
“Under parliamentary democracy, . . . landowners, . . . are elected to offices in the national and provincial legislatures. The army and bureaucracy, on the other hand, recruit their senior officers largely from rich rural families, thus affording the landowning classes a “built-in position” within the oligarchy. The bureaucratic elite, thus has a direct stake in the privilege of the landed classes. This link has been further strengthened by the allotment of land to civil and military officers, Consequently, landowners have been successful in pursuing their class interests effectively.”

CLASS STRUCTURE OF RURAL/URBAN ELITE AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN

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BACKGROUND

IN 1971, twenty-four years after its formation, Pakistan disintegrated under the pressure of national struggle, military repression, and a war of intervention. Ironically, this disintegration followed what was being described as a “decade of development, prosperity and success” for the Pakistani economy. It is essential, while analysing Pakistan’s economy, to examine this superficial ‘success’, which generated both real economic advance and bitter political and social antagonisms.

Pakistan emerged as a separate Muslim homeland on 14 August, 1947. Religion was the chief, almost only, rationale for uniting into one sovereign state two territorial units (East Pakistan, now Bangladesh; and West Pakistan) separated not only by geographical distance but by linguistic, cultural, social and ethnic differences. The common religion, Islam, served as a rather fragile mediating bond. Between these two wings lay one thousand miles of hostile Indian territory.

In Pakistan, political power, by and large, has remained concentrated in the hands of the military elite who were the successors of the British Raj. During the 1950s they worked with a parliamentary facade of politicians and ministers drawn largely from landlord interests but there was no genuine election in Pakistan before 1970,

while the government had been a military dictatorship since 1958. The main beneficiaries of independence have been:

1. The bureaucracy and military who have enjoyed lavish resources and have grown considerably in number;
2. The large landowning class;
3. The new class of industrial capitalists;
4. Professionals (especially doctors) whose number has grown rapidly.

Unlike its neighbouring state, India, Pakistan has never pretended to be a welfare state. When questions of social policy have arisen, the official doctrine before 1971 has been one of ‘functional inequality’. It was argued that, in the early stages of capitalist development, a high degree of inequality is necessary in order to promote “entrepreneurial dynamism” and savings. The official rhetoric of this doctrine was laid down in the *Second Plan* which argued that direct taxes cannot be made more progressive without effecting the incentives to work and save, and that the tax system should take full account of needs of capital formation; that it will be necessary to tolerate some initial growth in income inequalities to reach high levels of savings and investment. The *Third Plan* said: “What is basic to Islamic Socialism is the creation of equal opportunities for all rather

than equal distribution of wealth." In socio-economic objectives of the *Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-75)* the old philosophy is reconfirmed. "We cannot distribute poverty. Growth is vital before income distribution can improve." Thus the proponents of functional inequality claimed that the problems of social justice could be tackled more effectively at a 'later stage' of development when the economy is richer. However, this argument ignores the fact that the capital stock and productive capacity of the economy is geared to meeting a particular pattern of demand in particular locations, and the possibility of usefully redistributing wealth at a later stage actually diminishes over time. The capital poured into large luxurious housing projects, dams and tractors can hardly be transformed or transferred at a later stage. The production pattern has seriously affected the pattern of skills which have not been equally utilized. One can clearly visualize that the pattern of upper-class consumption and of government investment in Pakistan are still determined by what the British left, i.e. colonial bungalows, cantonment areas, large dams, etc. The postponement of social justice for several decades means that a whole generation of people who are categorized as living below subsistence level and who comprise more than half the population have been offered nothing by such a policy.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the change in the distribution of power and authority, and the consequent rearrangement of social hierarchy in Pakistan after the enactment of the land reforms of 1959 proposed by Ayub Khan and that of 1972 under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. If the power and authority of one person or of various groups is basically dependent upon the amount of control that group has over the resources of a country's economy, any redistribution of wealth should lead to an alteration in the power structure of the country. Both land reforms provide us with a good opportunity to test such a hypothesis.

Another purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between social structures and economic performance, or to establish whether the social hierarchy had a significant dysfunctional

role in hindering growth. My analysis will probe the extent to which Pakistani governments in office really tried to change the social structure and the degree to which their rhetorical commitments were constrained by the inertia of tradition, and by vested interests which inherited economic and social power. Unfortunately, information on income distribution is poor, and the social structure has such complex repercussions on growth that rigorous conclusions are not possible.

