

Quaid-i-Azam M.A. Jinnah and the Home Rule Movement in British India 1916-1919

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The Lucknow Pact of 1916 served as a charter of the Home Rule Movement in British India during 1916-1919. The terms of this Pact, as the joint scheme of reforms agreed to by the All-India Muslim League (AIML) and the Indian National Congress (INC), became the goal of all the political parties of British India on the basis of which the freedom of India was to be sought.

The Lucknow Pact was concluded in December 1916, but the signs of agreement between the AIML and INC developed immediately after the meeting of committees of both the parties in April 1916. As soon as the signs of agreement became significant the British Indian politicians thought it appropriate to establish the Home Rule League under whose auspices the Home Rule Movement was to prosper. But on this point disagreement developed between Mrs. Annie Besant and B.G. Tilak. Thus one Home Rule League headed by B.G. Tilak was founded in April 1916 and the other Indian Home Rule League was established in September 1916 under the presidentship of Mrs. Besant. Besant's Home Rule League was based in Madras and that of Tilak's in Bombay. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah served as a bridge between these two Home Rule Leagues. Other areas and provinces were required to establish branches of these Home Rule Leagues in their respective provinces. The *Bombay Chronicle*, an English newspaper functioning under Jinnah's guidance, served as the leading press journal to popularise the cause of freedom amongst the Indian masses. The educated classes of British India provided leader-

ship to this movement and they attended meetings arranged by either of the two without any discrimination.

After the conclusion of Lucknow Pact the Movement started with full tempo, which continued throughout the next two years. The British were not initially favourable to this movement. However, when the Movement gained ground, the British adopted pro-Indian posture because of their deep involvement in the first World War. After the end of War in the second half of 1918, the British made secret dealings with some Indian leaders who were opposed both to Jinnah and Tilak. Through their help and adoption of other means the British by the end of 1919 were able to give turn to the situation tactfully through national and international manoeuvrings. The repression of Indians in Amritsar on 13 April 1919 popularly known as Jallianwala Bagh Tragedy heightened political atmosphere of the country and paved the way for the hardline politicians of the country. It was followed up by harsh attitude of the British on the future of holy places of Islam captured during the War and on the Khilafat issue, after the end of War. The Khilafat issue further helped the hardline religious leaders of India. The pragmatic and reasonable approach of the politicians like Jinnah was to lose ground. Thus only two strong opinions were created in the country: one opposed to the British Government leading to non-cooperation, and the other headed by the Moderates sought co-operation with the British Government. The sane element faded in between. Jinnah's reasonable and pragmatic approach lost ground in the tense atmosphere giving ground to sentimentalism and religiosity in politics. Thus by the end of 1919 Gandhi and Ali brothers gained popularity in Indian politics which heightened in the next year. Jinnah considered all these developments against the Indian interest of freedom. He also saw that as a result of these developments Hindu mentality will come to hold in Indian political world wherein the cause of Muslim interests was bound to suffer. Incidentally it happened as previously guessed by Jinnah who was wise enough to leave Congress in December 1920 because he had lost hope for the Muslim interest being watched at the Congress platform. He spent the remaining life for the cause of the All India Muslim League and thenceforth never attended any Congress meeting.

After giving a new goal of direction to the country's political forces in the shape of Lucknow Pact, as discussed earlier, Jinnah planned to build pressure upon the Government from all platforms. This was all intended on democratic and constitutional lines. Himself being a constitutional expert he could well see the ground for the further spread of political activity in the country. As he was first planning for the grant of provincial autonomy, he had to concentrate his activities in his own province of Bombay. For he had achieved unity at the national level in the shape of joint scheme of reforms, he proved to be a viable personality in the higher ranks of political leadership. He became a source of unity amongst the galaxy of political forces — INC, AIML, two Home Rule Leagues, student organisations and other associations.

