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The unanswered challenge can never be disposed of and is therefore bound to present itself again and again until it either receives some tardy and imperfect answer or else brings about the destruction of a society which has shown itself inveterately incapable of responding to it effectively.

Toynbee

The study of history is a study of civilisations. A civilisation that cannot effectively respond to the challenge of time, inevitably disintegrates and over a period of time its cultural manifestations also disappear.

Toynbee

HISTORY of the Muslims in the Subcontinent portrays prolonged struggle for survival in a vast land of non-Muslim majority, survival not as a religious group but as a political entity. After 714 A.D. when Muhammad bin Qasim was called back to Damascus, it seemed for the time being at least that Islam would disappear from these lands. However, in spite of persecution at the hands of Hindus and a fluctuating graph of political upheavals during the Mughal and British periods, the Muslim culture survived here for centuries, so much so that in 1936 Sindh had to be separated

from Bombay Presidency for being a Muslim majority area and later on, for the same reason, it became a part of Pakistan.

The period between 1000 to 1857 was characterized by unrivalled Muslim ascendancy in India. During this period, the Turks, Pathans and Mughals ruled the Subcontinent one after the other, but the overall political pattern was apparently of a continued Muslim rule, witnessing a consolidation and disintegration of Muslim empires with the change of dynasties. The new dynasties came normally from the north-west. The new invaders would move with little resistance across the Indus Basin, a final and fierce battle would take place at Panipat which would bring in its wake the establishment of a new dynasty in North India. A few dynasties which remained more effective and viable over a longer period of time, however, succeeded in extending their power over South India also. The pattern of growth and disintegration of each dynastic state was a simple graph. The state developed as long as the rulers conformed to the principles of statecraft and were possessed of a strong and well-equipped army, but sooner or later when the kings developed a taste for easy and luxurious life, imperial control over

* Written after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration in 1966, this article could not then see the light of the day because of the prevailing euphoria that we had won the war. The new approach to national problems heralded by the advent of a democratic setup in the country has encouraged me to publish it now. (Author)

the army would weaken and rebellions would break the Empire from within, which would, at times, tempt some adventurous soul biding for his time beyond the north-western frontier of India, to try his luck and sometimes the people of India would themselves also invite an energetic ruler from that direction to end the prolonged anarchy within their country. Rana Sanga and Daulat Khan Lodhi invited Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire. Likewise, Ahmed Shah Abdali was invited to save the Muslims from Marhatta atrocities, but he chose not to assume the role of Babur, although India needed a government for the organization of a new political pattern. When the historical vacuum was not filled by the personality from the north-west, the prevailing anarchy and civil wars among various rulers provided a golden opportunity for the French and the British traders in India to intervene. Both started helping needy princes with weapons and trained soldiers. During this period while the rulers all over India were fighting for their survival, the British and the French were engaged in a struggle for supremacy in the Subcontinent. These wars continued for over a century and finally the British won the Empire.

The Muslim rule in the Subcontinent was possessed of two important features. First, though the Muslims and Hindus had lived together for almost a millennium, apart from some rituals and festivities, they failed to accept each others' cultural attributes to any appreciable extent. Most probably this was due to the fact that Hindu society, though highly developed in terms of philosophy and social structure, was not as advanced in polity and statecraft as Muslims. Islam being a combination of state and civilization from the very beginning proved to be a progressive creed, and succeeded in maintaining its ascendancy. The Muslim rulers looked on the Hindu religion as a conglomeration of rituals and celebrations, some of the more colourful ones of which they, too, patronized and participated in. Consequently, the two civilizations grew as two parallel societies. Spread of Islam was associated with Sufis and saints. While in the far extremities of India they introduced Islam through their missionary zeal, the generally liberal attitude of the

central power in and around Delhi always refrained from interfering with the religious freedom of the local population, with the result that the centre of Muslim power never developed into Muslim majority area and the core of the Muslim state continued to comprise Hindu majority.

The Mughals established the first modern state in the Subcontinent with a centralized bureaucracy, a centralized army and co-operation with Rajputs being its three main pillars. This arrangement worked well and, in many ways, served as a preserver of the socio-cultural parallelism. However, whenever the Muslim state weakened, the Muslim community had to look towards the Muslim countries outside India for support. In short, the Muslim society and the Muslim state flourished as complementary to each other but in different territories—Muslim society in the north-western and the eastern provinces of the state and Muslim state power around Delhi and Agra.