In the past two decades, the goals of economic growth and its explanation have been given by various economists while governments have attempted to implement policies to promote growth. These attempts have had very little success. Pakistan has had a modest but undeniable growth in real income. However, the material benefits of economic progress have not filtered down to the bottom half of the population. The degree of inequality has widened since independence. The overall effect of government action has been regressive. The tax system has had a negligible effect on income distribution, government expenditure has had a regressive impact, bureaucratic controls have favoured the rich, and land reforms and village uplift have done nothing for the bottom half of the rural population.

There is no evidence that the present distribution of income is particularly favourable for economic growth. The highly unequal distribution of land and the virtually complete tax exemption of the upper income groups in agriculture could not be changed without some temporary disturbance of production. In the long run, a more equitable system should make more productive use of land and labour.

In the industrial sector, the policies of bureaucratic control have promoted concentration of wealth and income and have reduced efficiency. Crucial issues concerning the elimination of disparity have been either ignored or postponed to a point where the problems are extremely complex and difficult to solve. Economic growth has largely benefited the upper income groups. The inequities have no functional justification, and growth has been below potential. There has been a sharp expansion in the size of the military-bureaucratic group which has been jealously guarding its per-

quisites and imposing a clientistic status on industrial capitalists through a network of direct controls. Similarly, the village capitalists cling to their caste privilege, land rights, and freedom from taxation.

With the presence of extremely conservative elements in the top social hierarchy of Pakistan, and with the poor being too weak and debilitated, whatever changes did occur have been reformist and piecemeal rather than being fundamental. The government slogans have been increasingly populist, the real reform being extremely slow. The theoretical options for reform and the prescribed policies which might have done more to promote equity and growth, have been foreclosed by the pressure of vested interests, even when sanctioned by legislation. Who are the people who represent the vested interests? What are the roles they perform? How do these roles conflict with and retard the process of economic growth in Pakistan? It is precisely these questions that my paper seeks to explore. It is not my intent to write a blueprint for social change, for I consider such an attempt useless unless an extremely thorough investigation is made about the complex social structure within which the powerful groups with their vested interests operate and have, until very recently, rendered impotent serious attempts to promote fundamental and radical social change leading to more equitable distribution of wealth in Pakistan.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN

In order to understand the pattern of economic development in Pakistan it is very important to have a brief sketch of the social or class structure of this country. The vast rural expanse of West Pakistan is dominated by large landlords, who form a traditional aristocracy and gentry owning over 30 per cent of the privately cultivated land. Although the rural economy of Pakistan has been transforming rapidly, (particularly the intensively irrigated regions of the Canal Colonies in the Punjab) it has not resulted in the free development of a capitalist economy. Capitalist and feudal modes of exploitation often coexist and complement one another on the same estate under the rule of the same landlord.

These landlords extract both feudal rents and capitalist profits from their estates, which are tilled by combinations of dependent peasants and wage-labourers. The emergence of capitalism has thus fused into a social formation which reinforces rather than weakens the social power of previously dominant classes — those with 25 acres or more — and the vast underclasses of dwarf-holders, micro-tenants and sharecroppers, landless labourers and rural unemployed who vegetate in various gradations of misery and social impotence.¹

Before using terms like feudal or capitalist we must examine the composition of the rural elite to see if it constitutes a single class or if it is differentiated into separate classes with competing interests. Basically, terms like “feudal”, “landed aristocracy”, or “semi-feudal” are often used rather loosely to describe an arrangement by which a small class of landowners appropriates one half or more of the produce grown by sharecroppers. I use the term “feudal” limiting its connotations to the arrangement stated above. It is sometimes argued that the feudal structure is giving way to a “capitalist” structure as a result of self-cultivation of land by middle class landowners who employ hired labour and invest in modern technology.² Proponents of a different view argue that it is extremely misleading to make a sharp distinction between feudal landlords and capitalist farmers because of the complex combination of the two modes of production.

Distinction between very rich and very poor farmers is not without significance, but, for a scientific analysis, such a prior distinction without specification of the relevant criteria would obscure rather than clarify the issues.³

The 1960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture classifies farms above 25 acres as “large farms”. Smaller landowners share with owners of very large tracts not only a privileged position in the rural economy, but also participate in the political structure.

