

The Urdu-English Controversy in Pakistan

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Introduction

Pakistan is an ideologically inspired state and Urdu is a part of this ideology. During the development of Muslim separatism in British India it had become a symbol of Muslim identity and was the chief rival of Hindi, the symbol of Hindu identity.¹ Thus, after partition it was not surprising that the Muslim League still considered it the unifying symbol for Pakistanis who belonged to different linguistic and ethnic groups. But Urdu was opposed by the supporters of Bengali even before the partition in 1937 when the delegates from Bengal opposed the idea of making Urdu the *lingua franca* of Muslim India in the Lucknow session of the League.² After partition the Bengali movement became highly politicized in 1948 and in 1952 the state tried to suppress it by force.³ In the western wing, too, language was an issue in the rise of ethno-nationalistic movements though it was mainly in the case of Sindhi that the opposition to Urdu became violent. Even so, the Urdu-Sindhi riots of January 1970 and July 1972 were the response of the supporters of Urdu to what they thought was an effort to dislodge them from their position and make Sindhis dominant.⁴ Other ethno-nationalist movements too opposed Urdu as a symbol of the Centre's unifying policies⁵ though in the case of the Siraiki Movement the opposition was to Punjabi.⁶ Although the Punjab elite was stigmatized as the oppressor, being the major partner in the ruling elitist group, the Punjabi language movement, like other language movements, opposed Urdu as a symbol of the ruling elite.⁷ Apart from a few references to this

ethno-nationalist linguistic opposition to Urdu in Amin⁸ and Shackle,⁹ the only literature on it is in the form of newspaper articles, propagandist pamphlets and highly polemical and methodologically unreliable books. These books invoke simplistic conspiracy theories for explaining the opposition to Urdu. One of them is that the elitist supporters of English have always conspired to protect it in their self interest; the other that ethno-nationalists supported by foreign governments, communists and anti-state agents oppose Urdu.¹⁰

Aim

The aim of this article is to provide an objective account of the English-Urdu controversy in Pakistan with a view to determining the political aspects of this controversy.

Specifically the following suggestions are made:

- 1) The ruling elite has ostensibly supported Urdu because of its integrative value as a symbol of Pakistani, as opposed to ethnic, identity. This wins the elite the support of the urban middle class and enables it to consolidate its power in the provinces.
- 2) In this capacity, however, Urdu is opposed by the ethno-nationalistic proto-elites of the provinces who perceive it to be the symbol of Punjabi dominance and counter it through the symbolic appeal of their own languages.
- 3) The ruling elite as a whole supports the continued use of English in formal official domains because it ensures its social distinction from the non-elite; facilitates the entry of members of its own class, including the younger generation, into elitist positions and increases the possibility of opening up the international job market. This support is covert, comes from people in unofficial positions and is opposed to declared governmental policy.

Methodology

This article uses the analytical-empirical methodology to analyse the political dimension of the Urdu-English controversy. Using the general framework of the theory of elite rule,¹¹ the controversy is seen as part of the conflict for power and resources between the ruling elite and the proto-elite. The ruling elite, defined as that group which takes or influences 'the major

decisions¹² comprises the feudal lords, the military, the bureaucracy and business magnates.¹³ Some members of the upper strata of these elites directly make or influence decisions. The Anglicized elite, which uses English with natural ease and fluency, is part of this class though not necessarily dominant in every government. However, since even members with vernacular education background feel that English is advantageous for them socially and economically, they tend to favour it in reality. As such, for definitional purposes, all members of the elite are categorized as the Anglicized elite.¹⁴

The proto-elite,¹⁵ defined as those who 'are (or feel) excluded from the power and influence they covet'¹⁶ are generally those lower-middle and middle class people from the Punjab, the Urdu-speaking *mohajirs* of Urban Sindh and the urban areas of other parts of Pakistan who believe that the replacement of English by Urdu would facilitate the entry of the less affluent Urdu-educated people of their class into elitist positions.

The Ruling Elite's Apparent Pro-Urdu Stance (1947-1958)

Even before the creation of Pakistan the representatives of Muslim Bengal (later East Pakistan and now Bangla Desh) had opposed the Muslim League's policy of declaring Urdu as the national language of all Muslims.¹⁷ Soon after the partition there was an ethno-nationalistic movement in which the vernacular proto-elite, using Bengali as a symbol of identity, opposed both the aristocratic (*ashraf*-dominated) traditional leadership of the Bengal which shared power with the West Pakistani elite and the Muslim League ruling itself (or Punjabi and *mohajir* domination).¹⁸ (Murshid 1985: 233-237). The Muslim League ruling elite countered this by asserting the need for national cohesion and Urdu was used as the major symbol of this by M.A. Jinnah, the father of the nation himself, in his well known speech supporting Urdu as the sole state language.¹⁹ Khwaja Nazimuddin, a member of the *ashraf* elite which despised Bengali,²⁰ also echoed the sentiments of the ruling elite of West Pakistan. The supporters of Urdu, who had begun to

arrange conferences and invite members of the ruling elite to preside over them, found the rhetoric against the claims of Bengali useful for their own crusade against both the regional languages and English. Khwaja Nazimuddin, presiding over one such conference in 1951, reiterated the official stance that Pakistan could only be established on strong foundation if it had one national language and 'this language can be no other than Urdu'.²¹

In the Punjab Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, the Governor of the province, set up an Official Language Committee in 1949 for devising terms which would replace English terms in official domains. This language planning (LP) initiative too was part of the ruling elite's general policy of appearing to support Urdu. Other such steps were the creation of Chairs of Urdu in the universities of Malaya and Tehran;²² (ABE 1955: 41); financial assistance to the Anjuman Taraqqi-i-Urdu (Organization for the Development of Urdu) to the tune of Rs. 20,000 in 1948-49 and Rs. 50,000 in 1950-51; and promises to change the medium of instruction at all levels from Urdu to English.