The British fought against the Muslims for the acquisition of the Empire in the Subcontinent. After their final defeat in 1857, the Muslims were utterly demoralized. Their decline was, however, not confined to the political sphere only; their position deteriorated in other aspects of life too, but its greatest manifestation was in the economic field. Muslims had been the rulers. Their general professional trends were service in the royal courts; they were associated with the administration of the state, or served in the Army. As a result commerce, small business and similar other odd activities were carried on by Hindus. Then suddenly the medium of instruction was changed from Persian to English. Mass education was not prevalent in those days. Muslim scholarship emerging from madrasahs and private tutoring used to be confined to the courts. This class had been annihilated in wars. Military as well as civil bureaucracy had been eliminated. It was not only a new government but also a new civilization, new language and a new economic system, a new political framework in which the Muslim community had to adjust itself. The nineteenth century witnessed a revolutionary change in the educational and socio-economic life of the West. Numerous new ideas came with the British from

Europe to India. There were too many fronts to fight on. In politics, kingship was replaced by nationalism, constitutionalism, democracy, right of self-determination and a host of new ideas far beyond the comprehension of Muslim intellectuals, if there were any. Loss of political power left the Muslims uneducated or semi-educated; they were unable to understand the concepts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In other words, the onslaught of modern knowledge crippled them intellectually. For them the only way to survive was to hang on to their glorious past and live with myths and dreams. Muslims were very late in accepting Western system of education. They considered the learning of the English language not only immoral, but also anti-religious. A complexity of inhibitions kept the Muslim society unaware of the realities of the Subcontinent for a long time.

The Hindu society, on the contrary, showed more flexibility and adapted itself willingly to the emerging power pattern. The British came to the Subcontinent as traders. Being in the same profession, the Hindus did not take long to understand their thinking and psychology. They adopted the new educational pattern and prepared themselves in time for entering Government jobs as partners with the new rulers. They considered the advent of the British as God-send for the resurrection of the Hindu society.

The Muslim intellectual tried to simplify political struggle into a confrontation of Islam and Christianity. Decline of the Muslim state in India was contributed to the neglect of Islamic principles. The only saint-scholar who could grasp the decline of the Muslim Society was Shah Wali Ullah. He understood that it was the end of the Mughal Empire and that it could not be saved. He wanted to save the Muslim people from the growing power of the Marhattas, Jats and Sikhs. He believed that if the Muslims survived, the Muslim state also stood a chance of being revived. He was the only one who could see that the rise of the Marhattas, Jats and Sikhs was not only against the Mughal Kings, but the common Muslims were also the victims of their atrocities. Shah Wali Ullah called Ahmed Shah Abdali to their rescue.

He did succeed but partially. What the

Muslim community actually needed was a comprehension of the western civilization, its modern socio-political concepts as well as the Christianity. The Muslims not only lagged behind in the field of education but also paid no heed to the institution of *Ijtihad*. Even the religious interpretations of Shah Wali Ullah could not escape their criticism. The only power that could resurrect the Muslim society was the power of knowledge which it resisted to acquire. It was only through the persistent efforts of Sir Syed and his comrades that the Muslim youth was finally guided towards the acquisition of the Western knowledge. The Aligarh University succeeded in breaking the citadel of ignorance and obscurantism, but reaction to Aligarh was equally potent. Orthodox Mullahs founded a number of madrasahs supposedly for the protection of Islam and thus brought about yet another kind of parallelism in the society, orthodox Muslims and progressive Muslims. With the passage of time, this parallelism led to confrontation, on the one hand between the Hindus and the Muslims, and on the other between the orthodox and the progressives elements in the Muslims society itself. The basic difference between these two groups of the Muslims was of approach. The progressives thought that the Muslims could survive in Bharat only as a religious community and not as a political entity, whereas the orthodox Muslims' perception of history was that if the Muslim community followed the tenets of Islam, they could survive both as a religious minority as well as a political power group. This schism could not be bridged. As a result, the Muslim power remained scattered and all their efforts at self-preservation proved self-defeating.

