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HINDU-MUSLIM SEPARATISMS IN INDIA: A SURVEY OF THE MUSLIM RULE

The history of Muslim rule in India, writes Aziz Ahmad, is "a history of Hindu-Muslim religio-cultural tensions, interspersed with movements or individual efforts at understanding, harmony and even composite developments". These efforts, however, he continues, touched "the fringe" and "the external element of their coexistence". The Hindus and Muslims failed to imbibe the "cohesive" features and soon gave way to "divisive forces".¹ And even an ardent advocate of composite development of Hindu-Muslim culture agrees that, "the content of the two did not quite coincide and fuse".² This failure, indeed, according to Hugh Tinker, had the effect of pushing the two communities into "separate traditions" to await the outcome of the British raj in the nineteenth century.³

In this paper, an attempt will be made to trace the origins of these "separate traditions", outlining the role of both "cohesive" and "divisive" forces in the evolution of Hindu-Muslim separatisms in India. In this sense, an appraisal will be made of political, social, economic and religious conditions that have had a direct bearing on Hindu-Muslim relations. The argument is that the balance of Hindu-Muslim relations has always weighed on the side of separateness and both communities, notwithstanding untiring efforts of the Muslim rulers and centuries of interaction and contact, moved on separate courses.

The arrival of the Muslims as rulers in India dates back to the Arab conquest of Sind in 711 A.D. under the command of Muhammad Bin Qasim. Mahmud of Ghazna (d.1030) was the next important ruler. However, despite his numerous successful invasions of the subcontinent he paid little heed to the foundation of Muslim rule in northern India. After the lapse of almost another two centuries this task was accomplished by Sultan Mu'izz al-Din Mohammad Bin Sam Ghuri. Although Ghuri did not live long to enjoy the fruit of his victory, the vacuum caused by his assassination in 1206 was filled by Qutb al-Din Aybak, the foremost of his slave governors of Indian domains. The dynasty founded by the latter and continued by other princes of servile origin was subsequently known to history as the 'slave dynasty' and was followed in its turn by a series of Turco-Afghan dynasties, namely the Khaljis, the Tughluqs, the Sayyids, Lodis, and finally the Mughuls whose rule was terminated and replaced by the British in 1857.

The attempts on the part of Muslim rulers to enforce their authority over the local chiefs and people of India, however, were met with serious opposition. Hindus in general and the Rajputs in particular put up a very stiff resistance. It

was not until the second battle of Panipat, in 1556, that Muslim power, under Akbar, emerged victorious over the contending Hindu forces, thereby establishing the supremacy of Muslim rule in India.⁴ A century and a half of Muslim rule under successive Mughul emperors, namely Akbar (1556-1605), Jahangir (1605-1627), Shah Jahan (1627-1658), and Aurangzeb (1658-1707) was indeed the high point of Muslim power and glory in India. While the Mughul dynasty continued in power until the last emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar was deposed in 1857, paramount Muslim power in India barely exceeded beyond the middle of the eighteenth century.⁵

The Muslim rule in India began with an effort at Hindu-Muslim understanding. The Muslims looked upon India as their home as much as the Dravidians and the Aryans of the old,⁶ and tried to make their rule in India compatible to their subjects in as many ways as possible. Right from the days of Muhammad bin Qasim and Mahmud of Ghazna Muslim rulers like Muhammad Tughluq, Ala al-Din Khalji, Sher Shah Suri, Islam Shah Suri and others sought Hindu-Muslim "amity and equality of rights", and even entrusted important civil and military responsibilities to the Hindu officers. During the reign of Islam Shah the Hindus rose to the most important positions in the government.⁷ The result was that not only the Hindus came to share with Muslims the responsibilities of power and office but great strides were made in the progress of common cultural institutions. Hindi, Bengali, Marathi, Punjabi and other northern Indian languages absorbed elements from Persian and Arabic and blossomed forth in a renaissance of literary activity.⁸

The efforts to promote Hindu-Muslim harmony reached their full potential under Akbar's concept of an Indian "synthesis".⁹ This synthesis had three aspects: political, economic and religious. Politically, Akbar realising that the Hindus would not support the Muslim rule unless they were allowed to join in "a partnership in the empire",¹⁰ incorporated them, particularly the Rajputs, into "the top officialdom as a matter of policy."¹¹ Raja Todar Mall became Akbar's Finance Minister and for some time even his Prime Minister. Man Singh, Bhagwan Das, Rai Singh and Todar Mall served at various times as governors of provinces. Out of his 137 *mansabdars* (ranking service, based upon a command of a number of horsemen) of 1,000 and above, 14 were Hindus. Out of 415 *mansabdars* of 200 or above, 51 were Hindus.¹² Akbar, indeed, encouraged the formation of Muslim army in India into a "true example of the synthesis of Hindu and Muslim ways". Though the cavalry, so important in the Turco-Afghan rule of India, remained an elite corps and a Muslim monopoly, an elephant branch, which was to be massed behind the infantry, was filled with the Hindus.¹³ The result was a "politico-military service" that brought "the motive of honour to the service of the crown and united the communities in a joint membership."¹⁴

