



## *Quaid-i-Azam and Armed Forces*

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Quaid-i-Azam, the Father of the Nation, was a great leader, a committed constitutionalist, a great orator, a model of a parliamentarian, a devoted Head of the State, a political strategist, and a mature statesman. He combined in him all the above mentioned qualities. He had several aspects of his personality and it made him greater. His biography reveals that from the beginning of his political career he took a keen interest in Armed Forces and defence matters. His speeches and statements throw a flood of light on his farsightedness and understanding of the importance of the Armed Forces. During and after the Ist World War he always advocated Indianization of the British Army. Before partition he was member of different Defence Committees. After partition his interest culminated into keenness. Though there are only nine speeches of the Quaid made before the Armed Forces, these are very important. These speeches remain an everlasting source of inspiration for the Armed Forces. The first part of this paper will deal with, why the Armed Forces exist, and their role? Then I will explain the historical background of the Quaid's keen interest in Armed Forces before partition and finally a brief analysis of his speeches to the Armed Forces would be given.





Armed Forces and nations exist together. The national pride and the Armed Forces go hand in hand. There is no concept of National Armies without a nation. Secondly, the Armed Forces exist for national morale. It gives confidence to the nation which results in national high morale. If the Armed Forces are strong and well-equipped, the aggressor cannot dare touch the border and create any problem. Nations take pride in the strength of their Forces because strength of the Armed Forces is the strength of the nation. States are members of international community and are members of the United Nations. A strong state in military terminology is that state which is equipped with the latest modern weapons and with a strong and disciplined Armed Forces. Countries with strong Armed Forces can dictate terms even in the presence of international law and United Nation, because these are weak agencies. Strong Armed Forces are the requirement for bargaining in bilateral talks from a position of strength.

Armed Forces are responsible for the defence of the country. They take care of national security. They win victories for the nation. In natural and national calamities they play active role. They provide aid to civil authority. Armed Forces provide forces for peace keeping on behalf of the UN and other countries. Armed Forces train youth organizations like NCC (National Cadet Corps) and Women's Guard. Armed Forces provide escort and security guards to the heads of state. In short, their basic role is to defend the country but other multifarious duties are also performed by them as and when assigned by the government.

Armed Forces play an important role in nation-building. Pakistan Army's own institutions which make nation-building contributions are, the Fauji Foundation, Army Industry, Technical Service, the Medical Corps, Military Farms, Sports Programme and the Historical Research Institution.<sup>1</sup> After partition a series of national emergencies also contributed to the





Army's non-military activities. Floods, cyclones, locust invasions, crops devastation by wild boars, food shortage, anti-smuggling operations all required Army handling when civilian authorities found themselves unable to cope with the problems.<sup>2</sup>

Quaid-i-Azam right from the very beginning took keen interest in the Indianization of the Army and Army Reforms before independence. It was not until 1917 that the British Government agreed to grant King's Commission to Indians. Ten vacancies a year were reserved for Indians at the Royal Military Academy (RMA), Sandhurst. Though the British Government could grant a commission for extraordinary service, an Indian aspiring to join the commissioned ranks had to complete a course at the RMA. The inadequate educational background and the high expenses of training at Sandhurst discouraged Indians from making use of this opportunity. The British Government was also very cautious in nominating Indians for training at RMA. They preferred the sons of politically docile families or those whose fathers served in the army. As a result, the reserved seats were not filled for several years after the British decision to grant King's Commission to Indians.<sup>3</sup>

The Indian commissioned officers were posted in eight units selected for Indianization. This was known as the Eight Unit Scheme. No Indian officer was allowed to be posted in Artillery, Engineering, Signals, Tanks and the Air Units of the Army. The British policy of restricted induction of Indians to the commissioned ranks stemmed from their fears (subsequently proved unfounded) that a rapid Indianization would undermine the efficiency of the army.