During the World War I, the British recruited a large number of men from the north-western part of the Subcontinent, a majority of them were Muslims. This contribution of the Muslims won them the appreciation and gratitude of the British, who, as a consequence, once again showed inclination to recognize them as a separate entity. Meanwhile, the Aligarh University produced educated people belonging to the middle-class Muslim families, who were able to get some jobs and as a result, their economic condition improved. The British made every possible effort to

coalesce the Hindus and Muslims into one nation, but to no avail. They introduced a common Hindustani language which was written in different scripts but its spoken form was almost the same. The Hindus' desire for pushing in more vocabulary of Sanskritic origin into it and the Muslim efforts for the introduction of more and more Persian and Arabic words nullified all these efforts. This convinced the British that the two civilizations could not be fused into one under their aegis.

The conceptual framework of both the civilizations had evolved round two religions. Both the communities were equally proud of their religions and of the resultant social structures. These feelings of pride during the Freedom Movement, gradually evolved into Hindu and Muslim Nationalisms respectively. The subsequent Hindu support to the Khilafat Movement, however, brought about a stark realization among the Muslims that they had no place outside the Subcontinent; the only place where they could look for their survival both as a political entity and as a civilization was within the Subcontinent. This was the first time in the history of the Muslims of the Subcontinent that they set forth the goal of achieving an independent Muslim State in South Asia without any help from the outside Muslim World.

Pakistan was born in 1947 out of 90 years long struggle under the British and Hindu domination. The Muslims of the Subcontinent who succeeded in achieving this goal finally thought that in order to live as free and respectable people, free to develop their civilization, and to come out of the psyche of statelessness, there was no alternative to the creation of Pakistan. It was in response to a basic challenge that the Muslims developed themselves into a political entity, a separate nation and a state in the Subcontinent and did not content themselves with being a religious minority in Akhand Bharat. Although the Muslim population was spread all over the Subcontinent, the demand for Pakistan was the universal demand of 100 million people. But a state could be formed only where the Muslims were in a majority. Thus owing to the pattern of Muslim population in the Subcontinent, the new

state—Pakistan—was born in two wings, leaving 40 million Muslims in Bharat. Consequently, the response to the challenge turned out to be partial and to make matters worse, Mountbatten gave Kashmir to Hindus and the Boundary Award left a huge chunk of Muslim population in Bharat. This allowed Hindus to aspire and strive for the realization of their long cherished dream of establishing Akhand Bharat one day.

The 6 September 1965 once again brought the Muslims face to face with these Hindus of India who wanted to destroy the state of Pakistan and thus put an end to the political entity of Muslims for all times to come. During the 18 years from 1947 to 1965 the relevant development in the socio-economic spheres in Pakistan had not been effective enough to provide the right response to the historical challenge that has been our history since 1000 A.D. It is high time that someone must probe the reasons for our failure to establish an order that could have given Pakistan enough strength to meet the Indian challenge, of which Pakistan was conscious from the very beginning.

Pakistan inherited numerous problems at the time of her birth. Out of the 100 million Muslim population of India, only 60 million Muslims could be accommodated in the new state of Pakistan and the remaining 40 million were left at the mercy of Hindus in Bharat. The questions which remained unanswered were what would be the position of 40 million Muslims in the Indian Union? Could the state guarantee the protection of all the Muslims in the Subcontinent? If not, was this the right solution of the problems of the Muslims in the Subcontinent?

When the boundaries of Pakistan were drawn, the British who were most reluctant to divide the Subcontinent, could not free themselves from their United India syndrome. Consequently, problems like Kashmir, distribution of the waters of the Indus Basin, distribution of assets, etc., were bound to follow the division of the Subcontinent. The Radcliffe Award divided between the two dominions not only the districts but also the thanas and tehsils. Division of Bengal and Assam created an East Pakistan which was surrounded by Indian territories. Had the division been effected province-wide, it would have left the same

number of Hindus in Pakistan, as there would have been the number of Muslims in India. Consequently, the necessity of transfer of power between the two dominions would not have arisen, the economic pattern would have remained undisturbed and the atrocities which were perpetrated on Muslims at the time of their migration to Pakistan would have also been avoided. There would have been no division of the Punjab and no dispute over the division of waters of the rivers. In such a situation, after some time people of both India and Pakistan would have learnt to live in harmony. The Boundary Awards given by the British created a host of intractable problems which became a permanent source of demoralization for any government in Pakistan for its failure or inability to successfully overcome them.