By abolishing *jizya* (poll tax) in 1564,¹⁵ Akbar not only removed a "major source" of Hindu "economic discontent" with Muslim rule but also created "a

common citizenship", for all his subjects, Hindus and Muslims alike.¹⁶ In addition, Akbar encouraged tax remission in times of famine or other natural calamities, expressing "greater understanding and sympathy" with the predominantly Hindu peasant population.¹⁷

In order to establish "a permanent harmony" between the Hindus and the Muslims,¹⁸ Akbar even pushed the "synthetic" effort on to the religious plane. He secured a "document",¹⁹ signed by the principle ulama and jurists of the day,²⁰ stating:

...that the king of Islam, Amir of the Faithful, shadow of God in the world, ... whose kingdom God perpetuate, is a most just, a most wise, and a most God-fearing king. Should therefore, in future, a religious question come up, regarding which the opinions of the Mujtahids are at variance and His Majesty, in his penetrating understanding and clear wisdom, be inclined to adopt, for the benefit of the nation and as a political expedient, any of the conflicting opinion which exist on that point, and issue a decree to that effect, we do hereby agree that such a decree shall be binding on us and on the whole nation...This document has been written with honest intentions, for the glory of God, and the propagation of the Islam ...²¹

No sooner had he obtained this document, providing a focus for a higher authority than the traditional religious scholars, Akbar propounded his 'divine faith', *Din-i-Elahi*, based on elements drawn from Hinduism and Zoroastrianism as well as Islam.²² He prohibited the slaughter of cows and the eating of their flesh,²³ initiated Hindu ceremonies in the Court, and even began to wear the Hindu mark on his forehead.²⁴ In addition, he started worshipping the sun. He kept a perpetual fire burning as he sat in the *Jharoka Darshan* (the Salutation Balcony) muttering spells which the Hindus strung together in Sanskrit verse for his benefit. He not only brought Zoroastrian priests to the court to explain the mysteries of their religion but also had the solar year reckoned in all official records (in place of the Arab/Muslim lunar year). He even initiated the festival of the solar new year as an official reckoning.²⁵ This Parsi-Hinduism, in all probability, remained with Akbar till his death,²⁶ causing some alarm and anguish among the orthodox Muslims.²⁷ The net result of Akbar's policy, however, in the estimate of Sri Ram Sharma, a leading writer on the religious policy of the Mughuls, was

.... fraternization of the learned in the two communities, as they were drawn together, their angularities were rubbed off, their hatred of each other decreased. The Hindus came to consider the Muslims less of a defiling influence, when they met them on terms of equality in the private audience-chamber, on the battlefield, and in the administrative secretariat. The Muslims ceased to think of the Hindus as an offence against their religion when they stood shoulder to shoulder with them in the greater enterprise of governing India.²⁸

Akbar not only encouraged religious "toleration" in official circles but also promoted a "tolerant attitude" at the public level.²⁹ It was only because of

Akbar's keen reception to the influence of the Bhakti movement³⁰ that Hindu artisans, traders, weavers, cultivators and shopkeepers could pursue their professions without having to suffer any loss at the hands of Muslim officers of the State.³¹ Akbar, in fact, created a climate of opinion in which Bhakti movement could even succeed in winning the allegiance of some of the Muslims.³²

Akbar's policy of "religious toleration" was followed by his successors, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. Jahangir did not differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims in public employment. Under Shah Jahan a Hindu was considered "the mightiest subject and the highest public servant". The imperial Finance Minister and several provincial Ministers of Finance, besides several military commanders of great fame continued in the Mughul service. Maharaja Jaswant Singh rose to the rank of a *mansabdar* of 6,000. Aurangzeb, like Akbar, continued with the policy of incorporating Hindus into his administration. In the reign of Aurangzeb no less than 148 *mansabdars* above the rank of 1,000 were Hindus. Among them were the only three *mansabdars* of 7,000 — Raja Jai Singh, Maharaja Jaswant Singh and Raja Sahu, Shivaji's grandson.³³ Aurangzeb, in fact, insisted that "public services must accrue only on the basis of ability and merit".³⁴ Although Aurangzeb revived the collection of *jizya*, it was "not necessarily the outcome of any feeling of dislike that Aurangzeb entertained towards the Hindus or their faith". The conception of the Islamic state made it obligatory upon him to order the levy of the *jizya* on non-Muslims as a substitute for military service which was obligatory on all Muslims.³⁵ Thus Aurangzeb exempted minors, women, slaves of all kinds, the blind, the mentally deficient, the unemployed, cripples and impoverished from the payment of *jizya* Hindus who were willing to serve the state were, of course, exempt from its payment.