The Sandhurst Committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Lieutenant Gen. Skeen in 1925 to meet the constant demand of the Indians for the Indianization of the officer ranks of the Army. The question of Indianization was first brought before the Legislative Assembly in 1921. On 25 August 1927, Dr. B.S. Mooniji



moved a resolution but later on an agreed amendment was also put up by Mr. Srinivasa. Quaid-i-Azam also supported this amendment. The Committee also recommended the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst later on in 1933 for the military training of the Indians. It was suggested by the Committee that half the number of officers should be Indian by 1942. As a member of this Committee Quaid-i-Azam made an excellent speech. He said:

I had pointed out in the very first year in 1924, to Lord Rawlinson, that giving us 10 vacancies at Sandhurst is not playing with the Army but playing with the people of India. To say that 350 millions of people in this country cannot give you 10 boys who can be considered suitable and fit for King's Commission is, I say, an insult to the intelligence of this House.

Recommendations of the Skeen Committee were turned down. The Quaid, on 10 March 1928, moved the adjournment of the House to discuss the announcement made by the Commander-in-Chief on 8 March 1928. He pointed out that the recommendations of the Committee were several links in one chain which could not be delinked at any stage without seriously affecting the recruitment of the best material.

The issue of setting up a military College in India was raised in the Defence Sub-Committee of the First Round Table Conference. On the basis of its recommendations, the government decided to establish a Military Academy at Dehra Dun in 1932 on the lines of RMA Sandhurst. Quaid-i-Azam was the Chairman of the Administrative Committee which was assigned the responsibility of its establishment.<sup>4</sup>

Quaid-i-Azam's keen interest in the Armed Forces dates back to the beginning of his political career and when Pakistan came into existence his interest culminated in his intense desire to make our homeland a strong country with an impregnable defence.






He was hopeful of the division of the country and even before that he was member of different committees relating to the army. He had first-hand knowledge of the Armed Forces. The division of the country meant division of the Armed Forces. He also demanded the division of the weapons and equipment. Pakistan emerged as an independent country on the map of the Subcontinent in 1947 due to sheer untiring and relentless efforts of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Junnah, the Father of the Nation.

The division of the Army was unpopular with the British government.<sup>5</sup> It did not welcome the idea of the division of the Indian Armed Forces. What had taken two hundred years to build was dismembered in three month.<sup>6</sup> The Muslim League put forward the thesis to divide the Armed Forces. The Military High Command was of the opinion that the division of the Armed Forces would be suicidal for an institution which they and their predecessors had established with hard labour of about two centuries. They argued that the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan would not be able to attain the degree of efficiency which marked the organization of the British Indian Armed Forces. Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, C-in-C, was particularly opposed to such a move. He believed that the Indian Army must be maintained as undivided and overall defence force. These officers were of the view that the division would put both India and Pakistan on a road of administrative chaos and leave the Subcontinent defenceless. The broken and confused units might start killing the followers of the opposite religion.<sup>7</sup> A section of the British press supported the views of the Military High Command and the Government of India. The biggest crime and the biggest headache said Ismay, was the breaking of the Indian Army.

The division of the Armed Forces along with the partition of the Subcontinent was a firm demand of the Muslim League. They were conscious of the fact that the





new State of Pakistan would be dangerously enfeebled if she did not possess her own Armed Forces. The reason for the Muslim League being more anxious than the Congress to get the Armed Forces divided was that it did not want to be dependent in any way on the Congress and to maintain its identity. Nawab Ismail Khan, President of the U.P. Muslim League, the only non-official member of the Nationalization Committee appointed by the Interim Government in 1946 to recommend measures to nationalize the Armed Forces, in his note of dissent, objected to the Committee's approach to the problem of nationalization which took no cognizance of the issue of partition. Malik Feroze Khan Noon, a prominent Muslim Leaguer, from the Punjab, (later Prime Minister of Pakistan), demanded the division of the Armed Forces, ordnance factories and military equipment between India and Pakistan before the day of independence "because", he said, "whosoever gets the army gets India."<sup>8</sup> Liaquat Ali Khan, Finance Minister of the Interim Government and General Secretary of the Muslim League, addressed a letter to the Viceroy suggesting that a plan be prepared for the reorganization of the Armed Forces so that these might be readily available to the new states at the time of independence.<sup>9</sup> It was opposed because the British maintained, it would jeopardize the prospects of settlement on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which remained the official policy of the British Government till 2 June 1947. The acceptance of the Muslim League viewpoint about the division of the Armed Forces would have meant that the British Government had agreed to the partition of India. However, the Congress maintained that in case India was partitioned, the Armed Forces would also be divided.<sup>10</sup>