Jinnah did not formally join any of the two Home Rule Leagues until June 1917 when Mrs. Besant was arrested by the British Government in Madras.¹ It was "more as a protest against her internment by Lord Pentland in Madras than for love of the League" or for Mrs. Besant that Jinnah joined Besant's Home Rule League in June 1917.² Soon he became President of its Bombay branch and guided destiny of the party affairs during Besant's absence. He maintained his membership of this League from 18 June 1917 to 5 October 1920.³

The whole brunt of his speeches and addresses was to prove that Indian people led by the educated and intelligent class were equally fit to share with the British responsibility of running the administration of the country. When the Indians were ready to get self-government, their aspirations should be duly respected by the British Government. In order to pave the way for Indian entry into all branches of administration, whether bureaucratic or political, executive or legislative, the whole constitutional set-up of the country should be changed at the earliest possible. In this effort Jinnah's concern seems not only to maintain unity, which he built up with so much labour, but for the purpose of popularising his ideas among the people he practically joined the Home Rule Movement.

Following the Lucknow Pact, all the politicians were basically required to work in their own provinces to popularise the cause of Home Rule and to create favourable public opinion

around this goal. Tilak, Jinnah and other leaders from Bombay moved to their own province and engaged themselves in hectic political activity. In this Jinnah's endeavours proved to be more determined as compared with many of his associates.

The first issue that proved Government's interference in political matters related to the 16th Bombay Provincial Conference held in October 1916. On his encouragement, the Government's interference was challenged in the Bombay High Court by Jiranlal V. Desai and Krishanlal N. Desai, Secretaries of 16th Bombay Provincial Conference. Though the plea of the Home Rulers was rejected by the Court, yet the publication of texts of the Deputy Superintendent of Police's letters, addressed to the Secretaries of the Conference, in the newspapers established the notion of official interference in public matters which signally contributed to further spreading favourable political activity.⁴

Another hint was given by Jinnah on 21 January 1917 when he presided over a meeting at Bombay, arranged by the Indian Economic Society on the issue "India and the Tariff Problem". He appealed to the Indians "to organise their efforts so as to defeat their opponents" sitting in Lancashire and Manchester — an idea that was applauded and commended by various letters in the newspapers.⁵ Self-reliance in all matters was the main theme of Jinnah's arguments.⁶ For the purpose of India's participation in Imperial Conference in London where representatives of all the British colonies were invited, strong demand for India's participation was rightly made. In this conference none of the Indian politicians or representatives participated or was invited to attend. It was the Secretary of State for India who represented India on this conference. Jinnah strongly objected to this and said that the Secretary of State for India had no right to represent India there as he was not the "real representative" of India.⁷ In this connection a protest meeting in Bombay was held on 23 January 1917 on the subject "India's Place in the Empire" which was presided over by Jinnah. In his presidential address, Jinnah thus conveyed the Indian aspiration:

Are we not entitled at least to have one representative of India properly elected by the unanimous voice of the people of this country (applause) that he should in this Imperial Conference sit and

represent directly along with Premiers of self-governing dominions and should have, his voice heard? I say that this is a farce — I feel very strongly on this occasion — I say that it is an absolute farce that the Secretary of State for India should have two assistants and that in the actual deliberations when the question will be discussed affecting the whole Empire including India — and the problems of India are problems of life and death to the Empire — we should not have one single Indian representative there to directly represent India. Gentlemen, it is a farce and I say that we shall not rest content, we shall do everything that lies in our power to see that we should have a real representative directly representing India, like the self-governing Dominions.⁸

Resolution demanding India's "real" representation at the War Conference was unanimously carried at this public meeting.⁹ This resolution was later sent to the Government. Jinnah was of the view that the "young generation must study all the problems seriously" because "there could be no regeneration of India, unless there was a sincere and true understanding between all the communities".¹⁰ Presiding over a Bombay Students Convention on 27 January 1917 Jinnah thus recounted his own efforts of founding London Indian Association in 1914. Similarly he also called upon them to organise themselves.¹¹

For this purpose he also believed that Indians should be well-prepared for self-defence. He desired the Indians to build up a "citizens army" which he emphasised on the occasion of Defence Force Bill in the Imperial Legislative Council moved by Sir Charles Monroe, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, in February 1917. This provided an instance for Jinnah's expressions in this way:

I understand that the object of this Bill is to give an opportunity to the educated people of this country for the defence of their own country. I can assure you my Lord, knowing as I do know and I can say that I am in touch with the opinion of young India particularly, that this measure is welcome.... There is not the slightest doubt that our frontiers have to be guarded, conditions are changing; events are moving rapidly. I do not wish to enter into details at this juncture, but suffice it to say that if anything untoward happens, it would be impossible in the present condition of our army to make an adequate defence of this country. What I call a national army, I venture to say, must come, and the sooner it comes the better — the national army not in the sense that it will be entirely a paid army; there must be a reserve and militia behind it.¹²

For the formation of reserve and militia force, he desired that 'Indian boys between the ages of 16 and 18 should be given an opportunity of local military service during the period of the War, and, when the bigger question comes to be considered, this will be the material ready to a certain extent having undergone a certain amount of training already and, therefore, fit for the future formation of a national army'.¹³ Jinnah's stand was duly supported by the Bombay public meeting on 23 February at which "enthusiastic scene" in Jinnah's support was visible.¹⁴ Tilak also addressed this meeting. Tilak reiterated his backing of these ideas of Jinnah at other meetings also.¹⁵

On the idea of Defence Force much hopes were built up by Jinnah and other Indian politicians as offering new opportunities for the young educated Indians for a new career. This was also seen an opportunity of preparing the Indians for the defence of their country for the freedom of which they were already working actively. Many jobless educated youth who saw signs of employment enthusiastically supported the move. Indian Defence Force Bill was passed by the Imperial Council, on account of public pressure, on 28 February 1917 in high expectations on the part of Jinnah and other politicians without giving specific indications as to how many Indians will be given commissioned ranks. Pandat Madan Malaviya's resolution supporting Jinnah's remarks about training Indians of ages between 16 and 18 was, however, defeated.¹⁶ However, after its approval by the Council, it was declared by the Government that about 6000 men will be recruited during the war: of these 1000 were allocated to Bombay Presidency. But when this scheme was implemented, very few Indians were selected and they were given initial training for three months. Moreover, they were not to go beyond the ranks of Risaldar Major, Subedars, etc. Thus it was clear that they were not to get King's Commission. Consequently the Indians were disappointed. Still Jinnah could develop some points of hope in the deep moments of nation's disappointments. He was not ready to lose even the remotest chances of success offered by this Act. Addressing an enthusiastic public meeting under the joint auspices of Bombay branches of the two Home Rule Leagues, as its President, on 22 April 1917 Jinnah thus called upon the youth to enroll themselves in the force in order to fulfil their duty:

We must remember our ideals, our aspirations and that we are a part of the British Empire. We must remember that the bureaucrats who had the direction of this country were not the only people who have to look after the interests and progress of this country. It is our duty to come forward, in spite of the fact that the authorities have done everything to mar the scheme. The question is: Are we going to mar the scheme also and the interests of ourselves and the Empire?¹⁷

Various letters in support of Jinnah's plea appeared in the columns of the *Bombay Chronicle*. In his letter of 26 April, J.M. Framjee Patel pleaded:

"Your India is in need of wise guidance at this hour. Therefore, I entirely agree with my friend Mr. Jinnah in his sound advice given the other day to young men to join the volunteer movement, in spite of certain restrictions. The British public is watching us closely, and let it not be said by our detractors that Indians are not willing to bear the burden as citizens of the greatest Empire known to history".¹⁸

The Home Rule Movement spread to other corners of the Indian Empire. The issue of Army training for the Indians was highly publicised by the Home Rulers. This Movement was spreading fast against the government. Jinnah went to Bengal to activate the movement there.¹⁹ Bombay government felt worried and by an order of 7 June 1917 banned the Home Rule meetings. It also called upon the heads of educational institutions in the province not to allow students to attend the Home Rule meetings because "the Governor was convinced that the growing laxity and discipline and disregard of authority are in some measure due to the tendency on the part of boys and students to associate themselves with political demonstrations".²⁰

