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SIKANDAR HAYAT AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

By the time provincial elections were due to be held in accordance with the India Act of 1935, the Punjab Muslim League, established in November 1907, had still not been able to muster any significant support in the rural areas of the province. It had remained mainly confined to Lahore, where an urban elite patronized its annual sessions from time to time. It needed organizational changes, a rejuvenated dynamism and more appealing programme to reach the Muslim masses in the province, who despite being in a majority, did not retain enough political consciousness and suffered from localized power politics geared by landed aristocracy and the well-entrenched money-lending class. The lack of a cohesive response sprang from the political vacuum at a time when politics was mainly the luxury and monopoly of the mentioned pressure groups and the common man did not matter at all in the provincial life. The Unionist Party had forged a supra-communal unity among such groups who could easily influence and mould local and provincial affairs to their own advantage. And when the elections came, they were also in a position to entice or coerce the rural masses to remain loyal to their chieftains.

In addition to the powerful Unionists, the Punjab Muslim League also had to compete with the Congress and the Ahrars and Khaksars. Following Jinnah's visit to Lahore on April 29, 1936 and the failure of talks with the Unionists, the Punjab Muslim League was reorganized, with Allama Iqbal as the President, Malik Barkat Ali and Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din as Vice Presidents, Ghulam Rasul Khan as the Secretary, and Mian Abdul Majid and Ashiq Husain Batalvi as Joint Secretaries, and, as in other provinces, a Parliamentary Board was also set up. Iqbal regularly kept Jinnah abreast of League activities and other developments in the province. During this period, Fazl-i-Husain was also engaged in reorganizing his Unionist Party, and frictions between Unionists and Leaguers were exacerbated with the establishment of the latter's Parliamentary Board for the province.¹

However, quite a few individuals representing a cross-section of Punjabi Muslims wanted both groups to reach some agreement, and "whispers of rapprochement" were in the air when Fazl-i-Husain died suddenly in Dalhousie.² After his death, in continuing efforts at reconciliation, Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz visited Sikandar Hayat, the new leader of the Unionists. Then, having first obtained his permission, she visited Jinnah in Lahore and informed him of "Sir Sikandar's suggestion that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party be known as Muslim League Unionists".³ Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz remarks: "I explained that it was not possible for a Muslim party to carry on a government success-

fully in the Province with the majority of only one vote, even if all Muslim members belonged to that party, which was very doubtful. The Unionist Party was composed of elements that were ready to co-operate with the Muslim League, and Sir Sikandar assured Mr. Jinnah of the whole-hearted support and loyalty of all the Muslim members of the Unionist Party, himself included, who were true Muslim Leaguers at heart... Mr. Jinnah could not accept Sir Sikandar's suggestion, and this made us Muslim Leaguers very depressed".⁴ Also looking for an alliance between different Muslim political groups under the single banner of the Muslim League, Iqbal wrote to Jinnah: "I am glad to see that your work is progressing. I do hope that the Punjab parties specially the Ahrars and the Ittehad Millat will eventually, after some bickering, join you".⁵ However in seeking a settlement with Sikandar Hayat, Iqbal "seemed to run into difficulties, as the Unionists were not in a mood to disband their party and to join the Muslim League".⁶

Following the Muslim League debacle in the elections, which left them with only two of a total of 175 seats in the Punjab Assembly, the Punjab Muslim League became apprehensive of facing continuing failure in the Punjab, and Iqbal himself expressed the fear that Punjabi Muslims were now tending to become favourably inclined towards the Congress. However, less than four months later, he was again quite optimistic: "The enthusiasm for the League is rapidly increasing in the Punjab, and I have no doubt that the holding of the session in Lahore will be a turning point in the history of the League and an important step towards mass contact".⁸

After Sikandar Hayat's Cabinet began to function on firm grounds, the efforts to reach an agreement between the two parties were reactivated. The Punjab Muslim League had by then come a long way, and displayed more confidence in parleys with the Unionists. Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz claims that she helped to initiate negotiations by bringing up the issue in a Unionist meeting: "After the Agenda had been disposed of and we were about to disperse, I opened the subject, and while I was speaking I could see the leader getting red in the face. After explaining the situation, I went on to say that everyone present in the meeting was of the same opinion as I, only they did not have the courage to say so. Each one of us, including himself, I said, was a Muslim Leaguer at heart, and the sooner we were within the Muslim League fold the better it would be for all of us and for the Muslim Nation. We therefore requested him to approach Mr. Jinnah again. I said that it was true that the Sikandar Ministry was strong and the Party had all the power in the Province in its hands; but it was our duty as Muslims to join the League and strengthen its ranks by working within it. There was complete silence after my speech as Sir Sikandar said nothing and got up and closed the meeting".⁹ In other words, according to her, excluding Sikandar Hayat, leading Muslim Unionists wanted to have a closer relationship with the Muslim League, and it was she who set the scene for the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact.¹⁰ However, if Sikandar Hayat was not inclined towards a

compromise with the Muslim League, why did he take such a big entourage to Lucknow to attend the Lucknow Session of the Muslim League? Moreover, as quoted at the beginning of this chapter, she has also indicated that Sikandar Hayat wanted a compromise, but Jinnah was not willing to accept his terms.

Jinnah requested Iqbal to seek some common working ground with Sikandar Hayat.¹¹ Subsequently, Sikandar Hayat came to attend the 25th Session of the Muslim League at Lucknow in 1937 with a number of other Muslim Unionists. The statement he read out before the Session then became the basis of the agreement between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League. Basically, this agreement acknowledged the supremacy of the All-India Muslim League in the province, and stipulated that in any forthcoming election or by-election Muslim Leaguers and Muslim Unionists would act unitedly.¹² Sikandar Hayat also pledged that, on his return to Lahore, he would call a session of the Unionist Party and advise the Muslim Unionists who were not yet members of the League to accept its creed and join it. However, the Pact did not provide for a complete incorporation of the Unionist Party into the Muslim League; instead, it laid down a framework for close co-operation between two political entities that the parties were allowed to retain their separate identities. Sikandar Hayat had thus come to realize that the Muslim League now expressed the will of the Subcontinent's Muslims, and to accept its leadership for the Muslims of the province as well.

Ispahani has observed that Sikandar Hayat, along with his Muslim Unionist followers joined hands with the League "not out of deep conviction", but "as a matter of necessity... He knew that the Unionist Ministry by itself could not withstand the tide of Congress totalitarianism unless he secured the support of a Muslim organization functioning on an all-India plane."¹³ However it seems doubtful that "Congress totalitarianism" could, in the Punjab, have been the kind of threat to the Unionists that would have forced Sikandar Hayat into an agreement with the League. The Punjab's election results had clearly shown that the Congress alone could not form a Ministry in the province. Besides, as already noted, there were people on both sides seeking a rapprochement, and the atmosphere for reconciliation had become more favourable. Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, for instance, had, in May 1937 announced that all Punjabi Muslims, irrespective of their party allegiance, were strongly in favour of Jinnah's policies. The only hinderance to the development of a co-operative relationship between the two parties had been the Unionists' reluctance to give up their non-communal stance.¹⁴ Thus, the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact was not an abrupt development, but the result of a series of parleys and efforts initiated long before the provincial elections took place.¹⁵ It emerged as "the shining hour of Sikandar's political career".¹⁶

Many Muslim leaders welcomed Sikandar Hayat's alliance with the League in the general interest of the Subcontinent's Muslims.¹⁷ For the Muslim League, it was a major achievement, since the Congress was threatening its very existence

in other Indian provinces. However, it disappointed non-Muslim Unionists and worried other non-Muslim Punjabis.¹⁸ The Pact aroused a spate of criticism against Sikandar Hayat; and some critics even cast doubt on his loyalty towards his own Party, as they could see no reason why a ruling party should submit itself to the authority of another. Sikandar Hayat tried to alleviate the suspicions and fears of his critics by delivering speeches explaining his intentions and motives; but the mistrust aroused did not abate. Indeed, the fact that now Sikandar Hayat tried to win favour with both non-Muslim Unionists and Muslim Leaguers made his role dubious for both groups; and every new political development made it more difficult for him to keep up his balancing act.

