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ROLE OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE PUNJAB RIOTS (1849-1900)

The Punjab witnessed several riots during the second half of the nineteenth century. Its population consisted mainly of Muslims (51%), Hindus (40%) and Sikhs (7%).¹ The Muslims formed majority in the Western part while the Hindus and the Sikhs lived mostly in the central and eastern districts. The area, then under control of the Punjab government also included the Delhi territory and the Frontier region, designated as the North Western Frontier Province. Its population experienced the same influences of material and social progress and religious antagonism, as affected other parts of the subcontinent. The Hindus here readily accepted and largely benefited from the facilities provided by the government, while the Muslims lagged behind due to their opposition to the new system of education. This created a grave imbalance and bitterness which provided the background and lay at the root of communal tension and riots. Serious riots took place at Multan (1881), Ambala, Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, Delhi (1886), Rohtak (1889) and Isakhel (1893), besides several minor clashes at other places.

These riots were caused by a number of factors. The local administration as custodian of law and executive authority played a key role. Its conduct in such crises was vital and any lapse on its part could produce serious consequences. Peace prevailed at those places where local officials showed vigilance and took precautionary measures.² Commenting on the 1886 riots, H. J. S. Maine, a member of the Viceroy's Council, observed that magistrates were responsible in nineteen out of twenty cases. They failed to take timely action and showed negligence at several places.³ This point is further illustrated by the attitude of the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi, G. Smyth, who delayed in deciding the route of the *Ram Lila* procession which had been slightly changed in 1885 on the representation of the Muslims to avoid their residential areas and the *Jamia* Mosque. G. Smyth confessed that, after an unsuccessful attempt to bring about Hindu-Muslim rapprochement, he failed to communicate his decision properly. It was conveyed only to four persons: two officials, a Muslim leader and the Hindus' high priest.⁴ This delay caused confusion and the *Muharram* and the *Ram Lila* processions clashed at the *Chandni Chawk*. The *Tribune* (Lahore) put the blame on G. Smyth who neglected to take precautionary measures, despite the tension prevailing among the Muslims after the discovery of a pig's head in the *Jamia* Mosque on 7 October 1886.⁵ Similarly in Ludhiana, the Deputy Commissioner took no heed of the Hindus' repeated complaints that the Muslims intended to sacrifice cows on the *Eid-ul-Azha*. When the Hindus came to know of the sacrifice in a Muslim Haji's house, they created conditions for a riot. In Hoshiarpur also, the district administration failed to take precautionary measures during the *Muharram* procession notwithstanding strained relations between the two communities. Insufficient police force accompanied the procession which could not prevent clash between the two communities. Even the military force, when called, was not properly

utilized. The Lt. Governor held the Deputy Commissioner responsible for this failure.⁶ In Rohtak too, conditions were worsened by the local officials' negligence. The first mistake was that the sacrificed cow was not removed to the slaughter-house till evening which allowed the Hindus to use the intervening period to incite their co-religionists.⁷ Then, the Deputy Commissioner's alleged statement in favour of cow-slaughter, offended the Hindus.⁸ He was also criticised for sending a small police contingent with the Hindus' *Jajihulni* procession, despite the arrival of additional force from Delhi. The Superintendent of Police defended his action on the plea that the additional force had arrived the same day after a tiresome journey and that the Muslim leaders had assured him that there was no danger of any disorder in the city.⁹ The clash, therefore, could not be averted. After this clash, the Deputy Commissioner did not stop the *Muharram* procession. The result was that the Hindus attacked it in order to take revenge.¹⁰ The Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Delhi circle) criticised the local administration for having underestimated the danger.¹¹ The Hindu magistrates, he alleged, showed deplorable lack of initiative and were considerably affected by communal feelings.¹²

In Isa Khel also, the attack by a small party on the Hindus' shops developed into a serious riot, mainly due to the negligence and supineness of the local administration.¹³ Both the Tehsildar and Naib-Tehsildar stayed at home and shifted responsibility to the Deputy Inspector of Police, despite timely warning. Even after the attack, they wasted time in dilatory activities. They also gave conflicting statements, holding each other responsible. The Deputy Inspector of Police was the only officer who showed responsibility and ran about to make arrangements, with meagre force at his disposal.¹⁴

