

## PROVINCIAL POLITICIANS AND THE ONE UNIT SCHEME (1954 – 1955)

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The origin and the growth of the idea of One Unit culminating in the establishment of one unified province of West Pakistan constitutes an important chapter in the history of Pakistan. It is a fascinating story for two reasons: one, it was a bold experiment conceived and executed by its framers to resolve some of the pressing constitutional problems facing the country; and two, it helps to understand the later constitutional and political developments which finally resulted in the imposition of a military regime in October 1958.

The Governor's Provinces of the Panjab, the North West Frontier (NWFP) and Sind, the Chief Commissioner's Province of Baluchistan and Karachi and the States of Bahawalpur and Khairpur and the Baluchistan States Union were merged into One Unit on 5 October 1955, to be called West Pakistan.

In October 1954, the process of getting provincial approval to the One Unit scheme was started and within few weeks the Provincial Assemblies met and approved the scheme by unanimous vote. The present study is aimed at explaining how all this came about so successfully despite vigorous opposition of the major provincial politicians. Perhaps it was a mixture of "skilful propaganda" and the use of "pistol to achieve political constitutional agreement."<sup>1</sup>

The NWFP Legislative Assembly was the first legislature to approve the One Unit scheme. A few weeks before the passage of this resolution, on 20 October, Sardar Abdur Rashid, while conceding that the One Unit idea might be "good in principle", had declared that it was not practicable and "therefore we cannot approve it." He, however, suggested that the wishes of the people and their representatives should be ascertained before taking a final decision. Personally he was in favour of zonal federation plan which the NWFP Muslim League Assembly Party had also approved on 23 October.<sup>2</sup> But despite these declarations the Provincial Legislature, which had a Muslim League majority, on 25 November, agreed to the merger of the NWFP with other provinces. The reasons for this volte face were not clear immediately. It was in July 1955, before his dismissal from Chief Ministership, that Sardar Abdur Rashid charged the Central Government with "non-fulfilment of pro-

mises" made to him. These promises pertained to representation of his officers in the new One Unit setup, the establishment of the capital of the new province of West Pakistan in the NWFP and the promise not to instal Dr. Khan Sahib as the Chief Minister.<sup>3</sup>

It was presumably after these promises that Sardar Abdur Rashid and his partymen had agreed to support the One Unit resolution in the Provincial Legislature. The resolution was passed without any difficulty as the opposition, the NWFP branch of the Awami League, led by the Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif, boycotted the session.<sup>4</sup>

The real opposition to the One Unit in the NWFP was staged outside the Assembly. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan who might have put up a resistance against the One Unit had already been replaced by Sardar Abdur Rashid. The opposition was led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who had all along been strongly hostile to the merger of the NWFP with other Provinces.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan had been released from detention in 1954 but was not allowed to enter the NWFP. During his stay in the Punjab, while the ban on him was still on, in a statement issued from Wah and released to the press by his son Khan Abdul Wali Khan, from Peshawar on 17 November 1954, he said that the "present atmosphere of inter-provincial jealousies and mistrust" does not allow him to support the One Unit scheme in principle. He further stated that any hasty step taken in this direction may "defeat the very purpose the scheme is proposed to serve."<sup>5</sup>

In July 1955, after the plenary session of the second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP), the ban on Abdul Ghaffar Khan's entry into the NWFP was lifted and he was given a grand reception by the Red Shirts and the NWFP Awami League, under the leadership of Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif. Abdul Ghaffar Khan attracted large crowds where-ever he went and spoke against One Unit. At Sadaryab, 20,000 persons are reported to have offered themselves to be imprisoned rather than live under One Unit government and the womenfolk volunteered to give their ornaments for the construction of an anti-Unit Centre.<sup>6</sup>