The Punjab Muslim League, led by Allama Iqbal, became more and more critical of Sikandar Hayat. Malik Barkat Ali, who very vocally represented the League inside and outside the Punjab Legislative Assembly, "was dissatisfied with the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact and had started trying to organize the League in the Punjab without any interference by the Punjab Ministry".¹⁹ On the other hand, by virtue of the Pact, Sikandar Hayat had attained a prominent position in the Muslim politics of the Subcontinent, and was taken as a member on the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League. He thus wielded enormous influence, causing much resentment among veteran Leaguers of the province. They felt as if he were thwarting them and the Punjab League and presenting himself as the sole and supreme leader of Muslim Punjab on the platform of the All-India Muslim League. To people like Iqbal, Barkat Ali, Ghulam Rasul Khan and many other Leaguers, he was basically a Unionist, whose primary loyalties lay with his own Party and who had successfully been following Fazl-i-Husain's mode of politics. Iqbal, who in the closing months of 1937 was not in good health, felt that Sikandar Hayat was not being faithful to the Pact, and was instead working against basic interests of the League. His meetings with Sikandar Hayat did not improve matters, and in November 1937 he wrote to Jinnah:²⁰

After having several talks with Sir Sikandar and his friends, I am now definitely of the opinion that Sir Sikandar wants nothing other than the complete control of the League and the Provincial Parliamentary Board... Knowing the opinion of the province as I do, I cannot take the responsibility of handing over the League to Sir Sikandar and his friends. The pact has already damaged the prestige of the League in the province and the tactics of the Unionists may damage it still further. They have not so far signed the creed of the League and I understand do not mean to.²¹

Letters carrying similar complaints were written by Ghulam Rasul Khan²² and Barkat Ali²³ to Jinnah, inviting his attention towards their apprehensions about the Punjab Premier's intentions. In reply to the letter of Barkat Ali, Jinnah wrote to him: "I have not been well enough to tackle the various details that are referred to there. May I just state one principle, that once the Muslim members of the Unionist Party or any Mussalman who becomes a Leaguer and pledges himself to the creed, policy and programme, he is no longer anything

else but a Leaguer and those who have been already in the League are not better than the Leaguers... And I assure you that if you people have a little patience these small matters of detail will be adjusted fairly and justly and mainly in the interests of the cause for which we stand".²⁴ Later events proved that Jinnah was right in his strategy and his estimate of the situation. Moreover, as a statesman, he believed in a dynamic policy based on well-calculated moves, avoiding abrupt changes.

After the parleys between Jinnah and Fazl-i-Husain failed in 1936, the Punjab Muslim League became a regular critic of the Muslim Unionists. Succeeding Fazl-i-Husain, Sikandar Hayat inherited this legacy. On the other hand, the reorganized Punjab Muslim League had not been affiliated with the All-India Muslim League on account of some "technical grounds".²⁴ As S.M. Ikram notes, the following circumstances may have contributed towards this lack of formal recognition. When Jinnah visited the Punjab in June 1936 to preside over the Provincial Parliamentary Board, there were only eight to ten persons to receive him at the Lahore Railway Station. The gathering outside the Delhi Gate was very meagre, and the public meeting did not register any significant response. The Punjab League's efforts to collect funds met with little success. Only the Gilani Family of Multan and the Nawab of Mamdot promised to help the Provincial League in its election campaign. In other words, the Provincial League suffered from a lack of support from amongst the Muslim masses and gentry alike.

Painstakingly covering the developments of these years, Ashiq Husain Batalvi, has quoted a number of examples where Muslim Unionists under Sikandar Hayat were shown preference over veteran Leaguers of the province. He mentions the time when the All-India Muslim League Council met in Calcutta on April 18 and 19, 1938, three days before Iqbal's death, when 25 out of 35 seats on the League's Organizing Committee in the Punjab were given to Sikandar Hayat and his group, while Iqbal's group was allotted only 10.²⁶ However, this pragmatic approach to the given situation in the Punjab, did not mean that Jinnah had lost faith in the leadership of Iqbal and Barkat Ali. It was Jinnah who, later on, had Iqbal's letters to him published with a foreword that paid tribute to the great visionary in a befitting manner. Jinnah had to make sure that the Muslim Unionists should, on no account, wander into the welcoming fold of the Congress. Thus, the Pact made at Lucknow proved beneficial to Muslims at large, and "it looked as if Jinnah had snatched victory from the jaws of defeat".²⁷

Ashiq Batalvi has also criticized Sikandar Hayat's servile loyalty to the British Government, which, among other things, made him support its import policies, despite their negative impact on the economy of the Subcontinent. Batalvi thus gives the impression that Sikandar Hayat was quite capable of sacrificing the interests of his own people to appease the British for his own ends. But, as noted before, it is to be remembered that Sikandar Hayat had no

pretensions to being a revolutionary or radical nationalist. He was a careful politician who tried to improve the condition of Muslims through power gained from heterogeneous sources that cared more for their own interests than those of their communities as a whole. Sikandar Hayat worked in a complex situation in which he endeavoured to do what he could without disturbing a delicate equilibrium between a number of pressure groups with conflicting interests. According to Patalvi, despite his pledge, Sikandar Hayat never founded a Muslim League Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, and it was his ambivalence towards the League that led to differences between the Punjab League and himself.²⁸

When on account of his failing health, Iqbal was no longer able to lead the Punjab Muslim League, the Nawab of Mamdot, a moderate landlord who could relate with the Muslim landed aristocracy in the Unionist hierarchy on their ground, was made its President. Other Unionists inducted into the Muslim League also came from leading landed families of the province, including Sardar Shaukat Hayat and Mian Mumtaz Daultana; and they all eventually joined the Pakistan Movement and became close associates of the Quaid, thus further vindicating the strategy behind the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact.²⁹ After the death of Allama Iqbal on April 21, 1938, Barkat Ali and Ashiq Husain Batalvi became even more critical of Sikandar Hayat and his politics vis-a-vis the League. Batalvi recalls that in April 1939, responding to a question from Hari Singh in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, Sikandar Hayat still called himself a staunch supporter of the Unionist Party.³⁰ On the other hand, another contemporary source maintains that Sikandar Hayat worked hard for the reorganization of the Punjab League and the broadening of its base among the masses.³¹ At the Patna Session of the Muslim League an organizing Committee was set up under the chairmanship of Sikandar Hayat to promote the establishment of district branches of the League throughout the province. On March 6, 1939, this Committee met, under the chairmanship of Sikandar Hayat, to initiate steps to carry out its assignments and appointed Mian Ramzan Ali, a retired postmaster-general as a caretaker for the implementation of its organizational decisions with the assistance of Pir Taj-ud-Din, Mian Bashir Ahmad and Shaikh Fayyaz Ahmad. These interim office-bearers were to relinquish their offices after the reorganization of the Punjab Muslim League had been completed. The organizing Committee also urged notable Muslims of the Punjab to cooperate with these office-bearers in establishing branches of the League at local levels.³²