The Medium of Instruction

The first meeting of the Advisory Board of Education (7-9 June 1948) agreed that 'the mother-tongue should be the medium of instruction at the primary stage',²³ but left the question of the place of English to be determined by the Inter-University Board. In the second meeting a committee was formed to develop Urdu — another LP initiative.²⁴ — and it was asked to consider how it should replace English by Urdu in the universities.²⁵ The Committee recommended, among other things, that Urdu should be used as the medium of instruction at the secondary stage from 1952.²⁶ The Inter-University Board too had agreed that 'English should cease to be the medium of instruction at the University stage'.²⁷ However, the question whether 'selected schools (including Pre-Cadet Schools) be permitted to run parallel classes with English as the medium of instruction?', posed by the fifth meeting of the Advisory Board

(4-5 March 1953),²⁸ remained as an unanswered contradiction to what the government was professing to do, i.e., replacing English by Urdu. These schools, in fact, not only remained but also multiplied. The government spent Rs. 40,00,000, for instance, in establishing a pre-cadet college at Chittagong to prepare students for 'commissions in the Armed Forces and the higher appointments in the Civil Services'.²⁹

Language Planning and Other Efforts for Promoting Urdu

The language planning bodies, both official and semi-official, did create Urdu terms for English ones for all domains. The Secretary of the Punjab Government's Official Language Committee reported in 1950 that 2,284 new terms had been created.³⁰ The Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu (henceforth Anjuman) too gave a historical review of available work on this subject,³¹ and gave a list of publications, mostly on scientific subjects, in Urdu translation.³² It was also suggested, with reference to statements of educationists and others, that the natural sciences could be taught in Urdu; that it could be used at all levels of education and that the standard of education would improve if this were to happen.³³ The Majlis-e-Tarjuma (Society for Translation), working under the Punjab government in Lahore since 1950, translated 27 books into Urdu and published them.³⁴ The West Pakistan Urdu Academy, the brain child of Syed Mohammad Abdullah who was a leader of the Urdu lobby, was formed in 1952 and its major objective was to promote the teaching of science in Urdu.³⁵

The Position of English in the Nineteen Fifties

Despite the efforts of the Urdu proto-elite to promote the use of Urdu and the ruling elite's apparent support of these efforts, it was English which emerged as the dominant language by the end of the fifties when democratic experimentation was replaced by General Ayub Khan's martial law in 1958. By 1956 the ruling elite had accepted the demand that Bengali should be one of the national languages of Pakistan so that the emphasis on Urdu was temporarily decreased in official rhetoric.

Moreover, the expanding middle class found that the best chance of acquiring power, social prestige and affluence was by joining the superior civil services, the officer cadre of the armed forces or the professions. And in all these, especially in the first two, English was very important. It was also a marker of class, urbane upbringing, affluent family background and sophistication and gave psychological and social advantage to those who were fluent in it. Thus, not only the urban upper middle class but even feudal and tribal chiefs from illiterate families, sought to educate their children in the elitist English schools. Thus Nawab Akbar Bugti, the chief of the largely illiterate Bugti tribe of Baluchistan, studied in Aitchison and 'spoke the English of any upper-class, public school boy' in 1946.³⁶ Schools like Burn Hall (Abbottabad) catered for the sons of the feudal lords of the north of Pakistan as well as other affluent people. The armed forces started developing their own schools — cadet colleges and the P.A.F Model Schools — to cater for the children of their employees who could thus get elitist schooling by spending less of their own money than their civilian counterparts did in other elitist schools. In other words the elite of wealth (feudal and tribal lords; business magnates etc) and the elite of power (the military and bureaucratic elites) made arrangements to facilitate the entry of their children into the elite, thus narrowing the base of selection of the elite, through promoting elitist schooling while professing to create equal opportunities of all through vernacularization.

The Ruling Elite's Pro-English Stance

Ayub Khan was a Sandhurst educated officer who believed in the superiority of the army over the politicians and, in general in the rule of an elite, over Pakistan. He also believed that this elite could be created in the English schools. Even as the General Officer Commanding in East Pakistan he urged the provincial government 'to start good public schools where intelligent young men' could be trained. With his usual

contempt for politicians and their constraints of democratic forms he wrote that Khwaja Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin:

... seemed to understand what I was talking about but were unwilling or unable to do anything about it. I never quite understood what they were afraid of. Perhaps they thought that general reaction to the establishment of public schools would not be favourable.³⁷

As Commander in Chief of the Army, however, he did establish 'a number of cadet colleges and academies' to train those who would administer the country one day.³⁸ As the armed forces encouraged the use of English even at the cost of the National language — in fact the vernaculars were not allowed,³⁹ they picked up some fluency and much confidence in the language. Thus the army reported that the language of its internal use, at least among the officers, would have to remain English in a report which was not made public.⁴⁰

The other powerful partner of the army during the Ayub regime, the Civil Service of Pakistan, was not only traditionally Anglicized like the army but had a larger number of people from the Anglicized elite in it.⁴¹ The English-language novelist Nasir Ahmad Farooki gives a colourful account of the CSP which is exaggerated but not misleading. Members of the CSP, he writes, spoke the English language and 'event dreamt' in it — 'this trade union was ours by birth' and:

We ran the government, we ran the business organizations, we built canals and railroads. Our grey pants and tweed coats, our foreign university blazers and emblems, the Anglicized structures our pet names, made us different from the rest of our countrymen.⁴²

Thus, despite the increased activities of the Urdu proto-elite which will be mentioned later, the government was more openly pro-English in its policies than upto 1958 when the politicians had to defer more often to public sentiment than was now necessary.

The Sharif Commission Report and English

The Commission on National Education, popularly called the Sharif Commission, was set up on 30 December 1958 and produced its report 'within about eight months'.⁴³ The impera-

tives of courting the favour of the Bengali proto-elite, which complained of discrimination and economic imbalance between the two wings,⁴⁴ Bengali was given the same status as Urdu in theory. The Urdu proto-elite was also courted as the 'national language' was declared the medium of instruction from class 6th onwards in non-elitist schools. While this adversely affected the position of Sindhi, which was the medium of instruction in Sindhi non-elitist schools, it had no effect on English. The English schools were defended as follows:

While we feel that English must yield to the national languages the paramount position that it has occupied in our educational system so far, we are at the same time convinced that English should have a permanent place in that system.⁴⁵

This was criticized by the Urdu lobby,⁴⁶ though most of the criticism against it came from the supporters of the regional languages.⁴⁷

The Hamoodur Rahman Report and English

The Commission on students' welfare and problems, generally called the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, was even more defensive of English than the Sharif Commission. Although it was constituted in response to the resistance of students to some of the recommendations of the Sharif Commission, it went out of the way to criticize the universities which had adopted Urdu as the medium of examination in B.A., a step which was popular with that large majority of students who came from the Urdu schools and had average ability.⁴⁸ The Report said:

We cannot help regretting that some of our universities should have preferred to be swayed more by sentiment than by a dispassionate judgment in accelerating the pace of changeover [to Urdu] beyond all reasonable proportion.⁴⁹

The universities singled out were the Karachi university (which had allowed Urdu in 1963), Punjab University (allowed Urdu in 1966) and the Sind University (which had allowed Sindhi).⁵⁰

The Commission also defended the English schools — the missionary ones on grounds of religious freedom of Christians and others on grounds of excellence.⁵¹ Disagreeing that such

schools produced snobs the Commission took the paradoxical plea that they were meant to produce the military and civilian administrative elite. It said:

Such establishments are intended to produce some better type of students who would be more suitably disciplined and equipped for eventually entering the defence service of the country or filling higher administrative posts and other responsible executive positions in the government and semi-government bodies and private firms and corporations.⁵²

The Commission did, however, agree that the existence of such schools violated the constitutional assurance that 'all citizens are equal before law' (Paragraph 15 under Right No. VI) and even recommended that the government 'should not build such schools any more.'⁵³ However, the Commission stopped short of making any practical changes in the status quo and recommended that the existing schools be allowed to continue and poor students should be given scholarships to study in them.⁵⁴ Thus, despite the criticism of students — such as the All-Pakistan Students Convention held at Lahore in 1956 on elitist schools,⁵⁵ the elitist schools continued to thrive during the Ayub Khan era.