Aurangzeb granted land and money to Hindu temples, and Hindu priests.³⁷ The large number of documents found all over India vouchsafe for Aurangzeb's religious toleration.³⁸ Aurangzeb, in fact neither interfered with the celebration of religious worship of his Hindu subjects nor forbade the Hindu priests from teaching the Hindus.³⁹ In the words of Rajendra Prasad, one of the leading figures of the Indian National Congress and eventually President of India (1950-62), thus:

The attitude of the Muslim conquerors had, on the whole, been one of toleration, and in spite of the fanatical zeal manifested by some of them at times, it may be safely asserted that there had been a continuous attempt from the earliest days to deal with the Hindus fairly.⁴⁰

In encouraging the spirit of Hindu-Muslim understanding and harmony the Muslim rulers were not alone. An equally keen effort in this connection was made by some of the most prominent *Sufis* of the time who tried to build "ideological bridges" between the two communities.⁴¹ The contribution of *Sufis* like Nizam-al-Din Awliya (1238-1328) is in point who with his piety and exemplary conduct inspired following not only from among his co-religionists but also from the Hindus. The leaders of the Bhakti movement, Kabir (1440-1518) and

Guru Nanak (1469-1538) in particular were inspired by his ideals and practices.⁴² Acknowledging the influence of these *Sufi* saints on the Bhakti message, Rabindranath Tagore, thus, recorded: "We should have no hesitation in admitting freely that this message was inspired by contact with Islam".⁴³

This powerful religious impulse which drew its inspiration from Islamic sources, however, did not last long. As "the line of these enlightened, large-hearted, generous humanists began to shrivel,"⁴⁴ the Hindus reacted sharply. The followers of Guru Nanak indeed went on to found a new religion, the Sikh religion, under their sixth Guru, Govind. Kabir's verses became part of the Sikh scripture.⁴⁵ The Bhakti movement, thus, rather than ranging above Hinduism and Islam, developed into some sort of "neo-Hinduism".⁴⁶ The "bridges" devised or sought to be constructed to unite the Muslims and Hindus themselves collapsed under the sheer weight of "mutual fear and antipathy," leading to further estrangement.⁴⁷ The efforts of Akbar and his successors also proved to be of no avail.

The trouble in fact started in the later part of Aurangzeb's reign,⁴⁸ though it developed into a full-blown crisis only after his death in 1707. The immediate cause of the crisis⁴⁹ was Aurangzeb's military campaigns against the Marathas and the other southern rulers. Aurangzeb's efforts to extend Mughul authority beyond the northern plains not only broke the so-called "Indian synthesis" that emerged under Akbar⁵⁰ but also aroused a "definite spirit of Hindu resistance" to Muslim rule.⁵¹ Shivaji (1627-1680), the Maratha rebel,⁵² raised the slogan of Hindu rule, *Hindu pad padshahi* and fought numerous guerilla battles against Aurangzeb. Although, he could not succeed against Aurangzeb, he laid the foundation of a movement towards the political regeneration of the Hindus. Mahadeo Govind Ranade, in his study of the Marathas, writes:

....the rise of the Maratha power was due to the first beginnings of what one may well be the process of nation-making. It was not the outcome of the successful enterprise of any individual adventurer. It was the upheaval of the whole population, strongly bound together by the common affinities of language, race, religion and literature, and seeking further solidarity by a common independent political existence... It was a national movement or upheaval in which all classes co-operated.⁵³

The Maratha rising was not isolated. In northern India, Jats, Rajputs and Sikhs, taking advantage of the Mughul empire's weak position, were also in revolt. Jats went so far in their anger against Muslims and the Muslim rule that they did not hesitate to desecrate Akbar's tomb "as a vengeance for his having married Hindu women."⁵⁴ The Rajputs were the "last defenders of Hindu power" in India.⁵⁵ They had maintained their independence until the time of Akbar and his successors and it was in the end largely with the aid of Rajput princes acting as their generals and ministers that the Mughuls completed their conquest of India.⁵⁶ Now, as before, they began to assert their independence.⁵⁷ In Central India, the grip of the Mughuls was wrenched away by the

Sikhs, who took control of the Punjab. These forces, strong and ambitious, demanded *Hindustan* for the Hindus. It was, according to Stanley Lane-Poole, "a religious war, centred round the phantom of the Moghul empire."⁵⁸

This was not surprising. India was held by the Muslims mainly by the strength of their arms at the centre. Now that the central authority was weak, the "persistent principle of regional autonomy"⁵⁹ essential to the life of India reasserted itself. The "communal units" became isolated and acted as dividing factors. Political unification, however, effected by an external rule "centralized, imposed, or constructed", as was done in Rome or ancient Persia, by a conquering dynasty was not possible in India in the first place. The "magnitude" and the "peculiarity" of the Indian situation, wrote Mackenzie Brown, a keen writer on India, was such that "the easy method of a centralized empire could not truly succeed in India, while yet seemed the only device possible and was attempted again and again with a partial success that seemed for the time and a long time to justify it, but always with an eventual failure."⁶⁰ Besides "the practical exigencies"⁶¹ of government over a vast population and a large area, a major cause of the failure was the absence of spiritual and cultural unity in India.⁶² Indeed the "inherent weakness" of Muslim rule⁶³ in India was that the Hindus regarded the Muslims as "Outsiders",⁶⁴ a people whose "spirit dwelt apart" in Central Asia or Iran.⁶⁵ The Muslim rulers, thus, could do no more than win the political support of "the higher castes", brought out in the organization of the *mansabdari* system. The Hindu masses, by and large, remained indifferent and unmoved.⁶⁶

