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"The Muslim attitude towards English education soon began to show its consequences . . . in the Punjab the Hindus began to dominate various important government departments such as Education, Law, Medicine and Local self-government. Slowly but surely the administration was falling under Hindu control . . . At the turn of 20th century the proportion of 'educated' Muslims in the Punjab was one in 69."

THE GROWTH OF COMMUNALISM IN THE PUNJAB BEFORE THE 1919 REFORMS: A BRIEF SURVEY

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THE word 'Punjab' literally means five waters or five rivers. The province took its name from its five famous rivers, the Ravi, the Chenab, the Jhelum, the Sutlej and the Beas. The combined waters of these rivers flow into the 'Panjnad' at the south-west corner of the Multan district. Although the Punjab's rivers, because of their continuously changing courses, were of little value to ships, they nevertheless supported a large boat traffic.¹ These rivers were also used for irrigation. The province was widely known to be a great wheat-producing area; this commodity the Punjab exported on a large scale to other provinces.

Due to its geographical position, being so near to the north-west frontier of the Indian Sub-continent, the Punjab was ruled over by successive conquerors who attacked India through its historic gate – the Khaiber Pass. In 1020s Mahmud of Ghazna added Peshawar, Multan, Lahore, Kangra and Thanesar to his dominions. He made Lahore a province of his empire and established a military headquarters there. Mahmud's various governors and his successors made several attempts to bring the entire Punjab up to Delhi under their control,

but failed.² In the year 1186 the Punjab was taken over by the Ghauris, who had set up a new dynasty at Ghazna; Multan, Lahore, Sialkot and Peshawar were conquered. After the Ghauris the Punjab came under the Turkish and Afghan Sultans of Delhi. During this period Multan and Dipalpur were under separate governors, while the cis-Sutlej region remained cut off from the rest of the province. In the Sultanate Period the Punjab had a long experience of Mongol raids. Sometimes the local governors also rebelled against the central authority; at one time Multan was even ruled by an independent dynasty. Under the Sayyid dynasty (1414-1451) on account of their weakness, most of the local governors and chiefs declared themselves independent. Daulat Khan, an Afghan noble in the Punjab, also rebelled. However, under the Mughul rulers, the Punjab enjoyed a long period of peace and 'good government'. The Mughul Empire included the 'Subahs' of Lahore, Multan and Delhi; Lahore particularly was extremely prosperous. Emperor Akbar made Lahore his headquarters from 1584-1598; several historical places were built in and around the city. Emperor Jahangir was buried,

and Shahjahan was born at Lahore.

After 1707, the Mughul authority weakened considerably. In 1738, Nadir Shah crossed the Punjab without much opposition. Eventually, in 1747 the Punjab was incorporated in Abdali dominions. The Afghan revolution of 1809 greatly facilitated the rise of a united Sikh government in the Punjab. Ranjit Singh who had obtained a grant of Lahore from the Durrani King of Kabul, Zaman Shah, succeeded in establishing Sikh rule over the Punjab.³ Ranjit defeated his Sikh rivals, conquered Jhang and attacked the last Muslim dynasty in Multan several times, eventually adding it to his Empire.⁴ In 1839, Ranjit Singh died and there followed a period of continuous intrigues and bloodshed among the various contenders for power. In 1846, after the first Sikh war, a Council of Regency was appointed to be controlled by a British Resident at Lahore. In 1848, Mul Raj, the Governor of Multan, was ordered by the British to resign on account of mismanagement. The Sikhs under Mul Raj revolted but eventually surrendered. Now the British Government assumed full control of the Punjab and the annexation was proclaimed on 29 March, 1849. Dalhousie appointed a Board of Administration consisting of three members (the two Lawrences and Charles Mansel). In 1853, the Board was abolished and the administration was entrusted to a Chief Commissioner; John Lawrence became the first. He was not only the head of the local executive but also Commander of the Punjab Frontier Force, established during the time of the Board's administration.⁵ In 1859, the Punjab rose to the full rank of an Indian Province and Lawrence became its first Lieutenant-Governor. After the 'Mutiny', the City of Delhi and certain attached territories lying on the right side of the Jumna, together with the confiscated territory which had formerly belonged to the Nawabs of Jhajjan and Bahadurgarh, were transferred from the Frontier Province to the Punjab. However, in the first quarter of the 20th century two important territorial changes took place. In October 1901 the Curzon government cut off all the territory to the west of the Indus from the Punjab and constituted the North-West Frontier Province, to be administered by a Chief Commis-

sioner;⁶ Colonel Harold Deane became the first Chief Commissioner. In 1911, Delhi was made the imperial capital and therefore separated from the Punjab.

Following the territorial changes, the geographical position of the Punjab was such that on its north lay the Frontier Province, Kashmir, Ladakh and Tibet and beyond, the deserts of Turkestan. On the west, it was bounded by Afghanistan and Balochistan and beyond that, Iran. To the south were Sind and Rajputana and in the east lay the United Provinces. The province had an area of about 100,000 square miles. The density per square mile of the population was 183 persons, which was close to the average density of the British India – 177 persons per square mile.⁷

The Punjab was a land of many religions – Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and Christianity. The latter spread because a large number of British troops were stationed in the province. All schools of Christian thought found the Punjab a very convenient place for their missionary activities. Each school preached the gospel, established schools, colleges, churches and opened other philanthropic organizations.⁸ According to the census of 1921, the province had a total population of 20½ millions. The population was predominantly rural, about 90% living in villages. There were only two towns (Lahore and Amritsar) with a population of over 100,000 and only five with over 50,000. About 12 millions, or 60% of the population, were supported by agriculture; 77% of Sikhs, 61% of Muslims and 55% of Hindus. The distribution of population by religion was as follows: the Muslims formed 11½ millions, Hindus 6½ millions, Sikhs 2½ millions and the Christians were over 1/4 million. The percentage was – Muslims 55, Hindus 31, Sikhs 11 and Christians 1½ per cent.⁹

After the annexation the province was divided into seven divisions and twenty-four districts; each division was controlled by a Commissioner and each district by a Deputy Commissioner. The divisional headquarters were located at Ambala, Jullundur, Amritsar, Lahore, Multan, Rawalpindi and Leiah. After the territorial changes the province retained five divisions and divided itself into twenty-nine districts.¹⁰ Each

district was almost equal to the size of a large English county. The Deputy Commissioner, in charge of the district, had enormous powers within his district. He was the Collector with judicial powers in revenue suits and also had several magistrates under him. Besides this, a district staff included a judge with several assistants and Extra Assistant Commissioners with criminal, civil and revenue powers. Each district was divided into 3 to 7 sub-collectorates called Tehsils; each Tehsil was under a Tehsildar and his staff. The Lieutenant-Governor was the chief civilian officer in charge of the Punjab administration. He exercised his authority with the help of his secretariat, consisting of a Chief Secretary and several Secretaries and Under Secretaries. The Punjab Government had three main branches – executive, judicial and revenue. The revenue branch was controlled by the Financial Commissioner, the most important man after the Governor. The executive, too, had some revenue and criminal powers but the judiciary was mainly under the chief court, divisional, sessions and district judges.¹¹