Jinnah looked to other directions also. As part of his Home Rule activities, Jinnah desired Indian representation in the services so that Indians may be well-trained in conducting their responsibilities. This was not a new matter. Alongwith Indian representation in the services²¹, he planned to nationalize the Railways administration in order to make room for Indians joining the system. This was because he had close link with the Railway workers union. It was even alleged by the government that in the Railways disturbances of April 1917 Jinnah was "approached" by an agent of the Railway union "both by letter and on the telephone". The intelligence even reported that Jinnah "continued to maintain touch with them during the

following week and he more than once attempted to obtained recognition by the Railway authorities".²² It was perhaps due to his commitment with the Railway workers that on 25th September 1917 he moved in the Imperial Legislative Council for appointment of "a mixed committee" of officials and non-officials "to examine the working of the Indian Railways Act and to make their recommendations at an early date". In his legislative speech he vehemently pleaded their cause.²³ For the entry of the Indians in the civil service, Jinnah was not demanding special favours. What he desired was the grant of "equal opportunities" to Indians as already enjoyed by the Europeans. Alluding the fears of the Muslims or on that behalf of the official preference for the Muslims he said that the Muslims were "today in a much better position that the Hon'ble Member know and are quite prepared to compete with their Hindu brethren, and therefore, there need be no anxiety of any kind whatsoever on the part of government for the Muhammadans".²⁴

Speaking on Malaviya's resolution for recruitment of Indians in the civil services, Jinnah said: "No race, no question of religion or creed has to be considered in recruiting our highest service. Efficiency is the only test". This was because "once you get the sons of the country who are capable and competent, there is no justification for maintaining that there should be a certain number of Europeans".²⁵ For having Indian say in the recruitment of central civil services he moved "that the constitution of the Central Recruiting Board be modified so as to secure at least two Indian representatives of British India on the Board".²⁶ Though this caused hectic debate in the Council, yet it was defeated by 33 votes to 18.²⁷ He pleaded for the private members' rights and the respect for the non-official opinion in the Imperial Legislative Council and emphasised for their due protection.²⁸ It was his regard for the public feeling that he was disappointed with the remarks of the new Home Member, Sir Reginald Craddock that the government could not appoint non-officials to the operation of the Defence of India Act, 1915. For Jinnah, the working of this Act was having "a most disastrous effect on public feeling".²⁹

Jinnah also wanted to reform the Indian society in order to purify it from its evils. This was not possible without spreading education at mass level. He emphasised the need of educa-

tion whenever he addressed the student organisations or spoke in the Legislative Council.³⁰ Speaking in the Imperial Legislative Council on B.N. Sarma's resolution for preparing a scheme to introduce compulsory primary education "within a period of 15 years", Jinnah strongly took exception to Education Member, Sir C. Sankaran Nair's opposing arguments which were condemned by him with a high tempo. He even quoted Butler's understanding given in 1912 that the British government was "determined to combat ignorance through the length and breadth of this ancient land".³¹ For free compulsory education, his argument was that it was with the intention to have "intelligent voters" really fit for the movement for local self-government that he was supporting the cause.³²

It was Jinnah's dedication to the cause of Home Rule that he came to be respected and loved by various leaders of British India. They praised Jinnah's leadership qualities and high sense of public duty. In a public meeting on 24 June 1917 at Allahabad, Sarojini Naidu highly praised the influence she received from Jinnah's three visions of life — "vision of love, the vision of religion and the vision of patriotism".³³ As President of this meeting Motilal Nehru agreed with these expressions.³⁴ Naidu termed these as "three great visions that must come to everyone who belongs to the generation that stands upon the threshold of destiny. The vision of love, the vision of religion and the vision of patriotism are three visions that make a brute a man and a man a god".³⁵ In a number of public letters also Jinnah's leadership qualities were praised.³⁶ Addressing a public meeting in Bombay on 16 July 1917 Jinnah's qualities were much adored by Tilak, Jamnadas and Horniman. Eulogizing Jinnah's services, Horniman had even declared:

Mr. Jinnah was a standing example in Bombay and in the whole of India of a man who had done his duty and who, they all believed, would always do it. When he came forward and joined the Home Rule League he carried out his duty, also when he became its President, and thus they had him presiding at their meeting and adding distinction and weight to it by his presence.³⁷