Another serious charge against the administration was of dividing and favouring one community against the other. For instance, the *Reformer* (Lahore) of September 1884, put all blame for communal estrangement on those inexperienced and incapable officers who gave undue encouragement to one community and thus sowed the seeds of disunion. Perfect peace and harmony prevailed in those districts where capable and judicious officers were posted.¹⁵ Similarly, the *Tribune*, commenting upon the Rohtak riot, asserted that most of the disturbances were the result of local officials' inefficiency. The Indian states, it argued, were free of riots because they were not managed by the British bureaucracy.¹⁶ At several places, the Hindus blamed the local administration for favouring the Muslims.¹⁷ In Multan, they submitted a memorial to Viceroy Lord Ripon, accusing Deputy Commissioner Charles A. Roe of partiality towards the Muslims. Similar complaints were made against the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana. The Hindus described his attitude towards them as unsympathetic and hostile.¹⁸ They also blamed him for trying to favour and protect Ahsan Shah, a Muslim notable, and Bahram Khan, the police inspector, and for pressurising them to withdraw charges against them.¹⁹ The *Tribune* criticised the local administration for its anti-Hindu policies and its attempts to prove the riots as a minor incident.²⁰ The Commissioner and the Lt. Governor also doubted the validity of investigations against Ahsan Shah and Bahram Khan.²¹ In Ambala, the Hindus criticised the Deputy Commissioner for his bias against them. In a memorial, they complained that his order for the charge of route of their procession was completely uncalled for because the Muslim shrine situated on it was unknown and insignificant.

They also blamed him for brutal treatment of their peaceful assembly outside the city. According to them, he had ordered the police to charge with batons and had started himself beating the crowd without any warning.²² The *Tribune* criticised the Deputy Commissioner for his action against Murli Dhar, who, called by the Hindus for legal advice, had reportedly advised them to disperse peacefully and had himself left the assembly before the Deputy Commissioner's arrival. He was arrested three days later, merely on political grounds.²³ The *Tribune* also accused the Hoshiarpur administration of siding with the Muslims. The Anglo-Indian officials there created conditions for disturbances in order to divide the Indians and to prove that they were incapable of running local self-government.²⁴ In Ferozepur also, the Deputy Commissioner was charged with leanings towards the Muslims. The reason was that he supported the opening of beef shops in the city because such shops and slaughter-houses had existed in the city. He considered the Hindus' opposition to it as unjustified and urged the government to uphold its principles of justice and fairness towards all communities. He asserted that the rules for cow-slaughter provided sufficient protection for the Hindus' feelings and that the Muslims had equal right for cheap and wholesome food. He also favoured allowing cow-slaughter inside beef shops.²⁵ The higher officials, however, did not agree with his views and regarded his order for allowing one beef shop as a result of carelessness. The Commissioner found two unauthorised beef shops and one slaughter-house in the city. He also considered the memorial, presented by over one thousand Muslims, as unrepresentative of their feelings and warned the local administration to refrain from encouraging or inciting any community to press its demands for religious rights.²⁶ The Lt. Governor also advised the local administration to discourage the Muslim demand for cow-slaughter and beef-shops. He asserted that the demand for beef should be judged merely by its actual need.²⁷ Similar charges of partiality and support of cow-slaughter were levelled against Major Rennick, the Deputy Commissioner of Rohtak.²⁸ The Hindus, in a memorial to the Lt. Governor, accused him and Qutb-ud-Din, the Deputy Inspector of Police, of injustice and cruelty.²⁹ The Deputy Commissioner replied that he had rejected the Hindu demand for total prohibition of cow-slaughter, as there was no law for such an action. Another allegation was that in a meeting of local leaders, the Deputy Commissioner had endorsed the statement of a Muslim leader that the Hindu students in England, consumed beef which did not injure their feelings. The Hindu opposition to cow-slaughter was merely a cover for their own intrigues and a pretext to attack the *Muharram* procession.³⁰ The Lt. Governor, though upholding most of the actions of the Deputy Commissioner, did not agree over the sagacity or need for his statement in the meeting which, in his opinion, had further excited the feelings. The Hindus knew that cow-slaughter was prohibited in several towns including Delhi. Further, his insistence that the Muslims were justified in offering sacrifice at their homes led the Hindus to press for total prohibition, which ultimately resulted in their attack upon the *Muharram* procession.³¹ The *Tribune* also criticised Major Rennick for his bias against the Hindus, and Sandhe Khan, the Deputy Inspector, for having opened fire upon unarmed demonstrators. Major Rennick, it upheld, was afraid of the Muslims.³² Bihari Lal, the Hindu tehsildar, also levelled serious charges against the local police. He maintained that the Hindus had been completely

