

Half a century later, another religious divine, Mir Shams al-Din Iraqi came to Baltistan to preach Islam with great success. Initially, he spent eight years in Kashmir after which he returned to Iran but came back to Kashmir where he died at the ripe old age of 99 years.

The author is doubtful whether these Muslim divines were Shi'a or Sunni but he is certain that all three were *Sufis* and all three achieved great success in the preaching of Islam. He himself is a Nur Bakhshi but has not clearly stated what exactly are the beliefs of this sect except that this *Fiqh* takes a middle line between Sunni'ism and Shi'ism.

The book under review compares favourably with contemporary books like, for example, Banat Gul's *Baltistan in History*.

A. B. Awan

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Noor ul Haq. *The Making of Pakistan*. (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1993). 225 p. Price: Rs. 150/-.

Dr Noor ul Haq's study under review reflects deep understanding of psycho-social and politico-military perspectives of the Pakistan Movement. It brings into bold relief those areas which normally remain hidden from the researcher's eyes. It aptly brings out the role of the Muslim component of the Indian Armed Forces and asserts that judged by any standards, this component richly contributed towards enhancing the image of Muslim soldiers. The author explores, during the course of his analysis, the triangular tug of war between the leaders of the Muslim League, the Congress and the British. He then examines the impact of the changing military situation on the evolution of the political scene.

In addition to focussing on the military aspects, the author also provides insight into other international factors as well as the developments that took place during the crucial War II years (1939-45). He reveals that the compulsions of the World War II, the postwar strategic and economic interests of the British Empire, the military potential and the will of the Muslims of the Subcontinent and the strategic location of their majority areas, as well as the modernization and politicization of the Indian Armed Forces were important factors which exercised a direct impact on the politics of the All-India Muslim League, the Indian National Congress and the British Government in relation to the struggle for Pakistan.

The author maintains that the outbreak of the second world war had forced the British as well as the Indian political parties to reorientate their policies and priorities. The immediate objective of the British Government was to obtain the maximum possible Indian support for their war effort. The strategy of the Indian National Congress was to achieve the formation of an Indian federation and to gain control of the Armed Forces through the legislative supremacy and Indianization. It concentrated on obtaining an acceptance as equal partners with the British in the control of the Indian defence policy. The All-India Muslim League, on the other hand, was fully conscious of their numerical strength in the strategic areas of the northwest and the northeast as well as their war potential vis-a-vis Hindus. The Muslims formally asserted their long cherished desire of an independent Muslim state or states in India. This demand of Muslim independence was, however, bitterly opposed by almost all sections of Hindus, the nationalist Muslims and the British Government. Led by Jinnah, the Muslims, however, spiritedly persisted in their demand.

It is of interest to note here that the World War II had forced the British Government to equip the Indian troops with modern weapons and send them abroad and to industrialize the country to meet the war requirements of the region east of Suez. Both these factors increased Indian capability to win independence. Further, motivation was provided by the interest of the

Allied Power for Indian independence as well as by the famine which brought home the curse of being a slave nation. Simultaneously, it was during the war that Hindu-Muslim ratio in the Indian Armed Forces was disturbed to the disadvantage of the Muslims. The industrialization was restricted to Hindu majority areas and the INC and the AIML blamed each other for aggravating famine conditions in Bengal. All this helped in hardening Muslim separatism.

The author reveals that the post-War policies of the British Government were to side-track the issue of Pakistan and evolve an Indian Constitution which should ensure a central authority to whom they could transfer power. This would enable them to enter into a treaty relation, thereby safeguarding their strategic and economic interests in India and the Far East. The aim of the Simla Proposals, the Cabinet Missions' Plan as well as of the Interim Government was to achieve the same objectives. When British failed to effect a rapprochement between the INC and the AIML, they felt that they could not force a constitution upon unwilling parts of the country. It is in view of these developments that an important hurdle in the way of Pakistan was removed.

The author holds that Mountbatten's desire to become a common Governor-General and to retain the British Commander-in-Chief and British Officers for India and Pakistan was meant to obtain an overall British Chain of Command and to maintain the continuance of their presence in the region. This was a natural corollary to the British demand of keeping India a united country with integrated Armed Forces. And thus, with a militarily viable India, the British desired to conclude a defence alliance. All this was aimed at securing the security and economic interests of the United Kingdom and not of India or the Muslims. The AIML did not fall into the trap and instead fought successfully to obtain for the Muslims a sovereign and independent state of Pakistan. Conscious of the Muslim majority in the strategic areas of the Northwest and the Northeast and their relevant strength in the Armed Forces, the AIML began to

assert its long cherished desire of an independent and sovereign Muslim state or states in India.

Interestingly, though Pakistan suffered in the division of the Provinces and the accession of the states, the field where it was better placed turned out to be the Armed Forces. Although the population of Pakistan was about 25% of the Indian Subcontinent, its share of the Armed Forces was about 33%. But the Pakistan Army had an initial setback in the sense that its forces were neither organized nor all of them readily available to Pakistan. NO Muslim companies were available in Pakistan for their replacement. This was precisely one of the reasons that Pakistan Army could not be used in Kashmir in October 1947 against the Indian military intervention. Later, when the Pakistan Army was a little better organized, it prevented the Indian forces from occupying the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir and forced India to seek a ceasefire. But since the basic tensions had remained unresolved, it was natural for the two Armed Forces to clash, as they did in 1965 and 1971. And even today in 1993, the significance of the post-World War II historical, political and strategic compulsions cannot be overlooked as they would continue to determine the course of history for a long time to come.

Ghulam Sarwar

Sabahat Durrani. *An Autobiography of a Diplomat's Wife from Cradle to Grave*. Costabrava, Provincia Girore Spain Author, 1992. Price: Rs. 300.00 H.B.

Autobiographies of notables usually provide with an insight into events in which the authors were involved. If properly written, autobiographies not only add to the existing knowledge about the relevant events but also provide source-