the Perak, which also formed part of the British colonial possessions in Asia.

II

British in Malaya

The history of the British occupation of Malaya, to-day's Malaysia, dates back to the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In 1786 the

*See Thomas Arnold, *The Legacy of Islam*, (Oxford, 1931), p. 96

East India Company, established by a royal charter of Queen Elizabeth (1533-1603) on 31st December 1600 A.D., obtained possession of the island of Penang as a base for its rapidly expanding trade with China. By the first quarter of the nineteenth century this small holding of the Company, situated close to the north-west coast of the peninsula, was made a part of the yet later acquisitions of the Company in the same region. These consisted of the Province of Wellesley, so named by the Company itself, and Singapore and Malacca. All these territories were distinctly separated and had no physical contact with each other. In 1826, following the administrative pattern of their South Asian possessions, the British acquisitions in Malaya named as Straits Settlements, were made a fourth Presidency. The other three being Bombay, Bengal and Madras. It was made to be governed by a Governor who resided in Penang. The status of Presidency was terminated in 1830 when, after an inquiry, it was discovered that the cost of separate administration was much too high.¹ Subject to this realisation the Straits Settlements were converted into a Residency and placed under the control of the Presidency of Bengal. The new set-up remained in force till 1867 when once again the status of the Settlements was changed. This time it was converted into a Crown Colony like Hong Kong. Under its new position the Settlements were placed in charge of the Colonial Office in London.² This was in consequence to numerous appeals from the British merchants and other residents of the Settlements.³ However, a more realistic view for this decision seemed to be based on administrative needs. For instance, long delays were experienced in securing London opinion through Bengal on matters which specifically and particularly related to the Straits Settlements.⁴ Therefore, the need for bringing them under Colonial Office directly.

III

Britain and the Native Malay States

For nearly a hundred years, after their first appearance and possession of Penang in Malaya, the general British policy in regard to the native Malay states, called Sultanates which were quite a few in number, had been to refrain from interfering in their domestic affairs. Intervention was refused even when British merchants and traders, living in the Straits Settlements, sought the reversal of this policy. Realising that some of the more adventurous among them might not pay heed to the existing official policy and venture to involve themselves in some kind of a conflict with native rulers, the British Government as a restatement of its policy,

issued them a cautious warning as late as August 1872. It was made known then that:

If persons, knowing the risks they run...choose to hazard their lives and properties for the sake of large profits which accompany successful trading, they must not expect the British Government to be answerable if their speculations prove unsuccessful.⁵

The following year however marked a change in the British policy of keeping aloof from interfering in the Malay States. A communication sent in September 1873 by John Kimberly, the Secretary of State, to Sir Andrew Clarke on the eve of latter's departure to Singapore for taking his new assignment as Governor of the Settlements, reveals the intent and purpose for the shift from the earlier stand. Expressing concern on the growing disorder in the neighbouring states Kimberley's letter contained *inter alia* the following instructions to Clarke for his prompt action when he reached in Malaya:

I have to request you that you will carefully ascertain, as far as you are able, the actual condition of affairs in each state, and...any steps which can be taken by the Colonial Government to promote the restoration of peace and order, and...secure protection to trade and commerce...to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British officer to reside in any of these States.⁶

Several factors seem to have contributed for this change in the attitude of the government. First and foremost was the breakdown of order in the Native States which rendered the safety of British merchants' trade and commerce difficult in the region. This in itself was the result of many developments. Chief among them was the mutual jealousies and internecine conflicts which afflicted the native royal families, particularly in Perak, situated close to the British occupied province of Wellesley and also not far from the island of Penang, also under British control. The disturbances in Perak were mainly caused by the three contestants for the throne which lay vacant due to the death of the reigning Sultan. The Royal dissension was followed by the petty-wars among the several chiefs of the Sultanate. Taking advantage of the Royal weakness the chiefs started making bids for their greater independent positions. Among them the chief of Larut in Perak was found most ambitious and almost on the verge of declaring his independence. There was therefore strong opposition followed by resistance from the other chiefs leading to a state of disorder and anarchy. Added to this situation was the emergence of clan-warfare among the various Chinese groups that lived in Perak.