Pacific and that the Muslims had started the riot with the connivance of the police. He also accused Qutb-ud-Din of having harassed and arrested several Hindu travellers on false charges. He threatened serious consequences unless conditions were immediately altered. Lt. Col. L.H.E. Tucker, the Deputy Inspector-General Police (Delhi Circle) who visited the town immediately after the riot, rejected these contentions as totally baseless. According to him, the Muslims had participated in the procession duly permitted by the Deputy Commissioner, while the Hindus had come and gathered there with arms and malafide intentions. The police had not arrested any person after the riot. Bihari Lal's opposition was aimed only at disreputing Qutb-ud-Din, the only Muslim officer in the town, and bringing the whole administration under Hindu control. He also upheld Sandhe Khan's action for opening fire which succeeded in dispersing the rioters.³³ The Commissioner, who praised his firmness and promptitude, regarded him as the only local officer who showed courage.³⁴ The Lt. Governor also commended his action for having averted a serious riot and several casualties.³⁵

The role of police was also subjected to criticism at several places. In 1871 it completely failed in its investigations of the murder of four butchers in Amritsar. Christie, the Superintendent of Police, who had been especially called for this purpose, fell an easy prey into the hands of two police informers who made up a false story and implicated a few other persons. They also confessed and were committed to sessions by the District Magistrate but were saved by the timely confession by one of the accused in the Raikot murder case (1871). They later charged the police with torturing and pressurising them for their confession. Reynell G. Taylor, Commissioner Amritsar Division, who wrote a lengthy report on the case, rejected these accusations as false.³⁶ The government too, despite demands from various quarters, declined to reopen the case and investigate into the conduct of the police, as, according to it, that would have only upset peace, revived communal bitterness and added no new information to the case.³⁷ In Delhi, the police despite its sufficient strength, failed to stop Muslims' procession from entering into the *Chandni Chawk*. It openly showed communal feelings and sided with members of their own religions.³⁸ The Hoshiarpur police also failed and was accused of arresting and torturing innocent persons.³⁹ In Ambala, the Hindus charged the police with wilfully ignoring their complaints. According to them, it took no action on their representation against Muslims' cooking beef in front of the place where they used to deposit their idols. Similarly Deputy Inspector Hira Singh refused to arrest persons bringing beef in open carts.⁴⁰ In Ludhiana, the Hindus accused Inspector Bahram Khan, of having encouraged his co-religionists to attack their members protesting against cow-sacrifice.⁴¹ They also blamed him of having set free a few Muslims arrested on charges of rioting. The district administration, however, rejected these accusations and described him as an efficient and reliable officer.⁴² In Rohtak, the police was censured for its inability to control the riot and for accompanying the *Muharram* procession with loaded guns. The *Tribune* also questioned Deputy Inspector Sandhe Khan's decision to open fire and the calling of military force, which only created unnecessary scare.⁴³ The Hindus also accused Deputy Inspector Qutb-ud-Din, Sergeant Dilmir Khan and ten other Muslims, of having paraded the cow which was later sacrificed in the washermen's quarters.⁴⁴ In 1890, the *Tribune*

blamed Qutb-ud-Din for falsely reporting about Hindus' plan to attack during the *Muharram*, which resulted in the internment of several of their notables.⁴⁵