The Rejection of the Urdu Bill in Parliament

In 1963 Allama Rahmatullah Arshad, and again Khwaja Mohammad Safdar, presented the West Pakistan National Language Bill demanding that Urdu be used as the official language instead of English. The bill was sent to the commissioners of divisions and heads of several educational institutions for comments. Although everyone agreed that Urdu should be given the place of English in principle, not everyone felt that it could be done without adequate translation and planning.⁵⁶ In a session of the National Assembly, Khurshid Ahmad, the Minister of Education, said that language planning was necessary to modernize Urdu and that the government had established two boards for this purpose at Lahore and Dacca for Urdu and Bengali respectively. The actual replacement was shelved as follows:

... I would like to say that in the year 1972 the President shall constitute a commission to examine the report on the question of the replacement of English language for official purposes...⁵⁷
 After this the question was postponed for another decade.

The Urdu Proto-elite's Reaction to Ayub Khan's measures

The Urdu lobby was very active during the sixties possibly because of Ayub Khan's pro-English bias. Almost the first confrontation with the regime occurred when Ayub Khan suggested the adoption of the Roman script for writing both Urdu and Bengali as follows:

31 December [1958]

I mentioned in the Cabinet that the introduction of Roman script for all the languages of Pakistan would help increase literacy and could result also in the creation of a common language.⁵⁸

There were two meetings in Lahore about the issue of the script and Maulana Salahuddin Ahmad declared that 'those who change the Quranic script will have to go over our dead bodies'.⁵⁹ The appeal to religious sentiment was not arbitrary. The Urdu proto-elite had always evoked religion along with Urdu as the integrative bonds of the country (after 1956 of West Pakistan mostly) and the mainstay of the Pakistani identity. The linking of Islam and Urdu was to become more pronounced later though the army, which at this period stood for Westernisation, was to change its image altogether.

In 1961 there was a movement for replacing sign boards written in English for Urdu ones.⁶⁰ Greeting cards, visiting cards and the number plates of cars were changed into Urdu. Syed Abdullah even walked out of a meeting in protest.⁶¹ The West Pakistan Youth Movement, which had been in existence since 1953, became very active in support of Urdu and collected signatures to change the medium of instruction in the Punjab University into Urdu.⁶² Urdu conferences were held every year and processions were taken out demanding that Urdu should replace English in every domain of life.⁶³ Despite all this activity the situation at the end of Ayub Khan's rule in 1969 was far from satisfactory from the Urdu lobby's point of view. It was true that Urdu was compulsory in all schools upto the

matriculation and even at the intermediate level; the West Pakistan Urdu Academy; the Central Urdu Board and the Majlis Taraqqi-e-Adab, Lahore (Society for the advancement of literature) were functioning and the President delivered his monthly broadcasts to the nation in Urdu. However, these were but cosmetic changes because entry to the most prestigious jobs was still facilitated by English. As for entry in the elect circle of the fashionable and the sophisticated, which was in the process of moving to Islamabad from Karachi, it was impossible without fluency in English. The most committed members of the Urdu proto-elite, especially those who were also committed to Islam, opposed Ayub Khan in the disturbances against him in 1969 and waited for the changes which General Yahya Khan's government would bring about.

Nur Khan's Radical Proposals and the Survival of the Status Quo

Air Marshal Nur Khan was appointed the chairman of a committee for recommending changes in the education policy by Yahya Khan's military government. The proposals for change were submitted in July 1969 and were surprisingly candid and even radical. Whether this bias was Nur Khan's or his advisers' is difficult to determine nor can it be said to what extent it was the consequence of Western liberalism, a sense of justice or enlightened national or class-interest. However, for the first time an official document acknowledged the fact that there is 'almost a caste-like distinction between those who feel at ease in expressing themselves in English and those who do not'.⁶⁴ It was observed that:

Not only does the use of English as the medium of instruction at higher levels perpetuate the gulf between the rulers and the ruled, it also perpetuates the advantages of those children who come from the well-to-do families, ...⁶⁵

The perpetuation of the 'barriers of privilege', it was opined, was inextricably linked with English, the 'cadet colleges etc' and under-development in peripheral regions (Baluchistan, the

Frontier, etc.).⁶⁶ Therefore the following rather bold proposals were made:

1. The medium of instruction at all levels of education should be changed to Bengali in East and Urdu in West Pakistan.
2. The official language of the provincial governments should be changed to Bengali and Urdu respectively by 1974. Both these languages should be brought into official use at the centre by 1975.
3. Admission to cadet colleges should be made purely on merit and all those who cannot otherwise afford them should be offered full scholarships including all living expenses.
4. 25 per cent of the admissions to private institutions which charge fees of Rs. 30 per month or more should be on merit with free education for those who cannot otherwise afford them.⁶⁷

The proposals were hardly radical in the real sense of the word because the elitist schools were not to be abolished nor were the proto-elites of the provinces, who identified themselves with provincial languages in the Western wing rather than Urdu, were co-opted. However, after Ayub Khan's open elitism, the Urdu lobby was right in regarding them as radical. The Urdu Academy of Lahore endorsed the proposals in a meeting at Lahore and the leaders of the Urdu lobby showed their approbation.⁶⁸ The Punjabi language movement, however, published a memorandum demanding Punjabi as the medium of instruction at the primary level. The argument was that the 'disregard for the regional cultures and languages has also contributed much towards the perpetuation of privileges'.⁶⁹ The rights of Sindhi were upheld by the Jeeay Sind Naujawan Mahaz⁷⁰ — the Young Peoples' Front of the Sindhi Nationalist Party — which argued that if Urdu became the sole medium of instruction in Sind the distinctive Sindhi way of life would be destroyed and Sindhis would be 'deprived of their legitimate share in all State services'.⁷¹ The supporters protested by collecting signatures against the proposals in Karachi.⁷² Syed Abdullah also reports that the English lobby pestered the government representatives in a language conference held in

Rawalpindi with unanswerable questions in which the proposals were discussed.⁷³

For whatever reason, the published version of the *New Education Policy* (1970) left the task of examining 'the question of the change over from English to the national languages' to a commission which would be established in 1972.⁷⁴ The egalitarian proposals too were withdrawn and a vaguely pious cliché that it 'is important to safeguard against the division of society into several segments by ensuring equal access to educated opportunity'⁷⁵ was substituted instead. Thus the incipient radicalism of Nur Khan was reversed as the status quo asserted itself. In East Pakistan, however, the movement for autonomy could not be contained by linguistic adjustments any more. It led to the war of 1971 with India and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose PPP had won most of the seats of the National Assembly in West Pakistan in consequence of the voters' endorsement of the aspirations for egalitarianism and social justice the socialist rhetoric of Bhutto had inspired in them, took power in 1972.