The basis of Pakistani nationalism was not understood and accepted by the West, although the state of Israel was created by the Western countries on the same basis. By 1947 there were many other states where nationalism was defined on the basis of ideology. Islam is as much a code of life as any other contemporary ideology and if the Muslims of the Subcontinent had achieved a state of their own on the basis of Muslim Nationalism there was nothing extraordinary about it. However, our failure has been the failure of our intellectuals who failed to translate Islam into a modern socio-economic system. Consequently, the parallelism between the progressive and the orthodox elements of the society ultimately took the shape of a confrontation, giving rise to centrifugal forces within the state.

After partition, India initiated parliamentary democracy on the basis of the 1935 Act. Pakistan also started on the same lines, but there was an intellectual and conceptual contradiction in introducing something which would be called Islamic polity. It was not possible to establish an Islamic polity without a critical assessment of our Islamic heritage and without synthesizing it with modern political theories and economic institutions. There were no ready-made Islamic politico-economic institutions already in existence which could provide a basic infrastructure to the newly founded Muslim state of Pakistan, nor was there any other Muslim state in the world that could be

followed as an example. The renaissance of knowledge that characterized the period between 1857 to 1947 had also become suffocated and as a result the outline suggested by writers of the renaissance, particularly Allama Iqbal, was not carried forward. The politicians of Pakistan were lost in the maze of the conflict between the orthodox and the progressives. Consequently, Pakistan could not get a Constitution for years to come and finally when it did get one in 1956, not long afterwards Martial Law was clamped on the country and the Constitution was abrogated. In 1962 another Constitution was given which endowed the Head of the State with dictatorial powers. It was a manifestation of the fact that the lawmakers of Pakistan understood neither the socio-cultural pattern of Pakistan nor the modern developments in the fields of politics and economics. The Muslims, it appears, were suffering from intense inferiority complex. Evidently, it was not possible for them to innovate principles and institutions which could help the nation towards progress and prosperity. The patterns of politics and economics remained the same against which Pakistanis had fought during the Freedom Movement. Consequently, political institutions, financial control, economic planning and education, the basic ingredients of statecraft, in which the Muslims were the weakest, could not be envisaged in their proper perspectives; hence Pakistan failed to develop a programme of its own.

The leadership of Pakistan came from the upper and upper-middle classes. Most of them were feudal lords, and the psychology of feudal lords is that they own everything—the land as well as the people. Consequently, there seemed to be two different perceptions of history, one cherished by the leaders of the nation and the other held by the people. The upper classes continued to think in terms of an Islamic state while the poor people continued to wait for the socio-economic reforms. All economic issues remained unresolved for 18 years, until in September 1965 the challenge faced by the Muslims assumed an enormous magnitude.

New ideas create new issues in every historical period and a people who do not innovate become a prey to old socio-cultural habits and in-

stead of forging ahead fall at the mercy of reactionary forces which pull them further into their past. Pakistan is a typical example of this process. Confusion was created about ideology. Everybody seems to be talking about the Pakistan ideology without understanding or ever explaining the genesis of the Ideology.

Soon after its birth, Pakistan as an independent Muslim state was confronted with a number of predicaments.

The western world was the product of the Industrial Revolution. Scientific innovation have drastically condensed the world. Information moves from one corner of the world to another in no time. No one is unaffected by what is happening beyond the boundaries of one's own country. Regional conflicts become world conflicts. It has become immoral to attack a neighbouring state, open confrontation has been replaced by cold war. In a cold war, the fronts are economic, socio-cultural and even psychological. After the World War-II many of the western colonies gained freedom, political imperialism was replaced by economic imperialism but the West continued to have economic hold over the economic policies of the newly independent countries. Political issues changed their colour. Local socio-cultural issues gained more importance. The new war on the cultural front opened an intellectual front, as part of the cold war. This front has yet to be recognized by the people of Pakistan. As long as they ignore it, they will not be able to understand the causes of instability of the Government.

After the Second World War, Russia and America emerged as two Super Powers, leading the path toward a bi-polar world. As this bi-polar perspective offered more chances of increase in global tension and confrontation, countries achieving independence after the World War-II began to espouse the philosophy of non-alignment in increasing numbers, as they needed time to develop themselves in terms of political stability and economic well being of their people. Since most of these countries belonged to Asia and Africa, gradually an Afro-Asian bloc of non-aligned countries emerged. It was formulized in 1954 at the Bandung Conference, in which Egypt, India and Indonesia played a very active role. India ap-

peared to be leading the bloc.