Thus big and small landowners are different segments of a single continuum, on which they are placed according to differences in their wealth and share in political power, without any structural criterion differentiating their interests for setting them apart into separate classes.⁴

In recent years, there has been a drive towards resumption of land from tenants for self-cultivation by mechanized methods. This effort at mechanization has not created a middle class of capitalist farmers. On the contrary, it is the big landlords who have made greatest progress in the

direction of farm mechanization. Only part of the total land owned by persons who have tractors is under mechanized cultivation. Land not cultivated by them is in the hands of sharecroppers who employ bullocks. There also exists a close interdependence between mechanized cultivation and share cropping on large landholdings. One can conveniently use the term "mechanized farm sector" here in reference to the total area of land affected by mechanization in contrast to the area cultivated by sharecroppers.

The 1968 records show that owners of holdings 50 to 100 acres numbered only 27% of the landowners in the mechanized farm sector, and they accounted for no more than 10% of the cultivated area of landholdings in that sector. However, they owned 25% of the tractors which suggests that the degree of mechanization, or the proportion of land cultivated by tractors was greater.

On the other hand, landowners with holdings above 100 acres owned 86.5% of the land in the mechanized farm sector and 55% of the tractors. From these figures one can draw two conclusions:

1. It is probable that middle class landowners who own 50-100 acres of land cultivate their land more intensively. The relatively higher investment of capital in terms of the tractor/land ratio may be reflected in the case of other inputs also. An investigation of management of different size holdings by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Pakistan, indicates greater intensity of cultivation and higher productivity on farms in that category.
2. Bigger landlords, although fewer in number, control vastly greater resources than middle class landowners. The total amount of land and capital controlled by middle class is not of such an order that they can be said to dominate the rural economy. Quite the contrary is true.

We can seriously question the significance of drawing a distinction between these groups of landowners. It is extremely difficult to accept the implication that they constitute separate classes since their interests are not conflicting. Their ob-

jectives and goals on all important issues of public policy are identical, whether they be questions of prices of agricultural commodities, taxation or agricultural incomes, or provision of facilities to landowners. They also share an identical position on issues of class relationship in the rural society vis-a-vis sharecroppers and landless peasants, and on issues of public policy and legislation.

There is a widely held belief propounded by the Land Reforms Commission during Ayub Khan's regime, that the system of Basic Democracies had displaced the landed aristocracy from a position of political dominance and that it had brought about a shift in the locus of political power into the lands of a rural middle class. One can find, however, that the predominance of the big landlords in the agrarian economy has by no means ended.

What was altered by the system of basic democracies, now defunct, was not a shift in the locus of power, but rather a change in the mode of articulation of power at the village level into the national political system.⁵

Political power in the vast majority of Pakistani villages is typically organized by factions. The leader of a faction – a big landowner – organizes support by a variety of methods and forms a core of supporters, viz. (1) their economically dependent sharecroppers, who have little option but to follow their masters; (2) those relatives who might also be big landlords in neighbouring villages, having their own economic dependents. The core of relatives is referred to as the *Biradari* in Punjabi language. The faction leader enters into an alliance with fellow landlords who bring their own economic dependents. Economic power, by that token is the aggregated power of members of a landowning class in close alliance with each other, rather than the power of a single individual or family. Because economic dependents are tied to landlords in factional politics, as they are tied to them in the economic field, political cleavages are not "horizontal" along class lines but "vertical" across class lines. The transformation of the factional mode of politics into class politics is just beginning to manifest itself. Instances of it are few so far.⁶ Besides his own *Biradari*, the leader of a faction recruits other sections of rural society. These are the independent, small peasant proprietors. As individuals they are weak but

often they are organized under the authority of their lineage council called the *Biradari panchayat*. Leaders enter into alliances with these *Biradaris* for which they use different means of persuasion. A strong factor is the ability of a faction leader to bestow favours and patronage. For this, the faction leader's relationship with the administrative officials, and his access to their favours, is of special importance. Another common way of securing support is by threat or coercion. Big landlords having influence at high levels are protectors of small "goondas" (enforcers) through whom they operate.

On the national scene, leaders of local factions participate in the dealings of higher level factions. Political parties as well as individuals with ambition in the district, provincial, or national politics, seek "grass-root support" with local faction leaders. Participation of faction leaders in political competition institutionalizes alliances of factions into political parties. Because, structurally, rival factions replicate each other in their class composition, factional conflict is not class conflict. However, since factions are based on the power of the landowning class at all levels of their organization, all factions stand for common goals of social and economic policy that embody the interest of the rural elite. When it comes to the level of national policymaking, it is such leadership that becomes an active participant in legislative processes, and the members of the landowning class proliferate in the bureaucratic establishment.