The idea to keep the armed forces united proved useless. The British Government not only agreed to the partition of India but also decided to divide the Armed Forces between India and Pakistan. A last minute effort to preserve the unity of the Armed Forces was made by a



few senior officers of the Army. Brigadier K.M. Cariappa (later General) contacted the Muslim officers to secure their support for the proposal to keep the Armed Forces united but the response was not encouraging.<sup>11</sup> Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a former President of the Congress, firmly supported the move to keep a joint control of the Armed Forces.<sup>12</sup> It was rejected by the Muslim League and the Congress. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah threatened to decline to assume powers on 14 August 1947, if Pakistan did not have her Armed Forces under her operational control.<sup>13</sup>

When it was decided to divide India into two States on the basis of the 3rd June, 1947 Plan, Field Marshal Auchinleck carried out the orders to "reconstitute" the Armed Forces. On 2 July 1947, he handed down the principles which governed the reconstitution of the Armed Forces. The guiding principles can be summarized as follows:

- a. Single administrative control of the existing Armed Forces would continue until the process of "reconstitution" was completed and the two governments were in a position to manage their Armed Forces.
- b. The process of "reconstitution" would be completed in two phases. The first phase would be a more or less rough and ready division of the existing Armed Forces on a communal basis. All Muslim majority units, that might be out of the Pakistan territory, would be moved to Pakistan. Similarly, all exclusively non-Muslims or non-Muslims majority units at present in Pakistan would be moved to India. The second phase would involve sorting out Muslims and non-Muslims. Every Indian officer and other rank would be asked which of the two States he wished to serve. There was one exception to this





principle. A Muslim from that area which became Pakistan would not opt for India and a non-Muslim from the rest of India could not opt for Pakistan. There was, however, no objection to non-Muslim Officers and men from the Pakistani area and the Muslim officers and men from the rest of India selecting to serve the Armed Forces of Pakistan and India, respectively.

- c. Except as demanded by the process of "reconstitution" there were to be no changes in the basic organization and nomenclature of formations, units, establishments and installations and the class composition of the units until the "reconstitution" was complete.
- d. The liability for non-effective charges in respect of pensions, gratuities, annuities, etc., earned by Indian officers and other ranks of the three services prior to 14-15 August 1947, would be undertaken by the new governments.<sup>14</sup>

Auchinleck addressed the officers on 4 August, 1947, on reconstitution of the Armed Forces. He told that as Supreme Commander for India, he was empowered to report direct to the Chief of Staff in the UK on matters concerning Armed Forces.<sup>15</sup>

By 15 August 1947, the division of the troops was completed. The units under the Punjab Boundary Force and the troops overseas temporarily escaped the division on communal-cum-territorial basis. These units were divided between India and Pakistan later on. Quaid-i-Azam was very vigilant about the division of the Armed Forces and he noticed that Lord Mountbatten was reluctant to give priority to the division of Indian Army. The Quaid concluded that he was determined to cripple the new State from its very inception.<sup>16</sup>

Most of the arms and ammunition were stored in India and the 16 ordnance factories were within the





Indian territory. It was decided that Pakistan would get one third of the military stores and equipment, but difficulty arose when the plans were put into practice. The Government of Pakistan was trying to acquire as much as possible, whereas the Government of India was determined to give Pakistan as little as possible. As a result of these opposite approaches the meetings of the Joint Defence Council were marked with sharp exchanges between the representatives of India and Pakistan. On certain occasions, the decisions of the Joint Defence Council were not carried out by the Junior Staff responsible for despatching military stores and equipment. Field Marshal Auchinleck came under strong criticism from the Indian Government. Although he had no operational control over the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan, the Indian leaders interpreted the presence of such a senior officer in the capacity of the Supreme Commander as a negation of their sovereignty and accused him of being pro-Pakistan. Sardar Patel said that Auchinleck's office "may think that they are acting impartially, but as they are all mentally pro-Pakistan, they are in fact out to help Pakistan at every turn."<sup>17</sup> Anyhow the share of the military assets to Pakistan was not sent by India. Whatever it received, it was claimed, was broken and useless. Indian's negative attitude can be assessed from their Hindu mentality. Just after partition, India charged that Pakistan was making excessive and unrealistic demands.<sup>18</sup>

