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THE KASHMIR PROBLEM: A BRIEF SURVEY

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THE state of Jammu and Kashmir, situated in the northern part of the Subcontinent, has an area of 85,805 square miles out of which 38,829 are under Indian and 46,976 under Pakistani control. The 'line of control' which runs through the two Kashmirs is a sign of the disputed status of this part of the world – something which even their names suggest. The Indians, for instance, call their part 'the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir' and refer to the Pakistani part as 'Pakistani Occupied Kashmir' (POK). The Pakistanis, on the other hand, refer to the Indian part as 'Indian Occupied Kashmir' or simply 'Occupied Kashmir'. They call their own part 'Independent' or *Azad* so that the full name is 'Azad Jammu and Kashmir'. Parts of the state, now called the Northern Areas, are administered directly by Pakistan.

This article is concerned with the background to the present crisis in Kashmir which has the potential to precipitate another Indo-Pakistan war. The approach is, therefore, historical and aspires to scholarly objectivity. Since only published sources were available, and these necessarily do not give the whole truth, this article too cannot claim either to absolute accuracy or authenticity. What it can claim to is that no attempt has been made to conceal the truth as it has come to be determined from the available sources.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The state was created when, by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar at the conclusion of the 1st Sikh War in 1856, the Dogra ruler of Jammu, Gulab Singh, was created the ruler of the whole Himalayan kingdom 'to the eastward of the River

Indus and westward to the River Ravi'.¹ Since most of the Maharajah's subjects were Muslims in the vale of Kashmir as well as areas now controlled by Pakistan whereas Jammu was predominantly Hindu and Ladakh Buddhist, this was a hazardous arrangement. In fact, according to the historian Percival Spear 'The effects of this ill-omened act have not yet ceased to operate.'² In 1947 the ruler Hari Singh was facing a revolution among the Muslims of Poonch.³ This was one of the several movements against the Maharajah since the major political awakening led by Sheikh Abdullah in 1931.⁴ By 1947, however, Abdullah's All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference had taken a Congressite orientation and had been renamed the National Muslim Conference. Meanwhile Ghulam Abbas, a follower of Abdullah, formed the Muslim Conference in 1941 and allied himself to the Muslim League. As the whole of Muslim India began to respond to the idea of separatism on the basis of religion – the two-nation theory of Jinnah – the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir 'began to return to the Muslim Conference led by Ghulam Abbas, abandoning the ranks of the National Conference of Sheikh Abdullah.'⁵ For the Maharajah, however, they were both rebels as were the rebelling ex-servicemen in Poonch and, when the Congress and the Muslim League accepted the Partition Plan of 3 June, 1947, he had them locked away in jail at this critical juncture.

PARTITION: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE

The partition plan was based on the principle

of separation on the basis of religion. This was unacceptable to the Congress which claimed to determine nationality on a secular basis. What the Congress failed to appreciate, and this is a common failing of all leaders of states, is that nationalities may be defined by people in different ways according to their subjective and changeable perceptions. Thus religion, language, ethnic group, and cultural values may be considered divisive or integrative when they are different. The fact that the Muslims called themselves a nation should have been seen as the determining factor of their perceived identity just as the fact that the Bangladeshis called themselves a nation should have guaranteed their nationhood in 1971. However, Pakistan was conceded but not accepted on its own terms by the Indian rulers. Moreover, even this principle applied to British India and not the Indian states (over 584 of them existed) which were ruled by princes. The Indian Independence Act of 18 July, 1947, made their position clear as follows:

The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian states lapses, and with it all treaties and agreements in force at the date of passing of this Act between His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States,....