Meanwhile, Ashiq Husain Batalvi had also founded a provincial branch of the League, which he called the League Radical Party. Its manifesto was widely circulated in the Subcontinent; and according to Batalvi, in response he received numerous letters of applause and appreciation from distinguished personalities. He quotes the full text of a letter written to him by Syed Fida Husain, the President of City Muslim League, Campbellpur (Attock), in June 1939. In this strongly worded letter, Fida Husain calls the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact "an act of

opportunism on the part of Sikandar Hayat" and a Unionist "conspiracy to dismember the Muslim League". Syed Fida Husain further states that Lal Shah, the Pir of Makhad, an influential personality from the Attock District, was not ready to join the League owing to Sikandar Hayat's inclusion in it.³³ S.M. Ikram suggests that Batalvi is so harsh in his criticism of Sikandar because he had "personal squabbles" with him. Moreover in those days Batalvi is reported to have been in contact with Dr. Muhammad Ashraf, a secretary of the Indian National Congress and later a prominent communist leader.³⁴ His relations with Dr. Ashraf came into the limelight when he founded his League Radical Party. According to Batalvi, Sikandar Hayat had a personal grudge against him, and had planted two letters supposedly written by him, but actually written by some official, for publication in the local press. Addressed to Dr. Ashraf, these letters were intended to discredit Batalvi, as they implied that Batalvi was put on the payrolls of the Congress for the establishment of his new party. Batalvi also accuses Sikandar Hayat of meeting Gandhi secretly at Bombay in 1939. Interestingly enough this information was apparently provided to him by Dr. Ashraf, and Jinnah refused to pay any attention to it.³⁵ Given these constant confrontations, "there could be no love lost between Sikandar and Batalvi..."³⁶

Leaguers and Unionists interpreted the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact differently in accordance with their own particular interests, thus complicating and worsening relations between themselves. Malik Barkat Ali and his group emphasized those parts of the Pact which refer to the formation of a Muslim League Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, and suggest that its position in the Legislature would be superior to that of the Muslim Unionists and that in case of differences between the two, these were to be arbitrated by the Muslim League Parliamentary Board. This interpretation of the Pact enjoyed the support of Allama Iqbal. The Unionists stuck to their own interpretation of the Pact as leaving them in control of the legislature; and Muslim Unionists refused to sign the membership forms of the League, though some later agreed to do so at the behest of Allama Iqbal.³⁷ Veteran Leaguers of the Punjab thought that Sikandar Hayat actually wanted to lead the Punjab Muslim League as well as his own Unionist Party. Indeed, Sikandar Hayat tried to convey the impression that an oral understanding to that effect had been reached between him and the Quaid, but Allama Iqbal, Barkat Ali and others stopped him from securing the overlordship of the Punjab Muslim League. When the matter was referred to Jinnah, he strongly "denied the existence of any oral understanding beyond the terms of the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact".³⁸

Following up its efforts to expand its activities and to secure massive support in the province, the Punjab Muslim League had applied for its affiliation with the All-India Muslim League by submitting a list of 90 Leaguers to participate in the elections for the Muslim League Council. No Unionist was mentioned in the list, since at the time none of them had yet signed the League membership forms. The Council appointed an Inquiry Committee, under the chairmanship of

Nawab Ismail Khan, to assess the application. The Committee rejected the application for affiliation on the ground that the constitution of the Punjab League was not in consonance with the requirements of the All-India Muslim League. This was a great blow to the Provincial League, and it disheartened Iqbal, Barkat Ali and their associates. Iqbal wanted to publish a statement in the press against the Unionists, declaring that the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact did not exist any more; but the Quaid advised him not to do so.³⁹

Embittered recriminations between Sikandar Hayat and Barkat Ali had become a matter of routine in the Assembly as well as in the press. The Quaid advised Barkat Ali, Ghulam Rasul and others to wait until the Patna Session of the League, where issues could be discussed and settled. In the meantime, the controversies over various Bills in the Punjab Assembly kept Sikandar Hayat and Barkat Ali at daggers drawn, until in December 1938, the latter came out with a proposal to form a nationalist party of his own to represent the different communities.⁴⁰ This proposal was made in a desperate mood, and the pro-Unionist weekly, *Inqilab*, representing the official viewpoint, criticized it severely.

In the Patna Session of the Muslim League, the tension between Sikandar Hayat and Barkat Ali was lessened through the efforts of their colleagues and a sort of *detente* developed between them. Malik Barkat Ali even wrote a letter to Sikandar Hayat to this effect.⁴¹ During most of 1939, reconciliation between the Punjab Premier and Barkat Ali continued, with the latter supporting Sikandar Hayat and his Party in the Punjab Assembly on a number of occasions. During this period, at least six motions of no confidence against the Unionist Government were moved in the Assembly, but Barkat Ali did not support any of them. These motions were initiated by the Congress and Independents in the Assembly. By then, Barkat Ali had become aware that the alternative to Sikandar Hayat's Ministry was only a Congress Ministry, and that he was not ready even to visualize. How could he, he said, accept "the government of a people whose outlook is absolutely different from mine, whose notions of culture are absolutely different from mine, and whose notions of nationalism are absolutely different from mine." Ghulam Rasul and many other associates then criticized him for siding with Sikandar Hayat during this period when he could have created real trouble for him.⁴²

Differences between Sikandar Hayat and Malik Barkat Ali surfaced again when the League Organizing Committee began to hold its meetings under the former's chairmanship. Following up on its earlier meeting held in March 1939, the Organizing Committee met on August 11, 1939 to initiate preparations for the forthcoming League Session at Lahore, in March 1940, and to complete arrangements for the formation of the new Provincial Muslim League. Ashiq Husain Batalvi, in his own peculiar style, describes how the Committee met at the residence of Nawab Shah Nawaz of Mamdot, with Sikandar Hayat in the chair and Malik Barkat Ali, Zafar Ali Khan, Ashiq Husain Batalvi, Ghulam Rasul Khan, Malik Zaman Mehdi Khan, Pir Taj-ud-Din, Mian Abdul Aziz and Khalifa

Shuja-ud-Din conspicuously absent.⁴³ Only close associates of Sikandar Hayat including Mian Amir-ud-Din, Mian Ramzan Ali, Shaikh Inayatullah, Abdul Majid Salik, Fateh Mohammad Chaudhary, Syed Hameed Ali, Nawab Rashid Ali Khan, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Shaikh Mohammad Naqi and Mian Bashir Ahmad were invited to attend. The meeting constituted a Reception Committee, with Mian Bashir Ahmad as its Secretary, to make arrangements for the forthcoming session of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore. Subsequently, Barkat Ali and his companions explained to the press that they were not a party to this decision.