The Red Shirts and the NWFP Awami League finally set up an "Anti-Unit Front", on 1 August 1955, to resist the implementation of the merger scheme. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif toured the southern districts of the Province and addressed public meetings to explain and clarify their stand against One Unit.<sup>7</sup> The Front expanded its base by attracting the Wror Pakhtoon, the Ustaman Gul, the Sind Awami Mahaz and the Azad Pakistan Party into its fold. On 1 October 1955 a convention of the Frontier Anti-Unit Front was held at Peshawar under the presidentship of Khan Samin Jan Khan, the deputy opposition leader of the NWFP Legislative Assembly. It reiterated the demand that "a referendum or general election be held in the smaller units of Pakistan before the establishment of One Unit." It asserted that "the people of the Frontier Province will not

accept the decision to form One Unit unless the people's wishes were ascertained." In a resolution the "false propaganda" that Anti-Unit Front was creating hatred and discord between the Pathans and the Punjabis was condemned and it was declared that "all people in the Punjab are our brethren and we shall serve our country shoulder to shoulder with the Punjabis."<sup>8</sup>

Five days later, on 6 October, the consultative committee of Anti-One Unit Front, after two days deliberations at Karachi, declared that it would oppose the integration of West Pakistan "by all democratic and constitutional weapons at its command," since the One Unit bill according to it, had been passed in the face of "formidable opposition within and without the CAP by the people of minor Provinces inclusive of princely states and areas contiguous to them are opposed to the establishment of West Pakistan Unit." It also charged the representatives of the two major Provinces of East Bengal and the Punjab for having bartered away the autonomy of other Provinces and units for the sake of their regional autonomy and asserted that "the masses in Bengal and the Punjab are in no way responsible for the sins of wilful omission and commission of the present leaders."<sup>9</sup> The Front appreciated "Badshah Khan's constructive and constitutional methods to resist the imposition of the One Unit scheme, which apart from the denial of the democratic and political rights of the people of the smaller Provinces and states, established a bureaucratic regime over the entire West Pakistan." It further called upon the members and supporters of various parties supporting the anti-Unit agitation to remain peaceful and follow "the noble example of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's non-violent and constitutional methods."<sup>10</sup> In the concluding session of the Committee on 10 October it was demanded that tribesmen of the NWFP and Baluchistan should either be integrated with these two Provinces or be "allowed to organize themselves into a separate Province" so that they could escape "the Governor-General's rule which is tyranny and which the people can never tolerate under any circumstances."<sup>11</sup>

A brief reference may also be made here to the reaction of Afghanistan to the One Unit issue. Although the unification of various Provinces of West Pakistan into one Province was clearly an internal matter of Pakistan, the ruling clique in Kabul thought it fit to make it a matter of concern for them. The Afghan press in general and Radio Kabul in particular, day in and day out instigated the Pathans and Baluchis in order to create hatred between the people inhabiting different Provinces of Pakistan. As a result of sinister propaganda and 'go-ahead' blessings of the Afghan Government the Pakistan Embassy premises at Kabul were attacked by a violent mob in March 1955. Similar attacks were made on Pakistan consulates at Kandhar and Jalalabad where the Pakistan's National flag was pulled down and publicly torn.<sup>12</sup>

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, in his first-of-the-Month Broadcast on 1 April 1955 referring to these attacks observed that the consternation in Afghanistan was due to the fact that the rulers of Kabul "realize that the

merger of West Pakistan Provinces will sound the death knell of their Pakhtoonistan stunt with which they have hitherto sought to divert the attention of the Afghan people from their autocratic and oppressive regime." He, however, made it clear that "if the rulers of Afghanistan think that by issuing such threats they can browbeat us or prevent us from doing what is patently in our interests they are sorely and gravely mistaken." The outbursts of Radio Kabul, which he quoted at length in his speech, in his view, were precisely in line with the policy of Afghan Government which it had adopted at the time of the emergence of Pakistan. It was, therefore, not a matter of surprise that it "is today equally emphatic in its opposition to measures being taken for the consolidation of Pakistan."<sup>13</sup>