Elitism Survives Bhutto's 'Socialism'

Bhutto's PPP, which had promised to satisfy the aspirations of the Sindhi nationalists in the Sind province, was considered biased in favour of Sindhi. It was attacked by right wing newspapers⁷⁶ for the Sindhi-Urdu language riots of January 1970 as well as July 1972. As the PPP had the image of being left-leaning, and the supporters of Urdu explained language conflicts through the conspiracy theory that communists engineered them to de-stabilize and disrupt Pakistan,⁷⁷ they did not believe that Z.A. Bhutto would really give Urdu the place of English. Moreover, the NAP-JUI coalition government in the NWFP and Baluchistan seemed bent upon proving their nationalist credentials. Thus, under the initiative of the Governor of Baluchistan, Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo, and then the Governor of the Frontier, Arbab Sikandar Khalil, Urdu became the official language of these two non-PPP provinces.⁷⁸ The initiative appeared to have passed away from the PPP's

hands as its political opponents in the provinces and the right wing religious pressure groups appeared to favour Urdu.⁷⁹ The Urdu lobby held several Urdu yearly conferences and the question of Urdu being made the national language of the country was raised in the parliament several times.⁸⁰ The debate of 17 Aug 1972 was very prolonged and Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo supported Urdu on the ground that provincial languages could create bloodshed. Curiously enough he also made the paradoxical statement that:

We give Sindhi to the Sind province. Baluchi to Baluchistan. Punjabi to the Punjabis. Pashto to the people of the N.W.F.P and bring Urdu in the centre [for peace].⁸¹

He remained firm against English though which rather embarrassed the PPP several of whose ministers, including Bhutto himself, spoke fluent English. Maulana Abdul Mustafa al-Zahri even objected to Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, a powerful minister of the PPP, making a speech in English.⁸² On 31 August, Maulana Ghulam Ghaus, a member of the opposition, moved the 'Official Language Bill 1972'.⁸³ This bill was before standing committee in 1975⁸⁴ and had not been finally disposed of even in 1976 when Bhutto's government was coming to an end.⁸⁵

The only concrete step the government did take was to give symbolic recognition to Urdu as the national language of the country in the 1973 Constitution. Its Article 251 said:

- (1) The National Language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day.
- (2) Subject to clause (1) the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.

English had got another fifteen years reprieve. Meanwhile, Bhutto moved away from socialist egalitarianism⁸⁶ which took away one possible motive he might have had to introduce Urdu, or Urdu and the regional languages, in place of English. To please the Urdu proto-elite he would have to do away with elitist English schools and thus alienate the Anglicized elite. Such a policy would also alienate the Sindhi,

Baluchi, Pakhtoon and Punjabi ethno-nationalist lobbies who were already fighting against the regime. Moreover, the Urdu lobby was opposed to Bhutto being generally aligned to the religious right-wing parties. As Islam had by far the greatest appeal for the religious lobbies, Bhutto chose to placate them by announcing cosmetic Islamic measures rather than the less emotive, and more controversial, strategy of giving Urdu the place of English.

Thus all the Urdu lobby's efforts at developing the technical vocabulary of the language;⁸⁷ the conferences under the auspices of the Anjuman⁸⁸ and the identification of Urdu with Pakistani nationalism — the 1976 conference was named after the Quaid-e-Azam and that of 1977 after Allama Iqbal — did not succeed in altering the status of Urdu in the country. Once thing was, however, clearer than ever before: the Urdu proto-elite was with the religious right wing while the ethno-nationalistic proto-elites and the Anglicized elite were left of centre being either inclined to socialism⁸⁹ or liberalism respectively. The fortunes of Urdu would now be connected more closely than ever before with the struggle between the religious and the secular in Pakistani politics.

The Use of Urdu as Supporter of Martial Rule

General Zia ul Haq imposed martial law on 5 July 1977 when the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) comprising mainly of the parties of the Right — Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), the Muslim League (ML) — and Bhutto's other political enemies, refused to accept his apparent electoral victory in the 1977 elections. The PNA, which included the Urdu proto-elite, has been described as being based 'upon the retrograde sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the urban lumpen elements'.⁹⁰ It was inspired by Islam, regarded the ethno-nationalism of the provinces as anti-Pakistan and, at least in the Punjab, had a close emotional bond with the army.⁹¹ As Bhutto had been very repressive towards the opposition and far from just or democratic,⁹² even liberal and leftist parties like the

Tehrik-i-Istaqlal and the National Democratic Party (NDP) acquiesced to the martial law. Zia ul Haq, having come from urban lower middle class religious background, had great emotional attachment to Islam.⁹³ Like many other members of this class he might also have been attracted to Urdu. In any case, Islam and Urdu were now the symbols which would legitimise his rule, which extended until 1988, in the eyes of the religious parties, the Urdu proto-elite, the urban middle class and the lower middle class in general. As for the ruling elite of the Punjab (and its partners like the *mohajir* elite) Zia ul Haq's insistence on Pakistani nationalism and the centralizing ideology he espoused in opposition to the ethno-nationalists, was very re-assuring. In an interview with Selig Harrison he said:

... on 29 July 1978 and 8 March 1980 that he had no sympathy for the concept of a "multinational" Pakistan in which Baluch, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Punjabis are entitled to local self-rule. "I simply cannot understand this type of thinking" he said earnestly, pausing to reflect on the matter. "We want to build a strong country, a unified country. Why should we talk in these small-minded terms? We should talk in terms of one Pakistan, one united, Islamic Pakistan".⁹⁴

Urdu, which had always been a part of the ruling elite's 'centralizing ideology' — the term is found in Ahmed⁹⁵ in this context — was now exploited for its symbolic value by the regime. In April 1978, for instance, General Zia ul Haq ordered that all speeches would now be in Urdu.⁹⁶ By the end of 1979, Urdu was being used in many offices of the Punjab.⁹⁷ In 1979 the National Language Authority (Muqtadra Qaumi Zaban, henceforth *Muqtadra*) was constituted:

To consider ways and means for the promotion of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan and to make all necessary arrangements in this regard....⁹⁸