But then it could not be helped either. Hinduism, says Wilfred Cantwell Smith, could never "outgrow its tribalism", could never aspire or claim to be "anything higher than the religion of a group", or rather "a series of sub-groups" embodied in the caste system".⁶⁷ To the Hindu, a Muslim was "an outcast out-caste, an Untouchable with whom dealings must not be so intimate as to transgress formal rules". This exclusion was "religious", but with Hinduism, religion means "social" in a highly evolved traditional way. The result was that Hindu attitude presented India with "a communal situation" throughout the centuries, sometimes less, sometimes more, a problem.⁶⁸ Thus, according to Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Hindu communalism, for all practical purposes was "never entirely dormant", though it made its "peace" with the Muslim conquerors and a substantial number of Hindus were even "reconciled" to the Muslim rule, but deep down "hostility" always "persisted among conscious sections".⁶⁹ The efforts of Marathas, Jats, Rajputs and Sikhs constituted in reality "a continuation and externalization" of Hindu communalism.⁷⁰

There was no way the Muslims could help arrest or obliterate Hindu communalism. This is how the Hindu social order was founded and indeed operated. Hinduism, with its distinctive customs and practices, traditions and norms and ways of life and social intercourse, revealed how rigid and in some respects hostile the communal sentiment could be. Hindu laws even prohibited inter-

marriages and inter-dining with the Muslims. The interaction between the two communities thus could not help but foster "a greater degree of mutual withdrawal, antipathy, and orthodox insularity".⁷¹

This led naturally to the rise of Hindu-Muslim "separatism" in the eighteenth century. Shah Waliullah (1703-1762), a religious divine of Delhi, who saw the sad plight of the Muslims in India not only propounded a philosophy of the "ideal state", which sought the establishment of "an independent Muslim state", where "true Islam, freed from semi-pagan practices could be practised" but also invited Ahmad Shah Abdali (1722-1773), the ruler of Afghanistan to India to defend Islam "in a situation where Muslims were losing the physical power to do so."⁷² Abdali came to India and defeated the Maratha-Jat forces at Panipat in 1761. But the Muslims had by then lost so much in vitality that they could not hold India back. Their plight was indeed too severe to be arrested at this point.⁷³ The coming of the British on the scene further aggravated the elemental clash between the Muslims and the Hindus.

The advent of the British stirred the Hindus. They lost no time in demonstrating awareness of the need "to protect and promote" their special interests, "religious" in particular.⁷⁴ "When the British took over the rulership of North India", thus wrote K.M. Panikkar, "Hinduism for the first time in 700 years stood on a plane of equality with Islam".⁷⁵ Thus, there developed "a new self-conscious awareness" of differences and distinctions,⁷⁶ promoting "religious revivalism" based on different sources of inspiration,⁷⁷ the Hindus falling back on the *Vedas*, *Brahmas* and the *Mahabharata* and the Muslims on the Holy Quran, *Hadith*, and the early community of Islam.

Muslim revivalism sprang from the reform movements of Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly (1786-1831) and of the Fara'izis⁷⁸ aimed at the transformation of the Indian Muslim Community from "an aggregate of believers" into "a political association with a will for joint action".⁷⁹ Sayyid Ahmad strove to free the Punjab from the stranglehold of the Sikhs in the hope that it would one day inspire Muslims to hold India for Islam of the early days.⁸⁰ He, however, did not succeed in his fight against the non-Muslims and died in the battle of Balakot in 1831.⁸¹ The movement failed not only because it was confronted by powerful enemies and difficult circumstances but also because the warriors who were also reformers in their zeal to create "a facsimile" of the Muslim community in the areas they liberated did not consider it right to postpone the establishment of their concept of the Islamic *Sharia* till the gains could be consolidated, leading to internal dissensions and divisions.⁸²

The movement nevertheless did succeed in some important respects. It succeeded in keeping alive the aspect of "political resistance" against the encroachment of the non-Muslim powers together with a conscious effort to "reform and rejuvenate" Muslim society in terms of ridding the religion of its accretions and corruptions. It also succeeded in creating "a passionate urge" for the establishment of *Dar al-Islam* in the Indian subcontinent, encouraging the

succeeding generations of Indian Muslims to advance towards the idea of a separate Muslim homeland.⁸³

Hindu revivalism, directed against the Muslims, emerged from the Hindu movements of reform and re-interpretation of religion, symbolized, in particular, by the Arya Samaj, founded in 1875. The Arya Samaj attacked the Muslims with increasing ferocity, demanding that the Muslims should either leave India or get converted to Aryanism.⁸⁴ Arya Samaj wanted a return to the *Vedas*, simple and pure. They held the Vedic period as the ideal and endeavoured to persuade its followers "to re-establish and revive its pristine unity and the ancient civilization". Founded by Dayananda Saraswati (1824-83), this "militant puritanical sect of Hinduism" continued with the leadership of Swami Shirdhanand, Lala Lajpat Rai, Lala Hans Raj, Pandit Lekh Ram and Bal Gangadhar Tilak well into the twentieth century. Hindus, according to Duni Chand, were convinced that Arya Samaj was "the deliverer of the Hindus."⁸⁵