The Punjab, being less advanced than other provinces, was not given a Legislative Council until 1897. It had been treated basically as a military province. Before 1897, the legislative business was in the hands of the Governor-General's Legislative Council; the Lieutenant-Governor was also empowered to issue regulations from time to time. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 had created local legislatures in Madras and Bombay, directed the Governor-General to establish a Council for Bengal and also empowered him to create similar Councils for other provinces. While the Councils in other provinces had been created, in the Punjab the matter had been postponed by the government year after year. The main argument was that the creation of a legislature would affect the discipline in the province and weaken the prestige and power of the Punjab administration with the martial races of the province. In 1897, eventually the Council came into being; it consisted of nine members, all nominated by the Lieutenant-Governor.¹²

A degree of local self-government already existed in the Punjab and its municipal administra-

tion in particular was perhaps the most successful outcome of the Punjab's annexation to British India. In 1862, Montgomery issued an order enjoining the election of municipal committees annually by the delegates of Panchayats in each town. Between 1862-65 a total of 49 such committees had been created. Later, during Lord Ripon's viceroyalty, local self-government developed a great deal. Municipal committees, partly elected and partly nominated, were created in 187 towns; twenty-six district boards were also established.¹³ In 1888, another important development took place in the shape of a division of seats between the Hindus and the Muslims, although the electorates remained common. A few years later, in Lahore, a new system was established which was based on a fixed number of members to be elected by Muslim and non-Muslim voters. In 1895, a full-fledged communal form of representation had come into existence in Amritsar. The same system was extended a few years later to other towns such as Multan, Murree, Ambala, Shujabad, Lahore, Ferozepur, Jhirka, Palwal, Rewari and Sialkot.¹⁴

Despite being slow in constitutional and political advancement, the Punjab administration had to its credit some excellent works in other areas. A Punjab Code, embodying much of the existing customary civil law, was prepared; the Criminal Code adopted during the Residency was maintained. Another of the greatest achievements of the administration was the creation of a magnificent system of irrigation canals. Some of these canals were in themselves the great feats of British engineering.¹⁵ These canals transformed some deserts like Lyallpur (Faisalabad) into great irrigated lands, called Canal Colonies. After the annexation, the administration first directed all its efforts to the important and remodelling of the existing indigenous works rather than undertaking the creation of new ones. The western Jumna Canal was the most important achievement in this direction; it was remodelled and became a modern irrigation work. The work on the Upper Bari Doab Project was completed in 1859; by 1880-81 the area irrigated by the canal had risen to 861,000 acres. The Sirhind Canal was opened for irrigation in 1882. The construction of the Lower Chenab

Canal was one of the greatest irrigation projects in the world. It irrigated an area of 3 million acres. Several other old canals were built and several new ones were constructed.¹⁶

Similarly, the government also undertook the responsibility of developing the roads and railways in the Punjab; until then, good roads did not exist. The celebrated 'Grand Trunk Road' passed through the Punjab from Delhi in the north-west; it connected Delhi, Karnal, Ambala, Ludhiana, Jullundur, Amritsar, Lahore, Gujranwala, Jhelum and Rawalpindi. The government undertook the construction of this historic road. The section from Lahore to Karnal was finished before the 'Mutiny', and was completed from Lahore to Peshawar in 1864. Soon more roads were constructed in every direction. The government also prepared a scheme to cover the entire province with a network of railways.¹⁷ A track between Lahore and Amritsar was built in 1861; the Lahore-Multan line was completed in 1865. In its early days the Railways used wood but after 1872 coal was introduced. In 1870, Amritsar was connected with Delhi, and in 1883, Lahore was linked with Peshawar. Shortly afterwards the system developed in every direction. The Punjab's capital, Lahore, became the headquarters of the North-Western Railway.¹⁸

Emergence of Communal Antagonism

The Punjab as noted earlier, was a home of three important religions. The Hindus and the Sikhs resented Muslim rule over India; the orthodox Muslim rulers such as the Emperor Aurangzeb were the subject of criticism. During the Mughul rule some Sikh Gurus had been executed and certain taxes were levied on the non-Muslims, which they considered an insult. The non-Muslims were happy when Muslim rule ended. When the Sikhs established their state in the Punjab, the Muslims lost their religious freedom; they in turn were jubilant when Sikh rule over the Punjab came to an end. Although the relations between the Muslims and the non-Muslims were strained, there did not exist any communal organizations as such until the last quarter of the 19th century. The Punjab Hindus were the first to start their 'revivalist' movements which destroyed the chances of a long term unity be-

tween the two communities. It was about the same time that they started identifying themselves with the extremist Hindu politics at the national level.

In 1863, the Brahmo Samaj was founded in Lahore by a small group of Bengalis.¹⁹ It founded branches in Rawalpindi (1867), Amritsar (1873), Multan (1875) and a little later, in various other towns. The Brahmo Samaj itself was not a threat to the Muslims because it stood to promote education, diffuse theism, effect moral and social reforms and to maintain Anglo-Vernacular institutions in the Punjab.²⁰ But unfortunately its hierarchy included persons like N.C. Roy, who had been a leading advocate of Hindi as the lingua franca of India. The Brahmo Samaj movement, too, soon became a supporter of the Hindi language; the movement also started a campaign of vilification against some former Muslim rulers of India. In 1878, a more militant revivalist Hindu movement under the name of Arya Samaj was founded in the Punjab. The result was that the less militant Brahmo Samaj lost its membership to Arya Samaj.²¹ The Arya Samaj was aggressive and insistent on the superiority of orthodox Hinduism; it freely attacked both Islam and Christianity; and preached against Hindu alliance with either of these religions.²² It also advocated the conversion of non-Hindus to Hinduism;²³ and sought the purification of the Hindu observances by discouraging its traditional participation in Muslim festivals and by playing music before Muslim religious places at the time of prayers.²⁴ It also had started a series of newspapers, some openly advocating provocative ideas.²⁵

Dayanand, the founder of the movement, was a prominent advocate of militant Hinduism, a leader of anti-cow-killing movement,²⁶ and a champion of Hindi to replace Urdu as an official language. Dayanand founded a society for the protection of kine, in 1882; he prepared a petition asking the Government to ban the slaughter of cows in India.²⁷ Shortly afterwards anti-cow-killing riots started in major cities of the Punjab, such as Lahore, Ambala, Ferozepur, Delhi.²⁸ From 1883-91, N.G. Barrier records 15 riots on the same subject; and concludes that this movement played a significant role in widening the gulf between