The Chinese were mostly engaged in the tin-mining fields. There was a large concentration of Chinese population in Perak ever since the first tin-discovery there in early 1850s. These Chinese first came to the Settlements and then successfully made their entry into Perak for better prospects. They were divided into groups and adhered membership to their secret organizations which had their centres in mainland China. Often they clashed with each other and disturbed the peaceful working conditions in Perak. Due to their clannish conflicts there had been some very serious clashes in Perak in the years 1861, 1865 and 1872.⁷ The constant disturbing conditions in and around Perak made not only the trading unsafe it placed the trading routes also in jeopardy affecting the business interests of many a merchant of the Straits Settlements, who had their capital invested in the tin mines. Since the central authority in Perak had almost broken down due to the internal conflicts and also the weakness of the royal authority the prospects for the improvement of situation of law and order appeared very dim. The merchants and businessmen once again began to demand the British Government to intervene for the sake of protecting their commercial interests. Meanwhile the Malayan peninsula appeared to be threatened by other European powers, like the Dutch and French, who engaged themselves in extending limits of their territorial possessions in the region of Southeast Asia as a whole.

The French were found trying to extend their authority over Indo-China while the Dutch were most active in Indonesia. The activities of German Trade Officials proved of no less concern to the British Government. The Germans were just beginning to find a foothold for themselves in the region.⁸ These were the conditions when Kimberley sent his instructions to Clarke. But it was not a mandate given him to intervene. The note simply asked for investigation and report. Clarke however exceeded his instructions and started interfering in the internal affairs of the native states. The decision to abandon the earlier course based on non-intervention thus proved a turning point in the history of Malay's native rule. The new British thinking inaugurated the era of British control over the native administration. Perak was the first to fall prey.

IV

Colonial Government and the Malay State of Perak

Andrew Clarke arrived in Singapore in November 1873. He already possessed a note of instructions with regard to native affairs. This he interpreted as his mandate to act in the manner he himself thought fit.

As an officer of the Crown Clarke already had the fame of being a man of action and more than that a man who acted first and reported later to his superiors.⁹ This was what he exactly did on reaching Malaya. Within less than three months of his arrival he dictated a treaty to Perak which, because of its tin wealth, was the major concern of the business groups in the Straits Settlements. The terms imposed on Perak were soon extended to States of Selangor and Sungei Ujong which together formed part of Negri Sembilan State brought into existence at a later date. Clarke completed this task in less than a year's time after his arrival.

According to the terms of agreement embodied in the Pangkor Engagement of January 1874, the Sultan of Perak was to receive a British Officer to be known as Resident. The clause VI of the Engagement required the Sultan to "receive and provide a suitable residence for a British Officer to be called Resident, whose advice must be asked for and acted upon [by the Sultan] on all questions other than those touching Malay Religion and Customs. "Clause X, another important clause of the Engagement indeed, virtually passed the State administration into the hands of the British Resident as the same stipulated "the collection and control of all revenues and the general administration of the country [to] be regulated under the advice of these Residents."¹⁰ J. W. W. Birch was the first Resident sent to Perak under the newly drawn Engagement.

Birch reached Perak in October, a few months after the Engagement was signed, to take up his assignment as Resident. But after setting up of his office Birch met with the Malayan hostility. The little over twelve-months period that Birch was there proved deadening for him. It was not so much the presence of this white-man as it was his policies and actions which caused the greatest ire among the various chiefs including Sultan Abdullah of Perak. The fact was that Malays as a ruling class were not prepared to accept the changes which the Pangkor Engagement as a treaty or Birch as a Resident had tried to introduce in the State. The way the Malays conducted their affairs in Perak, or elsewhere in the peninsula, was very much in contrast to that which the British attempted to implant. The natives' system of government was very much personal and autocratic. The Sultan was the head of the state. He made all the appointments as all kinds of authority emanated from him. The Sultan was held in the highest regard and his person was treated as most sacred. When he appeared in public it was always with most elaborate ritualistic ceremonies which surrounded the Sultan. He