As time went on, China emerged as a strong Asian Power and became interested in this Afro-Asian Non-aligned bloc. It presented the future perspective of a tri-polar world with comparatively less tension and confrontation. But the prospects of China leading the Third World were not acceptable to the two Super Powers.

The U.S. strategists believed that after the Hungarian revolt they had proved to the Soviet Union that there were no more chances of any further expansion of Soviet power and socialist ideology. In other words, the United States had been successful in its policy of containment of the Soviet Union. The U.S strategists also thought that Viet Nam was the Hungary of Asia. Manifestation of China's containment was victory of the United States in Viet Nam. Although the United States eventually lost this war, there was no evidence as yet of China becoming a Pacific sea power.

Russia is a land power, so is China but she possesses a long coastline in the Pacific Ocean — warm and navigable all the year around. In view of the distant prospects of China becoming a sea power, a new strategy had to be evolved. The choice was very clear. India was to be built up as a sea power in the South and the South West Asia.

China is a communist state. India is the leader of Western democratic capitalism. Indian capitalism is sanctified by its religion. Caste system bestows upon Brahman and Kashatris leadership of the nation not only in politics but in economic development as well. United States could not find a more fertile ground than India for capitalism to take roots. Its size and population also evidently made India a match for China. Thus the United States henceforth decided to help India. Economic and military aid was poured in. The question was: will Indian soldiers be able to fight a war? India in the West is know for its pacifism. Indian militarism was to be tested. The 1962 war between China and India, on the Mac-Mohan line, was an unscheduled phenomenon. Indians lost this war. Now a victory was needed to boost the morale of the Indian army.

Second Bandung Conference was scheduled to be held in Algeria in 1965. This time China,

Indonesia and Pakistan were in the forefront. It was evident that China will capture the leadership of this bloc. It was also decided that Russia, despite its claim of being an Asian Power, will not be able to get the membership of this bloc. This state of affairs was not acceptable to the West, because it meant that China, as leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, will soon become the most effective global power. A military coup d'état in Algeria indefinitely postponed the Conference. Thereafter a number of rebellions, one after the other, occurred in those Afro-Asian countries, which were more prominent in this Conference and were inclined to try socialism for their economic development. In all anti-Afro-Asian solidarity rebellions, Indonesia suffered the most. As far as Pakistan was concerned, she was not suitable for revolutions by her very nature. West Pakistan was quite cold towards revolutionary ideas. East Pakistan was rebellious in nature due to sheer pressure of population and persisting poverty, but still no Indonesian style revolution could take place there. There was now only one option available to America to achieve its objective—military operation against Pakistan to weaken the country militarily so that it relinquished the idea of solidarity with the Afro-Asian bloc. It was possible only through an Indo-Pakistan war. The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war was thus a link in the chain of attempts to instal pro-American regimes in Afro-Asian countries.

The United States wanted to see the largest democracy of the world—India—to become a leader of the Afro-Asian democracies. In order to achieve this status, if India had to go to war with China, she should be in a position to win the war. Neither China nor India had become a sea power as yet. Thus the war could be fought in two areas, the NEFA or LADAKH. Both these areas were under Indian control and had common borders with Pakistan. For a battle to be fought in the NEFA by India the war supplies had to be transported through East Pakistan. Indian victory in the war depended on the availability of a direct road link between the West Bengal's industrial region to the NEFA. Thus the achievement of the separation of the eastern wing of Pakistan emerged as the real issue. Cultural predicaments of the country could play a vital role in these anti-

Pakistan conspiracies. Linguistic riots and the sinister propaganda that East Pakistanis had been deprived of their due share in the National Wealth were resorted to. Consequently, disturbances took place in various districts but a total breakaway still did not occur. In spite of all the trouble that was becoming it was now evident to the enemies of Pakistan that without a war they would not be able to achieve their objective.

Kashmir was an issue on which a war between India and Pakistan was possible any moment. If this issue was resolved amicably the next issue would be the common defence. War between India and Pakistan in which Pakistan was defeated would solve the problem. Indians would not object to common defence because in such a development all senior officers would be Indians.