Hindus and Muslims.²⁹ The Aryas had another prominent leader named Lekh Ram. He was famous for his advocacy of aggressive defence of Hinduism. He was equally well known for his strong feelings against Islam. Ram wrote 32 articles or pamphlets on religious issues, many of which were critical of Islam.³⁰ The Muslims filed law suits against him but each time he was acquitted. He was assassinated in 1897. Following his murder the Aryas assaulted Muslims.³¹ Munshi Ram (later Swami Shradanand) was also well known for his anti-Islamic views. Following his attacks on the Prophet Muhammad, he was murdered in 1927. The Aryas had a great national and international figure in Lajpat Rai. He, too, belonged to the extremist section of Hindu politicians, who cared little about Hindu-Muslim unity or for Muslim support to the 'Swaraj' movement; for he believed that the two communities would never be united.³² Lajpat was a guiding spirit behind the uncompromising attitude adopted by the Hindu Sabha movement (1909-27) against the acceptance of the principle of communal electorates. He always opposed the Congress for paying 'a high price' to get Muslim co-operation for nationalist movements.³³

To sum up, communalism once started by the Hindus became a regular feature in the province; attacks on religions, and religious and historical personalities, continued in the 20th century.³⁴ These movements from the very outset created a feeling of insecurity among the Muslims and made them apprehensive of the hegemonic tendencies of the Hindu majority.³⁵ In the end, this communalism led to the partition of India.

Before discussing the Muslim response to the Hindu anti-Islamic movements, we shall briefly mention the Punjab's backwardness in the field of education and its lack of interest in national politics. In the field of education, it remained one of the most backward provinces of the British India. The Punjab Census of 1911 indicates that there were not even 4% 'literate' in the sense of being able to read or write a simple letter; less than half of one per cent of the population were 'literate' in English.³⁶ It was not until 1870 that the first graduate passed out from a Lahore college. The Punjab University was not established

until 1882.³⁷ In the year 1900-01 there were only 244 students who passed their intermediate examinations; only 144 were able to graduate. By contrast the numbers in Bengal, for the same year, were 1039 and 329, respectively.³⁸ The Education Report for the year 1902-07 shows that Bengal was well ahead of the Punjab in every respect. In the year 1906-07 there were only 7,785 educational institutions in the Punjab whereas in Bengal the number was 44,601; the total number of pupils in the Punjab was 300,000, whereas Bengal had over 1,200,000. In higher education Bengal had 34 Art Colleges, while the number in the Punjab was only 9; total students were 15,000 and 5,000, respectively.³⁹ The situation remained almost the same between 1907-15. For example, in the year 1912-13, the Punjab Government's grant to its University was Rs.45,000, whereas Calcutta University received 128,000. For secondary education, the Punjab allocated Rs.95,000, whereas Bengal gave 226,000. Before the first World War the Punjab had 4,158 primary schools, whereas in Bengal the number was 27,470; the numbers of pupils were 2,020,000 and 10,028,000, respectively.⁴⁰

The educationally backward and highly communal Punjab had little contribution to make towards national politics. The first important political organization, the Lahore Indian Association, which provided a common platform to all communities, was founded in 1877 by a Bengali nationalist leader, S.N. Benerji.⁴¹ It included some of the Punjab's prominent leaders such as Dyal Singh and Barkat Ali Khan. Dyal Singh started a newspaper, *The Tribune*,⁴² which criticized government policies and soon emerged the most important daily of the province. The paper became popular but the Association, being a predominantly Hindu body, failed to make any significant impact on the Punjab.⁴³ In the year 1885 the Indian National Congress established its branch in the Punjab; the Lahore Indian Association co-operated in its establishment.⁴⁴ But unfortunately by that time the Muslims and the non-Muslims were divided into two camps, due to the Hindu revivalist campaign. The Congress' all-India and secular programme had little attraction for a province with communities so clearly separated.

The Arya Samaj movement was more concerned about the communal interests than to support the Congress cause.⁴⁵ Congress' policy of winning Muslim support was also not liked by the Punjab Hindus. In 1888, the Congress had given an undertaking to the Muslims that it would not discuss any subject to which the Muslim delegates as a body objected, unanimously or nearly unanimously.⁴⁶ Soon it was on trial. The Punjab Government proposed to restrict the transfer of land from the agricultural to the non-agricultural classes – to protect the Punjab's landowning classes, by means of a new law called the Punjab Land Alienation Act.

The Bill was strongly opposed by the Hindu money-lending class, and by the Hindu intelligentsia and their paper, *The Tribune*, on the plea that the proposed legislation would crush the money-lending class. The Indian Association and the Congress also sided with them. But soon the Congress was in an awkward position. The Muslims had come out in support of the legislation. The Muslim daily *Paisa Akhbar*, criticized the opponents of the Bill and supported the measures. The Congress, therefore, changed its policy. When it met at Lahore (1900) the Muslim delegates succeeded in pressurizing the Congress to delete the proposed Bill from the list of hostile resolutions to be presented in its session.⁴⁸ The Congress' decision clearly showed that it would not side with Hindu opinion on 'communal matters'. This policy further alienated the Hindus, for they thought that the Congress would come to their rescue. The Hindus were dismayed, with the result that their attendance at the Congress sessions thereafter were often thin.⁴⁹ The Congress existed in the Punjab, but it failed to arouse any enthusiasm. The province 'was so politically dormant that it could be described as quiet and somnolescent as any bureaucracy would wish'.⁵⁰ The Punjab could not establish traditions for political activity to make its contribution to national politics for a long time. The papers of national repute like the *Hindustan Times*⁵¹ and *The Tribune*⁵² often criticized this attitude.

However, it was not only the Hindus who did not support the Congress, the Muslims at large also kept aloof,⁵³ and there were several reasons

for the latter. It is a well known fact that after the failure of the 'Mutiny' the British blamed the Muslims for their part and treated them as a hostile community.⁵⁴ Thus the first priority for the Muslims was to create a good image of their community in the British mind. At all-India level this task was undertaken by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. To bring about an understanding between the Muslims and the Government, he wrote a commentary on the Bible to show that the teachings of Islam and Christianity were similar on many issues. Sir Syed also wrote a treatise on the causes of the Indian Mutiny; in it he tried to prove that neither the Hindus nor the Muslims were responsible for the Mutiny; instead its origin lay in the misguided policies of the Government. One of Sir Syed's main problems was to persuade Muslims to acquire English education. It so happened that the Government had replaced Persian with English as the language of the courts; its learning had become a passport to Government service, and making progress as a whole. The Muslims were much more orthodox than the Hindus; they were very slow to understand the changed environment; they avoided the new learning and therefore failed to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. On the other hand, the Hindus quickly adapted to the new conditions.⁵⁵ The Muslim attitude towards English education soon began to show its consequences; their ratio in Government services was fast deteriorating.⁵⁶ The result was that in the Punjab the Hindus began to dominate various important Government departments such as Education, Law, Medicine and Local self-government.⁵⁷ Slowly but surely the administration was falling under Hindu control. For example, from 1882-92 the number of Muslims enrolled in Arts Colleges was only 632, against 2,251 Hindu⁵⁸ students; and between 1882-88 only 224 out of 746 qualified for the entrance examination.⁵⁹ At the turn of the 20th century the proportion of 'educated' Muslims in the Punjab was one in 69.⁶⁰