The first chairman of the *Muqtadra* was I.H. Qureshi, one of the leaders of the pro-Urdu group in the Sindhi-Urdu controversy of 1972. Other supporters of Urdu too were against ethno-nationalism and, in their support of the military regime, they even abandoned democratic norms in principle. Thus Zia ul Haq was declared the 'Patron of Urdu' by 100 organizations

working with the Anjuman.⁹⁹ Moreover, in the two-day Annual Urdu Conference at Lahore (27-28 Nov 1981), the Urdu lobby demanded that Urdu should be imposed through a presidential ordinance.¹⁰⁰

Organizations like the Majlis Zaban-i-Daftri (Organization for the language of administration) launched personal contact drives to make Urdu acceptable in this domain. However, as they were dominated by people with known rightist views — like Brigadier Gulzar whose passion for Islam and anti-communism were noted even in a humorous biographical sketch by Zamir Jafri¹⁰¹ and Wahab Khairi who had been sympathetic to the Jam'at¹⁰² — they were aligned with the rule of Zia ul Haq and his rightist policies rather than the PPP brand of socialism or any Western idea of social justice. Thus, although the idea of doing away with the privilege of the English-speaking elite might have been considered a socialist one in other circumstances, in the peculiar conditions of Pakistan socialists and liberals failed to support it. This is evidenced in the medium of instruction controversy of the Zia era.

The medium of instruction controversy

The most significant anti-English policy of Zia ul Haq was the order that Urdu would be the medium of instruction in all schools from 'class 1 to K.G as the case may be from 1979'.¹⁰³ Thus all students appearing in the matriculation examination in 1989 would use only Urdu. Moreover, the Ministry of Education also said that the nomenclature 'English medium' schools would be abolished.¹⁰⁴ After this it was reported that several schools did adopt Urdu as the medium of instruction from class 1 and 2.¹⁰⁵ The visible resistance to this came from the parents of the children of English schools who had been confronted with a change of language about which they had serious misgivings. Among them were the parents of the Badin PAF Model School¹⁰⁶ and other parents.¹⁰⁷ Some English dailies also wrote editorials in favour of retaining English in the school system.¹⁰⁸ The major arguments of the English lobby were that Pakistan would fall behind other countries if English were

abandoned.¹⁰⁹ To this the Urdu lobby replied that sufficient books did exist in Urdu and more could be translated. Since parents preferred to teach the language of the government superior services, the Urdu lobby also recommended that all competitive examinations be conducted in Urdu.¹¹⁰ Although no practical steps were taken in this direction it was speculated that both Urdu and English might be allowed in such examinations.¹¹¹

However, the elitist schools continued in existence and Hina Faisal Imam, and English language poet and daughter of the very affluent, Aitchison-educated industrialist Babar Ali, commented that the closing down of the English schools would hurt the middle class because the upper class would send their children abroad for education.¹¹² By this time, however, most observers felt that the government was not sincere in its policy. The editorial of the *Muslim*,¹¹³ voiced public opinion by reporting that unofficial rumours suggested that English would be allowed to continue. One minister of the government, Nasim Aheer, stated that Urdu was not fully developed and that the decision to eliminate English had been taken in a hurry.¹¹⁴ Syed Sajjad Hyder, the minister of education, defended Urdu very strongly¹¹⁵ though a press conference had been held earlier in which, according to press speculations, it was proposed that the changeover to Urdu due in 1988 would be postponed.¹¹⁶ The real change in policy occurred in 1983 when Zia ul Haq gave legal protection to the elitist English schools by allowing them to prepare students for the senior and higher senior Cambridge examinations through MLR 115.¹¹⁷ On 28 October, the *Pakistan Times* reported:

The Federal Ministry of Education has decided to continue the existing practice of allowing English as medium of instruction in the science subjects besides Urdu or provincial language in all the secondary schools of the country.

On 11 October General Zia ul Haq himself allayed the fears of the English lobby by declaring that English could not be abandoned altogether.¹¹⁸ Apart from a few comments against the continuation of the elitist system of schooling,¹¹⁹ the reversal of

the 1979 education policy, the biggest concrete step taken in favor of Urdu, was allowed to take place almost silently.¹²⁰

Urdu as the Language of Administration

In the beginning of the Zia era there was much fervour about the use of Urdu as the language of administration. The ministries of Religious Affairs & Haj and Information & Broadcasting, both under Raja Zafarul Haq, started working in Urdu (3 June 1984). The national assembly too was supposed to switch over to Urdu in 1988.¹²¹ and the speeches of all political leaders, including that of Zia ul Haq himself, were invariably in Urdu. But by 1987 the press reported that the ministries had been asked not to give up English, the Auqaf department had actually reverted to it and no change had come in the competitive examinations for the superior civil services.¹²²

The Ethno-nationalist Opposition to Urdu

English was supported directly by the Anglicized elite as we have seen. it was also supported indirectly by the ethno-nationalists who opposed Urdu and advanced the claims of their own indigenous languages in its place. Such claims were, however, stigmatised as being not only anti-Urdu but also being anti-state — as, for instance Masood Khaddarposh's championing of Punjabi was called.¹²³ The ethno-nationalists became more articulate when martial law was removed in 1984 and Mohammad Khan Junejo was the prime minister. On 11 Feb 1987 the members of the opposition in the National Assembly — Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali and Syed Zafar Ali Shah — articulated their opinion that Urdu should not be imposed on the whole country in 1988.¹²⁴

The effect of this opposition or that of the Anglicized elite cannot be ascertained. Considering that Zia ul Haq adamantly adhered to policies which he considered vitally important — such as that of eliminating the PPP's political role; supporting the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and Islamization — it is unlikely that he was deterred by this opposition, weak as it was, to Urdu. What is more likely is that, the Anglicized elite which supported

him being in its favour, he decided not to alienate it. As for the Urdu proto-elite, they would keep favouring him despite their disappointment in this instance because they could hardly support the PPP which was reputed to be secular and evoked memories of Bhutto whom they cordially disliked.