PROBLEMS OF LAND TENURE: 1959-1968

An overall look at the pattern of land distribution in Pakistan will show that it is quite lopsided. In 1959, one tenth of 1% people owned as much as 15% of land area, in holdings of over 500 acres. In sharp contrast to this, 65% of owners held land area in units of less than 5 acres each. Such disparity of landownership at national level was also present at provincial level. In Punjab about 80% of owners held less than a third of the cultivable area while less than 1% (0.6%) owned more than 20%. The following table taken from the Report of the Land Commission for West

Pakistan shows the structure of landownership in Pakistan in 1959:⁷

Landownership Structure in West Pakistan

Size of Holdings in Acres	No. of Owners	Percentage of Total Owners	Area Owned in Acres	Percentage of Total
Less than 5	3,266,137	64.2	7,425,614	15.0
5 to 25	1,452,241	29.0	15,438,138	33.6
25 to 100	286,470	5.6	10,616,308	21.0
100 to 500	57,287	1.1	7,671,537	15.4
500 and over	6,061	0.1	7,490,933	15.0
Total:	5,068,376	100.0	48,642,530	100.0

Note: The Land Reforms Commission compiled the above statistics on the basis of data collected earlier by the Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission. The original data were collected during the period 1946/47 to 1954/55, at different times in different parts of the country.

Consistent with such a pattern of landownership was a great degree of tenancy. Even though there are not available accurate figures, William Baredo says that at about the time of independence over 50% of cultivated land was held in form of tenancy in West Pakistan.⁸

In spite of these tenure conditions, little attempts were made at reforms. There were, however, several proposals for reform and official pronouncements on the urgent need for reform. The 1949 Agrarian Reform Committee had made several such proposals, including a demand for ceilings on land holdings, rent reduction and security of tenure to tenants at will, and the abolition of occupancy tenancies and *jagirs*. Several of the reforms recommended by this Committee were picked up by the First Five Year Plan (1955-60). Ironically, such recommendations were not implemented and were postponed "for further study." In former Sind, the Punjab and the NWFP the tenancy regulations that were enacted were hardly implemented. The rhetoric of the reform was used to stave off possible peasant unrest and to gain support on the ground that the government was concerned about the welfare of the people.⁹ The major reason for the ineffectiveness of the reforms was the dominance of the landlord interests. Mushtaq Ahmad describes this as fol-

direction of farm mechanization. Only part of the total land owned by persons who have tractors is under mechanized cultivation. Land not cultivated by them is in the hands of sharecroppers who employ bullocks. There also exists a close interdependence between mechanized cultivation and share cropping on large landholdings. One can conveniently use the term "mechanized farm sector" here in reference to the total area of land affected by mechanization in contrast to the area cultivated by sharecroppers.

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lows:

Thus more than 10 years after independence, not only the problem was unsolved but there was not even the hope of a solution. Dominated as the political parties of West Pakistan were by the landed interests, no basic change in the structure of the land tenure could be expected from them. The Republicans were hostile to the very idea of reform and whatever might have been the professions of the Muslim League, in view of its performance in office, not much credence could be attached to its promises about the future. Only a government, completely detached from class loyalties, could carry through a programme of reform.¹⁰

After the military takeover, in 1958, President Ayub, in response to the report submitted by the Land Reforms Commission decided to implement certain of its provisions. The ceiling on land-ownership was placed at 500 irrigated acres or 1,000 unirrigated acres per person. There were several exemptions to this. If the retained land was less than 36,000 produce index units, an individual was permitted to increase his holdings up to this amount. There was a right to transfer to heirs, and upto 18,000 produce index units provided such transfer had not been made after 14 August, 1947. There was a right to own orchards upto an additional 150 acres provided such orchards were in blocks of not less than 10 acres each. Other exemptions included stud farms, land owned by religious or charitable institutions, and transfer of land to female dependents. Security of tenure was expected to be provided to tenants by the provision that no tenant should be ejected unless it was established that he had not paid the rent, had failed to cultivate the land, or had used the land improperly or sublet it.¹¹

The results of the Ayub reforms were very limited. In Pakistan, where only 6,061 persons owned over 500 acres, a ceiling on land at these levels, with so many exemptions was not going to be an effective redistributive measure. Consequently, only about 2,300,000 acres were affected by the ceiling. Of these, 930,000 consisted of waste, hills, and river beds.¹² The land reform was unable to make a sharp dent in the existing class structure.