was helped by a group of chiefs particularly in matters like succession to the throne. For administration purpose the state was divided into districts and villages called *kampung*. A district was usually based upon section of a river and its tributaries. Each district had its own Chief who derived his authority from the Sultan, but within his precincts acted more or less independently. For all practical purpose it was the Chief and not the Sultan who administered and had control over his assigned district. The revenues came mostly from taxes on crops and mining lands, and also from tolls levied on merchandise which passed along the river in either direction. Every Chief, under their own system of rule and administration, felt free to collect taxes if any kind of goods passed through his domain. It meant that the same commodity and quantity would be taxed several times over all along the transportation route if it was held by more than one Chief. Below the district stood the *kampung* which was under the charge of a headman called *penghulu*. The *penghulu* was responsible to the District Chief for all his actions and was not directly in touch with the Sultan.

Among the various Malay social customs one, which was the most striking, was the practice of debt-slavery. This was a custom whereby a subject whenever in need of money or goods go to a Chief and obtain a loan on promises of repayment within an agreed time. But if he failed to keep up with his promise, a most likely chance to happen and a very common phenomenon, he became his Chief's bondsman alongwith his entire family, wife and children included. This was a condition he had to live for the rest of his life. The custom, in comparison to other Malay States, was more common in Perak. However distasteful the prevailing Malay life and custom to an outsider the fact remained that this was the system which was largely understood and followed by them in the country. Although many of the traditions had fallen into decay through the passage of time, and the Sultan, for instance, had lost most of the pomp and show together with his position and authority which he once used to display, the Chiefs in the districts and *penghulu* in the Villages still retained most of their power and authority.¹¹ When Birch arrived he found the latter two exercising most of the authority in the districts and kompongs. Birch disliked all that. Moreover he was seized by the poor fiscal conditions and the debt-slavery system in the state. Already he had a very poor opinion of the natives, their ability to rule and manage the affairs in a proper and effective manner. He derived this conception out of his twenty-four years experience as a Colonial Officer in Ceylon. Having served in Ceylon Birch came to conclude about the natives there that they were "perfectly incapable of good government, or even of maintaining

order, without guidance and assistance from some strong hand."¹² Besides Birch also carried with him a strong sense of missionary zeal. Thus when he arrived in Perak he was fortified with his views as a colonial administrative officer and felt also endowed with the task of improving the conditions in Perak which he felt were most deplorable and needed immediate change. He felt he could expect good results only when native affairs were placed under strong British control. His personal considerations made him an enthusiastic advocate of British rule in Perak. Accordingly the Resident, Birch of course, was bound to exceed the limits which the Pankor Engagement had placed on his authority. By virtue of his nature he was not willing to distinguish a secular affair from the religious. As one who was also possessed of the missionary spirit the eradication of debt-slavery assumed for him a far-greater importance than the improvement of fiscal affairs of Perak.

Fired by his imaginations Birch, who had hardly been for two days in Perak, proceeded with his pre-conceived plan. This he made public through a proclamation. According to the orders issued he intended to create a police force for the maintenance of peace and to act as supervisor over the *penghulu* in the villages. Taxes on all rivers were to be collected by men appointed officially—this was perhaps to mend the financial conditions. For the elimination of slavery system Birch announced protection to the run-away slaves and did actually provide shelter to many of them. In most cases these run-away slaves proved belonging to either the Sultan or his Chiefs.

Birch was appointed as an adviser to the Sultan to help improve the conditions which were conducive for the maintenance of law and order in the State. But by acting the way he did was to prove most distasteful to the people and also to their rulers.

