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KASHMIR AS A FACTOR IN PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICS: 1947—1985

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The Kashmir issue has been an important factor in Pakistan's foreign relations and its domestic politics since the state's inception. While the former has been the subject of analysis by numerous scholars,[1] the impact of Kashmir upon the Pakistani psyche in the context of domestic politics has received scant analytical attention. Nevertheless, the Kashmir issue has woven "itself into the fabric of Pakistan's domestic life",[2] influencing the calculations of the Pakistani political elite.

Some commentators have asserted that in 1947 the conflict over Kashmir was primarily an ideological one, expressed in terms of the conflict between the 'one-nation' and 'two-nation' theories.[3] India's acquisition of the state would lend credence to its proclaimed secular ideology and "without Kashmir Pakistan's whole theory of the Hindu and Muslim being separate nations" would lose credibility.[4]

The defects, deliberate or otherwise, in British planning which led to a failure in arranging Kashmir's future before 14 August, 1947 have been well-documented elsewhere.[5] Some commentators have asserted that for some of the decision-makers involved in partition, the notion of Pakistan was "a temporary expedient" which "would pass away in the face of a reunited Indian State. In this psychological atmosphere the unfinished business arising from partition might well not seem to be business of great urgency".[6] Indian leaders like Acharya Kriplani, President of the Indian National Congress, declared that "neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a united India".[7]

From Pakistan's perspective, therefore, the dispute over Kashmir was more than a psychological setback for the new state.

The issue aroused real security concerns, and it is not surprising to find the issue reverberating through the country's domestic politics. However, the extent and nature of the issue's impact has differed over a period of time. This paper identifies three distinct periods which reflect major shifts in the role of the Kashmir conflict as a factor in Pakistan's domestic politics: (i) 1947 - Tashkent Agreement (January 1966); (ii) Tashkent Agreement-Simla Agreement (July 1972); (iii) Post-Simla Agreement period.

1947-Tashkent Agreement:

During this period Kashmir was a major factor in Pakistan's internal political dynamics as well as the cause of two wars between Pakistan and India. While most analysts recognize that even without the Kashmir crisis issues existed which would have led to tensions between the two countries, nevertheless they support the view that without the Kashmir issue, "the chances for an amicable settlement would certainly have been better".[8]

Kashmir aroused a strong emotive linkage in Pakistan even before independence. The poet Iqbal who first put forth the idea of a separate Muslim homeland in the subcontinent was from Kashmir and the leaders who coined the word 'Pakistan' to reflect the area it would cover put the 'K' in it for Kashmir.[9] However, Pakistan's assumption regarding the acquisition of Kashmir was based not merely upon emotive links but upon three basic guiding principles relating to accession: geographical contiguity, the composition of the population and the wishes of the people.[10]

In fact, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah had assumed that there would be no problem over Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. The state comprised a Muslim majority, was territorially contiguous to the 'core' of West Pakistan.[11] Strategically there was a mutual dependence between the two-Kashmir depended upon the provinces comprising West Pakistan for essential supplies and services and the major rivers upon which West Pakistan's agriculture was based either rose from or flowed through Kashmir.[12]

As early as July 1947 a Muslim revolt had been festering in the Poonch district of Kashmir, and this developed into the Azad (free) Kashmir liberation movement.[13] Initially the movement was more a rebellion against the Maharaja's oppressive rule, but by September 1947 it had acquired a communal character and had developed

links with the Pathans of the tribal territory within Pakistan.[14] According to Lamb, "Hindu and Sikh bands crossing over from the Punjab sparked off a series of massacres which reduced the Muslim population of the province [Jammu] by over 200,000".[15] This led to direct intervention by the tribal Pathans into Kashmir — a move India accused the Pakistan government of initiating.

Before long, the Maharaja signed an Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union on 26 October, 1947, and in turn brought Indian troops into Srinagar in the shape of a Sikh battalion. By the end of the year, India had referred the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council, and 1948 saw fighting between the armed forces of India and Pakistan. UN-sponsored ceasefire took effect on 1 January, 1949, but the issue itself remained unresolved. Kashmir was split into two, with *Azad* Kashmir linked to Pakistan through the latter's Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, and its armed forces under the supreme command of the Pakistan General Staff.