The two revivalisms clashed with each other in their "emotional responses" to the history of Muslim India.⁸⁶ The Muslims distinctively remembered that they were once the conquerors and ruling people of India and the Hindus were their subjects. The splendour of their rule seemed "all the more brighter" by the contrast with the long period of decline and decay that had followed it.⁸⁷ The Hindus revered the memory of Shivaji and of others who had fought against the Muslims.⁸⁸ Thus, the two revivalism, as Beni Prasad put it, not only clashed between themselves but also "stimulated each other, competed with each other and became more and more different in outlook.... Hindus and Musalmans alike began to give up many practices which they had imbibed from one another and which had served to bridge the chasm between the two communities."⁸⁹

The Hindus and Muslims, however, had to contend with a third party in India—the British. History possibly provided the two communities an opportunity to make mends. But the religio-cultural differences, together with communal instinct on the one hand contending with an instinct for communal separateness on the other, nurtured by centuries of contact and conflict, drove deeper the wedge of differences dividing them in response to the British challenge. Different response of the Hindus and the Muslims to the British presence politically, socially and economically indeed went on to effect radically the final outcome of events in India's modern history. While the Hindus, mainly due to the efforts of Brahmo Samaj, founded in 1828, under the inspiration of a Bengali reformer, Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1774-1833), who sought to meet the challenge through the promotion of Western education and social reforms, reconciled with the British rule without any serious fear of losing their religious bearings,⁹⁰ the Muslims proclaimed a sort of war against the British.⁹¹ In their reluctance to accept the new conditions, the Muslims triggered off the traditions of Shah Waliullah and Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi of resistance to the concentration of power in non-Muslim hands,⁹² resulting in the Uprising of 1857.⁹³

Although no definite assessment of the Muslim role in the Uprising has been

made by historians, the British took no time in regarding the Muslims as the arch rebels. To them it was "a Muslim intrigue and Muslim leadership" that converted a "sepoymutiny" into a "political conspiracy aimed at the extinction of the British Raj."⁹⁴ Thus the Muslims were dispossessed of all positions of influence and authority that remained with them even during the collapse of the Mughul empire. The doors of civil and military services as well as professions were closed to them. In the case of Bengal alone, for instance, in 1871, of the 773 Indians holding responsible positions, the Muslims, though equal to Hindus in the province in numbers, occupied only 92 positions. The British put a seal on the decline of Muslims in all walks of life.⁹⁵

This new and unprecedented situation reinforced the realities of Hindu-Muslim separatisms in India. These realities were bound to develop into Hindu-Muslim conflict in the days ahead, when the British system of representative government, creating the corditions in which "religious grievances" could be satisfied were to make the Muslims realize "the full weight of the Hindu majority".⁹⁶ Hindus and Muslims had indeed come to grow and develop into two separate nations.

NOTES

1. Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, 1964, pp. 73-76, 89-90. In this estimate, Aziz Ahmad is joined by a host of important writers. See, for instance, Stanley Wolpert, *India*, New Jersey, 1965, pp. 56-60; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, 1957, p. 268; M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, London, 1967, p. 396; B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, 1945, pp. 18, 48; Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis*, 1967, p. 13; D. Mackenzie Brown, *The White Umbrella*, Berkeley, London, 1964, p. 133; Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, Karachi, 1958, p. 186; and Bernard S. Cohn, *India: The Social Anthropology of a Civilization*, New Jersey, 1971, p. 66.
2. Tara Chand in H. Kabir, ed., *Abul Kalam Azad*, cited in Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
3. Hugh Tinker, *South Asia: A Short History*, New York, 1966, p. 92.
4. Tinker believes that the second battle of Panipat was "probably the most decisive encounter in Indian history. Akbar raised the Mughul position from that of the most important of many Muslim States in India to that of the paramount power over all India". Hugh Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
5. While Wolpert claims that the British were a "paramount power" in the eighteenth century, many are convinced that it was only in the nineteenth century (in 1818, after the British had finally overcome the Maratha forces) that the British could lay claim to a "paramount" position in India, holding as its direct territory the Gangetic Valley up to Delhi, the Maratha homelands in the Deccan, the littoral of the Arabia Sea and the coastal strips extending from Bengal to the south. See K. M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, New York, 1969, p. 81; and S. Wolpert, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
6. H. K. Sherwani, *Cultural Trends in Medieval India*, London, 1968, p. 4. "Differently to the English", wrote Sherwani, "who never tried to make India their home, the Perso-Turks, the Mughals and others professing Islam, who became the founders of dynasties in different parts of India, lost sight of where they came from and made the country