In other words, the British government did not choose to divide the princely states on communal lines as British India was to be divided. In the states the will of the princes, rather than the religion of their subjects, was to determine the future of the subjects. Nehru and Patel objected to the principle of the independence of the princes saying that Congress would 'encourage rebellion in all states' which remained independent.⁶ Nehru did not, however, say that these rebellious subjects would then be encouraged to join the state of their coreligionists as that would have supported Jinnah's two-nation theory which he was to refute in uncertain terms even years later as follows:

Now, we have never accepted, even when partition came to India, the two-nation theory, that is, that the Hindus are one nation and the Muslims are another.⁷

Why Nehru opposed the possibility of the independence of the princes was because he was afraid that it would result in the 'balkanization' – the break up into sovereign units – of India.⁸

Ironically the Muslim League too did not ad-

vocate the two-nation theory as far as the princely states were concerned. In fact Mr. Jinnah, by now called the Quaid-i-Azam by the Muslims, declared on 18 June that the states would be legally independent units. On 12 July he told Mountbatten that he would support the Nizam of Hyderabad's decision to remain independent. According to Mountbatten he said that:

... if the Congress attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, every Muslim throughout the whole of India, yes, all the hundred million Muslims would rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India.⁹

In fact the idea of the independence of Hyderabad was lobbied for by Sir Walter Monckton and the Quaid since early 1947.¹⁰ Similarly, Bhopal, ruled by a Muslim ruler though the subjects were mostly Hindu as in Hyderabad, too aspired to independence and was encouraged by the Muslim League. Then, in contradiction of the two-nation theory but within the parameters of the Independence Act, Jinnah accepted the accession of the Nawab of Junagadh in September 1947 whereas his subjects were predominantly Hindu. In other words, there was no objective principle mutually agreed upon by the Muslim League, the Congress and others concerned for the future of the states. In the absence of such a principle the states could either be conquered by force or the rulers persuaded by less drastic means. As it happened everything was tried in the case of many states and in the end some were also conquered. Among those which were conquered were Hyderabad and Junagadh – though there was little actual fighting since their armies were mostly ceremonial – and India absorbed them into the Indian Union. Kashmir proved more problematic. For some time, according to V.P. Menon and Rajendra Sareen¹¹ some Pakistani leaders even thought in terms of bartering away Kashmir for Hyderabad. In an interview with Sareen, K.H. Khurshid, private secretary to Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, states that Sardar Patel had suggested that if Pakistan would keep out of Hyderabad, India would leave Kashmir alone. To this the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, is said to have replied: "Sirdar Sahib, have you gone out of your mind? Why should we leave a

province larger than Punjab and settle for some mountain rocks?"¹² Even if this is true it would hardly suggest that all, or even most, Pakistani leaders felt that Kashmir was dispensable. In fact, on purely moral grounds, the question was one of what the Kashmiris wanted rather than what Pakistan or India wanted. But it is on pragmatic grounds rather than moral ones that such questions are decided and this complicates decisions.

THE INDIAN INTEREST IN KASHMIR

Both Pakistan and India realized the geostrategic significance of Kashmir – the borders of the U.S.S.R., China, Afghanistan and the Sub-continent meet there and major rivers run through it – and this realization was reinforced in India's case by ideological and personal factors. The ideological factor was that India denied the two-nation theory, as mentioned already, and Nehru felt that this stand would be vitiated by giving away Kashmir on the basis of the religion of its inhabitants. The following statement of Nehru makes this clear:

... well, apart from political and other aspects, it was very important for us because it helped our thesis of nationalism not being related to religion. If the contrary thesis were proved in Kashmir, it would affect somewhat – I don't say it would break up India – but it would have a powerful effect on communal elements in India, both Hindu and Muslim.¹³

Another factor was what Nehru laconically referred to in passing as the 'sentimental aspect, not so important'.¹⁴ This was the fact that Nehru belonged to a Kashmiri Brahmin family and this may have had considerable conscious or unconscious influence on his decisions. There is, at any rate, evidence to suggest that he loved Kashmir. In one of his letters to Gandhi, for instance, he confesses that the Himalayas 'have meant a great deal to me'. He goes on to add:

They seem to rouse in me ancient memories of the long ago when perhaps my ancestors wandered about the mountains of Kashmir and played in their snow and glaciers.¹⁵

In a brief article in the *National Herald* (24-31 July, 1940) he wrote:

The loveliness of the land enthralled me and cast an enchantment all about me. I wandered about like one possessed and drunk with beauty, and the intoxication of it filled my mind.¹⁶

All this does not prove anything conclusively and, in any case, decision-makers keep what they think is national interest to the forefront, but it does suggest that Nehru might have been influenced by unconscious emotional motives in trying to retain Kashmir in India.