By the 1880s Muslim representation in Government service had been almost eliminated. In 1895 an official enquiry revealed that for a long period of time the Hindu officers had been deliberately preventing the qualified Muslims

from getting higher jobs.⁶¹ The Government realized this and decided to give Muslims their due share in administration, as soon as they improved their position in education.⁶² The Government policy was disliked by the Hindus, for it was a threat to their supremacy. As they were better educated and far more advanced than the Muslims, they raised voices against jobs being allocated on communal basis. It was strongly advocated that posts, even those of clerks and patwaris, should be awarded only on a competitive basis.⁶³ The Muslims now realized that the Hindu demand meant their permanent exclusion from Government service. They presented their case to the Public Service Commission (The Aitchison Commission). The Muslims argued that the adoption of a competitive system at this stage would ruin their community; they demanded a due share for Muslims on account of their numerical strength in the Punjab.⁶⁴ The Hindus now openly labelled Muslims as 'greedy job-seekers', questioned their ability, and suggested that they should stop behaving like children – and fight like men.⁶⁵

Fighting for jobs was not the only area of conflict; the two communities were also at loggerheads in the field of local self-government. After 1884 the Government gave an opportunity in the Punjab to elect some members of its municipal committee. Being a member of the committee was considered to be a source of enhancing one's power, influence and patronage. Elections were, therefore, savagely contested – in several cases resulting in communal tension.⁶⁶ There emerged a big anomaly. The province was predominantly Muslim but the economic lever was in the hands of Hindu money-lending class. In elections for local bodies, the Hindu money-lenders often pressurized their Muslim clients to vote for a Hindu candidate. In addition, the Hindus being superior in education and politics, quickly mastered the electioneering techniques. From 1883-84 in 96 elections, Hindus won a majority in 72 committees, whereas the Muslims got only 12.⁶⁷ The Hindus were able to win in seats excess of their proportion in the provincial population; and after establishing their influence they distributed jobs and other benefits to their Hindu supporters. This

situation gave birth to the demand for separate electorates for Muslims, first in election for local bodies and then for the election of Councils when the same anomaly occurred in the elections for the Punjab Council. As the Muslims continued to be outweighed by the Hindus the demand for communal electorates became more vociferous as the time passed.⁶⁸

To remedy the situation and to safeguard their interests in the Punjab, the Muslims had founded various Muslim associations in the province. The first was founded in 1869 under the name of Anjuman-i-Islamia.⁶⁹ This organization discussed all questions relating to the Muslim community and its proceedings were regularly published in the journal of Anjuman-i-Punjab. It maintained mosques, and represented Muslim opinion on various subjects. In 1885, it had 200 members; Nawazish Ali and Barkat Ali were its President and Secretary, respectively. Similar associations were established in 20 districts of the Punjab.⁷⁰ In 1884, another Muslim organization, Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, was founded. Its objectives included: (a) to answer attacks against Islam and the propagation of Islam; (b) to impart education to Muslims; (c) to improve the social, rural and intellectual conditions of Muslims; (d) and to advocate loyalty to the Raj.⁷¹ The new association represented the middle-class Punjab Muslims. It so quickly grew in popularity that within one year its membership rose from 200 to 6,000. It made tremendous efforts, particularly in the field of education, collecting funds, opening schools, colleges and Muslim associations⁷² at local level.

The Muslim hierarchy in these organizations supported Sir Syed's movement and believed that the Muslims should seek British support to get their due share in administration. They should not launch an agitation but instead present their demands to the Government and then rely on it for the protection of their interests. They thought that the Muslims should concentrate on English education in order to improve their status and to occupy an honourable place in India; and that without proper education they could not get their due share in the administration.⁷³ Sir Syed's leading supporters (the Anglo-Muhammadan school of

politics) in the Punjab were Hayat Khan, Barkat Ali, Shah Din and Sir Shafi. After 1887, Sir Syed became the greatest Muslim critic of the Congress party. The Congress had demanded the introduction of an elective system and enlarged Councils. The Muslims considered these demands harmful, for they had very slim chances under the existing elective system, and that their interests would be overridden by the Hindu majority. They preferred a system which empowered the Government to effect a balanced form of representation for various communities; a system of separate electorates was very much favoured. Sir Syed therefore advised Muslims to keep away from the Congress. Muslim associations in the Punjab quickly aligned themselves with the anti-Congress movement; giving a good deal of attention to Sir Syed's thoughts.⁷⁴

In 1886, Sir Syed founded the Muhammadan Educational Congress ('Congress' was later replaced by the word 'Conference'). Although its object was to deal with the subject of Muslim education, it also provided a political platform for Muslims. Attacks on the Congress policies, request to the Government to protect Muslims and redress their grievances, were launched from its platform. The Punjab Muslims were leading participants in this Conference. At its second meeting (1887) the Punjab delegates discussed the question of Muslim backwardness in the Punjab.⁷⁵ The third meeting was held in the Punjab; Barkat Ali and Hayat Khan made the arrangements and the latter became a Trustee of the Aligarh College.⁷⁶ In this meeting, too, the Punjab's backwardness in education came under discussion. Resolutions were passed asking the Government to assist the Muslims.⁷⁷ The fourth meeting of the Conference was presided over by Hayat Khan; the Punjab delegates formed the majority. The Conference was told that various Muslim organizations in the Punjab were helping poor students.⁷⁸ The Punjab continued to be a chief supporter of the Conference in the following years and after Sir Syed's death, the Conference assumed a leading role in viewing the demand for the establishment of a Muslim University in India.⁷⁹ Sir Shafi brought the Aga Khan into the Conference for this purpose and the latter visited the Punjab in February

1911.⁸⁰

In 1894, Sir Syed founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India; its main objective was to defend Muslim political rights and discourage popular agitation among them.⁸¹ By this time the Government had accepted some demands of the Congress; Councils were enlarged, their powers were slightly increased and the elective principle was introduced. The Punjab took a keen interest in the Defence Association's formation; Barkat Ali, Yousaf Shah, Shah Din, Niaz Mohammad, A. Rehman, A. Hakim and Sir Shafi were its leading members.⁸² Nawab Zulfiqar, M. Hayat, U. Hayat, Tiwanas and Pir Ghulam Rasul were close associates of Sir Syed.⁸³ The Association criticized the Congress' aim to get 'control of India'. Shah Din and Sir Shafi were behind the resolutions it passed against the application of the competitive system for the allocation of jobs. It also submitted a paper on the subject of Muslim representation on Councils and local bodies. In it the Association explained that the elective system did not give them a fair chance, and their due share; and that under the existing system they would be swamped by the Hindu majority. It demanded the extension of communal electorates in Councils and all local bodies.⁸⁴