While the crisis itself had temporarily subsided as a result of the ceasefire, its impact was felt upon Pakistan's domestic politics throughout this period. The Kashmir issue gave the historical Hindu-Muslim hostility a concrete shape and focus, and became "an article of faith with Pakistan."[16] The security aspect of the dispute was stressed by Pakistan along with the legality of its position on the issue. In 1950 Pakistan's foreign minister emphasised Kashmir's importance for his country's security, pointing out that West Pakistan's strategic road and railway systems ran parallel to Kashmir and the defense of that area was "based upon the fact that this line would not be threatened from the flank. If Kashmir acceded to India, the whole of that flank would be threatened".[17]

Within the Pakistan army the ceasefire aroused dissatisfaction amongst a number of officers. One of the most senior officials expressing anger at the ceasefire was Major-General Akbar.[18] This discontentment led to an alliance between certain army officers and members and sympathisers of the Pakistan Communist Party. While the latter were not interested in Kashmir, they saw an opportunity to bring about a change in the government,a government that had refused an invitation to the Prime Minister to visit the Soviet Union and was instead moving wholly into the US sphere of influence.

The government for its part felt a growing lack of trust in senior officers like Akbar, and in September 1950 appointed Ayub Khan as Commander-in-Chief of the Army over the heads of more

senior officers. He took command in January 1951 and in March 1951 Major-General Akbar along with a number of other officers was implicated along with members of the Communist Party in a conspiracy to overthrow the government and establish "a military dictatorship"—in what became known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case.[19] Based upon scanty evidence the government used the opportunity to rid the armed forces of officers advocating a more aggressive role on the Kashmir issue, along with politicians and intellectuals questioning the direction of government policy.[20] Thus, the Kashmir issue was a vital factor in Ayub Khan's rise to power within the army.

Meanwhile the domestic political crises that engulfed Pakistan between 1953 and 1958, especially the growing dissatisfaction in East Pakistan with the successive central governments, which culminated in military takeover by Muhammad Ayub Khan in October 1958, pushed the Kashmir issue into the background.[21]

Nevertheless, the Kashmir issue remained a politically emotive issue as was demonstrated by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan. In 1958, under his leadership, the Muslim League attempted to reassert itself and gain public support for the national elections that were to be held in February 1959 by claiming that the party would actively support the Kashmiris in their liberation struggle.[22] He built up the Muslim League's National Guard to about 60,000 members and they went around uniformed and armed with rifles.[23] In September 1958 the government banned the wearing of military uniforms and the maintenance of paramilitary forces by individuals and non-government organizations.[24] However, it was only with the imposition of Martial Law in October 1958 that the National Guard was disbanded.[25]

Although Ayub had disbanded the militia, once he assumed power, as head of a martial law regime, he could not afford to ignore public sentiment on Kashmir and the economic and political realities the issue had created. At the same time, being the architect of the US-Pakistan alliance he sought to lessen Indo-Pakistan tensions — a policy advocated by the United States which felt that conflict in the subcontinent would detract from the containment of Communism. Therefore the period from 1960 to 1964 can be seen as one of dialogue between the two antagonists, symbolized by the Ayub-Nehru meeting of September 1960[26] — with Kashmir still the main source of conflict between them.

Along with the security implications, Pakistan had begun to

feel the economic repercussions of the Kashmir conflict almost immediately after independence. Since most of the major rivers upon which Pakistan's agriculture depended rose from or flowed through Kashmir, India threatened the country's economic base by cutting off this source of water-which she did in 1948. Under US pressure through the World Bank, Pakistan agreed to the partitioning of the Indus basin waters. By the time the Indus Basin Treaty was signed (1960) India had already closed off the water from three important rivers: the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, and the treaty legitimized this action. As a result of this treaty Pakistan had to divert huge amounts of funds towards building an extensive link canal system, which has now proven to be less than satisfactory—having caused immense water-logging and desalination problems. Out of the two dams built with foreign assistance, the Tarbela Dam has been beset with structural defects, causing not only agricultural problems for the country, but also problems related to the provision of hydro-electric power.[27] Furthermore, according to government and non-governmental sources, India has attempted to close the source of the Chenab river[28] in spite of the Indus Basin Treaty which allotted the water of the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus to Pakistan.