The ruler and his subjects alike looked with great suspicion at the activities of Birch. They first frowned at Birch's announcement of the measures intended for the improvement of state administration. But this attitude took a hostile form after Birch, in his zeal to make the state machinery including the Sultan and his Chiefs obey his orders, had a toll-house on one of the rivers burnt to ashes. On one occasion Birch proved so reckless as to threaten the Sultan with deposition if the latter refused to follow his instructions.¹³ Birch was supported in his actions by the Governor. When a complaint was made to the Governor by the Sultan about the mis-conduct and high-handedness shown by Birch, the latter sent his own report against the Sultan to which the Governor gave

full credence. Approving of his officer's action the Governor further observed that the Resident might tolerate minor irregularities but he must put down "by force if necessary all unlawful exactions of whatever nature so as to secure that whatever revenue is collected shall be for the state alone."¹⁴ Andrew Clarke during whose time Residence system came to be introduced was not the first and last Governor to have supported his officer in Perak. His successor William Jervois was even more anxious to see the Resident working with greater authority. Therefore he too in succession, extended support to Birch for remodelling the state and society in Perak. Unmindful of the feelings and activities running overtly and covertly among the ruler and his subjects against the behaviour of the Resident Jervois, being in full agreement with Birch, told him that "it really concerns us little what were the old customs of the country, nor do I consider they are worthy of any consideration."¹⁵ Clearly, the Governors and the first Resident sent to Perak had no regard for the local customs and traditions. The Resident was encouraged in his action by Governors of the Straits Settlements. However, being a man on the spot it was Birch's responsibility as Resident to have restrained himself and acted in a more cautious manner. But he did not. This was a fact which caused great unrest among the native population and also to the traditional men in authority. No wonder in unison they rose in revolt against Birch and caused him death by spearing his body through when he was taking bath inside his residence. The incident was an example that was caused by the utter disregard of Malay customs and traditions by the English Resident.

The disregard to the native customs and traditions was the result of that very strange notion which many British Officials carried with them long before the policy to intervene was devised for Malay's native states. Frank Swettenham, who himself served as a Resident for a number of years, has vividly described them. It was generally desired, observed Swettenham, that:

a British Officer or two, should be sent into a country where white men were unknown, where everything that could be wrong was wrong; where there was hardly any trade, no police, or other means of keeping order; and where two or three individuals claimed to be supreme. It was... supposed that ... the single white man would reduce everything to order...¹⁶.

But the murder of Birch proved how drastically misconceived was the idea of those who believed "the single white man would reduce everything to order" in a native state.

The conflict which arose between the Resident and the Chiefs of Perak was resolved, after the assassination of Brich, through the institution of a State Council,¹⁷ which was soon given to other Malay states brought under the Resident system.

The State council was to consist of eight members. Of them four were to be Malay, two Englishmen and two Chinese. Among the four Malays one was the Sultan himself, who acted as Chairman of the Council, and the rest were drawn from the district Chiefs. Their selection was however made on the basis of their political reliability and not on the basis of their rank. The two Englishmen were no other than the Resident and his Assistant. The inclusion of the Chinese was considered necessary as it would provide a strong lever over the Chinese communities that lived in Perak in large number but often disturbed peace and order placing obstructions in the way of smooth trade. Another reason for their inclusion in the State Council was that their population had outnumbered the native population and some of them had risen to be great merchants and taken even tin-mines on lease. With the passage of time, the Council membership in Perak was raised from eight to twelve in 1895. With the increase in membership there was a change in the representation of Malay and Chinese elements. There were now seven Malays and three Chinese. The number of Englishmen remained unchanged.

With the setting up of the Council such matters as tax-collection and any proposal relating thereto, land policy, appointment of village officers penghula, and fixation of pay and pensions of Officers and Chiefs, came under its discussion. Matters relating to justice involving death penalties were also discussed by the Council but the final decision rested with the Governor of the Straits Settlements. Elaborating on the functions of the State Council William Jervois, Governor of the Settlements, observed that in the main it connected:

with the Government of the country, influential natives and others, with whom the Government may consult regarding proposals for taxation, appointment, concessions, the institution or abolition of laws and other matters [and secure] in carrying into effect any measures that may be determined upon.¹⁸

The first council opened its deliberation in Perak in 1877. Sir Hugh Low the new Resident was mainly responsible for its setting and functioning in an effective manner. He is also to be credited for rescuing the Resident system from the native Malays hostility. Unlike Birch, who had neither the idea nor any regard for the native society and

its cultural traditions Low showed the greatest understanding and respect to all of them. Moreover he possessed knowledge of the region, its people, their language and customs. He realised from the start of his arrival that it was not possible to offend the leading men of the state and still hope to control them and their affairs. Therefore, on reaching Perak, he gave his utmost attention to the setting up of the Council which would provide him an opportunity to come close to the native elite and associate them with the work of administration. This will help him win their confidence and trust. With the State Council and Resident being a member of it an era of indirect British rule was inaugurated in Perak which was a substitute to the direct rule as was attempted earlier through Birch.