It will be clear from my earlier analysis that the recent land reform regulation in Pakistan will still leave a large landlord class, with estates considerably smaller than they were, it is true, but still substantially large. They will also reduce some of the economic and political power of this class, especially of certain individuals. But on the whole it is doubtful that the effect will be sig-

nificant.¹³

It is interesting to note that the expropriation of the small amount of self-cultivated lands (under the 1959 land reforms) of the large zamindar group did not result in the breaking up of large efficiently operated farm units. Neither did such a reform induce any immediate technological changes in agriculture.

Myrdal, commenting on the failure of the reform in Ayub's era, argues:

As later carried out, the reform was anything but drastic or radical. One estimate reckons that it probably redistributed not more than two per cent of all cultivated land. Nor does it appear to have been rigorously enforced. Prior dispositions to relatives were common and even officially sanctioned, and there were many rumours of favouritism in allocations. More important, the high ceilings on holdings left all but a few landowners unaffected. In keeping with the conservatism of the new regime, the reform aimed, in fact, at stabilizing the position of the hereditary landlords: Ayub Khan could hardly afford to alienate the higher officer corps and civil servants, the main props of his regime, who were clearly related to the landlord class.¹⁴

LAND REFORMS UNDER BHUTTO: 1968-77

The Pakistan Peoples Party under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, during its entire election campaign, relied much less on traditional landlord support and instead, drew its candidates from urban intellectuals and small landowners. It also appealed, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, directly to the peasants and workers. Bhutto favoured (in his election speeches) a fundamental change in the structure of Pakistani economy and "positive" ways of dealing with the rural problems. On 29 November 1970, in one of his speeches he declared:

We cannot leave the fate of our peasantry entirely to the anarchy of private possession. There must be a bold and imaginative agrarian reform aimed at reformation. The remaining vestiges of feudalism require to be removed. State lands will be given to the landless peasants, cooperative farms will be introduced on voluntary basis. The small landowners will be exempted from the payment of land revenue and self-cultivation will be laid down as the principle of land policy.¹⁵

On 11 March 1972, Bhutto's administration introduced the new Land Reforms scheme. Its most important provision was the reduction of the land ceiling to 150 acres of irrigated or 300 acres of unirrigated land, or the equivalent of 150 irrigated acres, where one irrigated acre was taken as

equivalent to two unirrigated acres, or an area equivalent to 15,000 produce index units, whichever was greater.¹⁶

In the reform, however, the administration allowed the landlords various concessions which were almost fatalistic to the egalitarian redistribution of land in Pakistan. One of these concessions (in accordance with paragraph II of the Land Regulation) allowed the landlord to select area of his choice of not less than an economic holding. He could also exchange land with members of his family for purposes of consolidation. Family, in this case, included grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, brothers, sisters, cousins, paternal and maternal uncles and nephews and nieces. This opened the door for blackmail of tenants and for lucrative blackmarketing in land because, on the pretext of use of right of choice, the landlords were able to favour one set of tenants against other tenants.

Thus we see that by the simple trick of accepting individual ownership in place of family ownership, the power of the feudal family has been kept intact. This power will be further augmented by lease of orchards, stud and livestock farms and shikargahs (game reserves) back to the original owners.¹⁷

In his speech concerning the new land reform policy, Mr. Bhutto declared that:

1. Several objective factors have been considered while fixing the new ceiling. The prime one being that agriculture should continue to be an attractive and profitable vocation. The size of the holding should permit maximum benefit of investment to enable productivity to increase. Enterprising and enlightened farmers should continue to live on the land and give agriculture the sense of purpose it deserves.
2. This is consistent with the urgent need to encourage mechanization and consolidation and to prevent fragmentation, the government will allow liberal consolidation of holding to a family.
3. That in future, ejections will only be possible if tenants fail to pay the batai share or rent or meet the requirements of cultivation.¹⁸

Unfortunately, there was a total absence of a concrete programme which could help the poor tenants to meet the requirements of cultivation envisaged in (1) and (2) above. Consequently, the rise of self-cultivated mechanized big farms led to an increase in the number of ejected tenants augmenting the ranks of wage slaves in the city. The 1972 land reform policy also stipulated that payment of water rates, agricultural taxes, and costs

of seeds will henceforth be the responsibility of landowners and not of the tenants. This policy's by-product was the creation of discord among the peasantry.