At the next meeting of the Organizing Committee, held on November 8, 1939 on further discussion of formation of the Punjab Muslim League, it was decided that the organization of League branches at the district level should be completed and their representatives should take part in the formation of the Provincial League. However, following another meeting of the Committee on January 10, 1940, at the residence of Sikandar Hayat, where, according to Batalvi, only Muslim Unionists were present, the establishment of the Punjab Muslim League was announced to the press on January 11, 1940. Nawab Shah Nawaz Mamdot was elected as the President of the Punjab League, Mian Ramzan Ali as the Secretary, and Mian Amir-ud-Din and Mohammad Ali Jaafri as Financial Secretary and Organizing Secretary, respectively. Sikandar Hayat was elected as the leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party. To plead the case for the affiliation of the newly constituted Provincial League, Shah Nawaz went to attend the session of the All-India Muslim League Council in Delhi on February 25, 1940. But Malik Barkat Ali, Ashiq Husain Batalvi and Pir Taj-ud-Din were also present and they argued that the new organization did not enjoy the support of the Muslims of the Punjab, and that it was a mere off-shoot of the Unionist Party. To resolve the deadlock, the League Council set up an Inquiry Committee headed by Nawab Ismail Khan with Choudhry Khaliqzaman and Raja Mahmudabad as members. Referring to the circumstances that led to the establishment of an Inquiry Committee, Khaliqzaman observes: "In August 1939, Mr. Jinnah advised me to have a talk with Sir Sikandar Hayat and to find out from him the best means of forming a proper Muslim League in Punjab. I wrote to Sir Sikandar that I would meet him and his friends at Simla to discuss the matter".⁴⁴ In his reply, Sikandar Hayat suggested that they should meet in Delhi, where an emergent meeting of the League Working Committee was to be held. Following their meeting, Khaliqzaman visited the Punjab, and then recommended the establishment of the Inquiry Committee to the Quaid.⁴⁵

Malik Barkat Ali and his group submitted their plea before the Inquiry Committee, which also heard evidence given by Malik Rab Nawaz of Ferozpur, Syed Mir Ahmad Shah of Campbellopur and Nawab Wilayat Ali Khan of Karnal. On the other hand, Nawab Shah Nawaz, Mian Ramzan Ali, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mian Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani and Syed Amjad Ali pleaded the case of the newly established Provincial League as "the main, trustworthy witnesses of

Sir Sikandar".⁴⁶ According to Ashiq Husain Batalvi, Khaliqzaman later told him: "We are convinced that you people have done a tremendous service to the League in the Punjab and have taken all sorts of pains and challenges. But, as a matter of fact, we need Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan and not you. The League derives prominence due to his status".⁴⁷ In his autobiography, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Khaliqzaman has not referred to any such statement by himself, and there is also no other source substantiating it.

After reviewing the Punjab Muslim League's application, the Inquiry Committee decided to grant it affiliation on March 16, 1940, a week before the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim League.⁴⁸ Malik Barkat Ali participated actively in this Session; but his differences with Sikandar Hayat continued. When, on March 26, 1940 K.L. Gauba presented his adjournment motion in the Punjab Assembly, regarding the killing of the Khaksars, Barkat Ali supported it. In June 1940, when the Punjab Government arrested many Khaksars from several Lahore mosques, Barkat Ali wrote a strongly-worded letter to Sikandar Hayat.⁴⁹ Sikandar Hayat and Barkat Ali also exchanged harsh words in the Punjab Legislative Assembly when certain Bills, like the Urban Immovable Property Tax Bill, were presented before the House. When the Bills were passed, demonstrations against the Government culminated in a general strike. During this time, Malik Barkat Ali severely criticized Sikandar Hayat's administration, and moved an adjournment motion in the Assembly to discuss the arrest of traders and politicians.⁵⁰ The general strike was finally called off on February 6, 1942, but the tussle between the two Muslim leaders continued on various issues and platforms.

While Sikandar Hayat did try to appease both the Muslim and non-Muslim leaders of the Subcontinent, he often very vocally supported the cause of the Muslims as advocated by the All-India Muslim League and exhibited an unflinching trust in the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam. When the Shahidganj controversy engaged the attention of the Subcontinent's Muslims and he was under direct attack from a number of quarters, Sikandar Hayat, addressing the Calcutta Session of the League in April 1938, "assured the gathering that he realized the pain and distress which the Shahid Ganj affair had given to the Muslims of India and he was no exception", adding that he stood behind Jinnah, and "no misunderstanding could tear them away".⁵² Then on October 8, 1938, during a session of the Sind Muslim League, he "exhorted the Muslims in Sind, in the name of the Muslims of the Punjab, to sink their differences and to rally round the banner of the League for the prestige of Islam in their own province".⁵³

When, preparing for war, the British Government indicated that it expected full-fledged support from its Indian subjects, Sikandar Hayat, on August 25, 1939, issued a statement to the press asking the people to support the British Crown fully in its war effort. In another statement, issued on September 4, 1939, Sikandar Hayat advised the people to take up arms in favour of the Allies. This loyalist attitude aroused resentment amongst some Muslim Leaguers, who

thought that before issuing such strong statements, he should at least have consulted the League. As Batalvi writes, this problem was "a very big cause of the bitterness and misunderstanding which arose between the Muslim League and the Punjab Premier, Sikandar Hayat Khan".⁵⁴ In December 1939, Z.H. Lari brought a resolution before the League Council criticizing the unilateral support for the British war effort being rendered by Sikandar Hayat. While Syed Ali Rashidi maintained that this "does in no way represent the views of the Muslims of India", Professor Inayatullah said that passing a strong resolution against Sikandar Hayat would wipe out "the work of the Muslim League in the Punjab".⁵⁵ At this juncture, the Quaid-i-Azam supported Sikandar Hayat, praised his services to the Muslims, called him "a strong pillar of the Muslim League", and asked Lari to withdraw his motion.⁵⁶ This strong defence of Sikandar Hayat was aimed at countering the hostile forces that were at work to sow dissension amidst the Muslim League at the very time that it was emerging triumphantly as a mass movement. Certain quarters similarly tried to capitalize on his attitude towards the Khaksars and their massacre in March 1940, in order to accentuate the differences between the mainstream League and Sikandar Hayat.⁵⁷ In later years, Sikandar pointed out: "People exaggerate petty differences. Although at times, I may differ with the Quaid-i-Azam on an issue, yet I shall never fail to carry out his orders".⁵⁸

By now, the persistently hostile attitude of the Congress Ministries towards the Muslim minority in their provinces and its Mass-Contact Movement intended to annihilate the Muslim League, had alienated Muslims everywhere: "Slowly but relentlessly the Congress was forcing the Muslims of India into separation".⁵⁹ In the Punjab itself, the Congress initiated the Mass-Contact Movement under Dr. Ashraf, a close associate of Pandit Nehru. But, under the dynamic leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam, the Muslim League, too, was re-orienting itself to meet contemporary exigencies and was reaching the Muslim masses everywhere. Muslim youth all over the Subcontinent joined its ranks, and a new goal was set at Lahore on March 23, 1940, with what later came to be known as the Pakistan Resolution. This struggle for the rights of Indian Muslims became the Pakistan Movement. The Quaid had always maintained that Muslims did not want to achieve anything at the expense of sister communities in the Subcontinent: "Ours", he said "is not a hostile movement. Ours is a movement which carries the olive branch to every sister community. We are willing to co-operate, we are willing to coalesce with any group, provided their ideals, their objects are approximately the same as ours".⁶⁰ But the Congress refused to show any inclination towards accommodating Muslim aspirations in the Subcontinent; and Nehru, Patel and other Congressites adopted policies that were inimical to the All-India Muslim League. Thus Abul Kalam Azad's negotiations for the installation of a Congress Ministry in the United Provinces were designed "to put an end to the existence of the League as a political party at least in U.P. and cut the ground from under the feet of its President, Mr. Jinnah".⁶¹ Under the circum-

tances, the Muslims of the Subcontinent now sought a permanent solution for their problems and a reaffirmation of their identity in a separate homeland.