In the middle of October 1955 the Afghan Government formally protested to the Government of Pakistan saying that if the right of "self-determination" was not conceded to the Pathans living within the boundaries of Pakistan, Kabul would not remain a silent spectator. This note came in the wake of the Afghan Premier Mohammad Daud's broadcast from Radio Kabul that Afghanistan would break off diplomatic relations with Pakistan if the integration plan was implemented.<sup>14</sup> He, however, expressed a desire to come to Karachi and hold discussions with the Government of Pakistan on the condition that the implementation of One Unit scheme, which was to come into force on 14 October, was postponed. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, the Prime Minister, agreed to meet Mohammad Daud Khan but regretted his inability to postpone the unification of the provinces in West Pakistan. Since this was not acceptable to the Afghan Premier the proposed meeting did not materialize.<sup>15</sup> On the day following the implementation of One Unit the Afghan Charge d'Affairs in Pakistan lodged a protest with Pakistan Government "on the oppressive action of the formation of One Unit of West Pakistan and inclusion of Pakhtoon people in the unified Province?" In view of the "delicate situation" the Afghan Foreign Ministry instructed its envoy to return home.<sup>16</sup> Pakistan Government's consistent view was that the One Unit question was an internal affair and it could, therefore, not tolerate any interference from outside and as such it categorically rejected the protest note of Afghanistan. A number of noted political figures drawn from various parts of Pakistan namely Pir Sahib of Zakori Sharif, Qazi Mohammad Aslam, Raja Hasan Akhtar, Syed Zahid Husain and Khawaja Abdur Rehman in a joint statement regretted that the Afghanistan Government had sent the note of protest on a matter which was "a purely domestic and internal affair of our country." The interference was duly described as "contrary to international law, usages, amity and the principles and rules laid down by the United Nations charter". Rebutting the arguments of the Afghan rulers for a referendum to ascertain the wishes of the Pashto speaking people of Pakistan, the signatories of the statement reminded the Kabul Government of large and compact areas of Afghanistan where people of Iranian and Turkish stocks still spoke their

own languages. "How would it like", the statement said, "if they are asked to hold a plebiscite in those areas for deciding whether these Persian speaking and Turkish speaking people should remain with Afghanistan or go elsewhere?"<sup>17</sup>

As a measure of retaliation to the withdrawal of Afghan envoy, the Government of Pakistan also recalled its ambassador from Afghanistan. Although it was pointed out that this step did not mean the breaking of diplomatic relations, it was none-the-less described as an indication of "strained relations" between the two countries.<sup>18</sup>

The province of Sind witnessed a bitter political conflict much before the bill was formally passed by the Provincial Assembly on 12 December 1954. The severe opposition to the unification scheme was apparent from the fact that before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) on 24 October, the Provincial Chief Minister, Abdus Sattar Pirzada had not only himself opposed the scheme publicly, but had also obtained the signatures of 74 out of 110 members of the Assembly in support of his stand.

The opposition to One Unit was not confined to the members of the Sind Assembly. On 8 November 1954, the last day of Pirzada's Chief Ministership, G. M. Syed, Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Ghulam Mustafa Bhurgari and Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur met in Karachi and endorsed Pirzada's stand against One Unit. Encouraged by the support of these leaders, Pirzada communicated his refusal to the Governor to lend the desired assistance in favour of One Unit.<sup>19</sup> It was followed by his prompt dismissal and the swearing-in of Mohammad Ayub Khuro as the new Chief Minister. The latter had evidently agreed to support the One Unit, not only because the central Government and the Muslim League leadership were determined to make West Pakistan a unit but also in the hope that he would eventually be able to find "a place in the One Unit cabinet."<sup>20</sup>

The central Government had anticipated Pirzada's refusal to toe the line in favour of One Unit, and as such were fully prepared to meet the situation. The language of the two secret documents, written during the second half of 1954, though anonymous, are believed to have been the work of Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana, clearly indicates not only the expected turn of events but also a ready-made solution to overcome it:

Sindh holds the kernel, Pirzada leads the opposition; his past symbolises it. He is also an exotic growth which withers without patronage. Present indications are that he is building up to a tactical show of strength which would be a demonstration at once of his own support and one unit hostility which would queer the pitch to a speedy solution. A hostile resolution passed anywhere would take months to undo, and we have only weeks. Pirzada, therefore, must go at once. He must be immediately replaced by a person who has the character and the authority to prepare the ground for Sind's acceptance of one-unit. This denouncement should take place within days if not hours.<sup>22</sup>

Pirzada's own reaction too was that his dismissal had come about because of his "firm stand against the One Unit issue" and that Mohammad Ayub