Pakistan had hoped that the signing of the treaty would eventually lead to a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue, but was disappointed.[29] By the beginning of 1963, Ayub's popularity had plummetted and an important factor was the perception that he had failed to take advantage of the 1962 Sino-Indian war in order to gain Kashmir militarily. Domestic public opinion assumed Ayub was "following the dictates of his US advisers".[30] Ziring felt that as a military dictator, Ayub's popularity, especially with the intelligentsia, could only come through military success "and the battleground for such a test was readily available in Kashmir".[31]

Amongst Ayub's cabinet, Bhutto advocated a hard-line on Kashmir "not only because a Muslim population was being denied the right of self-determination, but because it would immeasurably improve the President s image at home".[32] Bhutto was well aware of the fact that at least in West Pakistan "Public opinion had been so aroused about Kashmir for so long that any government attempt to bury the question would almost certainly have serious repercussions".[33]

Although Lamb asserts that the Kashmir issue "seemed a trifle

remote" in East Pakistan,[34] in fact until the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Kashmir did arouse public opinion in the Eastern province albeit not as frequently nor as intensely. This was most clearly demonstrated during the crisis in Indian-held Kashmir in the early sixties.

By late 1963 the Indian government had begun to undo the impact of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which provided for the special status of Kashmir within India.[35] In December 1963 the Pakistan government lodged a protest with India against the latter's moves to formally integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union. Around this time it was discovered that a sacred Islamic relic, a hair of Prophet Mohammad, had disappeared from the Hazratbal shrine near Srinagar. This led to large-scale civil disturbances in Indian-held Kashmir as well as protests in Pakistan — including "in far off Khulna in East Pakistan".[36] In both Khulna and Jessore (East Pakistan) the incident led to anti-Hindu riots, and the government found it difficult to control the situation in both Wings, where the call went out for 'Jihad '(holy war), until mysteriously the relic was recovered.

The extent of the protest within Indian-held Kashmir demonstrated to India its inability'to win mass support from the Kashmiri Muslims'.[37] In addition, the communal protests had spread to other parts of India, especially Calcutta. The result was a breakthrough in the Indian posture on Kashmir in that Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmiri leader, was released from prison and allowed to open talks with the Pakistani government—as well as with the Indian central government.[38] Nehru for the first time seemed willing to publicly admit "that Pakistan did possess a genuine right to be interested in the future of Kashmir".[39] However, Nehru died (May 1964) before any concrete developments could take place between the two countries regarding Kashmir's future. Shastri, who became prime minister in June 1964, lacked the political strength to bring about "an Indo-Pakistan *detente* over Kashmir".[40] On 4 December, 1964, the Indian government established Presidential rule in Kashmir, with the intention of abrogating Article 370 of the Constitution and incorporating Kashmir into the Indian Union.[41]

1965 saw tensions between India and Pakistan on various fronts. The Rann of Kutch military encounter occurred in May, but was limited on 30 June in scope and duration by a British-spon-

sored ceasefire. Meanwhile, in Indian-held Kashmir a crisis was brewing as hostility to union with India grew. In March (1965) Sheikh Abdullah, on his way to Mecca for *Haj*, visited Algiers and met the Chinese prime minister, Chou-En-Lai, to discuss the Kashmir issue.[42] This led to his arrest on his return to India which in turn instigated rioting in Indian-held Kashmir. Lamb asserts that there was evidence to suggest "that by the middle of 1965 there was prevailing within Indian-held Kashmir a situation which could in some ways be compared to that of the autumn of 1947".[43]

In some regions there developed an anti-India guerrilla movement and soon there were clashes between Indian and Pakistani troops. By August "incidents on the Indian side of the ceasefire line had become so frequent as almost to warrant the description of rebellion or civil war".[44] India attacked Pakistani positions in the northern sector of Kargil around 14 August and by 24 August the Indian government officially announced its crossing of the ceasefire line.[45] However, by early September it was clear that India had suffered a major setback since Pakistani forces were less than twenty miles from Jammu itself.[46] This led to the expansion of the war by India to Pakistani territory with an attack on West Pakistan.

The 1965 war, while ending in stalemate, along with the Tashkent agreement that followed, had long-term repercussions on Pakistan's domestic politics. The war had made the East Pakistanis realize their physical vulnerability and their inability to defend themselves against foreign aggression, since they had only one army division present and limited military supplies. Communications between the two wings of Pakistan were broken during the war and East Pakistan became acutaly aware of its physical isolation as it was left to fend for itself. The fact that India chose not to attack East Pakistan was of little comfort to the Bengalis who had been demanding an increased defense capability.[47] More important, "the Bengalis resented the fact that they were exposed to the danger of Indian occupation for the sake of Kashmir".[48] More than any other single factor, "the war may truly be called a watershed in East Pakistan's relationship with the centre".[49]

In West Pakistan, lack of progress on resolving the Kashmir question at Tashkent was seen as a 'sell-out ' by Ayub to the Hindu "babus" and "warlords".[50] Since "for home consumption the ceasefire . . . had been interpreted as representing" a Pakistani victory,[51] anything less was seen as a betrayal by the government.