Sikandar Hayat had banned armed volunteers and their parades in the Punjab in March 1940 and the Khaksars were affected most by this restriction. Yet, in a conversation with Khaliquzzaman, Sikandar Hayat told him "that some time before, 13,000 Sikh volunteers had paraded throughout the city of Lahore creating danger of an outbreak of violence, which had obliged him to ban all parades of private volunteers". To this Khaliquzzaman retorted that this seemed to mean that "those who are already organized may continue to remain so, but those who might begin later will not be allowed to have any training", and felt that Sikandar Hayat was quite aware that he was thus referring to the effect of the ban on the Khaksars.⁶² When the Quaid reached Lahore on March 21, 1940, the people gathered to receive him wanted to lead a procession through the streets of Lahore; but the Quaid declined, making them realize that any jubilation after the recent killing of the Khaksars was out of place. Indeed, according to Batalvi, Sikandar Hayat, Shah Nawaz Mamdot and Mian Bashir Ahmad had wanted to postpone the Session after the tragic incident, and had reluctantly agreed to hold it on schedule only on the insistence of Nazir Ahmad and Mian Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad.⁶³

Again giving expression to his antagonism against Sikandar Hayat and his group, Ashiq Husain Batalvi observes that arrangements for the Session were inadequate and that participants coming from outside the city faced troublesome problems of accommodation and transportation.⁶⁴ However, Sikandar Hayat did play an important role in the holding of the Lahore Session, and had much to do with the drafting of the Lahore Resolution. In the open session on March 22, Shah Nawaz delivered a speech in which, among other things, he extolled Sikandar Hayat's services for the restoration of the Badshahi Mosque. At this point according to Batalvi, the audience got furious and started hooting and shouting "shame, shame", "sit down", "do not mention Sikandar" and so on. This uproar, mainly reflecting feelings aroused by the tragedy of the Khaksar massacre, became so embarrassing that Sikandar Hayat walked out.⁶⁵ Then, the Quaid-i-Azam delivered a long speech, partly in Urdu and partly in English, tracing the history of political and social developments in the region, including a reference to Lala Lajpat Rai's letter to C.R. Das about differences between Muslims and Hindus being irreconcilable.

In the evening of the same day, the Muslim League Subjects Committee met to finalize resolutions for the next day. The issue of the Khaksars was postponed at the suggestion of the Quaid. Liaquat Ali Khan then read out the text of the famous resolution later known first as the Lahore Resolution and then as the Pakistan Resolution. Since some participants did not understand English well enough, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan sitting next to Sikandar Hayat, was asked to translate the Resolution into Urdu. According to Ashiq Husain Batalvi, the text of the Resolution was finalized at the residence of Nawab Shah Nawaz on March

21, 1940, and beside the Quaid-i-Azam, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, Sikandar Hayat, and Malik Barkat Ali were involved in its final drafting. Batalvi adds that Sikandar Hayat had also brought a resolution of his own into the Working Committee meeting, along the lines of his Zonal Scheme, but the meeting gave this little consideration.⁶⁶ The decisive step towards Muslim Separatism was taken in an "atmosphere surcharged with communal tension and open antagonism between the League and the Congress".⁶⁷ But the Muslims were now confident that their aspirations could not be ignored in any resolution of the Subcontinental problem and they felt that the Quaid was voicing their own thoughts when he felt compelled to say: "When you scratch a Congress-man, you find a Hindu underneath".⁶⁸ Ironically enough, it was the Hindu Press that coined the phrase Pakistan Resolution for the Lahore Resolution.⁶⁹

Despite the setback Sikandar Hayat had suffered on account of his mishandling of the Khaksar situation, he redeemed his image for Muslims through the important role he played in the historic Session of the League in his provincial capital. On the other hand, this also made his position more difficult in relation to the non-Muslims of the Punjab, and, indeed, also in relation to his own ruling party, which believed in a non-communal coexistence. The Muslim masses of the Punjab were ready to defy the British, while he remained a loyalist. Besides, as V.P. Menon has put it, "Although he was a member of the Muslim League, he was also the head of the cabinet representing the Unionist Party, which included not only Muslims, but also Hindus and Sikhs. He expressed his intention of resigning from the League and he hoped to take with him all the members of Unionist Party... Sir Sikandar was dissuaded from his purpose. Nevertheless, he took the opportunity of explaining his position vis-a-vis Pakistan in the course of a debate in the Punjab Legislative Assembly in March 1941. He admitted that he was, but in a qualified sense, the author of the Lahore resolution, the original resolution which he drafted having been radically amended by the Working Committee".⁷⁰ In the course of a long speech in March 1941, Sikandar Hayat tried to clarify his position on the drafting of the Resolution: "It is, therefore, a travesty of fact to describe the League Resolution as it was finally passed as my resolution. It must be taken as the official Resolution of the Muslim League... We want freedom for our country, freedom in the sense that we shall have full control of our own affairs, as an equal and autonomous unit within the British Commonwealth...".⁷¹ This shows how cautious Sikandar Hayat had become at this delicate juncture, when his divided loyalties were being put to a severe test from different angles. He could not quit the League, as such an act could eventually disband his Ministry. On the other hand, he could also not give up his Unionist base, with its cross-communal roots. However, with the lapse of time, he started inclining more and more towards the Muslim League, and he thus joined the mainstream of Muslim politics in the Subcontinent: "It was reported that unless he walked warily and kept on the right side of Jinnah, he would be swept away by a wave of fanaticism."⁷² Veteran Congressites, such as Abul Kalam Azad, finding him in a precarious position, approached him to wean him

away from the Muslim League. According to Khaliqzaman, the Quaid then asked "Sir Sikandar by telegram not to come to any decision with any individual or party, and that it was only the League's right to do so. On this, Maulana Azad sent a cable to Jinnah asking him if it was the position of the League that no provincial agreement that was based on the two nation theory would be acceptable to the League. The Quaid replied to Azad, "I refuse to discuss with you by correspondence or otherwise as you have completely forfeited the confidence of Muslim India".⁷³ Thus, a strong and opportune stand taken by the Quaid foiled conspiracies hatched by the Congress, and Sikandar Hayat's position was made more secure.

To mobilize more support for its war effort, the British Government of India had, at about this time, instituted a number of regional War Boards and War Committees which notable Indians were asked to join to popularize the Allied cause against the Axis Powers. On the other hand, neither the Congress nor the League were willing to support the British Government without receiving some commitment from it in response to their demands. The Indian National Congress, in particular, was very vocal in its denunciation of the Crown for keeping the Subcontinent in bondage and exploiting its people and resources for its imperial objectives. The League Working Committee meeting held on June 17, 1940, at Bombay, warned its members against joining any of the War Committees and Boards. It also recommended that every Provincial Muslim League should organize regular bands of volunteers to be known as Muslim League National Guards. Sikandar Hayat attended this session and accepted its resolutions.