At many places, Muslims also complained of injustice and harsh treatment. For instance, the Commissioner Jullundur Division while commenting upon the Hoshiarpur riot (1886) blamed the police for having restricted its activities only against the Muslims, whereas several Hindus as well had attacked the Muslims. According to him, the prosecution against Sheikh Mehr Ali, a Muslim leader, was also based upon false evidence.⁴⁶ The *Tribune* too condemned the police for its atrocities and severe punishments to the Muslims.⁴⁷ According to the *Rahbar-i-Hind* (Lahore), all the police officials and magistrates were Hindus, whereas the Superintendent of Police and Deputy Commissioner were helpless and hostile towards the Muslims. The police wrongly implicated a large number of persons with the result that no respectable Muslim was free from fear of arrest.⁴⁸ It levelled similar charges against the Deputy Commissioner, Ludhiana. According to a correspondent, the Muslims could not expect justice as all the high officials were Hindus. The Deputy Commissioner was a tool in their hands and too anxious to please them. The correspondent also criticised the conciliation committee for its partiality towards the Hindus.⁴⁹ In Rohtak too, most of the officials were Hindus, many of whom were involved in inciting their co-religionists. The *Jats* of the neighbouring villages had attacked the *Muharram* procession only on the assurance of assistance from them, which they did receive to a large extent.⁵⁰ The Hindu magistrates, despite their long experience and service in the town, hesitated and failed to pacify and control their co-religionists. According to the Deputy Commissioner, Major Rennick, they were so charged with communal feelings that they refrained from giving any information about their plans for the riot. Some of them were actively associated with the agitation and provided shelter and assistance to members of the Hindu *Panchayat*.⁵¹ In Rewari, a serious crisis was created due to wilful withholding of information by Hindu tehsildar and naib-tehsildar. In 1896, the Deputy Commissioner had cancelled his own order regarding the fixation of the height of *tazias* to forty feet. Next year, when the *Muharram* approached, these officials raised the question before the new Deputy Commissioner but did not inform him of the last year's decision. The Deputy Commissioner, therefore, ordered that *tazias* should not be built beyond twenty feet, to which the Muslims strongly protested. They maintained that these had been built several months earlier and could not be reduced in size. The Deputy Commissioner did not agree with the result that the Muslims refused to observe the *Muharram*. The *Rahbar-i-Hind* accused the two Hindu officials of wilfully misleading the Deputy Commissioner, thus creating a volatile situation, which could have developed into a serious riot.⁵²

There were also complaints about unsatisfactory reports and delays in their submission. For example, both the Commissioner Jullundur Division⁵³ and the Lt. Governor⁵⁴ expressed their dissatisfaction and anger over the Deputy Commissioner's incomplete reports on the Hoshiarpur riot. Similar strictures were passed against the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana.⁵⁵ The reports of the Deputy Commissioner of Rohtak were also found wanting in important information and had to be redrafted in accordance with the Lt. Governor's instructions.⁵⁶

Several complaints were also made against summary trials. In January 1887, the *Tribune* criticised the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi for the summary trial of twenty-nine Hindus and fourteen Muslims within one day which violated the spirit of the law and deprived the accused of their right of defence.⁵⁷ Similar haste was said to have been shown by the Deputy Commissioner, Ambala. The *Tribune* accused him of personal vengeance against a local leader, Murli Dhar, on political grounds.⁵⁸ The Deputy Commissioner of Rohtak was also condemned for summarily trying fifty-eight Hindus inside the jail without letting them have any legal help.⁵⁹ Even the Lt. Governor criticized him for several irregularities and lack of discrimination, as a result of which most of the sentences passed by him were reduced by the Chief Court.⁶⁰