Furthermore, the cutting off of US military supplies during the war led to increasing disillusionment with the US. Upto the 1965 war, the government could explain foreign policy decisions, like its support for Britain in the Suez crisis and its alliance with the US, even when they were unpopular in terms of the country's defense needs and international support for its position on Kashmir. For example, in 1964 Bhutto explained why Pakistan was reluctant to support the Algerian revolution in spite of domestic public sentiment.

> We have always said that Kashmir was the most fundamental question for Pakistan. At the same time, some people wanted us to jeopardise our position about Kashmir in the Security Council of which France is a permanent member, by giving recognition to Algeria.[52]

The 1965 war revealed the conflict of interest between the US and Pakistan, and this had a long-term impact upon Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies in the post-Tashkent period.

Tashkent Agreement—Simla Agreement

This period saw the working out of the repercussions of the 1965 war and the Tashkent agreement, but otherwise the Kashmir issue no longer dominated the domestic political scene as it had done between 1947—1965. The focus shifted to regional issues within the country where the political situation was in a flux.

In East Pakistan, the 1965 war had not only created a sense of isolation and vulnerability, it had made the Bengalis aware of the disadvantage of being too dependent upon the central government.[53] When it was cut off from the Western wing, it had insufficient resources to meet its needs and the prices of essential goods, normally imported from West Pakistan, had risen. Finally, since the US had cut off all arms aid, Pakistan had to use its own resources to build up its military strength and this meant cutting back on development programmes.[54] Thus, Sheikh Mujib's Six-Point demand in February 1966, calling for more provincial autonomy, gained widespread support in East Pakistan and marked the beginning of a new phase in East Pakistani politics.

In West Pakistan, Tashkent was seen as a "sell-out" by the Ayub government—a view that was further reinforced by the Ayub-Bhutto conflict. This conflict resulted in Bhutto quitting the government and forming the Peoples Party in 1967. His party adopted a hard line on India and called for the "liberation" of

Kashmir.[55] Bhutto's initial popularity can at least partly be attributed to this hard line on India and dissociation from the Tashkent agreement. He also capitalized on the people's disillusionment with the US and vowed to take Pakistan out of CENTO and SEATO.

Tashkent also fueled the anti-Ayub movement which was growing rapidly in both East and West Pakistan. While Ayub's fall from power was a result of domestic political strife and economic problems, the Tashkent agreement was also a factor. As the Kashmir issue continued "to defy solution the temper and frustration of the [West] Pakistanis [was] magnified, and the displeasure was directed at the government".[56]

Ayub Khan was replaced in 1969 by another Martial Law regime-that of General Yahya Khan. The general elections that followed and the resulting polarization between the two wings of the country eventually led to civil war in East Pakistan, and by December 1971, to war with India. However, unlike most previous Indo-Pakistan conflicts, this one focused primarily on East Pakistan and resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

The trauma of losing East Pakistan finally confronted Pakistan with the reality of Indian power. After 1971, *Dawn* stated that "for Pakistan the achievement of parity in military might with India was not a practical proposition even before 1965. It is even less so in today's conditions", and the *Pakistan Times* commented that "we on our part have to rid ourselves of the fiction of equality of status with India."[57] Pakistan's acceptance of Indian power in the region was reflected in the signing of the Simla Agreement in July 1972, which marked the new concept of 'bilateralism' on which future Indo-Pakistani relations were to be based-something that India wanted since 1947.[58]

According to some commentators, India and Pakistan had effectively partitioned Kashmir as a result of the Simla agreement, "even if they did not admit it".[59] Nevertheless, a 1977 government of Pakistan White Paper on Kashmir in reference to the Simla agreement, distinguishes between the international border and the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir asserting that "there is, therefore, no question of the line of control being regarded as an international frontier.[60]

The Simla agreement did signal Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire line in Kashmir, even though India had gained territory in the Kargil sector. Article 4,ii of the Treaty stipulates that:

> In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.[61]