A third objective was to make those Afro-Asian leaders unpopular who were seeking economic development through socialism. If Pakistan lost a war against India, the makers of the foreign policy of the country would automatically become unpopular. Hence a war between India and Pakistan became inevitable.

Here let us not forget that the prevailing impression has been that Pakistan was not ready for this war. If it was really so, how did she get involved in the war? No information is available for Pakistanis to understand the phenomenon. Another equally ambiguous aspect is that why did not we continue the war to the finish. An analysis of some rumours may help us in reaching a conclusion. Rumours are not always baseless. They could be misinformation, disinformation and sometimes consoling information.

One of the prevailing rumours was that if we had continued the war, we could have won it. Thus the natural question is why did we stop the war? It was talked about that we stopped the war because we were not numerically strong enough. We were not properly equipped for a long war. In a gathering attended by intellectuals Field Marshal Ayub Khan even went to the extent of saying publicly that Pakistan was economically very poor and if we had chosen to fight to the finish, people would have lost their "Kurtas and Pajamas."

Second rumour was a contradiction between the statements from the Foreign Office and

the Ministry of Defence. The latter say that the Foreign Office convinced them that there would not be any attack on West Pakistan's international borders. Thus the attack on Lahore took the Armed Forces by surprise. The Foreign Office's reply was that the Defence Forces should always be ready for any kind of eventuality. Defence preparations are done in view of enemy's capability, not intensions. However, in all probability the war was imposed on us and we were not prepared for it. The reasons for this lack of preparation will probably always remain a secret.

The war initially started in Kashmir but within a period of one month on the 6th September, Indian troops attacked Lahore. The whole of Pakistan was drawn into the grip of an all-out Indo-Pakistan war. We won every battle but lost the war. Our colonels and majors proved their worth, so the battles were won. Our generalship was poor, so we lost the war. Neither we won the war nor the American objectives were realized. The fighting capability shown by the younger officers took American strategists and commentators by surprise. National and international Press comments revealed that Indian Army could not fight to a successful finish after the 17th of September. Hence the Indians took the issue to the UN. From Algeria to Indonesia, the U.S. global policy had worked according to the plan. In Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, however, the US desire to see India victorious remained unfulfilled and the situation turned out to be of a stalemate. There were comments that if the war continued, within a few weeks Pakistan's position in terms of weapons will become very weak. War will take the shape of Pakistan Infantry facing the Indian Infantry and India, being well supplied in conventional weapons it manufactured in her national armament factories, will win in the end. But Indian hue and cry in the UN resulted in a ceasefire between the two countries.

Leaving aside the issues that who succeeded and who failed in achieving its objectives, there was little doubt that if Pakistan had not won the war, India had not won it either. Consequently military confrontation changed into diplomatic negotiations. Pakistan was made to believe that the attack on Lahore was not to destroy Pakistan

but to divert its attention from Kashmir and since Pakistan wanted to win Kashmir by the force of arms, which it could not do, she should accept the defeat.

In this war Russia and America both supported India. Russians thought that India being the largest country of South Asia, could not be left entirely to American manipulation to the latter's own advantage in international politics. The Soviet Union had been supporting India right from the day she won her independence and had so far invested in India a great deal of time and money. With this background, the Soviet Union could hardly pursue a different approach towards this country. Besides, there was a geo-political dimension of the issues involved which both the Super Powers knew, but neither of the combatants—India as well as Pakistan—could think of. Assuming that the 1965 war had continued, China would have come out in support of Pakistan, in which case the US would have been in no position to refuse help to India. In this situation if the Soviet Union had chosen to help China that would have led to the victory of the Socialist bloc which in turn would have bestowed on China the leadership of the Afro-Asian bloc. Had the Soviet Union opted for extending its help to India also, that would have confronted the Socialist world with a ridiculous phenomenon. Thus the Soviet Union which did not have cordial relationship with Pakistan, decided in favour of bringing about a ceasefire. It is therefore evident that September 1965 war was designed to halt the growth of the Afro-Asian bloc. Unfortunately, we did not fully comprehend the global issues which motivated this war. But once it started, we could have won it because of our military capability manifested in various battlefields, but we signed the Tashkent Declaration—a document which was the lot of a defeated nation.