The Position of Urdu at the End of the Zia era

After Zia ul Haq's death in August 1988 the position of Urdu was not much better than it was when he first took power. This can be confirmed by the proceedings of the meeting of the Tahrik-i-Nifaz-e-Urdu (Movement for the imposition of Urdu) on 23 December 1988. In this, while reviewing the government's policy about Urdu, they pointed to Waseem Sajjad's reply in the senate on 15 September 1988 that 3,000 officers in pay grade-17 and many stenographers had completed courses in Urdu correspondence and office work; certain ministries still used Urdu for official work and the budget speech was broadcasted in Urdu. The Committee examined all the initiatives which different governments had taken in favour of Urdu — all the way from sardar Abdur Rab Nashtar to General Jilani, the Governor of the Punjab, who had instructed all the provincial secretaries to use Urdu for official correspondence — and concluded that nothing worthwhile had really been achieved. Even the District Official Language Committees, which held monthly meetings under the chairmanship of the Deputy Commissioner, had not brought about the change to Urdu which was their ostensible objective.¹²⁵ Even now, the most powerful ministries, the armed forces, the higher judiciary and commercial firms used English and, above all, the proliferation of expensive elitist schools during the eighties — the Beaconhouse and the City School systems — suggested that people felt sure that it was English which was the passport to social prestige and economic well being. The Tahreek was, therefore, justified in demanding that Urdu should be used in all domains of life, thus eliminating the duality of the education system, in the country.¹²⁶ By now, however, the PPP led by Benazir Bhutto had won the elections and the Urdu proto-elite, being against the

PPP, was in the opposition. Once again, like before, the English-Urdu controversy could not escape being politicized.

Politicization of English Under Benazir

Benazir Bhutto's PPP ruled only from November 1988 till August 1990. But in these twenty months she faced continual opposition from the Islāmī Jumhūrī Ittihad (IJI) of Nawaz Sharif, the chief minister of the Punjab, and others like him who favoured Zia ul Haq's policies, or at least appeared to favour Islamization.

With the forces of the IJI against her and the real power still with the army and President Ghulam Ishaque Khan, Benazir had very little room to exercise power as some political analysts had predicted.¹²⁷ Thus, it was not surprising that the issue of the medium of instruction, along with other policies, would be politicized. The opposition got its chance when a high level meeting in the Ministry of Education considered proposals for abolishing, or at least reducing, the discrepancy between elitist and non-elitist schooling. Among the proposals were that English should be taught from Class 1 onwards in all, and not only elitist, schools; that private schools should adhere to the national system of education and that all schools should be free to adopt English as a medium of instruction right from the beginning.¹²⁸ Out of these, the second proposal — the only one which could have gone somewhat towards creating similar, though not equal, possibilities of education — was quietly dropped when the Ministry issued its handout of 2 May 1989.

Option be given to adopt English as medium of instruction in all subjects from Class 1 onwards.

It has also been decided that the schools where the medium of instruction is Urdu or an approved provincial language, English be taught as an additional language from Class 1.

This was seen as an attempt to legitimize the proliferation of new elitist schools and was not in conformity with socialism, one of the PPP's own principles. It was, however, not opposed as much by the left wing supporters of Benazir as by right-wing, religious bodies. For instance, the Institute of Policy

Studies, 'one of the front organisations of the Jama'at-i-Islami' according to *PT* (18 Oct 1989), held a seminar in which speakers criticized these decisions.¹²⁹ The decisions were denounced as a dangerous conspiracy against the country.¹³⁰ But before change could be made, or become visible, Benazir's government was dismissed by the President and the IJI won the elections of 1990. Nawaz Sharif, who formed the government, was a supporter of Zia ul Haq but no significant change in the status of Urdu or English has been made yet (1993). Meanwhile the Urdu-English controversy goes on, with much the same arguments on both sides, as have always been used.¹³¹

The Proto-Elites' Support of English

Emphasis has been given so far to the elite's support of English on the assumption that it helps to maintain its distinction from the non-elite, facilitates entry into positions of power and affluence and into the international professional and business classes. But this alone does not explain the desire for English education in the Urdu proto-elite nor the lukewarm, and sometimes mildly contemptuous, attitude members of this group have for Urdu (the term Urdu medium was used in the humorous plays of the TV for those who were unsophisticated and lacked higher education). In a recent survey of students' attitudes towards English and Urdu, the subjects rated 'the English speaking community higher than the Urdu speaking community on the following traits: happy, modern, successful, open, (frank), independent, high standard of living, attractive, impressive, [having a] bright future.'¹³² The subjects did not only 'attached snobbish value to English and see it as a tool to impress others',¹³³ but also regarded it as the means of success in society. Mansoor sums up the situation as follows:

There is complete agreement between the Punjabi and Urdu speaking students regarding the usefulness of English and the need to study it both as compulsory subject and medium of instruction. Almost all Punjabi students (98%) and Urdu speaking students (96%) consider the study of English useful. A desire to study English as compulsory subject is seen in the responses of Punjabi (90%) and Urdu speaking students (95%) and as medium of instruction by 81% of Punjabi and

80% Urdu speaking students. In fact, more students want to study English than Urdu.¹³⁴

It appears that, in practice, most students work on the assumption that the status quo will not change and, given this condition, it would be useful for them to learn English so as to compete with the privileged elite which is taught that language from the beginning. They do not want the ghettoizing effect of knowing a language which makes social mobility difficult. Apart from rational considerations of loss and gain, people are also motivated by irrational motivations. Thus, for reasons of being socialized in a society which gives high social prestige to English, they give the same value to it in such deep recesses of the psyche that it would not be easy for them to change that attitude even if Urdu is made the language of all kinds of jobs in Pakistan. Moreover, English being an international language, it enables people to enter the international bureaucracy and business. That is why, as Kachru observes, 'in anti-English circles, there is one policy for the home and another for outside; the language policy is designed for specific consumers'.¹³⁵ These are some of the reasons why, despite the rhetoric against English, many Urdu-educated people are at best ambivalent towards English. Even leaders of the Urdu lobby teach their own children in English schools if they can afford to do so. Their reason — that they would not decrease the chances of advancement of their children as long as all schools, colleges, universities and prestigious jobs are not offered in Urdu — is unexceptionable but this investment in English as parents does decrease their enthusiasm for Urdu. In short, for many reasons, the pressure groups which support Urdu remain less powerful than those who support English. This might be one reason for the continued dominance of English in all official domains of prestige in Pakistan.

Conclusion

During the forty six years of Pakistan's independence, Urdu has been supported at the rhetorical levels by the ruling elites of Pakistan in order to counter ethno-nationalist

sentiment and to increase the power base of the elite. The Urdu proto-elite, which was not allied to the ethno-nationalist proto-elites, supported Urdu too as a symbol of Pakistani identity. Thus, over the years, the Urdu proto-elite identified itself with both Urdu and Islam (this position changing only in Karachi under the MQM when Urdu-based rather than only Pakistani nationalism was advocated between 1986 and 1992).

The ruling elite, however, actually supported English for use in all official domains so as to ensure its cultural predominance and distinction from the non-elites; to facilitate the entry of its children in positions of power and privilege and open the possibility of entering the international, very highly paid, professional elite. The Urdu proto-elite opposed this in the name of egalitarianism and social justice as it was disadvantaged in the competition for entry in elitist positions with the elite. However, many pragmatically inclined members of the Urdu proto-elite, or those who might have been expected to favour it in other circumstances, acquiesced to the status quo and favoured learning English. This weakened the demand for Urdu. It was further weakened because the Urdu proto-elite identified with the religious parties and favoured undemocratic policies and thus alienated the socialists and the liberals who could have been more enthusiastic about the Urdu proto-elite's position that the use of English did, indeed, favour the elite and hence perpetuated social injustice.