Although, a few months before Simla agreement, Bhutto had stated in the national assembly in April 1972, that self-determination was "the inherent right" of the Kashmiris which no one could deprive them of, and at a press conference in Simla he reiterated that "Pakistan has stated its position on the principle-the principle is that of the right of self-determination for Kashmiris",[62] yet according to some analysts, the Bhutto government seemed to accept the Kashmiris' right to self-determination was something they had to fight for themselves, and this was not Pakistan's "sacred duty".[63]

Post-Simla Period:

The post-Simla period has seen the Kashmir issue recede further into the background in the context of Pakistan's domestic politics. Nevertheless, it continues to retain an emotive force which no government can totally ignore. Bhutto, who with his charisma, had made the recognition of Bangladesh acceptable to the Pakistanis, had to continuously reassure the nation that his government was not forsaking the Kashmir cause. On his return from Simla he reassured a public gathering in Lahore that on the 'vital' issue of Kashmir, "we have made no compromise. This is a question which can be decided only by the people of Kashmir. Neither Pakistan nor India have any say in the matter".[64]

Although on this occasion he asserted that India and Pakistan had no say on the Kashmir issue, nine months later, in March 1973, he identified three parties to the Kashmir dispute "India, Pakistan and, above all, the people of Kashmir. No settlement of this dispute which attempts to bypass one of the parties, or is not acceptable to all the three, can be final or enduring."[65]

Bhutto attempted to maintain this ambivalent public posture on the Kashmir dispute domestically, even though in reality a change can be discovered in the Pakistani leadership's attitude towards the conflict after Simla.

After Simla, Bhutto created the Kashmir Council to deal with the affairs of Azad Kashmir along with the existing Ministry of Azad Kashmir Affairs, and the President of Pakistan was to be

Chairman of the Council. To intergrate Azad Kashmir into Pakistan, the Peoples Party began participating in Azad Kashmir politics. Previously, Azad Kashmir had its own political parties, even though they had links with parties in Pakistan and Indian-held Kashmir.

In November 1973, Bhutto toured Azad Kashmir where he hinted at the provision of provincial status to the region as a way of "taking the problem towards the solution."[66] At the same time, he realized the volatile nature of this suggestion and balanced it by other statements in which he reiterated Pakistan's commitment to the principle of self-determination. Bhutto explained the need to remain ambivalent publicly on the Kashmir issue, in an interview with the Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar:

> What I said in Azad Kashmir should have been very much appreciated in India because no politician in Pakistan would have dared to say: accept provincial status . . . . . It has to be covered up . . . . Many had contemplated that why not merge them and bring them into the mainstream of our national efforts. But they did not dare to do it.[67]

Despite Bhutto's non-committal public stance, he himself was very clear that war had failed "to resolve the Kashmir dispute."[68] However, his suggestion for provincial status for that region aroused opposition within Pakistan, as some interpreted it as a recognition of the existing status quo and a renunciation of the principle of self-determination.

Bhutto attempted to explain his reasons for making such an offer, which he claimed to be a response to requests from the leaders of Azad Kashmir for some "interim arrangement" till the resolution of the dispute:

> They [the Azad Kashmiris] ask how long this state of uncertainty will continue; how long they will be in Pakistan and yet not be in Pakistan . . .. In India they have got persons from Kashmir in the Central Government . . Yet the dispute exists. It has not been prejudiced . . . We are trying to make the people of Kashmir . . . feel satisfied at sharing with us what is in Pakistan, what belongs to us all. And then it can always be arranged that this does not prejudice the right of self-determination."[69]

However, the idea failed to gain support, and Bhutto himself resorted to using Kashmir as a political rallying point domestically, in the traditional fashion of supporting the principle of self-determination and "liberation" for the Kashmiris. In February 1975 he called for a *hartal* (general strike) by *all* the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistanis were to join because of "their indissoluble bonds" with the people of Jammu and Kashmir.[70] But, nevertheless, with internal political conflicts dominating the country's political agenda in the seventies, and regional antagonisms surfac-

ing—especially in Baluchistan where the government faced an insurgency—the Kashmir issue continued to recede into the background. Government statements on Kashmir became infrequent, and the issue was not utilized as a means for gaining political support in the elections that followed and the PNA movement that removed Bhutto from power.