US and Soviet policy towards South Asia was almost the same. It was formulated in view of the growing power of China. Evidently in the sixties the Chinese approach towards South Asia was quite different from that of the two Super powers. Total Indian hegemony in South Asia was hardly in the interest of China, which perceived in a continued Indo-Pak war, the possibility of a decrease

in US pressure in Viet Nam and India becoming weak enough to abandon preparations to match China at least for a decade. In the process the balance of power in Afro-Asian countries would have swayed in favour of China. Besides, if war had continued, Pakistan would have become a socialist country before India. A lesson from history is that during a war if the leadership is incompetent a revolution becomes imminent. Revolutionaries say that a defeat in war triggers a revolution. It has been proved in the case of Russia, China and Turkey. A change in Pakistan would have brought a similar change in India not only by defeat of India but by internal progressive socialist movements which had been brewing in India ever since Independence.

There was another predicament, too which was not acceptable to both the Super powers. In case of a prolonged war, India being five times bigger than Pakistan, might have escaped a total defeat, but there was a possibility that Pakistan might have captured Kashmir. Super Powers studied the whole situation from the point of view of Indian security and its survival as a mini Super Power in South Asia. A success of Pakistan might have triggered freedom movements in multilingual, multi-national India as described by Selig Harrison in his book *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (1960). Such an analysis of the military situation in South Asia, not only conspired to bring about a ceasefire in the region, but also set at thinking the US circles to devise a new military strategy for South Asia. Thus it was decided to weaken Pakistan to such an extent that she should lose the capability to withstand a military challenge from India. The Tashkent Declaration was the first step in this direction. A close scrutiny of this Declaration reveals the following disturbing predicaments:-

- i) In 1965 Pakistan faced India in the Rann of Kachh and at the Lahore Front. Pakistani soldiers' performance was in line with their history of bravery and confidence—an undesirable characteristic in the eyes of the Super Powers, to be found in a Third World Muslim country.
- ii) In Tashkent Declaration, the two

leaders, F. M. Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri agreed that since a war could flare up any time, on the issue of Kashmir, this issue should be solved through negotiations. Use of force was made immoral, and it was implied that, in due course of time, the ceasefire line would come to be accepted as the international boundary between India and Pakistan.

This clause also implies that Kashmiris could not be given their right of self-determination. The extension of the issues is that if 40 million Muslims could live in a secular India, why not the remaining 60 million do the same. It makes the entire Freedom Movement launched by the Muslims during the first half of this century, a ridiculous phenomenon. Similarly, the acceptance of the ceasefire line as International boundary would automatically purport that Pakistan had accepted the Maharaja of Kashmir's accession treaty with India. It will give birth to a legal problem which might carry the conflict too far.

India needed time to bolster her achievements in two spheres of national strategy. Firstly, she wanted to increase its military power from one to five or seven-folds or more. In such a situation Pakistan would think twice before challenging the Indian hegemony in South Asia. Secondly, she strove hard to excel in the economic field. China, was a challenge to Indian economic ventures in South East Asia, while Pakistan rivalled her in South Western market of Muslim countries. If Pakistan and India got involved in joint ventures India will be free from an economic challenge by Pakistan in the Muslim World. One clause of the Tashkent Declaration was that the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India had agreed to develop economic relations between the two neighbours and open up transport and communication facilities soon.

As stated earlier, in the Indo-Pakistan war, the US motives were: (i) to decrease the Pakistan military preparedness, give her a setback in the realms of weapons and training so that she accepted the Indian hegemony; (ii) to persuade Pakistan to agree to joint economic ventures with India; (iii) to obtain the facility of use of East

Pakistan's waterways for India, (iv) to punish Pakistan for her independent Foreign Policy of bilateral relations with China. The successful achievement of these objectives, it was thought, would allow the US to concentrate more fully on the Viet Nam war. No doubt the US policy worked successfully from Algeria to Indonesia, but the Indo-Pakistan war changed the entire Pakistan thinking.

As regards the approach towards Pak-China relations the 1965 war created two main schools of thought in Pakistan. Comparatively prosperous sections of society believed that Pakistan would gain nothing by promoting Pak-China friendship; she will only earn the displeasure of Americans who would stop her economic aid. This would further weaken Pakistan. And in case the Viet Nam war flared into a Sino-US war, it would weaken China too, while the US being far away from the actual theatre of war would be effected only marginally. A weak China would not be in a position to help any Asian country, militarily or economically. Nobody at that time believed that USA would lose the Viet Nam war. Thus a foregone conclusion was that staying away from China would be in the larger interest of Pakistan.