There were also complaints about the behaviour of certain officials. For example, in 1881, the Hindus of Multan, in a memorial to Lord Ripon, blamed the Deputy Commissioner, Major R.T.M. Lang, for threatening their members and returning with contempt a petition signed by their representatives.⁶¹ The Deputy Commissioner contended that he had only opposed outside interference in a conflict between Bahawal Bakhsh, the *mutawalli* (custodian) of Bahauddin Zakriya's tomb and the *mahant* of the Prahladpuri temple.⁶² The Lt. Governor, disagreeing with him, regarded his conduct as curt and unsatisfactory.⁶³ In Ludhiana also, the Hindus blamed the Deputy Commissioner for losing temper and ordering them to leave his bungalow when they went to protest against cow-sacrifice.⁶⁴ An extremely negligent and authoritarian attitude was exhibited by the Commissariat Sergeant of Wiltshire Regiment in Gujar Khan in 1888. He got two cows killed at an encamping ground on the Grand Trunk Road, at a distance of only forty yards from the main street. He refused to listen and even maltreated some of the Hindus when they objected and requested him to shift the animals to the farther end of the ground. The Deputy Commissioner criticised him for hurting Hindus' religious feelings.⁶⁵

Certain decisions by officials led to serious consequences. The most illustrative example is of the Multan administration. Two decisions by Deputy Commissioners, Captain A.S. Roberts and Charles A. Roe, started a chain of events which culminated in a bloody clash in September 1881. The first decision was Captain Roberts' permission to the *mahant* for raising the height of spire of the Prahladpuri temple. He gave this decision without any regard to previous arrangements. When Bahawal Bakhsh objected it developed into a communal issue and caused Hindu-Muslim estrangement.⁶⁶ The second decision, i.e. by Charles A. Roe, was with regard to the cancellation of the route for bringing beef into the city. This route had been fixed after exposure of beef by a butcher in a Hindu locality in April 1881. It was then ordered that beef should in the future be brought only through a particular route populated mainly by Muslims. The Hindus were not satisfied with this decision. They demanded total ban on cow-slaughter and sought permission to open slaughter-houses and shops for *jhatka* meat. The Commissioner accepted the second but rejected the first demand. When the Muslims requested him to lift the ban on route for bringing beef, as it involved an unnecessary burden and a long and circuitous route, Charles A. Roe accepted their demand.⁶⁷ The Hindus reacted strongly and forcibly obstructed butchers from bringing beef into the city, thus precipitating the first major riot in the Punjab. Both the Commissioner and the Lt. Governor

censured Charles Roe's decision⁶⁸ and did not accept his explanations.⁶⁹

The government policy towards cow-slaughter created difficulties for the local administration. In East Punjab, cow-slaughter had been allowed by the East India Company under certain conditions in order to make it least offensive to non-Muslims. Similar policy was adopted in the Western part after 1849. According to it, district officials were required to fix places for slaughter houses at least three hundred yards away from public thoroughfare. Beef, even when slaughtered outside, was not to be exposed and offenders, were punished severely. Permission however, was not granted in any circumstances in places of mixed population. The purpose of these rules was to introduce uniformity and remove the ban which had been imposed by the Sikh rulers.⁷⁰ As a result, slaughter-houses were established and shops for sale of beef, opened at various places. The Punjab Laws Act (IV) of 1872 also contained two provisions regarding the subject. Section 43 stated that "the slaughter of kine and the sale of beef shall not take place except subject to rules to be, from time to time, either generally or in any particular instance, prescribed by the Provincial Government", whereas Section 50 provided punishment for the violation of rules contained in the Act.⁷¹ The Punjab Government, however, did not frame any rules, which created several difficulties for the administration. For example, the Commissioner of Delhi pointed out in 1874, the need for such rules while discussing cow-slaughter problem and the resultant Hindu agitation in Panipat.⁷² Judges C. Boulnois and Campbell of the Chief Court also in a decision over an appeal against the sentence of imprisonment and fine by Assistant Commissioner, Montgomery, called upon the government to frame clear and elaborate rules and publish them every year.⁷³ The Lt. Governor, however, did not agree and maintained that the rules so far prevalent in the province and contained in the Punjab Board of Administration's letter of 10 April 1849 and Circular of 5 May 1849 were sufficient to deal with the matter.⁷⁴ In 1876, the Deputy Commissioner of Gurdaspur complained that it was difficult in the absence of rules, to implement the provisions of Section 50 of the Punjab Laws Act of 1872.⁷⁵ The Municipal Acts of 1884 and 1891 also authorised municipal committees to supervise, fix places and issue licences (with permission of the District Magistrate) for slaughter-houses and frame bye-laws for their management.⁷⁶ The subject, as it related to the religious susceptibilities of a major community, required strict and constant vigilance by officials and cooperation between various bodies of public administration. At several places, bye-laws were not framed by municipal committees, while at others, district officials did not wish or allow them to exercise control. The government was also opposed to their interference in this matter. For example, the Commissioner, Jullundur Division condemned Deputy Commissioner, Ferozepur for having referred two butchers' applications for permission to open beef shops, to the municipal committee. According to him, the Deputy Commissioner was fully authorised to deal and issue orders in this regard. He opposed reference of this question to municipal committees in view of their own communal differences.⁷⁷ Several newspapers called upon the government to adopt a clear and uniform policy on cow-slaughter.⁷⁸ Finally, in 1890, the government decided to frame rules for the control of cow-slaughter. Cows were to be slaughtered only at places fixed by the Deputy Commissioner. The latter could also refuse, suspend