Of course, Kashmir could not be forgotten, and as Bhutto had remarked "it would be naive and foolish for any government to think that people will forget the Kashmir problem."[71] General Zia's regime once again tried to reassure the people that it was also committed to the principle of self-determination and even went to the extent of raising the Kashmir issue in the UN Human Rights Commission in March 1982.[72] The following month, Zia stated that Pakistan was willing to discuss all issues bilaterally except Kashmir, which was an "international issue".[73] Again, in May 1983, Zia announced that Pakistan was not bound by bilateralism and was within its rights to take up the Kashmir issue in the UN.[74] However, in February 1984, when the Kashmiri "freedom fighter" Maqbool Butt was hanged in India for killing an Indian diplomat in Britain and there were massive processions and rallies in Pakistan, the government adopted a low-key and restrained posture towards the Indian government.

More recently, the Pakistan foreign minister, speaking in Parliament, stated that Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir issue remained "firmly rooted in the UN resolutions"[75] and the government was "resolved to find a peaceful settlement of this dispute in the spirit of the Simla Agreement."[76] It is significant that while the Zia regime in principle supported the concept of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, it had committed itself to the framework of the Simla agreement and therefore to bilateralism on the Kashmir dispute.

Evaluation:

An interesting aspect of he Kashmir issue, within the context of Pakistan's domestic politics during the whole 1947—1985 period has been that it has never directly been crucial in bringing a government into power or removing one from power. The quick turnover of central and provincial government between 1947 and 1958 was a result of regional political dynamics and intrigues within

Pakistan. Kashmir was a major factor in the rise of Ayub Khan to the position of C-in-C of the army, but the military takeover in 1958 was again a result of internal political wranglings.[77] Again, while Bhutto capitalized upon the anti-Tashkent fervour — in fact, he was largely responsible for creating it—the nation-wide anti-Ayub movement already existed. The immediate cause of the large-scale rioting which finally made Ayub step down was the worsening economic situation symbolized by a sugar shortage — accompanied by an organized student protest movement in East and West Pakistan.

However, once a government is in power, it cannot afford to do anything that might be taken as a sign of compromise on Kashmir, as was apparent during the Bhutto period. It is at this stage that Kashmir becomes a crucial factor in Pakistan's domestic politics. It is an issue which has always been a unifying factor that governments have used to gain public support. The exception was East Pakistan after 1965, where the Kashmir issue acted as a devisive factor, aggravating the hostility the Bengalis felt towards West Pakistan and the central government.

In order to understand why Kashmir declined in importance as a factor in Pakistan's domestic politics after 1965, one must examine a number of factors, including the role of the Kashmiri settlers within Pakistan, in order to assess their relevance vis-a-vis the Kashmir issue.

Writing in the early fifties, Brecher asserted that as many as 10,000 Pakistani soldiers belonged to the Poonch region of Kashmir,[78] and there are many people of Kashmiri descent in the government bureaucracy and in the private sector where they account for some of the most important industrialists in the Punjab. Most of the Kashmiri population in Pakistan is based in the Punjab, with a heavy concentration in the urban areas of Sialkot, Lahore and Gujranwala.[79] In these cities they form an important political force, especially during elections, but as such their influence has been limited since Pakistan has had few elected governments.

In fact, if one goes through the names of civil and military decision-makers since 1947, few Kashmiris stand out. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan is the most important exception, but even he had a limited impact upon Pakistani politics—his base of support being restricted to the Frontier province. More relevant, perhaps, is the link between the Kashmir cause and the Pathan people. Since the

tribal intervention in Kashmir in 1947, the issue has evoked a strong emotive response in the frontier — influenced to a large extent by the Islamic factor, at least at the level of the masses. Furthermore, Major-General Akbar of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case was a Pathan, and a large proportion of the senior officers of the Pakistan army have been, and still are, Pathans. However, very little research has been done on this issue which might provide concrete evidence of the Pathan factor in itself influencing the role of the Kashmir issue within Pakistan's domestic political milieu.