At the time of partition the Army organization inherited by Pakistan was static and based in five areas; Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Waziristan and Sind. A new sub-area in East Pakistan was created after the independence. The total strength of the Army was 1,50,000 which may organized into 508 units of various sizes. However, 40% of these units were stationed outside Pakistan. The question of division of military assets like ordnance stores, institutions and ordnance factories remained unsolved. To meet the operational needs of the



country, 12 infantry brigades and one armoured brigade, formed through grouping of above, mentioned units, were required to be reorganized into divisions. The Army was also assigned the tasks of extrication, protection and movements of refugees, in addition to helping the depleted civil administration in maintenance of law and order to stabilize the public confidence in the administration of the new government.

The size and combat potential of Indian Army at the time of partition was far larger than Pakistan. Following comparison will help to understand the military strength of both the countries:

	Pakistan	India
Armour Units	6	14
Artillery Units	8	40
Infantry Battalions	33	88
Air Force Squadrons	2	8

India inherited well-organized armament industry – 16 ordnance factories, capable of producing small arms and ammunition in addition to a number of other items of equipment. Out of total share of Pakistan in military assets as decided by the Joint Defence Council, it received only 15% of ordnance stores, 5% of vehicles and 0.6% of engineer stores. It is most significant that the remaining share of 249 tanks and 60,000 tons of ammunition were held back by Indian Union. Thus Indian Army enjoyed a complete quantitative superiority in men and equipment at the time of partition. Indian Army was organized into proper field formations with an existing General Headquarters at Delhi while Pakistan Army had to create a suitable command structure including the establishment of a General Headquarters.

The Muslim Officers lacked staff experience. Out of all the Muslim Officers four decided to stay in India. But a few non-Muslims who opted for Pakistan, went to India soon after independence. The competent officers in



the lower ranks were given accelerated promotions. Non-commissioned officers of the three services were promoted to the commissioned ranks. The accelerated pace of promotion can be demonstrated by the fact that the first Pakistani C-in-C of the Pakistan Army (Muhammad Ayub Khan) was promoted from the rank of Lieut. Colonel to that of General in a period of less than four years. A limited number of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the three services were sent to England, the United States and some of the Commonwealth countries for specialized and technical training. The released personnel, not in government or essential services, were asked to offer themselves for enlistment. A good number of them were taken back. The government also decided to stop all the releases from the armed forces except in certain special cases.

The nationalization of the Navy and the Air Force took an even longer period of time. The Navy and the Air Force of the prepartition India were designed as a force, subsidiary to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, respectively.

After the creation of Pakistan, the Armed Forces were short of men, equipment and everything which goes to make up an army, except morale. Faith in future of Pakistan alone held it together and preserved its discipline.<sup>19</sup> Four Muslim officers of the Navy had 8 years' experience and all the 50 Muslim officers of the Navy had joined the service during the 2nd World War. Almost similar was the position of Air Force at the time of independence. It was not before January 1948 that a Pakistani attained the rank of Air Commodore. As the required number of officers became available, they replaced British Officers. The Pakistan Navy and the Air Force had Pakistani C-in-Cs in 1953 and 1957, respectively. The Army had its first Pakistani C-in-C in 1951.

Reconstitution of the old Indian Armed Forces necessitated the reorganization of the Armed Forces.





The problem of reorganization was more acute in Pakistan as there was not a single exclusively Muslim battalion, so the non-Muslim elements had to be subtracted from them. Almost all the battalions and regiments had to be regrouped. Two methods were adopted to reorganize the Army. First, the regiments with common traditions, common class composition and common recruiting areas were amalgamated. Second, the gaps were filled by fresh recruitment. Therefore, one could find such soldiers and officers in one regiment who had never seen or met each other before, and thus, certainly lacked *esprit de corps*.

After the creation of Pakistan the training institutions of the three services of the armed forces had to be doubled. The initial proposal was that till 1 April 1948, the training institutions would be jointly used. But the political situation necessitated the abandoning of the plan and the cadets were asked to go to their respective countries and these institutions were handed over to the country in whose territory these were situated. Both India and Pakistan had to establish new institutions for those which they lost to the other.