For all these reasons, English continues to be the official language of Pakistan today almost as it was at the birth of the country in 1947.

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4. Amin, Tahir, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), p.126.
5. *Ibid.*
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8. Amin, *op.cit.*
9. Shackle, Christopher, 'Punjabi in Lahore', in *Modern Asian Studies*, 4:239-67; Shackle, Christopher, 'Language and Cultural Identity in Pakistani Punjab', in Krishna, G. (ed.), *Contribution to South Asian Studies*, Delhi:
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12. Parry Geraint, *Political Elites* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), pp.59-63.
13. For definitions of elite, power and influence in the context of Pakistan, I have followed Hussain (Hussain, Asaf, *Elite Politics in an Ideological State: the case for Pakistan* (Folkestone, kent: Dowson and Sons, 1979), pp.34-35). Hussain gives the following representations of different elite groups — counting presidents, prime ministers, governors-general, martial law administrators and central cabinet ministers — who have been ruling Pakistan between 1947-1978.

	1949-58	1958-69	1969-71	1971-77	1977-78	TOTAL	% of TOTAL
LE*	40	10	2	6	4	62	25.2
BE	15	19	2	0	4	40	16.2
RE	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.4
IE	7	2	2	1	1	13	5.3
PE	52	27	4	10	4	97	39.5
ME	1	12	9	0	11	33	13.4
TOTAL	115	70	19	18	24	246	100.0

(* L stand for landed; B for bureaucratic; R = Religious; I = Industrial; P = Professional and M = Military). From Hussain, p.36).

It appears to me, however, that the PE and the RE are not elites in the sense of being the actual possessors of power as a class. The RE has never actually held power and possesses what can be termed as influence. Even this has increased only since 1977 when the PNA made an alliance to oppose Z.A. Bhutto. The PE, which has held 39.5% of the powerful posts has not held power as a class. This is conceded by Hussain who agrees that it is weaker than the ME and explains the position as follows:

For the post of law minister the governing elite always sought men who would rationalize, justify or legalize the political policies of the regime as democratic. The PE who occupied such posts often compromised their political views with the roles prescribed for them, and the more they became involved with the policies of the governing elites the less they identified with their own group. The *esprit de corps* found among members of the ME and BE was missing among the PE because they were lacking in strong organizational development (Hussain, p.115).

Since *esprit de corps* is the essential feature of all pressure groups, especially the BE and the ME, it appears to me that the PE cannot be counted as part of the power elite at all.

14. The terms Anglicized elite and the Urdu proto-elite are not used in any other political analysis. However, as La Porte points out, 'a synthesis of several studies' perceives the 'ruling elite' to be 'Western-oriented and Western-schooled' (1975: 12). As there is no empirical study on the schooling of the ruling elites, it is difficult to be definitive in this matter. It is, however, certain that English is a status symbol and marker of affluence, cultured upbringing and modernity.
15. The term proto-elite is not used by Hussain, nor by other writers in Pakistan (La Porte 1975; Amin 1988), but it is useful for explaining the RE's as well as the ethno-nationalist leaders' desire for taking direct power from the ruling elites.

16. Fisherman, Joshua, *Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays* (Rowley, Massachusetts: Newbury House, 1972), p.15.
17. Umar, B., *Purba banglar bhasa andolan o tatkalin rajniti* [Bangla: Language Movement and Contemporary Politics in East Bengal], Vol.I, revised ed., Dacca, pp.18-19, quoted in Murshid, pp.234-35.
18. Murshid, pp.233-37.
19. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48*, Karachi, 1948; Islamabad, 1989, pp.175-87.
20. Murshid, *op.cit.*, p.131.
21. Abdullah, Syed, *Pakistan mein Urdu ka Mas'alah* [Urdu: The Problem of Urdu in Pakistan] (Lahore: Khayaban-i-Adab, 1972), p.45.
22. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, *Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Board of Education, 4-5th March 1953*, (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1955), p.41.
23. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, *The Advisory Board of Education: First Meeting 7-9 June*, Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1948, p.4.
24. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, *The Advisory Board of Education: Second Meeting 7-9 Feb. 1949* (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1949), pp.25-27.
25. *Ibid.*, p.27.
26. *Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Board of Education, 4-5th March 1953*, p.220.
27. *Ibid.*, p.261.
28. *Ibid.*, p.262.
29. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, *Proceedings of the Seventh Meeting of the Advisory Board of Education, 27-29 Jan. 1958*, (Karachi: Manager of Publication), 1958, p.58.
30. *Proceedings of the Fifth Meetings of the Advisory Board of Education*, pp.208-09.
31. *Ibid.*, pp.45-85.
32. *Ibid.*, pp.81-142.
33. *Ibid.*, pp.143-219.

34. Abdullah, Syed, *Pakistan mein Urdu ka Mas'ala* [Urdu: The problem of Urdu in Pakistan], (Lahore: Khayaban-i-Adab, 1972), p.210.
35. *Ibid.*, pp.230-33.
36. Matheson, Sylvia A., *The Tigers of Baluchistan* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1967), p.2.
37. Khan, Ayub, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography* (Karachi: OUP, 1967), p.25.
38. *Ibid.*, p.43.
39. The author has been a cadet in the Pakistan Military Academy during 1970-71 when any cadet found speaking in the vernaculars was punished. The official language of communication in the officer-training military academies remains English and cadets are still forbidden to use any other language.
40. The author wishes to thank Professor Waheed Qureshi, once the Chairman of the National Language Authority, for having shown me this report. Since the report is confidential it can neither be referred to in full nor quoted from.
41. Braibanti, Ralph, *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emerged from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), p.28 — Besides scholarly accounts of the CSP there are many less formal documents about it too. From these it becomes clear that the CSP trainees were taught in English and learned to associate it with elitist culture. English gave a 'tremendous advantage' to the candidates for the CSSP examinations (Goodnow, Henry F., *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation* (Karachi: OUP, 1969), p.162 and some of the candidates had foreign (generally British) degrees. According to Braibanti, out of the 141 recruits into the CSP from 1960-64 '17.7 per cent, studied abroad' (*The Asian Bureaucratic Systems*, p.276.) had mostly members of the CSP and its dinner was attended by members of the ruling elite (*ibid.*, p.250). These foreign educated members of the BE were very few in numbers though, being articulate and culturally prominent, they acted as exemplars for the rest. Others were mostly from the middle class and the upper middle class though, given the income of their parents which is indicated in charts below, it seems reasonable to conclude that most of them must have been educated in English-medium schools.