THE ACCESSION TO INDIA

In 1948 Prime Minister Kak resigned since different factions were trying to influence the Maharajah within the state.¹⁷ The Maharajah had signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan and was undecided about the future of his country. Pakistani leaders, however, felt that he was only buying time so as to join India on the most concessional terms. Their conclusion was based on the fact that Hari Singh was a Hindu with a known anti-Muslim bias and a hostile Muslim population whose leaders were in his jails. It was felt that the Maharajah would feel more at the mercy of Muslims in Pakistan and for that reason alone he would prefer India. Then there was the fact of the Congress' persuasive efforts earlier¹⁸ and misgivings about the partisanship of Mountbatten who was perceived as being anti-Pakistan by Muslims¹⁹ and neutral by others.²⁰ The facts that certain Muslim majority areas in Gurdaspur, which provided access to Kashmir, were given to India in the Radcliffe Award and Mountbatten's alacrity in accepting the Maharajah's accession do give some credence to Muslim allegations though there is no direct evidence of complicity on Mountbatten's part.

Then, while the Maharajah was shilly shallying, events began to move fast. On 23 October Pakhtun tribesmen crossed the Pakistani border into Kashmir and started moving towards Srinagar from Muzaffarabad. The government of Pakistan denied that it had anything to do with the invasion but there is evidence to suggest that this may not have been the case. For one thing, a certain Major Onkar Singh Kalkant, who was a Brigade Major at the Bannu Frontier Brigade Group, received the plan of infiltrating irregular fighters into Kashmir. This plan, called 'Operation Gulmarg' was for Brigadier C.P. Murray but the Major took it to India and it is mentioned by Indian writers.²¹ This does seem a little difficult to

credit since General Gracey refused to obey Jinnah's orders to send in the regular troops later and General Akbar Khan informs us that senior British army officers were not informed about the efforts made to divert weapons, etc. to Kashmir later. Akbar Khan's account does, however, suggest that at some level of the Pakistani leadership the tribesmen who went into Kashmir were aided and abetted.²² It appears that Wolpert, generally sympathetic to Jinnah, the subject of his biography, is probably correct when he says:

But trucks, petrol, and drivers were hardly standard tribal equipment, and British officers as well as Pakistani officials all along the northern Pakistan route they traversed knew and supported, even if they did not actually organize or instigate, that violent October operation by which Pakistan seems to have helped to trigger the integration of Kashmir into the nation....²³

In any case, supposing charges of organized military abetment are justified, Pakistan was doing no more than India did in Junagadh and Hyderabad – a point which most Indians and Pakistanis do not dwell upon for similar reasons.

On 24 October the Maharajah is said to have requested India for troops. On the 25th the Maharajah was asked to accede to India and, when his accession had been accepted on the 26th, troops were sent in on the 27th. The tribesmen who had failed to take the initiative of moving immediately from Baramula to Srinagar were repelled and the battle for the areas now controlled by Pakistan was fought for a long time. The bare facts of the accession, which is the basis of India's narrowly legalistic claim to India, have also been the subject of controversy. The version which follows is based on some recent evidence.

It has been mentioned earlier that both pro-Indian and pro-Pakistan forces were trying to influence Hari Singh.²⁴ However, M.C. Mahajan, the Prime Minister of Kashmir, also states that he had been promised 'military aid' by the Indian authorities.²⁵ On 24 October V.P. Menon met Mahajan who did ask him for such aid threatening that he would go to Lahore to negotiate with Pakistan if this was not given. On the 27th, Mahajan could 'hear the noise of planes flying over Sardar Baldev Singh's house and carrying the military personnel to Srinagar'.²⁶ After this Mahajan flew to Jammu with V.P. Menon and the

documents for accession were signed. Mahajan's account is of crucial significance since it proves that the deed of accession was signed *later* (and not earlier) than the sending in of the troops to Srinagar by India (this point has been made by Wolpert).²⁷ This, of course, vitiates the Indian argument of legal justification of military aid as a consequence of the act of accession.