The reorganization and nationalization of the Armed Forces, the modernization of equipment, arms and the establishment of training institutions was also to be tackled. The problem of modernization was more acute in the case of the Navy and the Air Force, which consisted of outdated training crafts, overage bombers and frigates, mine sweepers and destroyers. Pakistan purchased arms and ammunition and other military equipment from Britain and a few other Commonwealth countries to tide over the initial problems. Missions were sent to various European and North American countries with shopping lists. Since Pakistan had no ordnance factory, plans were rushed to erect one. By the end of 1951, the first ordnance factory was inaugurated at Wah in Pakistan.

In the first week of Pakistan's independence the number of refugees pouring into the country reached





such proportions that the civil government was unable to cope with the situation. The care, feeding, clothing, medical facilities control of refugees could not be handled by normal procedure and the Army had to take over the management of the refugees camps. Reception, registration and housing were all turned over to the Army. Even the rations of the Army were shared with the refugees, the Officers and the Jawans of the Army contributed so generously that it was adversely affecting the operations of the Army itself and contributions have to be halted.<sup>20</sup>

The task before the Armed Forces was even more difficult than it appears. The lack of cooperation between the Governments of India and Pakistan; the disruption of the means of communications which became an obstacle in the way of movement of the troops from one troubled spot to another; and enormous number of refugees were the main hurdles in their way. On many occasions there were pitched battles between the troops and the raiders and, on certain occasions, the Army arrived when the raiders had disappeared after killing almost the whole population of a village. The general morale of the troops was not of the best because many of them were worried about the fate of their families.

No exact figures are available about those killed in the riots. Various unofficial estimates differ from each other. But one thing is quite clear; India had never witnessed such a large scale massacre. No doubt the Armed Forces could not totally control the situation but they did their best under the circumstances to fulfil the responsibility. Nationalist feelings were so strong that the Armed Forces seemed determined to help their co-religionists. In the past, they had come to the rescue of the colonial administration. Now, they were assisting the civil administration which was their own. The most important reason the Army was called upon in non-military affairs was that its public image was highly respected as compared with that of the most other groups



in the country.<sup>21</sup> Ever since the Army has quite often been called in aid of the civil authority whether the task was big or small, of long or short duration, and the call has always been answered by the Army with its tradition promptness and selfless devotion to duty. After completing the mission, the men always return to their unit without loss of time to busy themselves with their professional pursuits.

The already strained inter-dominion relations deteriorated further when the Indian Army moved to Kashmir. It added to the problem of newly created State. Quaid-i-Azam was informed of the development on the evening of 27 October 1947, at Lahore. It should be noticed that Quaid-i-Azam had picked Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Messervy, the Commander of the Northern Army of British India to serve as Pakistan's first Commander-in-Chief.<sup>22</sup> At that time Gen. Gracey was Chief of Staff and Gen. Messervy was on leave. However, Quaid-i-Azam asked the acting Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Gracey to send troops to Kashmir. Gracey got in touch with the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck, who flew from Delhi to Lahore on 28 October 1947.

Gen. Gracey failed to take action as desired by the Quaid.<sup>23</sup> It was an illogical argument of Gracey to ask Auchinleck because the employment of forces within dominion was outside the Supreme Commander's purview. Then Lord Mountbatten also came for the conference on 1 November 1947. These conferences and deliberations failed to solve this problem. This development on Kashmir had bad effect on the Quaid's health.

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947, and Quaid-i-Azam died on 11 September 1948. He was sick and busy but within one year and a month he attended many functions of the Armed Forces and delivered nine speeches.





The Quaid-i-Azam's speeches delivered to Armed Forces personnel on various occasions throw a great deal of light on their role and sacrifices. All the speeches of the Father of the Nation are precious heritage for us. These speeches remain an everlasting source of inspiration for the Armed Forces. He said, "God has given us a grand opportunity to show our worth as architects of a new state, let it not be said that we did not prove equal to the task."