CHART GIVING THE INCOME OF THE PARENTS OF CSP OFFICERS (The figures given below are percentages of groups per year.

Year	Above Rs. 1500	Rs. 1001-1500	Rs. 801-1000	Rs. 501-800	Below 500
1952	18.8%	18.8	6.3	12.5	43.5
1955	23.5	11.8	5.9	29.4	29.4
1958	8.7	17.4	8.7	13.0	52.2
1961	16.7	16.7	8.3	28.0	20.8
1964	30.8	17.9	15.4	17.9	17.9

NB: Per Capita income calculated at current (Adapted from Braibanti cost factors is between Rs. 242-351 in these years.

When incomes and inflation both increased, in the late seventies and early eighties, the lower threshold used for calculation was Rs. 5,000/- per month. As the per capita income of Pakistanis was Rs. 2,837/- in these years this represents lower middle class rather than working class income. The data for 1979 and 1980 is as follows:

	Below 5,000-	10,000-	15,000-	20,000-	25,000-	Above
1979	7.0%	11.8	21.8	9.4	11.8	10.2
1980	8.4	14.5	15.3	9.9	14.5	16.0

(there is some missing data in both years)

Adapted from Kennedy, Charles H., *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* (Karachi: OUP, 1987), p.119.

The general trend seems to be an increase in the number of people coming from affluent families. In any case, in most years of the CSP's existence and that of the groups which replaced it, the recruits to it have come from families with middle and upper-middle class incomes. Such families could well afford to educate their sons in English-medium schools. Thus most people in the superior BE were from English schools.

42. Farooqi, Nasir A., *Faces of Love and Death* (Lahore: Privately published, 1961), p.5.

43. Khan, p.98.

44. Jahan, Rounaq, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: CUP, 1972); Mankekar, D.R. *Pak Colonialism in East Bengal* (Delhi, 1971); Murshid, Tazeen M., 'The Bengal Muslim Intelligentsia, 1937-77', p.296.
45. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, *Report of the Commission on National Education*, (Karachi, 1959), p.288.
46. Abdullah, p.59.
47. Adil, Mukhtar, '*Sindh ki Diary*' [Urdu: the Diary of Sindh] *Jang*, 17 Oct. 1962; Ahmad, Saleem, '*Oluh Pakistan Men Boleen Jo Maslo*' [Sindhi: the problem of languages in West Pakistan] (Khairpur: Privately published, 1968), p.3; and editorial of *Mihran*, 31 October 1962 for Sindhi.
48. The following figures from Syed Abdullah (p.74) illustrate this:

	<u>1964</u>		<u>1967</u>	
Subject	Urdu	English	Urdu	English
Political Science	1195	1887	4596	673
History	959	830	2835	211
Economics	919	1478	3492	712
Social Work	8	35	97	12
Geography	74	213	163	67
Sociology	2	120	151	95
Philosophy	24	24	121	89
Psychology	15	15	82	146

The trend to take the examination in Urdu increased because it was easier for most students to express themselves in this language rather than in English. It must be kept in mind, however, that the best students do not take the above subjects for M.A. They either join the professional colleges or take science subjects. For M.A., they mostly prefer business administration, commerce, accountancy or English literature to the subjects given above. This explains the fact that students aspire to the study of English, admire those who can speak it fluently and even desire it as a medium of instruction for all (rather

than only elitist) students (Mansoor, Sabiha, 'Exploration of the Linguistic Attitudes of Pakistani Students'. Unpublished MA dissertation, University of Reading, 1992), while preferring to use Urdu for short-term pragmatic reasons.

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50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*, pp.17-18.
52. *Ibid.*, p.18.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. Abdullah, p.184.
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57. Govt. of Pakistan, *National Assembly of Pakistan; Debates*, Islamabad, 8 Augs. 1964, p.465.
58. Khan, p.85.
59. Abdullah, p.57.
60. *Pakistan Times*, 21 Feb. 1961.
61. Abdullah, p.145.
62. *Ibid.*, p.183.
63. *Ibid.*, pp.144-49.
64. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, *Proposals for a New Educational Policy*, Islamabad, 1969, p.14.
65. *Ibid.*, p.3.
66. *Ibid.*, pp.3, 15-16.
67. *Ibid.*, p.17.
68. Abdullah, *op.cit.*, p.83.

69. *Pakistan Times*, 9 Aug. 1969; *Punjabi Adab* 10:9 [Sept. 1969] is devoted to the reactions of the supporters of Punjabi to these proposals).
70. The Young Peoples' Front of the Sindhi Nationalist Party.
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72. Abdullah, p.84.
73. *Ibid.*, p.84.
74. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, *The New Education Policy*, Islamabad, 1970, p.19.
75. *Ibid.*, p.2.
76. 'Editorial', *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 25 Jan. 1970; Ahmad, Zahur, 'Urdu aur Sindhi Dono Hamari Zabanen Hain' [Urdu: Urdu and Sindhi are both our languages], *Jasarat*, 30 Jan. 1971.
77. 'Editorial', *Nida-i-Millat*, 24 Jan. 1970; Piracha, A. Halim, 'Pakistan ka Lisani Mas'ala-2', *Jang* 11 Nov. 1970; Bhutto, Abu A., 'Sindh mein Jhagre ka sabab' [Urdu: The cause of conflict in Sindh], *Jasarat* 16 Feb. 1971; Kashmiri, Shorish, 'Lisani Jhagra', [Urdu: Language conflict], 19 Feb. 1971; Bareilvi, p.113.
78. Amin, p.159.
79. One of the points of the Islamic parties in the election manifesto of 1970 was: 'national languages to replace English as the medium of instruction so that the dual system of education in Urdu and English could end' (Hussain, p.88). The association of Urdu with the RE, Bhutto's political opponents, is also commented upon in the text.
80. *National Assembly of Pakistan: Debates*, 15 April; 17, 30 and 31 Aug. 1972; 4 and 7 April and 15 July 1975; 6 Nov. 1975; 3 March 1976.
81. *Ibid.*, 5:1, 17 Aug. 1972, p.70.
82. *Ibid.*, 17 Aug. 1972, p.71.
83. *Ibid.*, 1:15, 31 Aug. 1972, pp.743-44.
84. *Ibid.*, 6 Nov. 1975, p.364.
85. *Ibid.*, 3 March 1976, p.170.

86. Ahmed, Aijaz, 'Democracy and Dictatorship', in Gardezi, Hasan and Rashid, Jamil (eds.), *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State* (London: Zed Press, 1983, pp.99-132.
87. Abdullah, pp.187-278.
88. *Ibid.*, pp.110-34, Zulfikar and Akhtar, pp.327-45.
89. Amin, p.244.
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