With the turn of the century the demand for communal electorates gathered more support. The partition of Bengal (1905) and the Simla Deputation (October 1906) which led to the creation of the Muslim League, constituted two important landmarks in the history of Muslim India. Bengal, on account of its large size, was undergoverned; and during Lord Curzon's viceroyalty was divided into two parts.⁸⁵ The partition offered tremendous opportunities to Muslims in the field of education, employment, local bodies and various other spheres, which had hitherto been under Hindu control;⁸⁶ the newly created Eastern Bengal was predominantly Muslim (59%). But the partition of Bengal became a challenge for Hindus who fared badly under the new arrangement.⁸⁷ The Hindus, therefore, started a large scale agitation, using the plea that the Bengali 'Nation' had been divided. In the Punjab, the Hindus started a boycott of British-made goods.⁸⁸ In the middle of this agita-

tion the Government declared that it would consider the Congress' demands for further reforms in India; this declaration further enhanced the Congress' prestige. The 'Anglo-Muslim school of politics' inevitably became worried, lest Muslim rights should be ignored. Sir Syed had died; Viqar-ul-Mulk (Secretary of Aligarh College) approached Minto's Secretary, Dunlop Smith, and expressed Muslim fears about the forthcoming reforms. The Governor of the Punjab, Denzil Ibbetson, also testified that the Muslims were much concerned.⁸⁹ Eventually, a delegation of 35 leading Muslims including 8 from the Punjab,⁹⁰ met the Viceroy, in October 1906.⁹¹ The deputation presented an address. The main points raised were similar to those often advocated by the Muslim community of the Punjab. The existing system of elections was criticized and it was pointed out that in the Muslim majority provinces, such as the Punjab and East Bengal, the Muslims were denied their share in services and that they were inadequately represented on various bodies. The address asked for Muslims due share (in accordance with their numerical strength) in Councils and local bodies; and that each community should be allowed to elect its own representatives, as was already partially in practice in some municipalities in the Punjab. A 'due share' in services was also demanded.⁹² The Viceroy gave a sympathetic reply implying that the Muslim rights would be safeguarded. *The Observer*, a Muslim daily under the Shafi group, however, expressed its disappointment that the Viceroy did not specify that the Muslims would be given their due share in services.⁹³ A few months later the delegates of Muhammadan Educational Conference met at Dacca and formed a Muslim political party – the Muslim League. From the outset it seemed that the Muslims were waiting for the right time to create an organized opposition against the Hindus. Immediately after its inception, the League declared that the partition of Bengal was beneficial to the Muslims and that the anti-partition movement should be condemned by them.⁹⁴

Even before the creation of the League, some leading Punjabi Muslims, such as Shah Din, were thinking in terms of establishing a 'Central Political Organization' for the Muslims⁹⁵ and in

February 1906, Fazl-i-Husain had already created a Muslim association by the name of Muslim League;⁹⁶ Sh. Umar Bakhsh and Fazl-i-Husain were its president and secretary, respectively. Nevertheless, Shafi got in touch with Viqar-ul-Mulk and succeeded in creating a provincial branch of the All-India Muslim League; it declared that it would fight for Muslim rights.⁹⁷ Later the differences between the Shafi and Fazl-i-Husain groups were composed and the Shafi League was recognized as a branch of the All-India Muslim League;⁹⁸ but for the present the Punjab League consisted of two groups; the Shafi group was called the 'Conservatives', whereas the Fazl-i-Husain group was known as 'Progressives'. The *Paisa Akhbar* supported the former group, while the *Zamindar* backed the latter.⁹⁹

After this the 'Conservatives' under Shafi, assumed the role of representing Muslim opinion in the Punjab. An opportunity came when in August 1907 the Government of India asked the provincial governments to elicit the opinion of various parties on the subject of such further reforms as the creation of Advisory Councils and the reform of existing legislatures. The Punjab Government sent a lengthy memoranda on the subject, along with its own recommendations.¹⁰⁰ On the whole the document represented the opinion of 3 sections – the aristocratic class, the Hindus and the Muslims. The aristocratic class represented by Pratap Singh, Tiwanas and Tilop Chand was hostile to the extension of reforms. The Hindus favoured the introduction of elective systems but were opposed to the Muslim demand for separate electorates.¹⁰¹ The Muslims backed the demands put forward by the Simla Deputation; on their behalf, Shafi, various Muslim associations, and the Muslim Press sent letters. Shafi pleaded the Muslim case for separate electorates and quoted several instances of malpractices by the Hindus in common electorates. Shafi opposed the introduction of an elective system and demanded 50% of the non-official seats in legislature for Muslims.¹⁰² Various Muslim associations pointed out that religion was the most prominent ground of difference in India, particularly in the Punjab. In the light of their experience all the Muslim associations demanded communal electorates in the legis-

lature as well as for local bodies; 50% was considered to be a due share.¹⁰³ *The Observer* sent a memorandum full of criticism against Hindu behaviour during the elections for local bodies and insisted that the Muslims should be treated as a separate nation. It pointed out that in the past the Muslims had been outweighed by the Hindus, and that the existing system had failed to give them adequate representation. It endorsed the Muslim demands and argued that if they were not met the Muslims would become even weaker than in the past.¹⁰⁴ The Muslims holding honorary jobs under the Government, such as G. Hussain, Mehdi Shah, Makhdum Hasan, S.M. Hussain, Fazl-i-Husain, Ch. Hayat, also backed the Muslim demands.¹⁰⁵ A little later the leading Punjabi Muslims such as Shafi, Abdul Qadir, Ghulam Sadiq and Aziz, took a prominent part in pushing the Muslim demands through the League.¹⁰⁶ Shafi used his personal contact with the Viceroy's private secretary, Dunlop Smith, to argue the Muslim case.