The common people, however, thought that Pakistan had to accept Tashkent Declaration because of its economic inferiority. Now the question was that how could Pakistan, without changing its economic pattern, develop into a strong nation — strong politically and militarily and avoid becoming an Indian satellite state. That after 18 years of its existence Pakistan still had to sign a document such as the Tashkent Declaration, was a point serious enough to warrant a genuine stocktaking of what had gone wrong and where? It was very clear to the people of Pakistan that they needed a well organized political system to promote a new economic and military order to preserve their Independence.

During this war people became conscious of two geo-political factors as well. East Pakistan was surrounded by India, and that West Pakistan was in no position to defend East Pakistan. The theory that defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan proved untenable. Pakistani troops did not or could not launch a successful attack either on

Kashmir or on East Punjab. This war also proved that Pakistan did not have enough offensive or defensive power to protect itself in a different situation. East Pakistan was saved only by the Chinese diplomatic offensive against India. Consequently, it became essential that to face successfully a similar future Indian aggression, East Pakistan should be provided with adequate defensive force to protect its territorial integrity and freedom. No nation could depend on friends for all times. Global political situations change and new alignments are born of new situations.

It will not be out of place here to say a few words about what we actually mean when we refer to the offensive and defensive capabilities of a nation. Offensive capability is defined as power to persuade/force other nations to submit to the will of a country, while the defensive capability stands for the power to refuse to submit to any moves designed to harm the national interests of a country. Both the September War as well as the Tashkent Declaration proved beyond doubt that Pakistan did not have enough defensive and offensive capabilities. In the absence of both, the question arises whether Pakistan had some deterrent power? China's friendship proved to be that deterrent power in 1965; but would it prove to be so in a more difficult global situation? The apprehension was that it might not be so!

Similar fears hanged over the mental horizon of East Pakistanis as well, but their feelings of insecurity were wrongly interpreted as a desire to secede from West Pakistan. As compared to their West Pakistani brethren, the people of East Pakistan had suffered much more, and for a longer period of time, the tyrannies perpetrated by the British and the Hindus. The British occupied Bengal in 1753, but its economic exploitation by the East India Company had started much earlier. This history was forgotten. The ruling elite never paid enough heed to the economic factors in the Muslim Freedom Movement in South Asia. One of the reasons of Muslim struggle for liberation was to seek freedom from Baniya exploitation. Muslims were weak, rather very weak, in Bengal. Poor Bengalis wanted freedom from industrial magnates of Calcutta. After independence, the industrialists in East Pakistan were Muslims, but

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 31. G.D. Bysack, "On the Antiquities of Bagerhat," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1867, p. 131.
 32. Creighton, Pl. IX.
 33. *Mosque Architecture*, pp. 77, 84-86; *Adina Masjid*, pp. 32-33.
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Articles Concluded

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they belonged to West Pakistan, or had migrated from Bombay, Bihar or U.P., and the expected economic growth was not visible anywhere. Resentment was natural. Pakistan did not fulfil the dreams of poor people. To top it all, there was a Hindu minority in Bengal which exploited the situation.

The September war laid bare a major contradiction in the government propaganda also. On the one hand, it was stated that Pakistan was too poor to defend itself and on the other, it was claimed that the economic developments of the last ten years had transformed the country into the most developed of the developing countries. Decade of development was being celebrated while there had been no tangible change in the life of the poor people.

To sum up, as the US could not achieve all its objectives linked with the 1965 war, the American interest demanded a perpetuation of hostilities between India and Pakistan. The natural culmination of this situation turned out to be the secession of East Pakistan from the Federation with all its ghostly consequences.

Ironically enough, Henry Kissinger went to China on a secret mission, via Pakistan, in July 1971, as a prelude to President Nixon's historic visit, in February 1972, to that country. As a consequence of these visits, America gradually normalized its relations with China, exactly the same thing which, under unavoidable geopolitical compulsions, Pakistan had embarked upon to do and had to pay heavily in terms of its national prestige and territorial integrity.

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