In May 1948 the Pakistan army also intervened in Kashmir. The details of these operations are given in Suharwardy²⁸ and need not be given here. According to Pakistani sources the danger to the Mangla Head Works made direct intervention necessary. It appears, however, that the logic of the operations itself made escalation inevitable especially in the areas contiguous to the sensitive areas of Pakistan. At last on 1 January, 1949, the cease-fire agreement became effective and the Karachi Agreement incorporating this was signed on 27 July the same year.

ARBITRATION

The Security Council, upon India's complaint against Pakistan for having sent in tribesmen into Kashmir, called upon both countries to 'improve the situation' (17 July, 1948, in the 29th Meeting) and mentioned a plebiscite on 21 April, 1948, in the 286th meeting as follows:

The Government should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a Plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State.

The Indian government had, in fact, already mentioned the need of consulting the will of the people of the state at the time of the accession. One Indian writer gives the following reason for it.

... the largest political party of J&K, the National Conference, had been agitating against the hereditary rule in the state. It was, therefore, an assurance granted by the Union of India to the people of J&K and no third party, like Pakistan, can claim any advantage out of it.²⁹

However, neither Mr. Nehru nor the other Congress leaders denied the desirability of plebiscite nor did they mention conditions excluding Pakistan in those early years. At that India's objection appeared to be that arbitration over the differences between Pakistan and India was not acceptable to India since it would undermine its

sovereignty. As this arbitration was a prelude to the plebiscite it was delayed. The details of the attempts at holding the plebiscite are given in several studies and I shall only refer to some of the more notable landmarks in this context.

Among these are the McNaughtan and the Owen Dixon Plan. Sir Owen Dixon, after several attempts, came to the following conclusion:

In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse, by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled.³⁰

In 1950 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers offered to send their troops to Kashmir to keep law and order so as to enable both Pakistan and India to withdraw theirs. However, Nehru declared that he would not tolerate foreign troops on Indian soil. In an interview published in 1957 he said:

We will admit no foreign troops in any spot of India, one inch of India, it does not matter whatever happens to India and whether you call them United Nations troops or any other troops As for the national plebiscite, it is upto us to decide what is going to happen in Kashmir. We will have two elections in Kashmir — two general elections in our part of Kashmir.³¹

Another notable attempt was made by Dr. Frank P. Graham, the U.N. representative, but it had come in the fifties when Pakistan had antagonized the Soviet Union by its openly pro-Western stance. Thus Graham's third report to the Security Council was objected to by the Soviet representative, Jacob Malik:

The United States and Britain are taking all measures in order to prevent a solution of the question as regards the status of Kashmir.... when in October 1950 it became known that the General Council of National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir adopted a resolution recommending the convocation in Kashmir of a Constituent Assembly for defining the future structure and status of Kashmir the United States and Britain immediately interfered in this matter in order to prevent the Kashmir people from independently deciding their fate....

Malik was referring to Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference and Bazaz, among others, points out that 'it is travesty of truth to say that the hand-picked men brought together by the Nation-

al Conference leaders are the real representatives of the people of the state'. He further asserts that 'Nationalist Government is ruling by brute force, by terror and by gangsterism'.³²

KASHMIRI POLITICS LEADING UPTO THE 1965 WAR

It was the National Conference, however, which was accepted as the representative of the Kashmiris when, in 1951, it convened the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. It appeared immaterial that the election, in which the National Conference had apparently won all the 75 seats, 'could hardly have been described as free'.³³ However, Kashmir was given a special status under Article 370. By 1953 Abdullah was disillusioned with the Congress and Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad took his place as the Prime Minister. Bakhshi tied Kashmir more closely to the Indian Union while Abdullah, who had always insisted on some degree of autonomy, remained in prison. In 1954 the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir confirmed the legality of the accession to India and, by 1963, Bakhshi had made the head of the state a governor instead of the president (*sadr-i-riyasat*) and the Prime Minister had become a Chief Minister as in other Indian states. In October 1963 Bakhshi, probably on account of the rising tension between Pakistan and India because of his policies, was replaced by Khwaja Shamsuddin. However, tension increased even further when a sacred relic of the Muslims, said to be a hair of the Prophet Muhammad, was found missing from the shrine of Hazrat Bal on 26 December, 1963. The relic was found but the communal tension led to the replacement of Shamsuddin by G.M. Sadiq who had been an associate of Abdullah. Soon Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison and visited Pakistan in May 1964. On 27 May he was to visit Muzaffarabad but Nehru's death prevented him from doing so. From then on the conditions in Kashmir became unsettled. Sheikh Abdullah was again imprisoned and efforts to make Kashmir a state within the Indian Union became more pronounced. Meanwhile there was rioting in Srinagar as the Plebiscite Front and the Awami Action Committee of Maulvi Farooq campaigned for Abdullah's release. As Maulvi Farooq wanted