To sum up, Shafi, time and again, suggested that an amicable way to settle the Muslim claims lay in the introduction of separate electorates in the legislature as in various local bodies. He politely warned against deviating from its promises to the Muslim community.¹⁰⁷ Apparently Colonel Smith was also sympathetic to the Muslim point of view; he, too, wanted the Government to adhere to its promises.¹⁰⁸

Although the Indian Muslims were unanimously demanding separate electorates, the Government proceeded with great caution. At one time the Secretary of State had refused to entertain this demand and had instead proposed a scheme of electoral colleges, with a fixed number of seats for Hindus and Muslims. But the League agitated against this, particularly through its London branch. Eventually, the Government conceded this demand but the Act of 1909 did not meet many of the demands from the Punjab. For one thing, separate electorates were not made a part of the reforms in the Punjab; secondly, although the elective system was introduced its proportion was lower than other major provinces.¹⁰⁹ The Muslims complained; in the League's

session in 1910, they expressed their disappointment and anger.¹¹⁰ The elections to the Councils held under the new Act further proved that the Muslim fears were not unfounded. In the 1912 elections, the Muslims fared very badly; only one Muslim was elected. The Government nominated some extra Muslims, but they were hardly adequate to represent the Muslim case.¹¹¹ In elections some of the best Muslim candidates, like Fazl-i-Husain had also been defeated. The Muslim Press and the League criticized the system of joint electorates and continued to press their claims.¹¹²

Reconciliation between Hindus and Muslims

Frustration in the Punjab and some other factors at all-India level convinced many Muslims that the argument to keep themselves away from the Congress was no longer valid. For one thing, the partition of Bengal was revoked in 1911 after a vigorous Hindu agitation. It shocked the Muslims, and their policy of unconditional loyalty to the British also received a severe blow. In 1911-12 the Government further alienated the Muslims by acquiescing in conflict in the Balkan wars and by refusing to establish a Muslim University. The result was that the Muslims realized that some sort of understanding with the Congress was essential. A 'radical' group of all-India Muslim politicians, with the support of the 'Progressive' group in the Punjab, Fazli, Zafar Ali, Pir Taj, Khalifa Shuja,¹¹³ favoured a Congress-League rapprochement. But the Shafi group opposed this move, believing that the two organizations would pursue an anti-British campaign. This group labelled the Fazli group as 'selfish youngsters' working for their own motives. Shafi was supported by the Muslim titled gentry and the *Paisa Akhbar*.¹¹⁴ However, despite Shafi's opposition the League went ahead with its policy. The Congress, too, was ready to conciliate Muslim opinion in order to secure substantial reforms in India; it was even prepared to drop its opposition to communal electorates.¹¹⁵ Eventually, in 1916, both organizations held their sessions at Lucknow and a pact was concluded on the subject of further reforms in India. Congress accepted separate elec-

torates for Muslims not only where they existed but also agreed to their extension to the Punjab and the C.P.; Muslim minorities in the U.P., Bihar, Bombay, Madras received weightage, whereas in the Punjab and Bengal the Muslims had to forego a certain number of seats (being allocated 50% and 40% seats, respectively).

In the Punjab, as anticipated, the Shafi group opposed the pact, using the plea that the Punjab Muslims were not given 56% representation on the Council; and the League and Congress were preparing to launch together a 'peaceful resistance movement' and 'Home Rule' campaign against the British.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, the leader of the 'Progressive' group, Fazl-i-Husain considered this the best arrangement obtainable. He knew that for decades the Hindus and the Muslims had been quarrelling over petty things, these squabbles hindered political advance, and that the loyal attitude of Muslims had failed to win them any concessions. His group thought that by agreeing to certain principles both communities had resolved their differences and could go ahead with a joint demand for reforms. Henceforth this group never raised the most controversial issue of separate electorates, for the Congress itself had agreed to it; instead along with Congress it raised more important demands – to have a High Court, an Executive Council and an enlarged Legislature for the Punjab.¹¹⁷ Under the circumstances, the stand taken by the 'Progressive' group proved to be in the best interest of the Muslims. As mentioned earlier, the Shafi group was quite content with 50% representation on the Council. A time had come in 1911 when the Muslims were so depressed that it looked as if they would not be able to protect their interests even at municipal level;¹¹⁸ the Council elections had proved more damaging than they could have imagined. Moreover, under no circumstances were the Punjab Hindus prepared to accept separate electorates or any formula fixing seats for Muslims. The Hindus vehemently opposed the Pact;¹¹⁹ and their opposition continued against these principles until the partition of India in 1947. Thus Shafi was removed from the vice-presidency of the League,¹²⁰ his provincial League was disaffiliated

and its place was taken by the Punjab Provincial League created by the Fazli group.¹²¹ Shafi later created the Punjab Muslim Association, and tried to justify its creation on the plea that the League could no longer safeguard Muslim rights. The *Paisa Akhbar* also wrote several articles against the League-Congress 'agitational politics' and expressed lack of confidence in the Muslim League.¹²² In 1919 Shafi was nominated to the Viceroy's Council; though it was fully known to the Government that he was no longer trusted by the Muslims.¹²³

While the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were being formulated, both the pro-Lucknow Pact elements and its opponents presented their cases to the Government. Shafi's (disaffiliated) League endorsed the Government policy of creating self-governing provinces but did not commit itself to the 'Home Rule' demand. It asked for communal electorates and adequate representation, whatever system was introduced. It was against the Congress-League demand to have 80% elected element in the Council; at least 1/3 was to be nominated.¹²⁴ The Punjab Muslim Association demanded that the real power in Councils should rest with the rural classes, and that 56% should be the Muslim share.¹²⁵ The anti-Lucknow Pact Hindu and Sikh groups presented their demands through the Punjab Hindu Sabha and the Khalsa Divan. Both objected to the various 'concessions' granted to the Muslims under the Lucknow Pact; the Sabha, with the backing of its all-India parent body, criticized the principle of communal electorates and advised against its extension to the Punjab. However, both these groups were sure that the Lucknow Pact would not be ignored by the Government, and therefore the Hindus demanded 50% and the Sikhs 30% of the Council seats in the Punjab.¹²⁶

By contrast, the Lucknow Pact was widely supported by various interests in the Punjab. The Punjab League pointed out that since communal representation had been acknowledged by the Hindus it should be applied even to local bodies.¹²⁷ The Ahmadiya Isha'at-i-Islam suggested the immediate adoption of the Congress-League Pact.¹²⁸ The All-India Committees of the League

and Congress also demanded the same.¹²⁹ The Punjab Provincial Conference, representative of the most advanced Punjab politicians, also supported the Congress-League Pacts; it considered the Pact to be the most modest demand for Reforms and demanded the removal of official control over local bodies.¹³⁰ Most surprisingly, the Punjab Council itself passed a resolution that its size should be enlarged to 100 members, of whom four-fifths should be elected, and that only half the nominated element should be official. The non-official members of the Council also passed a resolution that the Congress-League Pact should be put into effect.¹³¹ This was the greatest success of the supporters of the Lucknow Pact, because the Punjab Council had only 11 elected members at the time (there were 17 nominated members). S. N. Banerji, a member of the Franchise Committee (the Southborough Committee) admitted that the Lucknow Pact guided them and that the Franchise Committee 'decided to proceed substantially upon the lines of the Lucknow Convention'.¹³²

However, the Government of the Punjab under O'Dwyer was unsympathetic towards the proposed reforms.¹³³ The Governor was convinced that the enlargement on a large scale was undesirable; he thought the maximum size of the Council should be 51; and indicated that it would be difficult to get a large number of 'qualified' non-official members.¹³⁴ O'Dwyer felt that reforms should be conceded from strength, not weakness.¹³⁵ He criticized the proposed division of the administration into reserve and transferred subjects; instead, he preferred a single system under which all subjects should be dealt by the Government as a whole.¹³⁶ On 7 December 1918, the Governor met the Franchise Committee. Here, too, he took the view that a Council of 100 members would be too big for 'educative purposes', and that half the members would be incapable of taking an intelligent interest in its proceedings. The Punjab Government made a case for the special representation of the landed gentry, for it would have a 'steadying influence' in the Council and a healthy check on the extremism. O'Dwyer recommended 4 special seats - 2 for