The most important factor in making the Kashmir issue so central to Pakistan's domestic political environment in the 1947—1965 period was the ingrained belief in the Pakistani psyche that Kashmir was a part of Pakistan. The circumstances surrounding the partition of India and the conflict over the division of supplies and finances lent support to the notion that Pakistan's existence was threatened by India from the start, and Kashmir symbolized Indian intransigence and non-acceptance of the concept of Pakistan. Bhutto summed up the Pakistani view when he stated:

> Why does India want Jammu and Kashmir? She holds them because their valley is the handsome head of the body of Pakistan. Its possession enables her to cripple the economy of West Pakistan and, militarily to dominate the country . . . . Above all, she retains the state against all norms of morality because she wants to negate the two-nation theory, the basis of Pakistan . . . . For the same reasons, Pakistan must continue unremittingly her struggle for the right of self-determination of this subject people. Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically."[80]

In the early years, Kashmir was dominant in the affairs of Pakistan because the latter's security and survival were perceived in terms of the Indian threat — with Kashmir being the concrete manifestation of this threat and a means of uniting the country for the task of nation-building. However, as the new state attempted to develop, internal cohesion was threatened by regional political conflicts within the country and the focus shifted to domestic issues and concerns.

After the 1965 war with India, the increasing volatility of the provincial conflicts within Pakistan shifted the Kashmir issue into the background, especially since "in all her dealings with India over Kashmir, Pakistan laboured under one crucial disadvantage . . . In order to bring about any change in the *status quo* it was upto Pakistan to act."[81] After 1965, the Pakistan government had too many other crucial problems which prevented it from acting on the

Kashmir issue, and the people were more concerned with domestic political conflicts which culminated in the creation of Bangladesh and insurgency in Baluchistan.

After Bangladesh, the people of Pakistan had to face the reality of Indian power, and liberating Kashmir militarly was not perceived as a feasible option. Also, by now Pakistan's focus was shifting increasingly towards the Islamic world, especially in the Gulf region. At the same time, new problems with India shifted the focus away from Kashmir in the Indo-Pakistan relationship — the foremost issue being India's nuclear explosion in 1974. Most recently, the Afghan crisis has focused domestic public opinion on the Afghan refugee problem.

Amidst all these issues, the Kashmir issue aroused less passion within Pakistan during this period, although no government went as far as Bhutto attempted to go in an effort to end the conflict by suggesting the absorption of Azad Kashmir into Pakistan.

An interesting development has been the attempt by the Azad Kashmir government to develop closer links with Indian-held Kashmir, by calling for the opening up of all travel routes between the two areas.[82] The President of Azad Kashmir in an interview stated that there should be no visa or passport restrictions on the movement of Kashmiris across the border, and any control on the movement of the people of the area should be in the hands of the Kashmiris rather than the governments of India and Pakistan.[83] However, it is too early to tell whether this implies new initiatives to resolve the conflict, since there has been no official response at the time of writing, to the Azad Kashmir President's suggestions from the governments of India and Pakistan.

NOTES

1. In the words of one of these "In the complex of conflicts between India and Pakistan that were the legacy of the partition, the Jammu and Kashmir issue has survived as the main cause, as well as the symbol, of their mutual animosity and intransigence". P.I. Cheema, "Kashmir as a Factor in Indo-Pakistan Relations", *Scrutiny* (Islamabad), Vol. III, Nos. 1&2, 1976, p. 125.
2. L. Ziring, *The Ayub Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958—1969*, (Syracuse, New York), 1971, p. 50.
3. A. Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir*, London, 1966, p. 13.
4. M.J. Akbar, *India: Siege Within*, Penguin Books,1985, p. 244.

5. Lamb, *op.cit.*, Also, Pakistan Government's *White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute* (1977); Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, Oxford University Press, 1953 and A.G. Noorani, *The Kashmir Question*, Bombay, 1962.
6. Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 13.
7. Cited in S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, Karachi, 1973, p. 9.
8. A. Lamb, *Asian Frontiers*, London, 1968, p. 110.
9. Rahmat Ali Chaudhry and his associates coined 'Pakistan' — 'P' for Punjab, 'A' for Afghania (the North-West Frontier), 'K' for Kashmir, 'S' for Sind and 'TAN' for Baluchistan.
10. S. Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations*, Bombay 1966, pp. 80—81.
11. *Asian Frontiers*, p. 105.
12. Akbar, *op.cit.*, p. 215.
13. Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir*, p. 37.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
15. *Ibid.*
16. M.A. Gurmani, Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Govt. of Pakistan. *Pakistan Times*, 14 January, 1949.
17. M. Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 46—47.
18. Information gained through conversations with Pakistani Academics, journalists and officials in government at the time, in December, 1985. Hereafter cited as *Conversations.*
19. *Ibid.* See also Brecher, *op.cit.*, p. 185.
20. *Conversations.*
21. For a full account of the growing conflict between East and West Pakistan that led to the creation of Bangladesh. See R. Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, Columbia University Press, 1972.
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