To ensure that Residents do not exceed their power and authority the Government in Singapore reminded them of their position and power. A directive issued in 1878 explained that they [Residents] have been appointed in the states as Advisers, not as rulers, and if they took upon them to disregard this principle they will ... be held responsible for any trouble which might occur."¹⁹ This was in fact a restatement of the directive issued earlier in 1876. Residents were instructed "not to interfere more frequently or to greater extent, than is needed."²⁰ But the advice seemed to have received little attention. Therefore the need to reasserting the policy of minimal interference.

The main aim of the British in Malaya was to protect the interest of their trading groups and protection of trade routes. If this could be secured without the use of force and no interference in the domestic affairs of the native states then why to go for coercive methods which would obviously involve heavy expenditure for maintaining their position. This in general represented the theoretical approach in so far as the application of Resident system was concerned in Perak and elsewhere in the Peninsula. But on practical side there was much more than the theory contemplated.

The Pankgor Engagement provided the Resident to act as an adviser to the Sultan. The idea being that in his capacity as an instrument of advice the Resident would help the Sultan establish a good government in his realm which in turn would pave way for the maintenance of law and order and thus be able to secure the safety of trade and trading routes so essential for the people and government of the Straits Settlements.

But the very terms of the Pankgor Engagement made it rather easier for the Resident to act the way he thought best. Clause X of the Engagement had the seeds of ambiguity. The said clause stipulated "collection and control of all revenues and the general administration of the country

be regulated under the advice of the Residents." But there was no government to be advised, observed Hugh Low who went there in 1877. "We must first create the Government to be advised"²¹ he added. This was largely done through the creation of the State Council.

Once the administrative structure was set-up it was expected that the Resident would have less effect and also less share in the framing of policies which in turn would minimise the amount of his direction in the running of State affairs. But what happened was to the contrary. After the Council was brought into existence it was the Resident and not the Sultan who made most of the decisions in the Councils. It was made possible due to the skilful management of Council proceeding by the Residents. Judging from the fact that the Perak Sultan was President of the Council one would assume that he would be the main factor behind all decisions. But what in actual effects happened was that acting as an adviser to the Sultan the Resident exerted influence on former and helped transform the Council entirely into an advisory body. Often the Resident acted independently if he found the decisions of the Council running counter to his own. This the Resident did by obtaining cooperation of the Straits' Governor. Because Council decisions had no meaning unless assented to by the latter. Thus if ever the Council decided in opposition to the views of the Residents there was the Governor to see that the decisions taken did not get his approval.

What authority did the President and members of the Council enjoy in comparison to the Resident can best be seen from the fact that at the time of submission of the annual budget of income and expenditure none but the Resident was at liberty to introduce changes if desired any. Strictly speaking, the Resident prepared "under the orders of Governor" business of each meeting of the Council and carried the measures and then advised the Sultan "to assent the minutes as a mere matter of form."²² An idea of the first Council proceedings opened in 1877 is a convincing evidence to it. Although the President, Sultan of course, was given a welcome befitting the personality, it was, however, the Resident alone who spoke and outlined the objectives and policies of the Council. In the end he asked for every one's assistance and cooperation to carry out those objectives successfully.²³

The situation was the creation largely of the personal motives, based and backed by spirit of imperialism of the Residents and Governor of the Crown Colony who acted most of the time in unison. Ostensibly Governor Robinson (1877-78) claimed to be impressing upon the Resi-

dents to do everything in the name of the Chief Native Authority, meaning the Sultan. But he also admitted that "practically it is not, and cannot be, strictly observed."²⁴ At times the ambiguity created by clause X of the Engagement was also deliberately exploited by Governors like Frederick Weld (1878-87). Weld helped a great deal in increasing power and authority of the Residents in spite of the presence of State Council. To Weld the idea of "advice" was "one of those fictions in which we seem to delight."²⁵ In his ideology and thinking Weld is to be identified with Birch. Like the latter Weld too wanted to teach "good lessons" to the natives. He was not satisfied with whatever Englishmen's presence had done so far in the native Malay states. He observed thus:

Nothing that we have done has taught them to govern themselves.... I doubt if Asiatics will ever learn to govern themselves, it is contrary to the genius of their race, of their history, of their religious systems, that they should. Their desire is a mild, just, and firm despotism that we can give them.²⁶

Weld had three alternatives in mind which he sent to the government at home in respect of British presence in Malaya. These were (1) to annex the territory brought so far under the indirect control of the British; (2) to withdraw from the areas; and (3) to extend gradually British influence so as to take it close to the borders of Siam, to-day's Thailand. Both, from the point of view of Weld and the Home Government "withdrawal" was not the right decision. Particularly Weld was not in favour; for he possessed the vision of a 'reformer' with regard to the region where he was formally the administrative head. Therefore he wanted to change the character of the Malayan people as a whole. What he foresaw was:

to help tame the wilderness and build up a young generation, to bring knowledge of the truth to savages and extend the rule of the British Empire.²⁷

But the idea of outright annexation was unacceptable to the Home government. The last course left open to follow was of gradual extension of power. The best way to achieve this objective could be through the State Councils. This of course would require helping the Resident inasmuch a way as possible. Weld was able to convince Kimberley, the Secretary of State for Colonies, who conceded to agree with this view stating that "this is the policy which should be pursued.... I would lay down no rules as to the appointment of Residents.... Our non-interference was I am inclined to think a mistake."²⁸ The new thinking

at home was the result of the opportunity which clause X had so conveniently provided. The presence of the Resident had further made it advantageous. The general impression that was created then was that by 1880 the Colonial Office was willing to accept the change in the earlier policy which had laid down that the Resident was to "advise" alone. Now it was said that in spite of its "determination to assert officially that the Resident was only an adviser, he was in reality much more."²⁹ This "much more" bore most fruitful results to the Home government in London. This was clearly to be seen in the extension of British control all over Malaya. The experiments carried into Perak proved a landmark in the history of British expansion and control in the region.

V

Conclusions

The origin of the British intervention in the Perak state is to be seen in their anxiety to protect business and other trading interests of the people living in the Settlements' territories.³⁰ The policy which was devised for this purpose was based on the introduction of British element in the native States. The intention was to help the native ruler in the better administration so that the anarchical conditions that plagued the area were brought under control and an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity was restored. This was considered a pre-requisite for the safe conduct of business and trade.

In the beginning the Colonial Office exercised a restraint keeping their intervention at a minimal stage. But it seems it had little or no control over their more ambitious Governors of the Straits and Residents sent to "advise" the native rulers. The Resident took maximum liberty for his being the 'man on the spot' and used his position and authority to his best advantage. The Governor and the Resident worked in close cooperation and the Home Government in London took not much notice of the activities of their officers posted in a far distant place. Whenever the situation was found not conducive or a state of revolt and unrest was noticed the London Government merely restricted itself to writing a note of advice sent to Residents through the Governor's office. The official policy at Home was more of connivance than taking a serious view of the activities of its officers who were ever more favourably disposed toward the idea of expansion of British authority over as much territory as possible. If the objective involved no expenditures for the British exchequer then there was no need to take stern view of these happenings. When the gains were to be made at no cost and British control could be extended

without fear of meeting challenges to its policy then why to stop its officers from following such a policy. The economic and other material benefits out of this policy were immense. The tin produce, one of the major items which Perak produced in the nineteenth century, was for instance adding constantly to the development and prosperity of Singapore as all trade of Perak must pass through it or Penang. When the tin demand rose at home also, due to the development of tin industry, the Perak-tin production started feeding that industry adding profits and better prospects for British commerce and trade. The extent of benefits earned in the pre and post colonial era of administrative control of Perak can be best had from the amount of tin extraction. In 1890s an estimated 7,000 tons of tin was produced in the state of Perak. The quantity rose to 20,000 in 1880s and by 1890s it reached a figure of 42,000 tons.³¹ Most of this tin production went to Britain and part of it to United States to feed the tin-plate industry where the metal was used for canning a variety of food products for home consumption and export abroad. Most of the businessmen involved in the export of tin were Englishmen and subjects of the British government.