or withdraw licence and with the Commissioner's sanction, and in urgent cases in its anticipation, prohibit slaughter or sale at any place. Similar conditions were prescribed for shops for sale of beef.⁷⁹ Sacrifice of cow was restricted to slaughter-houses except intra-mural sacrifice which could be performed under special licence to be granted by the Deputy Commissioner.⁸⁰ These rules, however, did not put the matter to rest and complaints continued against hawking, objectionable sites, difficulties in cow-sacrifice and Hindus' agitation for total prohibition, thus preserving causes for bitterness and estrangement. There were also differences over permission for slaughter-houses and beef shops. For example, in 1881, the Lt. Governor strongly opposed Hindus' demand for opening slaughter houses and shops for *jhatka* meat. He believed it to be a factious movement, intended to hurt Muslims' feelings.⁸¹ The Commissioner, however, before waiting for his orders, granted their request on the plea that there was no law to prohibit *jhatka* meat.⁸² Similarly the Deputy Commissioner, Ferozepur strongly favoured the opening of beef shops in the city, whereas the Commissioner⁸³ and Lt. Governor opposed and advised their maximum discouragement.⁸⁴ Complaints also arose, at some places, over the location of slaughter houses which had become objectionable due to urban development.

This account should not, however, lead us to conclude that all the riots were the result of official negligence. The causes of the riots were many and complex. Both the communities, Hindus and Muslims, were opposed to each other on several matters of religion, language, politics and material prosperity. The Muslims had ruled over and at times oppressed the Hindus. With the establishment of British rule, both the communities were brought at par; in fact in the earlier stages. Hindus were favoured by the government,⁸⁵ which also enabled them to take lead in education and other avenues of material prosperity. With progress in education and threats of conversions from Christian missionaries, both the communities became increasingly conscious of their religious beliefs, customs and prejudices. Competition for jobs and membership of local bodies further added to grievances and disputes. The later half of the nineteenth century therefore witnessed an abnormal increase in communal feelings and religious intolerance. All these factors were present in Indian body-politics. Whether these were created, encouraged or fanned by the British Government is a lengthy, complex and separate question. The officials, at least from the sources consulted, do not appear to have played an unwholesome role or deliberately encouraged collisions between the two communities. At numerous places they worked hard to maintain peace and communal harmony.⁸⁶ Even at Multan, Delhi and Rohtak, the Deputy Commissioners held several meetings with leaders of both the communities and urged them to maintain peace and restrain their co-religionists from taking law into their own hands. During and after the riots, the local officials worked hard to restore peace and order. They were closely watched and their failure or negligence severely condemned by higher officials. The latter took keen interest in the analysis of the events and wrote comprehensive notes on reports submitted by the Deputy Commissioners and other members of district administration. In some cases, they also urged the local officials for early submission of reports and completion of proceedings against the culprits. They severely reprimanded those guilty of negligence and passed censure on three Deputy Commissioners for their grave errors and lapse of res-