Outwardly Mr. Bhutto has done well for the tenant. But in our social conditions where the peasantry is totally unorganized, and is powerless against the big landlords, their powerful kinsmen and the bureaucracy, the implementation of this law will be merely a "paper treatise". But this provision has already created serious strife between the small landowners and their brother tenants. The aim of the lawmaker seems to be to force the small farmers into the lap of the big owners . . . , to effect a broad united front of the big landlords and middle peasants against the tenants, land-labourers and other poor sections of rural population.¹⁹

The 1972 Land Reforms did not bring about a drastic change in the tenure structure of Pakistan, and many of the basic problems have continued. The land ceiling was placed so high that it did not affect a significantly large proportion of cultivated land. Pakistan had continued to be a country where a large number of cultivators have owned land in small holdings while a small number of large owners own a significant proportion of the cultivated land leading to increasing income disparities.

CLASS BACKGROUND AND ROLE OF THE ARMY:

In many third world countries today the army and bureaucracy have been playing an almost independent political role by displacing political leaders. This role becomes evident from the frequency of coup d'état which have become a common phenomenon in ex-colonial countries. In such moments even though the army is always in the forefront, the role of the civil bureaucracy, although less dramatic, is nevertheless all-pervasive. By conducting day to day affairs of the state it acquires a decisive influence on policy formulation.

In order to examine the role of the army and bureaucracy in Pakistan's political economy one has to ask these questions: What kind of interests are pursued by the armed forces and bureaucratic personnel? What are the underlying values and perspectives of their policies? Which class forces do the army and civil bureaucracy align themselves with?

The army and bureaucracy in the third world

are sometimes understood to be the modernizing elite. They are believed to be the torchbearers of 'progress'. This class is the most highly educated section of the community and is educated in the Western tradition. The government is the largest employer of such men. The mystique of the professional efficiency of the army in particular implies the existence of unique solutions to problems of economic development based on "rational" criteria which should be acceptable to all. However, such an assumption obscures the nature of value judgments and choices which are made in the formulation of economic policy. This further obscures the conflict of class interests. There can be no doubt that the army as well as the bureaucracy are deeply involved in class interests.

Some Marxist economists quote Marx's saying that "the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie." Such a view is not in total accord with the situation in Pakistan. One cannot argue that the army and bureaucracy in Pakistan have consistently pursued the objectives of the "native bourgeoisie." The influence of landlords and foreign power have been too great to allow the army and bureaucracy to do so. What we find is that none of these classes have exercised an unequivocal control over the state apparatus but that each has sought to extend its influence over the state and fulfilled some of its demands. On the other hand, as the "incharge of Law and Order" the army and bureaucracy have successfully protected the institutions of private property up till today.

The military elite of Pakistan is very powerful and very conservative. A large part of their education is Western, the organizational framework within which they work is British and their working language is English.

Their houses, messes, cantonments and life style are British colonial. Although they are at apex of the Pakistani society in terms of power, prestige and income, they persist in thinking of themselves in terms of 'middle class' — classify themselves subconsciously as if they were still part of British society.²⁰

As the resources of Pakistan's economy remain limited, the Pakistani army and the Civil Service of Pakistan allocated more money out of the country's budget than ever before. This resulted in a substantial rise in the pay scales of

the civil and military services while for the workers and certain sections of the petit-bourgeoisie there was a wage freeze.²¹

The Pakistani army is a force of 300,000 troops mostly recruited from those sections of the Punjabi and Pathan peasantry who traditionally provided infantry for the British. The officer corps, from the important rank of Lieutenant-Colonel upwards, is a select elite screened with the utmost care for its class background and political outlook. The Generals, Brigadiers, and Colonels of Pakistan's army are scions of the feudal aristocracy and gentry of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, with a sprinkling of wealthy immigrants from Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and Hyderabad.

Like all political and economic expressions of class rule, the Pakistani army and bureaucracy have always enjoyed a certain relative autonomy from the landlords and businessmen of West Pakistan.²² Since the Bangladesh crisis of 1968-71, the oligarchy in West Pakistan has become more and more acutely aware of its dependence on the continued strength of the military and civilian state machinery.