Khuro had been brought in as the Chief Minister to shoulder "the responsibility of making the members of the Assembly and the people of Sind to accept this move."<sup>23</sup> G.M. Syed, a firm opponent of One Unit, was not dismayed by Pirzada's dismissal. He congratulated him on his "bold stand" and his preference "to be dismissed rather than to submit against the wishes of the entire people of the Province." He was also convinced that Khuro was living in "a fools paradise" if he thought that he could carry the people or the Assembly with him on this issue.<sup>24</sup> Kazi Fazlullah was equally sure that One Unit would be "harmful to the interests of Pakistan and smaller Provinces" and that "any member in the Sind Legislative Assembly will ever vote in favour of this proposal." The Kazi had no doubt in his mind that the One Unit proposal was "doomed to fail when it comes before the Assembly."<sup>25</sup>

Khuro was in a better position and a more accomplished tactician than the opponents of the One Unit. He did not take risks and convened the Assembly session only assuring the passage of the bill without any serious opposition. As a precautionary measure, a number of politicians, such as Abdus Sattar Pirzada, G.M. Syed, Pir Ilahi Bakhsh and Kazi Fazalullah, were detained on different charges. Even the Speaker of the Assembly, Ghulam Ali Khan Talpur, was also arrested on the charge of "conspiring to murder the members of the Sind Cabinet."<sup>26</sup>

An influential Sindhi daily *Al-Wahid* was banned for a year for publishing material "prejudicial to the security of Pakistan."<sup>27</sup> These measures instead of containing the opposition led to province-wide protests and demonstrations. On 22 November 1954 "Sind Day" was observed throughout the province. At the Sind Madrassah-tul-Islam, Karachi, the students of various colleges and schools held a meeting and protested against the One Unit plan, the arrest of G.M. Syed and the ban on the newspaper *Al-Wahid*. A procession of ladies and children on camel carts holding black flags and wearing black bands came out from Arambagh and raised slogans against the repressive measures of the Government. Schools and colleges remained closed in many other cities. In Mirpur Khas 2,000 students took out a procession chanting "down with One Unit", "down with Khuro" and condemned the ban on newspapers. Similar protest meetings were held in Nawabshah and Kandiaro and a number of students were imprisoned there.<sup>28</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then a prominent lawyer of Sind, issued a press statement, on 24 November, in support of these demonstrations, which read as follows:

It is most painful to have baseless accusations hurled at us merely because we are striving to preserve all that is dear and sacred to us. If it really was a question of vested interests, a feudal lord would not have become a Chief Minister in order to ram One Unit down our throats.

As for genuine fears—they are indeed genuine. No province or administrative device can erase them in the near future. The history of the last seven years serves as a witness.

Sind . . . stands for . . . equitable distribution of political power between all the provinces and not merely between the two major units.<sup>29</sup>

Undeterred by these protests, Mohammad Ayub Khuro presented the One Unit resolution in the Assembly on 11 December 1954 and got it passed by an overwhelming majority. Out of 109 members, 104 were present in the House and 100 voted in favour of the scheme.<sup>30</sup> To synchronize with this historic session of the Sind Assembly a public demonstration hailing the formation of One Unit and emphasizing its role as the panacea of all the problems of the people was also arranged.<sup>31</sup> Khuro had indeed worked very hard to bring about the favourable climate in which One Unit bill was passed. One opposition leader's comment was that "Hyderabad was converted into a military camp to decide a purely constitutional issue. The unification proposal has been passed with the aid of province-wide intimidations, coercion, repression and suppression of public opinion."<sup>32</sup>

The Punjab was the only province where the unification scheme did not arouse any serious opposition. The provincial Chief Minister, Malik Firoz Khan Noon, while introducing the resolution in support of One Unit in the Provincial Assembly on 30 November 1954, not only welcomed the decision to implement the scheme, but also urged the authorities to take necessary steps for its speedy implementation. The members of the Assembly whether sitting on the treasury benches or belonging to the opposition supported the motion. Indeed the members of the opposition were no less enthusiastic than the Government Party. Although the leader of the Opposition, Mian Abdul Bari, was not present in the House, none-the-less through a message he pledged his party's full support to the motion which was duly conveyed to the House by the Chief Minister.<sup>33</sup>