However, on his return to Lahore, Sikandar Hayat, inaugurated the Punjab War Board established by the Governor. This inaugural session was attended, among others, by Nawab Shah Nawaz of Mamdot, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mian Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Syed Amjad Ali and Mian Amir-ud-Din. When criticized for this action against instructions of the League Working Committee, Sikandar Hayat defended himself by saying that the Quaid had exempted the Muslim premiers of Bengal and Punjab from the ban on participating in War Committee. The Quaid took serious exception to this statement, and asked all Leaguers to refrain from any such participation until some agreement had been reached between the Viceroy and the League.⁷⁴ A delegation led by Nawab Shah Nawaz and including Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Syed Mohammad Jaafari visited the Quaid in Bombay, pleading for a special exemption in the case of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League. The Quaid refused, and published a statement to this effect in the press. He again advised Leaguers in the Punjab, including the Nawab of Mamdot, to abide by the resolution of the Bombay Session of the League Working Committee. He also directed Shah Nawaz to resign from the War Committee immediately.⁷⁵

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, a Parliamentary Secretary in those days, wrote an article in the *Civil and Military Gazette* criticizing the Bombay resolutions and

arguing against the idea of establishing Muslim League National Guards.⁷⁶ On the other hand, Malik Barkat Ali issued a strong statement to the press defending the decisions of the Muslim League and its leadership.⁷⁷ Two days later, the *Gazette*, discussing the issue in an editorial, concluded that Punjabi leaders should serve their province first, only thereafter thinking of doing anything else, and that in the interests of the province, the Punjab Muslim League should co-operate with the British Government in her war-efforts.⁷⁸ It was a confusing situation; and in an article on Sikandar Hayat even the *Tribune* expressed its surprise at his endorsement of the idea of Pakistan.⁷⁹

Malik Barkat Ali, Ashiq Husain Batalvi and some other Leaguers of the Punjab, who had always been doubtful about the sincerity of Sikandar Hayat's support for the Muslim League, now felt that he should work more openly for the objectives of the League, including the establishment of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Since this could ultimately have brought Sikandar Hayat's career as a Unionist to an end, he was naturally reluctant to set up such a party in the Legislature. Bent on not allowing Sikandar Hayat to continue to get away with his delaying tactics, Barkat Ali, on his own, started building up such a party in the Legislature by joining hands with Mian Abdul Aziz, Mian Nurullah, Syed Mohammad Reza, Syed Wilayat Husain and Sardar Mohammad Husain; and after some success in this direction, sought recognition for his Parliamentary League Party from the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly, and also corresponded on the subject with Hakim Ahmad Shuja, the Deputy Secretary of the Punjab Legislative Assembly. When all these efforts failed, Barkat Ali wrote a detailed letter to the Quaid and complained: "Sir Sikandar has been deceiving others outside the Punjab into thinking that there is a Muslim League Party in the Punjab Assembly... I must say that by capturing the League organization he has done the greatest damage to the cause of the Muslim League. He thought that in this way he would be able to control me but he forgot that my allegiance is not to him but to the Muslim League".⁸⁰

On another occasion, the two rival groups confronted each other in a by-election for an Assembly seat left vacant after K.L. Gauba had been ousted from the Assembly in 1941. Sikandar Hayat and Shah Nawaz wanted Mian Amir-ud-Din to contest the by-election on the League ticket whereas Barkat Ali and leaders of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation did not approve of this candidature. In the resulting tussle over the nomination each group tried to gain the Quaid's approval for its own stand. Batalvi refers to a telegram sent by the Quaid which he quotes as stating: "I have refused to interfere. I do not approve Amiruddin".⁸¹ But Sikandar Hayat and his friends persisted in their support for the candidacy of Mian Amir-ud-Din, while his opponents decided to support Abdus Sattar Niazi, the Secretary of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation. This Federation was affiliated with the All-India Muslim Students' Association, an organization that had come into existence in the late 1930s through the efforts of the students of the Aligarh Muslim University. Despite the fact that Abdus

Sattar Niazi was not a well-known political figure, his nomination on the League's platform would have assured his victory, since, after the Lahore Resolution, the Muslim League had gained the support of the Muslim masses even in those areas where it had formerly been weak. However, to resolve the conflict between the two rival League groups, Niazi wrote to the Quaid on August 12, 1941 requesting him to nominate a Leaguer of his choice: "If you agree to come to Lahore and work with us in order to break the Unionist spell, we will set up a young men's candidate. He will be given the League ticket by you, and you will stay at Lahore for a while to see him elected. Victory is certain. Quaid-i-Azam, if you have at least made up your mind to break the shackles that have been hindering you, now it is the time to strike when iron is hot. These suggestions are just to find out your inclination. If your reactions are favourable, we have a fully worked out plan. This will be submitted to you in due course".⁸² Since Sikandar Hayat was adamant in his support for Amir-ud-Din as a candidate, although the Muslim Students Federation's opposition to this did worry him, Niazi concluded his letter with a reference to Sikandar Hayat's stand: "The last date for submitting applications is the 12th instant. Moreover, Sikandar is pressing us to declare that his expulsion will be a shock to Muslim solidarity. We cannot take our positions in relation to these issues unless we are first in receipt of your instructions. Therefore reply soon".⁸³

In his reply to Niazi, the Quaid-i-Azam tried to be helpful: "As to your second point, about the by-election in the Lahore City Constituency, the matter is under my consideration, and I am in communication with Nawab Saheb of Mamdot and Mr. Barkat Ali. I believe they are both coming to Bombay on the 23rd, and we shall carefully consider what should be done in the matter... please let me know the name of the candidate that you would like to have".⁸⁴ However, in a postscript, the Quaid added: "Since writing this, I am informed today that nomination day is 21st of August and withdrawal day 22nd of August. In view of this information, it is not possible perhaps to finally decide as I have not got all the information. I want and time is short and I cannot express any definite opinion. Therefore it would be open to you or any one else to put in your nomination. So far as I am concerned, I am not committed in any way".⁸⁵ In a telegram sent on August 19, 1941, the Quaid told Niazi: "Your letter 16th received this morning. Letter posted already. Not possible for me within time limit to express definite opinion. You are free to decide as you consider best".⁸⁶ In another letter, the Quaid explained: "I am in receipt of your telegram and your letters, and beg to inform you that it is difficult for me to give you the League ticket over the head of the Parliamentary Board of the Provincial Muslim League, Punjab. I cannot overrule the decision of the Punjab Parliamentary Board unless there is some very strong reason to do so, because at present, they are, according to the constitution, the recognised Provincial authority; but I believe that the Nawab of Mamdot, the President, has not yet finally decided, and if you can persuade him to accept your nomination, I shall be glad to hear

that."⁸⁷ But Sikandar Hayat, the Nawab of Mamdot and others continued to canvass for the candidacy of Amir-ud-Din. On the other hand, Barkat Ali published a long statement in the *Tribune* of September 11, 1941, giving details on his advocacy of Niazi's candidacy and criticizing the stand taken on this by the Nawab of Mamdot and his associates.⁸⁸ In the end, Sikandar Hayat had his way, and Amir-ud-Din was elected unopposed. While this victory enhanced the prestige of the newly reorganized Punjab Muslim League, it did nothing to lessen the tension between the two rival League groups.