Factions in the military are based on personal groupings and allegiances but there are underlying structural factors that influence the concentration of groups into broader alliances. One can, therefore, distinguish, on the one hand, "conservative right wing generals." They come from the wealthier landed families, others have made substantial fortunes in business.

Big businessmen in Pakistan have adopted the practice of awarding profitable directorships to retired generals, and therefore attempted to establish relationships with factions in the army.²³

These different patterns of alliances and affiliations have resulted in powerfully entrenched positions within the army on behalf of the various vested interests. There is, however, another "ultra right influence" within the army. This element is preponderant in the fact that a high proportion of recruitment within the army is derived from one of the most impoverished and congested agricultural regions of the country, the unirrigated areas of Potohar, Punjab and NWFP. It is from these districts that the army draws its soldiers and junior officers. Unfortunately, not only do these

men have very little political education, they also suffer various social injustices due to inflation and deterioration of their economic situation in the recent years. Consequently, they imagine that their economic problem lies in the fact that a few families of businessmen own the wealth of the country, and they fail to see the roots of the problem in the economic system itself. The solution, in their view, is not to be found in radical economic policies but simply in the brutal punishment of "miscreants."

CLASS BACKGROUND AND ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY

According to Max Weber, "the expert, not the cultivated man, is the educational ideal of the bureaucratic age."²⁴

Under the pressures of the developmental needs of the country, the bureaucrats of Pakistan have agreed to broaden the horizon of their officers by including and emphasizing development economics and administration in their training programmes, but the end result is still intended to be generalist. Before we get into the failures of development planners and bureaucrats, it would be useful to give a brief sketch of their class structure.

The Civil Service of Pakistan, which stands at the top of the bureaucratic machinery of Pakistan, is the heir of the old Indian Civil Service. In total disregard of the authority of political leadership, the Pakistani bureaucracy carried into the post-1947 period, the traditional attitudes towards politicians on which they had been brought up by their British predecessors. Before independence, the British bureaucracy resented the intrusion of Indian politicians into the domain of government. Pakistani officers trained in the Indian Civil Service, who later occupied top positions in the bureaucracy after independence, were brought up in this tradition of hostility to politicians and of paternalism.

The supremacy of the bureaucracy was facilitated by the fact that the top bureaucracy is a tightly knit cohesive group with caste like characteristics. The bulk of civil service candidates are sons of government servants of various ranks.

With an eye set on the criteria for selection prospective candidates begin to prepare for the test early in their educational careers. They steer clear of radical causes and work very hard; but they devote much attention to cultivate a sophisticated manner of speech and deportment and to acquire — a veneer at least — of western culture and customs.²⁵

The Planning Commission of Pakistan is an institution which over a period of time has increasingly grown in its power and influence, the main function of the Planning Commission being the formulation of the *Five-Year Plan*, the evaluation of economic progress, advice on economic policy, planning of the private sector. Significantly, the Planning Commission has steadily penetrated the bureaucratic structure and is represented on every important economic decision-making body of the government. However, the key decision-makers, so far as the actual establishment and promotion of industries are concerned, are the civil servants.

Mahbub-ul-Haq, in his book *The Poverty Curtain*, explicitly describes what he calls the seven sins of development planners in Pakistan. Briefly, these are:

1. Obsession and preoccupation with the refinement of national accounts and not enough work on the problems of mass poverty;
2. Too much control and bureaucratic red tape in economic matters leading to a devastating blow to investment in private sector;
3. Regarding development as synonymous with physical investment; underutilization of infrastructure;
4. Changing development "fashions" without considering their relevance to local needs;
5. Planning without implementation;
6. Serious neglect of human resources;
7. Growth without equal distribution of wealth.

The bureaucracy has direct links with the landowning class in Pakistan through the institution of Lambardar, an office to which an influential landowner was appointed. The formal function of the Lambardar was to collect land revenue, which earned little material reward. Its real reward was intangible because the Lambardar was the principal link between the bureaucracy and the people of the village. The system of Basic Democracy, created in 1959, provided an effective and flexible link between the bureaucracy and those who wielded power in rural society. While the power of the upper crust of the civil-military

bureaucracy has been consolidated by close links and collaboration, the peasant movement is weak and ill-organized.