union with Pakistan there appeared to be much pro-Pakistan sentiment among some of the vocal elements in Kashmir in early 1965. In these conditions Pakistan tried to seize the initiative.

OPERATION GIBRALTAR

Having been frustrated in every other way, Ayub Khan's government, or rather a small coterie within it, decided to win Kashmir through military means. The idea was to infiltrate guerrillas into the Indian side of Kashmir so as to build up a mass insurgency and then to launch operations aiming at cutting off the state from India. The military aspects of the plan ('Operation Gibraltar') were handled by Major General Akhtar Malik and the foreign ones by Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, the then foreign minister. The plan was approved by Ayub Khan himself and General Musa, the then Chief of the army, says that he disapproved of it. According to him:

It was, therefore, not only surprising but also distressing that, despite the Supreme Commander's concurrence with us, it was decided in May 1965, that GHQ should plan and execute them [the sending of insurgents into India. The sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India, which, I feel, he himself wanted to avoid....³⁴

Whatever the facts were, it is indisputable that this plan was pragmatically disastrous. It led to a war in which lives were lost and wealth was wasted and which failed to help either Kashmiris or Pakistan. For, of course, India shifted the war from Kashmir to Pakistan and the offensive passed away from Pakistani hands. After 17 days the war ended and the Tashkent declaration of 10 January, 1966, signed by both countries did nothing towards solving the problem of Kashmir though it did mention that both sides would hold meetings 'on matters of direct concern to both countries'. Bhutto's Simla Pact, which formally marked the end of the wholly useless war of 1971 in which Bangladesh emerged as an independent country, did mention that:

... the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them (Simla Pact of 3 July 1972).

THE CRISIS OF 1990

The causes of the present discontent in Kash-

mir are traceable to the inordinately inefficient and corrupt government of Farooq Abdullah (1987 to January 1990). Once again the precipitating factor of the widespread insurgency seems to be the realization that the abolition of Article 370 and the complete integration of Kashmir in India would bring about a change in the status of the area. The rule of Governor Jagmohan further antagonized the Muslims since he was widely perceived to be cruel and dictatorial. According to an Indian writer:

The present situation is the cumulative effect of the injustices perpetrated on Kashmir during the last 40 years. Things could not have reached such a stage in merely three months of Janata Dal rule at the centre. We observed that the demand for Azad Kashmir and/ or plebiscite has captured the imagination of the majority of the vocal elements in the valley.³⁵

Some of these vocal elements are also militant. Among the militants the following have been mentioned: Ansarullah, J&K Muslim Janbaz Force, Harkatul Islam, Yalghaar-i-Haider under the leadership of Umar Mukhtyar Khan, Al-Madad, Shaheed-i-Farooq Force and Farooq Islamic Tigers formed after the murder of the Mir Wa'iz Maulvi Farooq, the chief of the Awami Action Committee, Al-Barque, Kashmir Freedom Movement, Harkat-i-Jihad-i-Islami, Lashkar-i-Mujahideen, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and the Jama'at-i-Islami. Some group out of these was responsible for the assassination of Vice-Chancellor Mushirul Haq and the Mir Wa'iz. The former act of violence has been condemned by non-partisans but the real responsibility for these gruesome acts lies on the situation in which extremists have been allowed to ask for the rights which have been denied for long to moderates. The family of the Mir Wa'iz was, after all, considered moderate since it stood for sanity and negotiation rather than violence. However, his political rivals, among whom P.N. Jalali, an Indian analyst, counts the Jama'at-i-Islami as the most formidable, did not like his position and he was eliminated. Jalali's analysis is that this will strengthen the fundamentalists in Kashmir since the Mir Wa'iz enjoyed spiritual pre-eminence in the state. It is too early to say what effect that will

have on the future politics of Kashmir.³⁶

Meanwhile the insurgency, or freedom movement from the point of view of the Kashmiri Muslims, goes on unabated. That it is indigenous has been acknowledged by all realistic observers including Indians. In an 'Editorial' of an Indian newspaper it has been asserted that the 'unquestionable alienation of the people, which the government itself used to acknowledge to begin with' has been made a non-issue by the Indian government.³⁷ Another Indian liberal writer has declared:

... the issue in Kashmir is neither communal nor religious, it is one of nationalism seeking to assert its dignity.³⁸

The leftists in India too contend that the 'remarkable mass resurgence of the Kashmiri yearning for independence' must not be interpreted as mere foreign intervention.³⁹ That is why such writers state categorically that 'Jagmohan and round the clock curfews' cannot control the situation. On the other hand some people, like Subramanyam, blame Pakistan almost entirely quoting the names and letters of Pakistanis alleged to be saboteurs in Kashmir and the Punjab.⁴⁰ In this context, General Popli, in a newspaper article mentions 'The late Gen Zia's low-risk-high-yield strategy of creating insurgency in Kashmir Valley and other areas....' He calls it 'Operation TOPAC' but admits that it supports 'the indigenous insurgency' in the Valley.⁴¹ Popli's point of view is more plausible than that of the government or scholars like Subramanyam since the scale of the movement in Kashmir is so colossal that it is improbable that a limited number of trained insurgents from Pakistan, and the evidence given by Subramanyam points to nothing more than that even if all of it is true, could sustain it for so long.

The movement, it would appear, has not been curbed even by the new governor Girish Saxena whose advisers are policemen (Jamil Qureshi, Ved Prakash and Ved Marwah are from the police service). Middle class people, who are generally timid in the face of violent movements, have also started dissenting. In this context it will be worth mentioning the movement of 137 officials of the Secretariat, the open letter of doctors on 26 June,

1990, the sit-in of the All-Kashmir Engineering Department, the challenge of the lawyers to the government's illegal measures and other such movements. Curiously enough the declaration of the JKLF leader Amanullah Khan to form an interim government in exile was not greeted with enthusiasm. The JKLF is secular in orientation whereas the Jama'at-i-Islami is fundamentalist. Whether power will eventually pass into the hands of the fundamentalists or the leftists cannot be determined at this juncture. That it might weaken the insurgency by infighting is evident but, once again, the degree to which this might happen is not clear. Meanwhile about 15,000 Kashmiris are in jails, 1,000 have been killed by the security forces and 300 by the militants. There are differences between the Muslims and the Buddhists and between Muslims and Hindus; Kashmir may look like paradise but it is a veritable hell to live in.

THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR

In the face of the mass uprising in Kashmir India has been stressing the 'foreign hand' and insisting on bilateral negotiations alone. Although the Simla Agreement did mention 'any other peaceful means' in addition to bilateral negotiations, this part of the pact has been unilaterally interpreted by India to mean nothing but an extension of the same process. In Indian liberal opinion this is irrational. A newspaper says:

The harping on bilateral settlement of problems between India and Pakistan as an immutable principle by the Indian government is hardly convincing that the events of the last few months again to manage their relations bilaterally.⁴²

A leftist writer admonishes the militant chauvinists about the idea that war can solve the present problem as follows:

Why do we have to fall back on war as the only medium of communication?... war begets war, and 1971 has only led us to 1990.⁴³

According to another Indian liberal analyst war would cost us 600 crores a day, could escalate into a nuclear holocaust and precipitate communal riots. He ends his article as follows:

The problem with the hawks [those who favour war] is that they fail to realise that even if India wins, we could all lose. The cost in lives and resources is quantifiable.