The biggest test of Sikandar Hayat's loyalty to the leadership of the League came with the controversy regarding membership of the Viceroy's Indian National Defence-Council, which Lord Linlithgow had established in July 1941 to mobilize Indian support for the British war effort through its membership of prominent personalities, including the Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and Assam. The Quaid bitterly criticized the appointment of the Muslim members of this Council "over the head of the President of the League"; and in its session at Bombay, the League Working Committee demanded that Sikandar Hayat, Fazl-ul-Haq and Saadullah should resign from the Council. Lord Linlithgow tried to clarify his position through a communique issued from Simla on August 27, 1941. In the meantime, pressure from different Muslim quarters built up to demand the resignation of all Muslim members of the Council. The Punjab Muslim Students' Federation spearheaded the movement for resignation very earnestly, upbraiding all those Muslims who were serving on the Council. Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz gave her reasons for accepting the Council's membership; but Sikandar Hayat remained quiet, coolly watching developments. As the student movement gathered momentum in the month of July 1941, students took out huge processions in the streets of Lahore and burnt newspapers supporting Sikandar Hayat, such as the *Inqilab* and *Shahbaz*.⁸⁹ In this situation, Sikandar Hayat requested Maulvi Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din Qasuri, a Unionist, to negotiate with the students. Qasuri invited student leaders like Abdul Hamid Mirza, Abdus Sattar Niazi, Manzur-ul-Haque Siddiqui, Mohammad Sadiq, Chaudhary Nasrullah Khan, Mohammad Ashraf and Mohammad Ilyas to his home for talks in August 1941. He also asked a number of editors to come and help him with the negotiations, including Ghulam Rasul Mehr, Abdul Majid Salik and Murtaza Ahmad Khan Maikash. The students stuck to their demand that Sikandar Hayat and other Muslim Premiers should resign from the Defence Council at once.⁹⁰ The negotiations went on for two hours without any substantial results; and the two groups gave conflicting versions to the press. In a letter to the Quaid-i-Azam; Abdus Sattar Niazi described the negotiations thus: "We were seated side by side with the editors of the Unionist press. Threats, temptations and sermons were served with the utmost tact. I don't want to waste your time in superfluous details. The whole strain was that poor Sikandar has done nothing. He is ready to submit to Jinnah, the tyrant. But if, God forbid, he were to challenge the League, can you imagine the terrible consequences? Our reactions were non-

committal. We emphasized that if he succeeds in satisfying the Quaid-i-Azam, we are with him. Perhaps this misled them to think that the prey was an easy one. The next day Mir Maqbool was pleased to visit us. Now Sikandar wants to see us tomorrow".⁹¹ In his letters and telegrams to the students, the Quaid-i-Azam asked them to operate in the larger interests of the Muslim community without ever surrendering their right to have their own opinions on issues. The Quaid observed that the Muslims' joining the British oligarchy's Defence Council had given a "serious blow to our cause which cannot be tolerated by any honest man",⁹² but he later added: "I do not wish to be misunderstood that I am a party to stirring up opinion against Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan or any of the erring members. I want the public to express themselves and act with freedom... I think that I have made our position absolutely clear, and we have decided to take disciplinary action against those who have gone against the League decision and its general policy".⁹³

When the matter was discussed by the League Working Committee at Bombay, Sikandar Hayat appeared with a big contingent of his followers. Some people then thought that he would not resign from the Council, and the Muslim League would have to take disciplinary action against him. But, to the surprise of many, Sikandar Hayat announced: "I am in the hands of this Committee and will abide by its decision whatever it may be".⁹⁴ On August 25, 1941 the Working Committee passed a resolution demanding the immediate resignations of the three Muslim Premiers from the Council. It also noted with satisfaction that Sikandar Hayat Khan had decided to tender his resignation from the Council forthwith.⁹⁵ Sikandar Hayat seems to have arrived at his decision to resign from the Council at the very last moment, as he had earlier thought of resigning from the League together with his associates before the meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee.⁹⁶ In Bombay, Sikandar Hayat met the Quaid informally on August 24, and listened to him explain the League's policy towards the Defence Council. The next day at the Working Committee session, Sikandar Hayat was informed that the Viceroy had taken him on the Council not in the capacity of a Chief Minister, but rather as a representative of the Muslim community. Sikandar Hayat was bewildered and disheartened by this play of the Viceroy. It was then that he decided to tender his resignation from the Council.

Certain other Muslim leaders, including Fazl-ul-Haq, Sultan Ahmad and Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz, did not resign from the Defence Council on one excuse or the other. In her autobiography Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz claims that Sikandar Hayat had "wired back advising me not to take any action until I had seen him. We met in Lahore, and after thrashing everything out we decided, for the sake of Muslim interests, that I should not resign my membership".⁹⁷ This contention is contradicted by herself subsequently in her book, when she says that she stayed

on in the Council for the welfare of Muslim women.⁹⁸ No other contemporary source supports Begum Shah Nawaz's claim that Sikandar Hayat had convinced her to continue with her membership of the Defence Council.

Thus, at a crucial juncture, contrary to the expectations of many, Sikandar Hayat, stood firmly by the creed of the Muslim League at the expense of his own interests and affiliations with the Unionists and the British. On the other hand, his resignation not only avoided conflict within the ranks of Muslims in the Punjab, but also confirmed the strength the Muslim League had gained in the Punjab as the representative party of the Subcontinent's Muslims. It also showed that "the Punjab Ministry, though not a Muslim League government, was not prepared to quarrel with the League".⁹⁹ One should also not forget the opinion of Khaliqzaman, when he says: "The reason which Sikandar gave to the Viceroy for his resignation was obviously not very convincing, but was meant to keep up the prestige of the League in the eyes of the British Government as well as the Congress. How it pains me to find that in certain quarters, he is remembered only as a Unionist".¹⁰⁰ Sikandar Hayat's full acceptance of the League's authority actually amounted to the Unionist Party's submission to a more dynamic, massive and significant movement.

NOTES

1. Ashiq Husain Batalvi writes that when the League Parliamentary Board was established at Lahore, the pro-Unionist Party press in the Punjab began to poison the atmosphere and even attacked the personality of Allama Iqbal in a very objectionable way. See Ashiq Husain Batalvi, *Hamari Qaumi Jid -o-Jihd*, 1939, Lahore, 1968, p.116.
2. Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz, *Father and Daughter*, Lahore, 1971, pp.161-162.
3. *Ibid*, p. 163.
4. *Ibid*.
5. Iqbal to Jinnah, May 23, 1936, Lahore, Rep. 1968, p. 8.
6. G. Allana, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation*, Lahore, 1967, pp.259-260.
7. Iqbal to Jinnah, *op.cit.*, April 22, 1937, p. 15.
8. Iqbal to Jinnah, *op.cit.*, August 11, 1937, pp. 25-26.
9. Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz, *op. cit.*, pp.164-165.
10. For the complete text of the Pact, see , the daily *Paisa Akhbar*, Lahore, October 21, 1937.
11. "The Quaid appears to have asked Iqbal to use his good offices with Sir Sikandar Hayat, Chief Minister of the Punjab, to sign the League pledge and thereby establish a League Ministry in the province." G. Allana, *op. cit.*, p.275.
12. According to Syed Nur Ahmad, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan was mainly responsible for the signing of Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. See Syed Nur Ahmad, *Martial Law Say Martial Law Tak*, Lahore, 1965, pp.190-192.
13. M.A.H. Ispahani, *Quaid-e-Azam as I Knew Him*, Karachi, 1966, pp.54-55.
14. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, May 7, 1937. Also see Z.H. Zaidi in C.H. Philips, ed., *The Partition of India*, London, 1970, pp.245-275.
15. Syed Nur Ahmad, *op. cit.*, pp.188-189.
16. S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1969, p.252.
17. Choudhry Khaliqzaman believes that "Sikandar saved Muslim India by coming to the