His immortal words are a great source of strength and inspiration for the Armed Forces. The glory he perceived for Pakistan, is evident in his speeches and messages. He was a realist and the problems created by the partition were before him. In his address to officers and men of the Pakistan Armoured Corps Centre, Nowshera, on 13 April 1948, he stated that all Armoured Corps training establishments were in India. There was no Armoured training centre in Pakistan. Literally Pakistan had to start from scratch. In his address he congratulated the officers of the Armoured Corps, who had, in such a short span of time established the Centre. The need for the training centre was visualized by the Quaid. The centres are responsible for giving basic training, and imparting instruction in allied administration; they make the young recruit a disciplined and dutiful trained soldier. The Quaid showed a lot of liking for the Cavalry because it had always been the spearhead of the Army. After appreciating the training at the Centre, the Quaid advised the staff officers that there was always a room for improvement because future depended on their efforts. He always advocated for the best performance. In his speech to the retired officers, he said that they had completed the Army service and given the best years of their lives to the service of their country, for which the country was grateful to them.<sup>24</sup> He advised the retired soldiers to serve the country as good citizens and expected them to spread knowledge. The Centre contributed a sum of Rs.4,516 to the Quaid-i-Azam Relief





Fund and this step was appreciated by him.<sup>25</sup> The Quaid told the soldiers not to forget *esprit de corps* in regiment, pride in the corps, and devotion for the country. He said, 'Pakistan depends on you and puts her faith in you as defenders of your country'. He appreciated the glorious past of the Army and told them to live up to their traditions.

For centuries cavalry has been regarded as the corps de elite of every nation. He said, "your Brigade is the only one of its kind in the Pakistan Army; in fact, in the whole of Muslim World."<sup>26</sup> This he stated in his address to officers and men of 3rd Armoured Brigade, Risalpur, on 13 April 1948. Victories and achievements of the Armoured Brigade were appreciated during World War II.

In spite of its multifarious duties, like evacuating millions of stranded Muslims from the Eastern Punjab and princely States and maintaining law and order, the reorganization and reforms the Brigade underwent within eight months was appreciated by Quaid-i-Azam. This success he attributed to high morale, integrity, selfless devotion to duty and loyalty. He was confident about the capabilities of the Armed Forces to perform such hazardous duties. He also appreciated the training and modernization of the Armed Forces.

The Quaid-i-Azam was of the opinion that the best way in which we could serve the cause of peace and the ideas of the United Nations Organization was by making ourselves strong so that no power might dare harbour any aggressive designs against us. This was stated in his address to officers and men at Malir, on 21 February 1948. The battle for Pakistan's freedom was won but more important was to preserve it and to provide a firmer base. We should be strong to survive because nature's inexorable law is the "Survival of the Fittest". The Quaid also exhorted the officers and men to prove fit for the newly won freedom.<sup>27</sup> He appreciated the effective contribution on the far-flung battlefields of the globe to rid the world of the Fascist menace and make it safe for





democracy. He said, "you have to stand guard over the development and maintenance of Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and the equality of mankind in your native soil."<sup>28</sup> He was confident that with faith, discipline and selfless devotion to duty Armed Forces could achieve each and every thing.

The Quaid advised Armed Forces to be alert and to keep their knowledge and equipment up-to-date. The Quaid told the officers that they did not have evil designs against the neighbours but the demand of security was to be very alert and aware of the situation.<sup>29</sup>

What are the essential qualities of a regiment? Unbounded sense of discipline, loyalty, selfless devotion to duty and physical endurance are, no doubt the essential qualities<sup>30</sup> and the regimental colours are symbol and reminder of the contribution of a regiment. Heroic deeds and battle records were appreciated by the Quaid-i-Azam. In his address to the 2-15 Punjab Machine Gun Regiment, Peshawar, on 15 April 1948, he said:

I am confident that you will live up to your traditions when you are called upon to defend your country and the safety and security of your nation. You will, I am sure, hold aloft the banner of Pakistan and maintain its honour and prestige as a great nation.<sup>31</sup>

In his famous address to the officers of Staff College, Quetta, on 14 June 1948, Quaid-i-Azam explained the responsibilities of the defence forces. He explained that Armed Forces were the custodians of life, property and honour of the people of Pakistan. In his opinion the defence forces were the most vital of all Pakistan Services and correspondingly a very heavy responsibility and burden lay on their shoulder. He said:

I have gathered that the spirit of the Army is splendid, the morale is very high and what is very encouraging is that every officer and soldier, no matter what the race or community to which he belongs is working as a true Pakistani.<sup>32</sup>



He believed that if Armed Forces worked as a team and selflessly like true Pakistanis, Pakistan had nothing to fear. He also explained the importance of Oath. He wished the officers to study the Constitution and understand its true constitutional and legal implications and importance of the Oath when it was said that they would remain faithful to the Constitution.<sup>33</sup>

He further advised the officers to study the Government of India Act as adapted for use in Pakistan. Executive authority rested with the Head of the Government of Pakistan and he was the Governor-General. He said "any Command or Orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the Executive Head." The Quaid-i-Azam believed in civil supremacy over the Armed Forces and that was legal position.<sup>34</sup> He desired to keep greater and closer contact with the officers and men of Defence Forces.

In his address to Civil, Naval, Military and Air Force officers on 11 October 1947, the Quaid advised them to make the state strong and firm. He said "This requires, work, work and more work."<sup>35</sup> To make Pakistan a strong state superhuman efforts were recommended by him. Constructive efforts, selfless work and steadfastness and devotion to duty will make the country strong. He concluded his speech with the remarks: "God has given us a grand opportunity to show our worth as architects of a new state. Let it not be said that we did not prove equal to the task."<sup>36</sup>

The Quaid fully supported the United Nations Organization and the United Nations Charter, but he also believed in strong defence. He said, "However strong the United Nations Organization might be, the primary responsibility for the defence of our country will rest with us and Pakistan must be prepared for all eventualities and dangers."<sup>37</sup> He was of the opinion that weak and defenceless invite aggression and the best way for survival was to prove that we were not weak. The country should be strong so that nobody could dare think of aggressive





designs against our country. The Quaid gave the watchword, "faith, discipline and self-sacrifice". He in his address to the Establishment of H.M.P.S. *Dilawar*, on 23 January 1948, said, "You will have to make up for the smallness of your size by your courage and selfless devotion to duty, for it is not life that matters but the courage, fortitude and determination you bring to it."<sup>38</sup>

Without a strong Air Force, the country is at the mercy of an aggressor. The Quaid in his speech at the Royal Pakistan Air Force Station, Risalpur, on 13 April 1948, stressed the need for a strong and effective Air Force and said, "It must be an efficient Air Force second to none and must take its right place with the Army and Navy in security of Pakistan's Defence."<sup>39</sup> He appreciated the contribution of Risalpur Centre. He was aware of the shortage of aircraft and equipment and men. He advocated team spirit and discipline in the Air Force. Air Force School was named as the Paksitan Air Force College.<sup>40</sup>

Quaid-i-Azam was expected to come to Rawalpindi on 8 November 1947, but he could not come owing to his illness. He sent a message to the Armed Forces members of the Security Guard. In that he advised them to work with harmony and to uphold the high traditions of Islam and National Banner.<sup>41</sup> The traditional nature of Pakistan Army has been explained by Major General Fazal Muqueem Khan who makes it clear and says, "It is an Army, young but rich in traditions."<sup>42</sup>

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah will be remembered in history as one of those few leaders who combined in themselves a large number of traits. He was a great statesman, leader, and strategist. Pakistan is the fruit of his efforts. The farsightedness and insight he demonstrated on the issue of division of the Armed Forces during partition and his motivation, guidance and advice after partition have been, and still are, great source of strength and inspiration for the Armed Forces. Once in



the lifetime of a people, a man is born who changes their destiny. Such a man was Quaid-i-Azam.

I conclude with an interesting incident quoted by Stanley Wolpert in his book. The last meeting of the All-India Muslim League was held in New Delhi's magnificent Imperial Hotel on 9-10 June 1947. Inside the grand ballroom, Jinnah was hailed as "Shahensha-i-Pakistan" (literally Emperor of Pakistan) but he was quick to disdain that title, urging his supporters not to repeat it and insisted: "I am a soldier of Pakistan, not its emperor."<sup>43</sup> This statement of the Quaid highlights his attitude and devotion to the country he had helped to create. Like any other soldier of Pakistan, he was devoted and sincere to the dear homeland, the Muslims called Pakistan.

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