Both the bureaucracy and the military in Pakistan are highly developed and powerful institutions. Because of bureaucratic control business opportunities have been restricted to a privileged few. In the late sixties, the chief economist of the government revealed that twenty families owned 66% of Pakistan's industry, 79% of its insurance, and 80% of its banking. The influence of the business community on the conduct of public affairs is primarily through its direct link with the bureaucratic elite.

Under the parliamentary democracy, party politics is monopolized by the landowners, who hold sway over the countryside. They are elected to offices in the national and provincial legislatures. The army and bureaucracy, on the other hand, recruit their senior officers largely from rich rural families, thus affording the landowning classes a "built-in position" within the oligarchy. The bureaucratic elite, thus has a direct stake in the privilege of the landed classes. This link has been further strengthened by the allotment of land to civil and military officers, who have thereby become substantial landowners in their own right, when they were not so already. Consequently, landowners have been successful in pursuing their class interests effectively.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Pakistan was said to have been created to eliminate injustice and sufferings of the Muslims of India, to give its people freedom, equality of opportunity and identity as a brave and respectable people. But Pakistan continues to follow a policy committed to the pursuits of a world system which lives on social injustice, inequality and subjugation of the majority of its people. Those who are responsible for creating an economic structure which preserves and promotes the existing pattern of privileges, are the ones who make decisions on the destiny of millions of people who live in backwardness.

The roots of Pakistan's economic problem are to be found in its feudal structure. This feudal structure has been kept intact with the tacit col-

laboration of other ruling classes. The interests of the rural and urban elite and not the interests of the masses. From the early fifties the real wage index has been steadily sinking: a temporary improvement in the early sixties proved to be illusory, for in the same period both working hours and family size had increased more than proportionally. Capital has been used to ruthlessly keep the wage cost down while increasing labour's factor share in production, a task rendered possible by the military dictatorship that outlawed strikes as well as maintained a permanent reserve labour force of the rural poor.

As described earlier, the chief source of Pakistan's economy is land. The unequal land distribution in Pakistan is a product of the unjust land tenure system of the country. A handful of people own almost 50% of the land while the majority do not even own enough for their own subsistence. This in itself lays the foundation for social and economic injustice. It is interesting to note that the military and bureaucratic elite also has close ties with the class of landed aristocracy, thereby making the interests of rural and urban elites of Pakistan coincide. Ayub Khan's system of Basic Democracy provided an integrated system through which the bureaucracy influenced every section of village society and in turn rallied the power of the rural gentry for support. The fact that the military and bureaucracy themselves have played a dominant political role and have mediated class demands is a factor of considerable significance in inhibiting the growth of radical political and economic change. When class demands are not articulated by political parties but are expressed simply through bureaucratic mechanisms safeguarding the interests of the elite, party politics is uninfluential.

Any policy which seeks to bring about radical economic and political change in Pakistan inevitably has to consider the class structure within which the economy of Pakistan stagnates today. It seems impossible to eliminate inequality and social injustice in the country within the existing class structure.

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India Officer Library and Records which would continue to be of crucial importance to researchers on history of Muslim nationalism. The publication of this *Handbook* is, however, a commendable effort and poses a challenge to researchers to come forward to make full use of the materials so meticulously organized by the Archives of Freedom Movement of Karachi University.

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It seems pertinent to mention here that the work on the restoration and listing of documents held in the Archives of Freedom Movement is continuing with unabated zeal even after the publication of the Handbook. The archival material which, for one reason or another, could not be noticed in it, the Archives of Freedom Movement plans to publish its lists in the shape of supplements. The first supplements of this series, spread over 4 pages, and dealing with 27 volumes altogether, mainly dealing with the All-India Muslim League (1906-47), classified series, has already been published and can be obtained from the Archives of Freedom Movement, University of Karachi, Karachi.

Editor

Articles Concluded

CLASS STRUCTURE OF RURAL/ URBAN ELITE

(Continued from page 26)

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EVOLUTION OF THE STATE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

(Continued from page 30)

nature of disappointment with the existing situation and the forms of its demonstration. In the colonial period the dominant ideas were those of national liberation and the entire political and public activities in these countries were focussed on achieving these aims. After winning the independence the national feelings of the victorious peoples motivated the ideas of "state" or "new" nationalism which were used by the ruling circles for pursuing their own state policies. Decades of "own" state caused disappointment among the masses which hoped for a better life after the termination of foreign rule. So, hopes were increas-