- their own." *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
7. See Fathullah Mujtabai, *Aspects of Hindu Muslim Cultural Relations*, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 139-40; Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui, *Some Aspects of Afghan Despotism in India*, Lahore, 1969, p. 83; Abdur Rahim, *History of the Afghans in India, A. D. 1545-1631*, Karachi, 1961; and Tara Chand, *Society and State in the Mughal Period*, Lahore, 1979, p. 60.
 8. I.H. Qureshi, *op.cit.*, p. 186; Tara Chand, *op.cit.*, pp.99-107; Fathullah Mujtabai, *op.cit.*, p. 135; and Abdur Rahim, *op.cit.*, p. 50. Bahmani rule in the south was even more accommodative. See Muhammad Kasim Firishta, *Gulshan-i Ibrahimi, History of the Rise of the Muhammadan Power in India*, translated by John Briggs, Calcutta, 1958.
 9. P. Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, London, 1958, p. 66. Akbar and his Mughuls, wrote Spear, "Had something of the same vivifying effect upon Muslim Indian Policy as William the Conqueror and his Normans had on Saxon England. There was a new vigour, a new unity, a new constructive purpose leading on to a new synthesis". *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67. On Akbar's synthetic efforts also see, Ramkrishna Mukherjee, *The Rise and Fall of the East India Company*, Lahore, 1976, p. 198; Wolpert, *op. cit.*, pp.57-59; Sri Ram Sharma, *The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, London, 1962, pp. 15-19; Bernard Cohn, *op.cit.*, p. 73 and Hugh Tinker, *South Asia. op.cit.*, pp. 66.
 10. P. Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
 11. Bernard Cohn, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
 12. Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
 13. S. Wolpert, *op. cit.* p. 55.
 14. P. Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
 15. Abu al-Fazl, *Akbar Nama*, Lahore, reprint, 1975, p. 31.
 16. Sri Ram Sharma, *op.cit.*, p. 19.
 17. S. Wolpert, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
 18. Ramkrishna Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
 19. Also referred to as the 'Infallibility Decree.' Sharma, however, takes an exception to this terminology. He argues that the nature of the document was "a little misunderstood in the heat of arguments raised over it. It gave Akbar no power until and unless the divines failed to agree. Even then he had the power to interpret the Muslim law and not to make it". Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33.
 20. Abu al-Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, translated by H. Blochmann, Lahore, 1975 reprint, p 195.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
 22. For different viewpoints on the subject see, in particular, Abu al-Fazl, *op. cit.*, pp.203-16, 221; Al-Badaoni, *Muntakhab al-Tawarikh*, translated by George S. Ranking, Karachi, 1976, 2 vols., Elliot and Dowson, *The History of India*, Lahore, 1976, vol. V, pp. 526-33; George Dunbar, *A History of India*, London, 1943, vol. I, p. 208; G. B. Malleson, *Akbar and the Rise of Mughal Empire*, Lahore, 1979 reprint, pp. 160,168-69; Michael Prawdin, *The Builders of the Moghul Empire*, London, 1963, p. 153; Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent, 610-1947*, Mouton, The Hague, 1962, p. 168; Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-45; and Shaikh Muhammad Ikram, *Raud-i-Kausar*, Lahore, 1958, pp. 130-32.
 23. The Hindus devoutly worship cows, and even esteem their dung as pure. This remained in fact the abiding source of Hindu-Muslim tension throughout the history of Modern India, during the British period, and happens to be so even today.
 24. To placate the Hindus Akbar even went to the extent of marrying daughters of the Rajput princes. Out of one of these Rajput wives of Akbar was born, the next Mughal Emperor, Jahangir. See G.B. Malleson, *op.cit.*, pp.120-30; and Sri Ram Sharma, *op.cit.*, p. 19.
 25. Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab al-Lubab*, in Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, p. 241; Sri

- Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42; and Abu al-Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
26. While Jahangir's memoirs suggest that Akbar "repented" on his death-bed of his efforts to combine the opposing elements of Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and Islam, Blochmann strongly feels that "Akbar, in all probability, continued worshipping the sun, and retained all other peculiarities of his monotheistic Parsi-Hinduism, dying as he had lived". H. Blochmann, Abu al-Fazl, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
 27. S. Wolpert, *India*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
 28. Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.
 29. Sri Ram Sharma in fact claims that Akbar's toleration was more comprehensive than that of his contemporary, the English Queen, Elizabeth. Indeed it was not till the later half of the nineteenth century that England was able to adopt religious toleration and freedom from civic disabilities to the extent to which Akbar had done in India in the sixteenth century". Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
 30. Akbar, besides the desire to create harmony among his Hindu and Muslim subjects, might also have been influenced by "the trend of society to promote production and commerce". Ramkrishna Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
 31. Sharma, however, is of the opinion that Akbar's policy, "had not been willingly accepted by many of his officers and they had no enthusiasm for it". Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-53.
 32. For some discussion of its harmful effects on the Muslim community in the long run see, Sharif al-Mujahid, *Indian Secularism*, Karachi, 1970, p. 36.
 33. For a detailed and full account of Hindu-Muslim relations, particularly the role played by Hindus in public services under Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, see Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 71, 76, 85, 119, 124.
 34. C. P. Roy, a noted literary figure of Bengal, cited in Syed Tufail Ahmad Manglori *Musalmanson Ka Roshan Mustaqbil*, Delhi, 1945, pp. 27-28.
 35. Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-58.
 36. Zahiruddin Faruki, *Aurangzeb: His Life and Times*, Lahore, 1977, p. 155.
 37. Syed Tufail Ahmad Manglori, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
 38. I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, Karachi, 1966, p. 215.
 39. Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
 40. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 1947, p. 85.
 41. S. Wolpert, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
 42. See, in particular, S. Wolpert, *ibid.*, p. 50; Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 96; Hugh Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 90.
 43. *A Tagore Reader*, ed. by Amiya Chakravarty, Boston, 1966, p. 271.
 44. Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
 45. Kabir's followers, *Kabirpanthis*, still sing his songs and follow the religion of Bhakti. But they are now merely sub-castes of the different castes to which their members originally belonged. Hugh Tinker, *South Asia*, *op. cit.*, p. 89; Shaikh Mohammad Ikram, *op. cit.*, p. 465; and Tara Chand, *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture* Lahore, reprint 1979, pp. 145-65, 166-77.
 46. Pakistan Historical Society, *A Short History of Hind-Pakistan*, Karachi, 1955, p. 184.
 47. Sharif al-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah- Studies in Interpretation*, Karachi, 1981, p. 321. Also see William Theodore de Bary, *Sources of Indian Tradition*, New York, 1958, p. 370.
 48. Stanley Wolpert feels that "the primary cause" was "economic". "The inevitable increase in revenue demands", he says, "drove more and more zamindars as well as peasants to risk death from rebellion rather than accept inevitable starvation". Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, New York, 1977, p. 159.
 49. For different opinions on the subject see Hugh Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Sri Ram Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-77; Stanley Lane-Poole, *Aurangzeb*, Lahore, 1975 reprint, pp.

- 64-70, 206; P. Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 20 and I. H. Qureshi, *Akbar: The Founder of the Mughal Empire*, Karachi, 1978, Ch XI, and *The Muslim Community*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
50. Bernard Cohn, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
 51. Hugh Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
 52. Shivaji, says Khafī Khan, "assembled a large force of Marhatta robbers and plunderers, and set about reducing fortresses." Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, p. 257. Also see, Stanley Lane-Poole, *Aurangzeb*, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-68.
 53. Mahadeo Govind Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power*, cited in Thomas R. Metcalf, ed., *Modern India : An Interpretative Anthology*, London, 1971, p. 51. Also see Mountstuart Elphinstone, *The History of India*, London, 1889, p. 658.
 54. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
 55. Hugh Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
 56. D. Mackenzie Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
 57. Hugh Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
 58. Stanley Lane Poole, *Mediaeval India*, 1979 reprint, p. 419.
 59. Barring short phases under the Maurya and Guptas, India, was never united. Even this rare unity was shortlived and very fragile. As soon as the hold of the imperial ruler weakened, India was torn into fragments. The centrifugal tendencies had always an upper hand over the centripetal forces. The only unity India had was in term of "geography". But there too, in the words of Spear "geography has promoted partial and hindered complete unity. It has encouraged aspirations to empire and hindered its maintenance". P. Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
 60. D. Mackenzie Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-133.
 61. Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
 62. D. Mackenzie Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
 63. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
 64. W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
 65. Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
 66. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
 67. On the exclusive nature of social relations in the caste system also see, Hugh Tinker, *op. cit.*, p. 13; George Rosen, *Democracy and Economic Change in India*, Berkeley, 1967, p. 79; W. C. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 268; M. N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India*, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 1-45; W. H. Morris-Jones, *The Government and Politics of India*, London, 1971, and W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972, pp. 32-35.
 68. W. C. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
 69. I. H. Qureshi, "Hindu Communal Movements", *A History of the Freedom Movement*, Karachi, Pakistan Historical Society, 1961, vol. III, part I, p. 240.
 70. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
 71. S. Wolpert, *India*, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
 72. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-14; P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Karachi, 1973, p. 30. The full text of Shah Waliullah's letter to Ahmad Shah Abdali is available in Khaliq Ahmad Nizami's *Shah Waliullah Kay Siyasi Maktubat*, Aligarh, 1950, pp. 97-114, and *Armughan-i-Shah Waliullah*, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-51.
 73. I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, *op. cit.*, p. 198. Also see, Percival Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals*, Karachi, 1980.
 74. Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*, London, 1974, p. 77.
 75. K. M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
 76. Ainslie T. Embree, *India's Search for National Identity*, New York, 1972, p. 18.
 77. Beni Prasad, *India's Hindu-Muslim Questions*, Lahore, n.d., reprint, p. 31.
 78. The religious and social movement of Dudu Miyan and Titu Mir in Bengal. In the conditions of Bengal under the Permanent Settlement of Lord Cornwallis, where