A few months later on 21 May 1955, Malik Firoz Khan Noon's Ministry was dismissed by the Punjab Governor Mian Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani. The next day Malik Noon addressed a Press conference and came out with an explanation about his dismissal that it was the result of his differences with the Central Government. Elaborating the causes of these differences he said that although he was a strong supporter of One Unit, he proposed an "amalgamation of West Pakistan Legislatures" instead of the dissolution of various provincial legislatures. He was equally opposed to the manner in which Dr. Khan Sahib was designated as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan by the Central Government.<sup>34</sup>

Later on, speaking in the CAP on the One Unit Bill, on 26 August 1955 he again reverted to the manner of his dismissal. He said that the day he received the order of his dismissal he immediately rang up the then Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra to enquire about the reasons for his removal from the office of the Chief Minister. The conversation that took place between him and the Prime Minister was reproduced by Malik Noon in the following words:

Is it your order? He said, No. It is not my order and the cabinet has never given this decision. I will ask Mr. Gurmani just now why he is dismissing the Ministry. So he rang up Gurmani. I also rang up Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and he, like a wise man,

said, 'please consult the Prime Minister,' I also rang up Iskander Mirza, but he also like a wise man said that you better consult Choudhary Mohammad Ali and the Prime Minister. So, I went back to the Prime Minister again. In the meantime the Prime Minister had rung up the Governor in Lahore as to why he was ordering dismissal of Noon Ministry and that how could he dismiss the Ministry. He said His Excellency the Governor-General before he went to Zurich on the 11th May, gave him a written order to dismiss the Ministry. So Mr. Mohammad Ali's mouth was shut up and his Cabinet did not know what to do.<sup>35</sup>

As regards the Princely States, only two states — Bahawalpur and Khairpur — had legislative assemblies. The Amir of Bahawalpur, after consulting Major General Iskandar Mirza, the Interior Minister, Government of Pakistan,<sup>36</sup> was the first to fall in line with the wishes of the Central Government. On 2 November 1954, he announced the dismissal of the Cabinet and the suspension of the State constitution and thus cleared all the obstacles in the way of One Unit. "The step now taken might involve sacrifices on the part of some" he said, "but if the sacrifices are for a stronger and greater Pakistan, none of us should feel unhappy, rather we should stand firm in our conviction that we are the first to make a sacrifice for the solidarity of the country and the nation."<sup>37</sup> In a later statement he dispelled the impression in certain quarters that the people of Bahawalpur were against the integration scheme. "They," he said, "have never stood in opposition to the proposal of One Unit."<sup>38</sup>

The Khairpur State Assembly followed suit in a unanimous resolution in favour of merger with other Provinces under One Unit on 10 November 1954. The Chief Minister, Mumtaz Hassan Qizilbash, described the resolution as a "historical one." The resolution, however, made it clear that:

If circumstances do not allow for the formation of a single unit in West Pakistan the people of Khairpur would not agree to the merger of the state with any adjoining Province or Provinces, as such a step would be contrary to the interests of the people who are fully conscious of the great economic and social advance made by the state in recent years, so much so that the state is even ahead of other states and provinces of Pakistan in several respects.<sup>39</sup>

Apparently the resolution passed by the Khairpur Assembly seemed to be a willing step, but the reality according to one source, was that the resolution was passed meekly and unanimously after looking at the fate of the Bahawalpur and Sind Assemblies.<sup>40</sup> Otherwise the Assembly members had called for a referendum to decide the matter.<sup>41</sup>

The rulers of the Baluchistan States Union, namely of Kalat, Makran, Lasbela and Kharan had agreed to merge their States with the centrally-administered Baluchistan as early as October 1954. Their agreement to become a part and parcel of One Unit was signed by Khan-i-Azam of Kalat on 1 January 1955 for which he had been duly authorized by the Baluchistan States Union.<sup>42</sup> That the Khan signed the instrument of accession under duress, not out of his own free will, is indicated by the following account:

The Khan was ordered to come to Karachi in December for consultation with the Minister for States and Frontier Regions. It is said that the Khan was given an

instrument and told that he could leave the room in which he sat, and Karachi, only after he had signed the agreement integrating his state.<sup>43</sup>

After the various Provinces and States had agreed to, or had been made to agree to, the acceptance of One Unit, the Governor-General on 17 December 1954 issued an order for the establishment of a Council for the Administration of the Province of West Pakistan.<sup>44</sup> This Council submitted its report in February 1955 and in the following months an ordinance was issued for constituting the Province of West Pakistan. A few days later Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani and Dr. Khan Sahib were designated as the Governor and Chief Minister respectively of the new Province. Everything seemed to go according to plan but one important factor intervened to upset the proposed arrangement. The ruling of the Sind High Court declaring the dissolution of the CAP illegal was reversed by the Federal Court of Pakistan on 12 July 1955. The Federal Court also gave a ruling that it was beyond the powers of the Governor-General to amalgamate the Provinces.<sup>45</sup> The scheme of unification had, therefore, to be postponed until the election of the second CAP which had its first meeting in July 1955. And the first task to which the new Assembly addressed itself was to pass the One Unit Bill on 30 September, 1955, by a vote of 43 to 13.

## NOTES

1. Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, New York, 1980, p. 42.
2. *The Pakistan Times*, 21 and 24 October, 1954.
3. *Ibid.*, 16, July 1955.
4. *Ibid.*, 26 November 1954.
5. *Ibid.*, 18 November 1954.
6. D.G. Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan*, New Delhi, 1967, p. 489.
7. *Pakistan Times*, 2 August 1955.
8. *Ibid.*, 2 October 1955.
9. *Ibid.*, 6 October 1955.
10. *Ibid.*, 9 October 1955.
11. *Ibid.*, 11 October 1955.
12. Anonymous, *One Unit and Kabul's Fulminations*, Karachi, n.d., p. 2.
13. For full text of the speech, see *Ibid.*, pp. 1-16.
14. *Pakistan Times*, 15 October 1955.
15. *Ibid.*, 16 October 1955.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, 19 October, 1955.
19. Faiz Moahmamd Soomro, "Enigma of Sind" in *Pakistan Observer*, 1 July, 1970.
20. William S. Metz, *Pakistan: Government and Politics*, Berkeley, 1956, p. 143. Mohammad Ayub Khuro had been twice debarred from holding any public office by the PRODA of 1949. Notwithstanding the disqualification, he was appointed the Chief Minister.
21. Copies of the documents were given to the author by Sardar Abdur Rashid.
22. *Document No. 2*, p. 3.
23. *Dawn*, 9 November 1954.

24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, 11 November 1954.
26. Metz, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
27. *Dawn*, 13 November 1954.
28. *Ibid.*, 23 November 1954.
29. Z.A. Bhutto, *Politics of the People, Reshaping Foreign Policy, 1948-1966*, Islamabad, n.d., Vol. I, p. 58.
30. The four members who opposed the resolution were Pir Ilahi Bakhsh (Muslim League), Sheikh Khurshid Ahmed (Muslim League) Abdul Hamid Jatoi (Muslim League) and Ghulam Mustafa Bhurguri (Sind Awami Mahaz). The five absent members were Pirzada Abdus Sattar, Shafqat Moosvi, Syed Hasan Bakhsh Shah, Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur and G.M. Syed, *Pakistan Times*, 12 December 1954.
31. *Ibid.*, 12 December 1954.
32. Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi's press statement in *Dawn*, 14 December 1954.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 361.
34. *Pakistan Times*, 22 May 1955.
35. *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Karachi, 1955, Vol. I, Part I, 1955, pp. 327-28.
36. *Pakistan Times*, 3 November 1954.
37. *Dawn*, 13 November 1954.
38. *Ibid.*, 23 November 1954.
39. *Pakistan Times*, 11 November 1954.
40. Both these Ministries were dismissed.
41. Wayne Ayres Wilcox, *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation*, New York, 1963, pp. 183-84.
42. For full text of the agreement see *ibid.*, pp. 240-42.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
44. *Pakistan Times*, 18 December 1954.
45. Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, London, 1958, pp. 188-89.