Muslims and 2 for non-Muslims. He also made a case for communal representation for all the three communities of the Punjab.¹³⁷ The Franchise Committee, however, did not agree with the Punjab Government. Instead it proposed a Council of 85 members; 28 seats (22 rural, 6 urban) were to be reserved for Muslims; 8 seats for Sikhs and 18 general seats (14 rural, 4 urban); 4 seats were given to the landed interests; 1 seat for the University and 2 seats for commerce and industry were also proposed.¹³⁸

In May 1919, O'Dwyer retired, and in October 1919 he appeared before the Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill 1919. He argued that since the Punjab was backward in education and politics it was not ready for 'responsible Government'; 'Good-Government', which meant security, protection, light taxation, honest officials and responsible rural representation, should be the Punjab's ideal. He pointed out that all these objects were pursued under the existing form of Government, and that substantial advance had been made in political reforms. He warned that if attempts were made to proceed faster, power would be transferred to an 'inexperienced intelligentsia'. He criticized dyarchy because in his opinion it would create administrative difficulties; ministerial responsibility was a theory foreign to Indian ideas, and the Ministers would pose as the champions of popular cause, strengthen their personal position and form party cliques. In short, O'Dwyer thought that dyarchy was unsuited to Indian temperament. He suggested that half the members of the Executive Council and the Cabinet should be official; the Government in Council should exercise ultimate control over the administration; there should be no division of subjects, but there would be a strong Indian element in Government. He also suggested that the rural classes, which contributed at least 90% of the total revenue, should be given a dominating position.¹³⁹

O'Dwyer's views favouring the establishment of the rural ascendancy were supported by two prominent representative of the Punjab's rural classes, Sir Umar Hayat Tiwana and Rao Bahadur Lal Chand. The latter complained that the rural classes had been greatly neglected during the last

fifty years. He said because they had failed to make a noise, unlike the urban classes, and failed to advocate their case before the Government, the latter gave preferential treatment to the urban classes, with the result that considerable development had taken place in towns, and rural areas had been largely ignored. Lal Chand suggested that the rural classes should be given 90% of the Punjab Council's seats and a due share in services (nine-tenth of all places). He warned that if rural classes were ignored again, power would be transferred from the British bureaucracy to the Indian urban bureaucracy.¹⁴⁰ Sir Umar Hayat presented his memorandum with the backing of the Punjab Muslim Association and the Punjab's Zamindar class. He also complained that the rural classes had been lagging behind the urban classes and warned that if the Government did not give due representation to his class the result would be that the urban classes would dominate the Government, which would result in agitation for further demands, and eventually the 'Bania' oligarchy would come to rule the country. Under these circumstances, Tiwana said, the running of the administration would become extremely difficult; there would always be a danger of Government being defeated on several issues in the Councils. He reminded the Government that the 'old families' had not joined the Congress-League agitation because they knew that the Congress was unfriendly to the British. Tiwana warned the Government that the rural classes would be ruined if power was transferred from British to the Congress party and asked the Government to do something to avert the coming catastrophe.¹⁴¹

However, O'Dwyer had been criticized by a vast majority of the Punjabis, not only for his anti-reform views, but also for his part in the Amritsar tragedy of April 1919. Only a few members of the 'leading families' had participated in his farewell function, at the Governor's House.¹⁴² The root cause of the Amritsar massacre was the passage of the Rowlatt Act, which gave the Government enormous powers to make arrests and inflict punishments upon anarchical and revolutionary movements. In spite of strong opposition the Act was passed but it brought in its wake a popular

agitation throughout India. In the Punjab, the movement against the legislation was led by Congress leaders like Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satapal, and was backed by the Punjab League.¹⁴³ Various protest meetings were held and resolutions were passed against the legislation. On 8-9 April, O'Dwyer issued orders deporting Kitchlew and Satapal and stopping Gandhi from entering the Punjab.¹⁴⁴ This order resulted in anger and bitterness which led to further rioting, looting, arson and strikes. General Dyer was given the authority to restore law and order in Amritsar, the worst affected area. Although this was an agitation against the Rowlatt Act, the Punjab Government considered it as an organized rebellion to overthrow the British Government in India.¹⁴⁵

On 13 April (the Hindu New Year Day) the city of Amritsar had scheduled a public meeting against the Rowlatt Act. On the same day, Dyer issued order prohibiting all meetings and processions; but these orders (on Dyer's own admission) were not very well publicized. The meeting was held and Dyer with his troops arrived on the scene. Without giving any warning, he ordered his troops to fire straight at the crowd; this resulted in 379 to 1500 killed according to various estimates and many more injured.¹⁴⁶ At first the Government of India and the authorities in London thought that Dyer had saved India,¹⁴⁷ But a little later when the Government knew the details and particularly the fact the Dyer had left the wounded on the spot, the Viceroy strongly criticized his behaviour.¹⁴⁸ In London, too, Government condemned Dyer's action.¹⁴⁹ Following the Amritsar tragedy, the O'Dwyer Government imposed Martial Law in the Punjab. The Martial Law administration also gave some inhuman orders, such as punishing the public to crawl on bellies, flogging in public, orders to surrender cars and cycles, asking students to be present for 4 roll calls a day, salutes to Englishmen, curfew on Indians and the obligation to get permission to leave their homes. The newspapers and their editors were also prosecuted; the editor of *The Tribune* was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1000.¹⁵⁰ Despite opposition from O'Dwyer,¹⁵¹ General Dyer imposed

an enormous fine of Rs.2,056,000 on Amritsar city.

As a result of these repressive measures, the O'Dwyer regime became a target of criticism. The Muslims and the Hindus in other provinces were backing the Punjabis; almost all eminent leaders were behind the appeals to help the victims of the Amritsar tragedy and the Martial Law regime.¹⁵² An unprecedented kind of Hindu-Muslim unity against the Government was noticed; it was the most memorable gathering in the city of Amritsar.¹⁵³ The Jallianwala Bagh, the scene of the tragedy became a place of pilgrimage and a memorial was built to pay homage to the victims.¹⁵⁴ On the League's behalf, Hakim Ajmal Khan criticized the Rowlatt Act and blamed the Punjab Government for ruthless firing on the Amritsar gathering, for not giving medical aid to the wounded and for the inhuman orders of the Martial Law authority. The League also blamed for approving Dyer's actions and passed a resolution demanding O'Dwyer's removal from the Committee on the administration and organization of the Army in India.¹⁵⁵ The Congress session also presented a catalogue of grievances against the Government and passed a number of resolutions. In May 1920, the Hunter Committee, which had been appointed in October 1919 under the pressure of public opinion to investigate the causes of the Amritsar tragedy, published its Report. Although the Report criticized the Punjab Government's role in the tragedy, it was subjected to a good deal of criticism for being inadequate and unsatisfactory. The Congress itself had also appointed a committee under the elder Nehru to look into the matter. This committee launched a wholesale criticism against the Government.¹⁵⁶ This was followed by a non-co-operation movement launched by the Congress, which included the boycott of elections under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, boycott of educational institutions and courts, the renunciation of titles and the boycott of foreign cloth. But Congress failed to register any significant support in the Punjab. An overwhelming majority of Punjab Muslims disapproved of the movement. The Hindus too were divided on the subject; some

prominent among them, such as Harkishen Lal, opposed the boycott of elections and wanted the forthcoming reforms to work. In short, the Punjab passed through a period of great stress and strain before the promulgation of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in 1919.