- League session in Lucknow and infusing life into the organization. His associations with the Muslim League at this crucial hour in the fate of Muslim India is an event in history and must live for ever to remind us of his greatness." Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Karachi, 1961, p. 290.
18. "Sir Chhotu Ram (Development Minister, Punjab) in a statement on the Unionist Party's future, regretted the suggestion that the agreement reached at Lucknow was a surrender to Mr. Jinnah by the Punjab Premier". *The Indian Annual Register, 1937*, Vol. II, p.13.
 19. Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
 20. Iqbal to Jinnah, November 10, 1937, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.
 21. Ghulam Rasul Khan wrote a lengthy letter to Jinnah informing him that the "agreement reached between Sir Sikandar and yourself at Lucknow has formed the subject matter of keen controversy in this province". In his letter, he accused the leading Muslim Unionists, including Sikandar Hayat, for not complying with the Pact. He, on behalf of Allama Iqbal, and in his capacity of the Secretary, League Party in the province, sent a list of 25 persons to be included in the Organizing Committee of the League. Ghulam Rasul Khan to Jinnah, November 4, 1937.
 22. Barkat Ali felt strongly about the clause in the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact that stipulated the formation of the League Parliamentary Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, in which at the time, he was the only Muslim Leaguer then. Allama Iqbal and Barkat Ali, along with Ghulam Rasul Khan, wanted Sikandar Hayat and the other Muslim Unionists to fill the forms of the League's membership, but Sikandar Hayat refused to do so. He instead referred to some "oral understanding between himself and Jinnah" about this issue, while Iqbal and his group persisted. Later on, Jinnah denied that any such understanding had ever existed between them. However, following his own interpretation of the Pact, Barkat Ali wrote to the Quaid informing him of the "irregularities" of Sikandar Hayat after the Pact. Barkat Ali to Jinnah, December 3, 1937. Also see *Tribune*, February 8, 1938; Ashiq Husain Batalvi, *Iqbal Kay Akhri Do Saal*, Lahore, 1961, pp.524-537; M. Rafique Afzal, *Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings*, pp.42-43.
 23. Jinnah to Barkat Ali, November 20, 1937.
 24. S.M. Ikram, *op. cit.*, p.256.
 25. *Ibid.*, pp.264-265.
 26. Batalvi, *op. cit.*, p.483.
 27. Khalid B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, London, 1968, p.97.
 28. Batalvi, *Hamari Qaumi Jid-o-Jihd, 1939*, Lahore 1968, pp. 71-72.
 29. "This was an achievement of great political significance made by the League at its session at Lucknow." *The Indian Annual Register*, Calcutta, 1937, Vol. II, p. 12.
 30. Batalvi, *op. cit.*, 1939, pp.123-124.
 31. *Inqilab*, March 11, 1939.
 32. *Ibid.*
 33. For the complete text of the letter, see Batalvi, *op. cit.*, pp.133-134.
 34. S.M. Ikram, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-262.
 35. *Ibid.*, p.261, footnote.
 36. *Ibid.*
 37. Letter dated November 8, 1937, quoted in Batalvi, *Iqbal Kay Akhri Do Saal*, p.516.
 38. *Tribune*, February 8, 1938.
 39. B A. Dar, ed., *Letters and Writings of Iqbal*, Karachi, 1967, pp.104-114.
 40. *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1938, Vol. IV, pp.840-46. Also see *Inqilab*, December 14, 1938; *Zamindar*, December 16, 1938 and *Tribune*, December 22, 1938.
 41. Barkat Ali to Sikandar Hayat, August 31, 1939. An interesting feature of the Patna Session was that the pro-Barkat Ali Leaguers from the Punjab reached the city earlier

than Sikandar Hayat and his followers, and planned to accord a humiliating reception to the latter. But elders dissuaded them from doing so. Malik Shaukat Ali, interviewed at Lahore on May 12, 1983. For more on the Patna Session, see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1970, pp.300-324.

42. *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1939, Vol.IX, pp.1139-42.
43. *Inqilab*, February 4, 1940.
44. Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p.229.
45. *Ibid.*, also see Sikandar Hayat to Khaliqzaman, September 8, 1939.
46. Batalvi, *Hamari Qaumi Jid-o-Jihd, 1940-42*, Lahore, 1975, p.11.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Inqilab*, March 21, 1940.
49. Quoted in Rafique Afzal, *op. cit.*, p.55.
50. *Ibid.*, p.56.
51. *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1942, Vol.XVIII, p.370.
52. *The Indian Annual Register*, 1938, Vol.I, p.386.
53. *Ibid.*, Vol.II, p.386.
54. Batalvi, *op. cit.*, p.53.
55. *The Indian Annual Register*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, p. 349.
56. Batalvi, *op. cit.*, p.141.
57. *Inqilab*, November 20, 1942.
58. "As a matter of fact some interested groups in the Punjab were making systematic efforts to misrepresent Sir Sikandar to Mr. Jinnah, not realizing what a great disservice they were doing to the cause of Pakistan." Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p.250.
59. I.H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi, 1965, p.109: Also see, Michael O'Dwyer, "India Under Congress", *National Review*, London, July, 1939.
60. Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p.83.
61. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Middle Phase of the Muslim Political Movement*, Lahore, 1969, p.175. Even certain non-Muslim authors criticized the Congress for its "fascist tendency" that soon "became all-pervading". Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, *Recollections and Reflections*, as quoted in *Ibid.*, p.187.
62. Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, pp.234-235. Also see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *op. cit.*, pp.325-349.
63. Batalvi, *op. cit.*, pp.15-16.
64. *Ibid.*, p.17, This has been denied by Meem Sheen and Abdus Salam Khurshid in their interviews.
65. *Ibid.*, p.18.
66. *Ibid.*, p.24.
67. G. Allana, *op. cit.*, p.315.
68. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.316.
69. Begum Muhammad Ali is said to have made a reference to the resolution as the Pakistan Resolution in a speech. Sayyid Hasan Riaz, *Pakistan Naguzir Tha*, Karachi, 1968, p.256.
70. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Princeton, 1957, pp.104-105. We have no other information about Sikandar Hayat's toying with the idea of resigning from the League.
71. For the complete text, see *ibid.*, pp.443-451. "The Quaid did not like the tone and temper of Sikandar's speech..." G. Allana, *op. cit.*, p.331.
72. Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, Boston, 1967, p.57.
73. Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p.250.
74. Quoted in Batalvi, *op. cit.*, pp.60-61.
75. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, August 11, 1940.
76. *Ibid.*, July 6, 1940.

77. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1940.
78. *Ibid.*, July 27, 1940.
79. *Tribune*, September 12, 1940.
80. Barkat Ali to Jinnah, January 1, 1941. For the complete text, see Batalvi, *op. cit.*, Appendix No.2, pp.6-8.
81. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.84.
82. Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi to Jinnah, August 12, 1941.
83. *Ibid.* Also see a detailed letter of Barkat Ali to Jinnah, November 11, 1941.
84. Jinnah to Niazi, August 17, 1941.
85. *Ibid.*
86. Telegram from Jinnah to Niazi, August 19, 1941.
87. Jinnah to Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi, August 27, 1941.
88. *Tribune*, Lahore, September 11, 1941.
89. Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza: ed., *The Punjab Muslim Students Federation: An Annotated Documentary Survey*, Lahore, 1978, pp.1xvii-1xviii.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Niazi to Jinnah, August 12, 1941. For details see, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, File No. 1099, pp.144-146.
92. Telegram from Jinnah to Niazi, *QAP*, F/393, p.12.
93. Jinnah to Niazi, August 17, 1941.
94. Quoted in Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, pp.254-255. Also see *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, August 25, 1941.
95. Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p.255.
96. Syed Nur Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p.218.
97. Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz, *op. cit.*, p.175.
98. *Ibid.*
99. I.H. Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p.175.
100. Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p.255.