possibility. A few members also raised questions in the British Parliament,⁸⁷ in 1889 Queen Victoria sent a telegram enquiring about any outbreak of violence on *Muharram*.⁸⁸ In December 1893, the Government of India presented a comprehensive report to the Parliament on riots in India during 1889-93. From all these records and activities, it appears that the government was quite anxious for the maintenance of peace or in other words that it nowhere deliberately encouraged communal disorder and violence. The mistakes or negligence shown by the local officials were, therefore, the result of administrative and personal reasons. The British officials, belonging to an alien and ruling race could not sympathise with and share feelings of the Indian people. It was, moreover, difficult to please both the communities on several issues. The complaints of injustice, partiality and 'divide and rule' should also be seen in the same light and background. The criticism or allegations by the press were, therefore, in many cases the result of frustration and communal feelings. This cannot, however, absolve the local officials of the responsibility for their errors and inefficiency. Had they acted with greater foresight and discrimination and adopted precautionary measures, some of the riots could have been averted or their extent, controlled and minimized. The importance of this paper, therefore, lies in the exposition of the role of local administration as a contributory cause of the communal riots in the British Punjab during the years 1849-1900.

NOTES

1. These figures are for the entire province, then under control of the Punjab government including the States, *Report on the Census of the Punjab 1881*, Vol. 1, Table XX, Calcutta, 1883.
2. *Lahore Chronicle*, 2 November 1850; *Tribune*, 16 October 1886; *Rahbar-i-Hind*, 4 November 1884, 9 October 1886, 1 October 1887, 15 September 1888; 19 July 1894, 29 June 1896, 17 June 1897.
3. "Religious Riots in Delhi, Ambala and Hoshiarpur", India Office Records (henceforward I.O.R.) L/J&P/6/559.
4. G. Smyth, D.C. Delhi to Commissioner Delhi, 27 October 1886, I.O.R. L/J&P/6/1575.
5. *Tribune*, 16 October, 1886.
6. Secretary Punjab Government to Commissioner Jullundur, 11 January 1887, I.O.R. L//J&P/6/1575.
7. Commissioner Delhi to Secretary Punjab Government, 2 December 1889, *Punjab Home-General Proceedings*, October 1890.
8. H. C. Fanshawe, Junior Secretary Punjab to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 7 February 1890, *Punjab Home-General Proceedings*, October 1890.
9. "Report on the Disturbances during the Jaljhaulni and Muharram Festivals" by H. S. Dunsford, Superintendent of Police, 10 September 1889, *Punjab Home-General Proceedings*, October 1890.
10. Commissioner Delhi to Secretary Punjab, 2 December 1889, *op. cit.*
11. Lt. Col. L. H. E. Tucker, D.I.G. to I.G. Punjab, 11 September 1889, *Punjab Home-General Proceedings*, No. 20 October 1890.
12. Major Rennick, D. C. Rohtak to Commissioner Delhi, 26 November 1889; Commissioner Delhi to Secretary Punjab Government, 2 December 1889; *Punjab Home-General Proceedings*, October 1890.
13. H. C. Fanshawe, Offg. Chief Secretary Punjab to Secretary Government of India, 23 May 1894; *Punjab Home-General Proceedings*, No. 11, May 1894.