But who knows how many urban areas will be reduced to rubble? How many oil installations bombed? How many reactors brought to the brink of disaster?⁴⁴

Unfortunately, Pakistani writers, though not all of them, support a policy of adventurism in Kashmir, have not cautioned the public against the horrors of war in similar terms. Possibly this is due to the fact that they have been thinking only in terms of defence. However, the extremists in Pakistan both chauvinists, militarists and fundamentalists have been advocating war. Slogans like '*Kashmir ba zor-i-shamsheer*' (Kashmir only by the sword) have been on the walls just as 'Crush India' slogans used to be on the walls in 1971. The former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, also gave strong statements but had generally been statesmanlike in her actions. Quite rightly, though, she internationalized the issue. The former Indian Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, too had been cautious and had succeeded in keeping the Hindu extremists down. According to Vir Sanghvi the 'war option' was discussed in the Indian Parliament in April and May when tension was acute and Arun Nehru and Arif Muhammad Khan took a militaristic line. Inder Gujral and George Fernandes, however, took a more pacific line. The newspapers even came up with statistics to prove or disprove that India would have a clear advantage in war. According to one estimate India could bring 29 divisions against Pakistan's 21. The air superiority would be 2.5: 1 and the armour too is superior. This analysis takes into account India's 9 mountain divisions of which at least 4 would be used against Pakistan.⁴⁵ Nuclear capability too has been discussed and there is fear that nuclear bombs might be used in a war.⁴⁶ Pakistani analysts have not pointed out that in a nuclear exchange Pakistan stands to lose since it has no depth whereas India has. In fact it is pointless to think there can be any winners in any meaningful sense in such a war but still the illusion of enhanced security makes governments opt for this kind of expensive deterrent. The fact is that neither India nor Pakistan can either afford or sustain a war. Further, war will not solve the Kashmir problem for Pakistan since defeating India in a protracted conflict will be disastrous even if it is eventually possible which is doubtful.

Other means of making the Indian position untenable in Kashmir can lead to escalation and must not be resorted to for that reason. For India, too, if the problem is not solved a guerrilla war is the alternative and not even superpowers can win such wars. Even if Pakistan is defeated the guerrilla war will not come to an end. In fact it will become even more bitter. If India and Pakistan sacrifice thousands of human beings and starve millions of others in financing these gory operations it will be another tragic case of futile thinking. Some other solution should now be suggested.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

The deadlock must be broken by talks between Pakistan and India which might discuss a solution presented in considerable detail by the Pakistani scholar Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema. According to him:

Azad Kashmir and Baltistan should stay with Pakistan. Jammu and Ladakh should go to India. The Kashmir Valley should be put under trusteeship for at least a decade or even more in keeping with the dictates of the situation with a view to prepare the Valley for eventual plebiscite.⁴⁷

Cheema's suggestion, which incorporate various proposals aired from time to time, takes into account the religion of the inhabitants of the area of Kashmir under Pakistani control, the Kashmir Valley (Islam), Jammu (Hinduism) and Ladakh (Buddhism) and is in accordance with the partition of India itself. If this principle had been agreed upon to begin with there would have been no fear of a war today and no loss of life and property earlier. To this plan the only modification which may be suggested is that the Kashmir Valley need not be under trusteeship but should be allowed to decide its future immediately.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH ASIAN TOWN

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production of sugar-presses to the production of chaff-cutters, ploughs, pulleys and pumps. This process led to the singling out of industrial capital proper, which was not large, and which had accumulated during the process itself. Yet, it also came in from the trade sphere and was formed by the capitalization of profits from grain-growing.¹⁴ The production of specialized goods, which experienced stable and expanding sales both in the countryside and out of it in the local economies, was another sphere which changed the city's image. Such goods included fabrics made at factories and textile mills – *karkhana* – (equipped with handlooms), as well as furniture and cutlery items.

The strengthening of industrial and/or cottage specialization became an important fact in forming the town of the new type which produced goods for the countryside, too. That is, in the system "outer world – rural area" it played the role of a re-organizer that added an additional cost to the cost of the commodity, rather than the role of a trade-transport transfer point. It is precisely this circumstance that provides an opportunity to speak about the gradual formation of a new type of town in the north-west region of South Asia, a town which fundamentally differs from the town of the old Asian type. This is the colonial, colonial-capitalist town which basically has the same functions and structure as modern cities.

The deep economic crisis of the early 30s and World War II were the historical circumstances, which served to speed up the modernization of towns and the whole complex of ties between town and countryside. During the crisis years the cost of