- majority of *Zamindars* (Landowners) were Hindus, the conflict between the exploited Muslim tenant and exploiting Hindu landlord was inevitable. What triggered off the movement under Dudu Miyan was that the Hindu landlords levied illegal cesses on Muslim peasants and then spent it on Hindu religious rites. The movement declined by late nineteenth century. See P. Hardy, *op. cit.*, pp 56-57; and Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 216.
79. P. Hardy, *op. cit.*, p. 58. Generally, though erroneously, Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly and his followers have been dubbed as "Wahabis". Nothing could be far from truth. The political objectives of Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly and his followers were derived from the teachings of Shah Waliullah, and not from the doctrines of Abdul Wahab of Nejd (d. 1787). For some of the discussion on the controversy see, in particular, Q. Ahmad, *The Wahabi Movement in India*, Calcutta, 1966; Dr. K. M. Ashraf, "Muslim Revivalists and the Revolt of 1857", P. C. Joshi, ed., *Rebellion 1857*, Delhi, 1957; and W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, Calcutta, 1945, pp. 47-70.
 80. P. Hardy *op. cit.*, p. 58.
 81. A certain element of mystery surrounded the death of Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly and in fact for nearly half a century after the battle of Balakot, the belief was common among many of his followers that he had not been killed but had simply disappeared and was still alive. For a scholarly analysis of this uncertainty about the Sayyid's death see Dr. Mahmud Husain, "The Mystery of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid's Death," *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, vol III, July 1955, pp. 167-71.
 82. I. H. Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p. 231.
 83. See Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, Bombay, 1963, p. 9; I. H. Qureshi, *op. cit.* p. 231; Sharif al-Mujahid, *op. cit.*, p. 336; Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 217, and W. C. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-11. A noted historian, Hameed-ud-Din, in an article referred to the battle of Balakot as "the first battle for Pakistan". Cited in S. M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*, Minneapolis 1974, p. 257.
 84. As late as 1936, Hindu leadership was still possessed with Aryanism. In his presidential address to the 18th session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha thus, Shri Sankaracharya said: "...it must be remembered that minorities can't claim to have any superior political rights and powers which prove detrimental to the interests of Hindus and subversion of the Aryan culture". *The Indian Annual Register*, Calcutta, 1936, vol. II, pp. 255-56.
 85. See Duni Chand, *The Ulster of India*, Lahore, 1936, pp. 18-31; K. M. Panikkar, *op. cit.*, p. 295; and Nancy Wilson Ross, *Three Ways of Asian Wisdom: Hinduism, Buddhism, Zen*, New York, 1966, pp. 67-73; P. Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-19.
 86. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
 87. Reginald Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part I, The Indian Problem, 1833-1935*, London 1968, pp. 31-32.
 88. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
 89. Beni Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
 90. P. Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-21; and K.M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance* *op. cit.*, pp. 241-43.
 91. Shah Waliullah's son and successor, Shah Abdul Aziz declared that India had become *dar-al-harb* because the infidels had taken control of it. *Malfuzaat-e-Shah Abdul Aziz*, Karachi, 1960, p. 25. Also see W. W. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
 92. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
 93. According to Sir Reginald Coupland, a noted authority on British Indian history, "It was a mutiny but more than a mutiny...[it] was the natural reaction of one civilization under pressure from another of an old order threatened by a new of Asia invaded by Europe". "But if the outbreak was more than a mutiny", maintains Coupland, "it was

not a national rebellion against foreign rule. Some sepoy regiments fought bravely besides the British. The Sikhs made no attempt to recover their independence... Southern India, on the whole stayed quiet. None of the rulers of the leading States, who held the strategic keys of Central India, joined in the revolt". *India: A Re-Statement*, London, 1945, pp. 38-39.

94. Thomas Metcalf, *The Aftermath of Revolt*, Princeton, 1964, p. 298. Also see Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, *The Causes of the Indian Revolt*, Lahore; and Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhry, "The Impact of the Revolt of 1857 on British Colonial Policy", *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society* (July 1963), pp. 208-219. "Had the spirit of Indian Nationalism inspired the struggle", wrote Wolpert, "all those revolting would have joined force. But Marathas and Mughals, Hindus and Muslims were still jealous and suspicious of one another, despite many examples of Hindu-Muslim unity in this year of travail". S. Wolpert, *India, op. cit.*, p. 98. In the words of Thomas Metcalf, thus, the Uprising of 1857 was "something more than a sepoy mutiny, but something less than a national revolt", Thomas R. Metcalf, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
95. K. B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948* London, 1968, pp. 13-14; Thomas Metcalf, *op. cit.*, p. 298; and M. Mujeeb, *op. cit.*, p. 432; W.W. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 161; and I.H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi, 1974, p. 18. Karachi, 1974, p. 18.
96. Francis Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 85. Syed Ahmad Khan, leader of the Muslims in the later half of the nineteenth century, thus described the majority-minority situation as "a game of dice in which one man had four dice and the other only one." It is certain, he said, that Hindus would obtain four times as many votes as Muslims because their population was four times as large. *The Present State of Indian Politics: Speeches and Letters*, introd., Farman Fatehpuri, Lahore, 1982, p. 36.