14. Report by H. A. Casson, Additional District Magistrate Bannu, 28 December 1893; Punjab Home-General Proceedings, No. 9, May 1894.
15. *Reformer*, 4 September 1884.
16. *Tribune*, 30 October 1889.
17. Memorial of Hindu Raises, Chowdries, Mohalladars and Residents of Mooltan to the Viceroy of India Lord Ripon; Punjab Home Proceedings, July 1881; I.O.R. P/1618.
18. Affidavit by one Hamir Chand before Commissioner Jullundur, 14 September 1886, I.O.R. L/J&P/6/1575.
19. Petition by Moolraj and Charan Das to Commissioner Jullundur, I.O.R. L/J&P/6/1575.
20. *The Tribune*, 18 September and 2 October 1886.
21. Commissioner Jullundur to Secretary Punjab, 2 March 1887; Secretary Punjab to Commissioner Jullundur, 31 March 1887, I.O.R. L/J&P/6/1575.
22. Memorial from Hindu Residents of Ambala to Lt. Governor Punjab, Punjab Home Proceeding No. 85, April 1887.
23. *Tribune*, 18 and 26 September 1886, 19 January and 12 February 1887.
24. *Tribune*, 20 October and 4 December 1886.
25. Deputy Commissioner Ferozepur to Commissioner Jullundur, 30 April and 20 August 1888, Punjab Home-General Proceeding, November 1888.
26. Commissioner Jullundur to D.C. Ferozepur, 18 September 1888, Punjab Home-General, November 1888.
27. Punjab Government to Commissioner Jullundur, 25 October 1888, Punjab Home-General, November 1888.
28. Major Rennick to Commissioner Delhi, 26 November 1889, Punjab Home-General October 1890.
29. *Tribune*, 12 October 1889.
30. Major Rennick to Commissioner Delhi, 26 November 1889. *Op. cit.*
31. H. C. Fanshawe Jr., Secretary Punjab to Secretary India, 7 February 1890, *op. cit.*
32. *Tribune*, 21 September, 16 October 1889, 9 April 1890.
33. Lt. Col. L.H.E. Tucker D.I.G. (Delhi) to I.G. Punjab, 11 September 1889; Punjab Home-General October 1890.
34. Commissioner Delhi to Secretary Punjab, 21 September & 2 December 1889, *op. cit.*
35. H. C. Fanshawe Jr. Secretary Punjab to Secretary India, 7 February 1890, *op. cit.*
36. Memorandum by Reynell G. Taylor, 2 August 1873; Punjab Home-Proceeding July 1874.
37. Commissioner Amritsar to Secretary Punjab, 1 July 1874; Punjab Home-Proceeding July 1874.
38. G. Smyth D.C. to Commissioner, 27 October 1886, *op. cit.*
39. *Tribune*, 16 October and 4 December 1886.
40. Memorial from Hindu Residents of Ambala to Lt. Governor Punjab, *op. cit.*
41. Affidavit by one Hamir Chand before Commissioner Jullundur *op. cit.*
42. "Report of Departmental Enquiry against Bahram Khan" by Superintendent of Police, I.O.R. L/J&P/6/1575.
43. *Tribune*, 21 September and 16 October 1889.
44. Major Rennick to Commissioner Delhi, 26 November 1889, *op. cit.*
45. *Tribune*, 25 April, 1890.
46. Commissioner Jullundur to Secretary Punjab, 19 November 1889, I.O.R. L/P&J/6/1575.
47. *Tribune*, 4 December 1886.
48. *Rahbar-i-Hind*, 26 October 1886.
49. *Rahbar-i-Hind*, 23 September and 2 December 1886.
50. Lt. Col. L.H.E. Tucker D.I.G. to I.G. Punjab 11 September 1889, *op. cit.*
51. Major Rennick to Commissioner Delhi, 26 November 1889, *op. cit.*
52. *Rahbar-i-Hind*, 24 June, 1 and 8 July 1897.
53. Commissioner Jullundur to Secretary Punjab, 19 November 1886, *op. cit.*
54. Secretary Punjab to Commissioner Jullundur, 11 January 1887, I.O.R. L/P&J/6/1575.

55. Secretary Punjab to Commissioner Jullundur, 31 March 1887, I.O.R. L/P&J/6/1575.
56. H. C. Fanshawe Jr. Secretary Punjab to Secretary India, 7 February 1890, *op. cit.*
57. *Tribune*, 22 January 1887.
58. *Tribune*, 26 September 1886.
59. *Tribune*, 21 September 1889.
60. H. C. Fanshawe Jr. Secretary Punjab to Secretary India, 7 February 1890, *op. cit.*
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