Due to the control over native Malay States Singapore's prosperity also went up, in particular its shipping business thrived manifold. In 1868 Singapore handled shipping business approximating to 600,000 tons. By 1879 the tonnage rose to 1,600,000. Simultaneous to the rise in tonnage there was an increase in trading activity. In 1870 the import, mostly from Britain for the entire region, stood to \$ 39 million and export amounted to \$ 31½ million. But by 1879 both registered an increase so that the import figures in that year reached to \$ 56¼ million and export \$ 49 million.³² The export-import trade corresponded with the increase in the tin production in Perak. In 1862 the number of tin-mines there was not more than twenty-seven which, by 1870, rose to eighty. But in the following decade there were more than 478 tin-mines in one district of Perak alone.³³ All these achievements had been made possible due to no other reason but only by the administrative control of the British who, no doubt, were able to stabilise the peaceful conditions. The Perak state happened to be the first where such administrative control was introduced. The experiences and experiments having proved useful the system of administrative continued through the Resident was extended to other neighbouring states of Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. This process saw its completion in 1880s. This was how the British gained control over yet another region which was to prove most profitable and useful in terms of British economic and trade and also for other business

and commercial activities besides adding more territory to its already held colonial possessions.

NOTES

1. N. J. Ryan, *The Making of Modern Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur, 1968) p. 98.
2. For an extensive study on the change of status and reasons for frequent shifting of position in terms of administration of the Straits Settlements see C. M. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements, 1826-67* (London, 1972).
3. Horace Stone, *From Malacca to Malaysia, 1400-1965* (London, 1966), p. 127.
4. C. M. Turnbull, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-73.
5. Frank Swettenham, *British Malay* (London, 1948), p. 113.
6. Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 174-5.
7. Richard Allen, *Prospects and Retrospect* (London, 1968), p. 44.
8. Chai Hon-chan, *The Development of British Malaya, 1896-1909* (Kuala Lumpur, 1964), p. 2, J. M. Gullick, *Malaya* (London, 1963), p. 35.
9. C. D. Cowan, ed., "Sir Frank Swettenham's Perak Journal 1874-1876" in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malaya Branch*, XXIV: 4 (December 1951), p. 10.
10. For full text of the "Pankor Engagement" agreement see *ibid.*, XXVII: 4 (November 1954), pp. 105-6.
11. Most of the information given here on Malay's native system of administration is derived from J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political System of Western Malaya* (London, 1958).
12. Emily Sadka, ed., "Journal of Sir Hugh Low: Perak 1877-1889" in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Malaya Branch*, XXVII: 4 (November 1954), p. 12.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
15. Horace Stone, *From Malacca to Malaysia, 1400-1965* (London, 1966), p. 132.
16. Frank Swettenham, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-14.
17. For full details of the working of the State Council in Perak and other Malay states see Emily Sadka, "The State Councils in Perak and Selangor, 1877-1895" in K. G. Tregonning, ed., *Papers on Malayan History* (Singapore, 1962), pp. 89-119.
18. Philip Loh Fook-Seng, *The Malay States 1877-1895* (Singapore, 1966), p. 6.
19. Frank Swettenham, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
21. J. M. Gullick, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
22. Emily Sadka in K. G. Tregonning, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
23. Philip Loh Fook Seng, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
24. Emily Sadka in K. G. Tregonning, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
26. Philip Loh Fook Seng, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
30. For a detailed description see C. D. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya* (London, 1961).
31. Ling Chang Yah, *Economic Development of Modern Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur, 1967), p. 43.

32. N. J. Ryan, *The Making of Modern Malaya: A History from Earliest Times to 1966* (Kuala Lumpur, 1968), p. 110.
33. Ling Chang Yah, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

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