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92. C. H. Philips, ed., *The Evolution of India and Pakistan: Select Documents*, London, 1962, pp. 190-92.
93. Kaura, *Muslims*, p. 17.
94. Philips, ed., p. 194.
95. Bashir, *Shah Din*, p. 344.
96. A. Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, p. 94, *Paisa Akhbar*, 2-3 October 1907.
97. *Paisa Akhbar*, 3 December 1907.
98. S. Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. I, pp. 22, 26-27, 38-39, (henceforth *Foundations*).
99. M. Rafique Afzal, *Barkat Ali*, Lahore, 1969, p. 4.
100. C.M.D. 4436, Enclosure No. XXI, 379 pages.
101. Nath to D. C. Pindi, 20 November 1907, *ibid.*, pp. 80-86.
102. Shafi to D. C. Lahore, 8 November 1907, *ibid.*, pp. 191-97.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 87, 101-02, 205, 210, 145-47.
104. Aziz to D. C. Lahore, 11 November 1907, *ibid.*, pp. 185-91.
105. *Ibid.*, Appendix 'D', pp. 1-10, 110-111, 125-26, 246-47.
106. Pirzada, ed., *Foundations*, Vol. I, pp. 41-86.
107. Shafi-Smith Correspondence in Wasti, *The Political Triangle in India, (1858-1924)*, 1976, pp. 125-59; M. Gilbert, *Servant of India*, pp. 176-85.
108. M. Gilbert, *Servant of India*, pp. 187-88, 189-92.
109. Hasan, *Nationalism*, p. 66.
110. Pirzada, ed., *Foundations*, Vol. I, pp. 87-130.
111. *Paisa Akhbar*, 13 January 1913, 31 March 1914.
112. Reinhardt, 'The Legislative Council,' pp. 91, 93, 120, 123-24, 133.
113. Afzal, *Barkat Ali*, p. 4.
114. *Paisa Akhbar*, 15 February 1916.
115. M.M.P.C. 1916-17, C.M.D. 9162, p. 11, H. Owen, 'Negotiating the Lucknow Pact,' pp. 567, 573.
116. *Paisa Akhbar*, 13 January 1917, 13 February 1917.
117. Fazli's Address to Punjab Provincial Conference, 26 October 1917. Mihr Collection Research Society of Pakistan, pp. 1-7.
118. *Paisa Akhbar*, 24 June 1911.
119. Owen, 'Lucknow Pact', pp. 577, 580; Kaura, *Muslims*, p. 20.
120. Pirzada, ed., *Foundations*, Vol. I, p. 391.
121. *Paisa Akhbar*, 13 February 1917, Hasan, *Nationalism*, p. 81; Owen, 'Lucknow Pact', pp. 581-82.
122. 31 March 1918, 5 April 1918.
123. O'Dwyer to Chelmsford, 23 May 1919, 25 May 1919, Chelmsford Collection, 262/22, I.O.R. (India Office Library and Records, London).
124. Address presented in India to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, London, 1918, C.M.D., 9178, pp. 2-4.
125. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
126. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14, 19-29.
127. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
128. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
129. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
130. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
131. *Ibid.*, pp. 207-08, Azim Husain says Fazli was behind this move. (*Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 168-69.)
132. Banerji, *A Nation in the Making*, London, 1925, p. 317.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
134. Letter from the Government of India and Enclosures on Reforms, C.M.D., 123, pp. 223-50.
135. O'Dwyer to Chelmsford, 16 November 1918, Chelmsford Collection, 264/21. India Office Records, London.
136. *Ibid.*, 5 November 1918.
137. *Government of India, Reforms*, C.M.D. 123, pp. 27-29.
138. Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to enquire into questions connected with the Franchise and other matters relating to Reforms, C.M.D. 141, (1919), pp. 56-59.
139. The Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, Vol. II, Minutes of Evidence & Appendices, pp. 417-47. O'Dwyer maintained his criticism against the Indian Constitutional Reforms throughout the years of discussion in the three sessions of the R.T.C., in the J.S. Committee and in Parliamentary debates on the Act of 1935. (See *The Times* (London), 14 & 15 March 1940).
140. *Ibid.*, pp. 142-43.
141. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-45.
142. Prominent were: Shafi, Tiwana, Zulfiqar, Yousaf, Kazilbash, Leghari, Qadir, Zafrullah, Mijithia, Nath, Lal Chand. *Civil and Military Gazette*, 14 May 1919.
143. Hasan, *Nationalism*, pp. 115-16; A. Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, pp. 12-24.
144. Mittal, *Freedom Movement*, p. 120.
145. For details, see I. Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer*, London, 1931; R. Furneas, *Massacre at Amritsar*, London, 1963; M. Naidis, 'The Punjab Disturbances of 1919,' unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1951.
146. Mittal, *Freedom Movement*, pp. 128-29.
147. Viceroy S/S, 11 June 1919, Chelmsford Collection (IOR) 264/5; P.S. to King to Viceroy, 23 June 1920, *ibid.*, 264/1.
148. Viceroy to S/S, 24 December 1919, Chelmsford Collection 264/5; Viceroy to King, 25 June 1920, *ibid.*, 264/1.
149. Naidis, 'The Punjab Disturbances', pp. 238-39.
150. MacLagan to Chelmsford, 2 June 1919, Chelmsford, 2 June 1919, Chelmsford Collection, 264/22.
151. *Ibid.*, 13 May 1919.
152. O'Dwyer to Chelmsford, 21 May 1919, Chelmsford Collection, 164/22.
153. *The Leader*, 29 December 1919, in Press Abstracts, R/5/202, IOR.
154. MacLagan to Chelmsford, 3 January 1920, Chelmsford Collection, 264/22.
155. Pirzada, ed., *Foundations*, pp. 502-09, 537. O'Dwyer served as a member of Lord Esher's Committee on the Indian Army, in 1919-20. (See *The Times*, 14 & 15 March 1940).
156. Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Conference, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1920, pp. 1-23, 156-60.