Himself being a great man in history, Jinnah termed these remarks as "too eulogistic" because what he had done was "a pure sense of duty and nothing else".³⁸ At the end of the meeting on Horniman's request the whole crowd stood up and

offered three hearty cheers to Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah.³⁹ This was duly complemented by the *Bombay Chronicle* editorials.⁴⁰ Addressing a "monster" public meeting, chaired by Jinnah on 30 July 1917, Tilak said, "with gentleman like the Hon. Mr. Jinnah at its head, the Home Rule Movement was bound to prosper".⁴¹ Similarly other leaders expressed their regard for Jinnah's personality. Even Edwin Montagu recognised Jinnah's abilities, when Jinnah met Montagu alongwith other members of Congress-League deputation on the cause of Reforms in November 1917, the latter wrote:

They were followed by Jinnah, young, perfectly mannered, impressive-looking, armed to the teeth with dialectical, and insistent upon the whole of his scheme. All its shortcomings, all its drawbacks, the elected members of the Executive Council, the power of the minority to hold legislation, the complete control of the Executive in all matters finance — all these were defended as the best made shifts they could devise short of responsible govt. Nothing else would satisfy them. They would rather have nothing if they could get the whole lot. I was rather tired and I funked him. Jinnah is a very clever man, it is, of course, an outrage that such a man should have no chance of running the affairs of his own country.⁴²

Addressing the 9th session of the Bihar Provincial Conference as President, Nawab Sarfraz Hussain Khan made a mention of Jinnah as a person of proud performance whose efforts extensively contributed to the "growth" of political literature. He had close intimacy with Jinnah. Jinnah's distrust in autocratic bureaucracy in which he had "little hope" were particularly cited and confirmed by the *Bombay Chronicle* editorial.⁴³

It was by his intensive efforts that Jinnah was able to make Bombay a model province which was ready to work any responsibility given in its internal administration. His ideas for the provincial autonomy were expressed at the 16th Bombay Provincial Conference in October 1916. It was by his exemplary devotion to the public cause that he emerged the most popular figure. At all the critical times his advice came to be heeded by almost all the sections of population. Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, and other Indians came to repose equal trust in him. It was in response to public demand that for writing a separate biographical sketch of Jinnah, alongwith a collection of his speeches, Sarojini Naidu, a passionate admirer of Jinnah and poetess-

nightingale of India, was asked to accomplish the task. She completed her biographical sketch on Jinnah in November 1917 in "a pen portrait" which was published in February 1918.⁴⁴ The foreword to this work was written by Raja of Mahmudabad, a close associate and friend of Jinnah. The Raja wrote that there was "no other worker among the Indian Mussalmans" like Jinnah who "has so far given proof in an equal degree" and who has presented the Indian claim of Home Rule with "arguments and facts dispassionately put forward and discussed in a calm and logical manner". This was because, as he himself elaborated, Jinnah's "ambition seems to be to concentrate on solid arguments and concrete facts". He had worked for attainment of Hindu-Muslim unity with a spirit of "mission" without resorting to "frenzy".⁴⁵ She even searched in her biographical sketch:

"Per chance it is written in the book of the future that he whose fair ambition it is to become the Moslim Gokhale may in some glorious and feasible crisis of our national struggle pass into immortality as the Mazzini of the Indian Liberation".⁴⁶

At a garden party in honour of Tilak and other members of Indian deputation who were ready to proceed to England in March 1918, Jinnah was also present. He was not required to address under the arrangements. But "in response to the persistent demand of the audience to speak", Jinnah said: "India was passing through critical times and it was absolutely essential that the deputation should go to England when their opponents were striving their best to come in their way".⁴⁷ Next day on 25 March 1918 Jinnah presided over a "mass meeting attended by about 15,000 people". Seconding Dr. Welkar's proposal inviting Jinnah to the chair, Tulja Parker said: "Jinnah was the *jina* (ladder) of Swarajiya and without such a stair-case they could not have so easily attained what little they could by this time".⁴⁸ "Rising to speak amidst loud cheers", Jinnah thus declared in his presidential address:

"We are maintaining a calm atmosphere for Mr. Montagu, who is in this country investigating the case of Home Rule of India, and let there be no bungling, let it be quite clear that the demand for the immediate step towards the transfer into our hands of the control of govt. of this country and for the marking of a clear road to establish self-government was the united demand of the people of this-country. It is the birth right of every man and the laying down of the principle

of self-determination for India. Mr. Tilak would place their case not only before the English democracy but before the English Nation".⁴⁹ He also hoped that 'the Congress would stand by the principles it advocated for the last 32 years'.⁵⁰

Towards the end of the year when the question arose of giving a memorial to the outgoing Bombay Governor, Lord Willingdon, it was under Jinnah's leadership that anti-Willingdon demonstration was exhibited by the Bombay public on 11 December 1918. The meeting was to start at 5:00 p.m., but Jinnah and his followers had arrived ten hours earlier. Even Mrs. Jinnah had accompanied her husband and she remained outside the Town Hall where the meeting was arranged. Jinnah entered the Hall with his supporters. It was his skill and admirable leadership which kept the angry masses within the bounds of constitutional limitation. He democratically defeated the motion which won him high laurels in the public.⁵¹ The people became so happy with this democratic success made possible by Jinnah's qualities, that "Jinnah People's Memorial Hall" was proposed to be constructed through collection of funds called the "People's One Rupee Fund". This fund was collected in abundance within a couple of months and the Hall was constructed in the Congress compound in Bombay next year which still stands a living Memorial to the name of Jinnah. Such an honour is conferred only on the prophets in their own times.⁵²

Jinnah passionately desired introduction of early reforms on the model of Congress-League joint scheme of Reforms. His purpose was to keep all the Indian leaders united on this political agreement. He proved to be the principal person to emphasize it from all the platforms, public or legislative. He struggled hard to ensure that deputations on behalf of INC, AIML, Home Rule Leagues should emphasize his scheme of Reforms, popularly known as the Lucknow Pact, in a unified way.

Jinnah was insistent upon the introduction of reforms in the country in a comprehensive way. This made him to resist those members who intended to propose for piece-meal reforms in certain areas. On 22 February 1917, Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru moved resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council that (a) "a Governor-in-Council may be appointed for the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh upon the expiry of the term of office of the

present Lt. Governor", and (b) "the Executive Council for the said Province be composed of an equal number of Indian and non-Indian members".⁵³ This was opposed by Home Member, Sir Reginald Craddock.⁵⁴ Though Jinnah was in "entire accord with the Resolution", yet he maintained, as the government was already considering the issue in its entirety he was not in favour of pressing the resolution which was withdrawn by Dr. Sapru.⁵⁵ On 13 September 1917 Mian Mohammad Shafi moved a resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council demanding that "the legislative and administrative system of the Punjab be assimilated to that of the Province of Bihar and Orissa".⁵⁶ While sympathising with this resolution Jinnah considered it being introduced at "wholly in-opportune" time when the question is already being considered by the government. He termed this a piece-meal demand. He wanted reforms not only in the Punjab but in all the other backward provinces as a whole and that also on the pattern of advanced provinces of Bombay or Madras, not on Bihar and Orissa pattern being the inferior provinces.⁵⁷ He desired that all these issues should be "taken up alongwith the general question of the constitutional reforms which should be introduced in India after the war".⁵⁸ When B.N. Sarma moved a resolution on 6 February 1918 regarding redistribution of provincial areas and the constitution of provinces on language basis, Jinnah felt so bad that he went to the extent of saying that the resolution should be "thrown out" of the council terming it "a most mischievous resolution".⁵⁹ Jinnah's contention was that when the question of constitutional reform of the country was before the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India, it was foolish to introduce such resolutions.⁶⁰

After having mobilised the political forces, the AICC in April and AIML Council in May 1917 decided to send their deputations to proceed to England in June in order to press for the grant of the scheme of reforms securely adopted by the two organizations.⁶¹ But the internment of Mrs. Annie Besant alongwith her two lieutenants by Madras Government in June 1917 changed the whole situation. It was in this high tension that a new declaration of British Policy was made by Montagu in the British Parliament on 20 August 1917:

The policy of His Majesty's government with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association

of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-government institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.⁶²

But in determining the ripe occasion for granting "responsible government" the British Government and the Government of India were to act as "judges of the time and measure of each advance".⁶³ Montagu also announced his intention to visit India in order to consult government of India and the Indians so as to afford "ample opportunity" for "public discussion of the proposals" to be submitted to the Parliament.⁶⁴ This announcement which was made after much thinking by the British, changed the situation showing that the British were not ready to receive Indian deputation at Home.⁶⁵ Despite all this, the declaration was welcomed by the Indian Press and the AIML Council and AICC.⁶⁶

Before the arrival of Montagu in November 1917, Jinnah wanted to see calmness in the political environment which had been enraged by the internment of Mrs. Annie Besant, her two lieutenants, and Ali Brothers. For better debating the political issues he desired restoration of peaceful conditions especially keeping in view the emotional temperament of the Indian masses. As far as Besant and her two lieutenants were concerned, they succeeded in securing their release in September 1917 for which he had even asked question in the Imperial Legislative Council.⁶⁷ He had also met the Viceroy for this purpose. Actually his offer convinced Chelmsford that many of the politicians dislike Mrs. Besant and would be glad to see her disappear politically if she was released.⁶⁸ Jinnah also insisted for the release of Ali Brothers before the arrival of Montagu by asking questions in the Imperial Council and meeting the Viceroy on a number of occasions but the government was not ready to release them considering them as "ruffians".⁶⁹

Jinnah was eager in arranging joint deputations by AIML, INC, HRLs to Montagu in order to press for the joint Congress-League scheme of Reforms. At a joint meeting of the AIML Council and AICC at Allahabad on 6 October 1917, it was on Jinnah's motion that the conference resolved to send a joint Congress-League deputation of 37 leaders to Montagu and Chelmsford in Delhi "with an address and a seasoned statement

in support of reforms adopted by the Congress and the League". For this it was also resolved that a memorial signed by a "very large number of people should be presented to the Secretary of State and the Viceroy supporting the Congress-League reform proposals".⁷⁰ It was also decided that the provincial branches of INC and the AIML should also send their separate petitions to Montagu in support of the Congress-League scheme of reforms.⁷¹ For getting signatures from the people in support of the Congress-League scheme, Jinnah also addressed various public meetings at Bombay, Poona, Ahmadabad, Delhi, Allahabad, Calcutta, Lahore and other place.⁷² Attending the Gujrat Political Conference at Allahabad in this connection in which specially composed songs were sung in praise of Jinnah on 5 November 1917, it was with "great cherry" that he was received at the meeting.⁷³

According to this strategy a "monster petition" signed by 1,30,000 persons was presented to Montagu which pressed early grant of the Congress-League scheme of reforms.⁷⁴ Jinnah met Montagu and Chelmsford for three times in three different deputations. He first saw him on two occasions in the same day (26 November), first as member of Joint Deputation of the INC and AIML under Tilak's leadership, and second, after an interval of an hour on the same day as member of joint deputation of the two All-India Home Rule Leagues led by Mrs. Annie Besant. For the third time he himself led Bombay presidency delegation of both the branches of the Home Rule Leagues on 24 December 1917. This last delegation consisted of 20 Hindu and Muslim leaders which, among others, included Tilak, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Jayakar and M.K. Sadhi.⁷⁵ On this occasion he made it clear that the address was "detailed explanation of Reform Scheme" yet "object" was "not" to "put forward any new proposals but to show that the Congress-Muslim League scheme is supported by the vast mass of the people of the Bombay Presidency". However, in this deputation Jinnah's demand went a step forward. In paragraphs 3 and 4, "the franchise and the local self-government", was suggested to be broadened.⁷⁶ By accomplishing this task of joint deputations both at the national and provincial levels, Jinnah was very happy.⁷⁷

At the AIML and INC sessions in December 1917 at Calcutta, Jinnah was even more resolute to demand the transfer

of power into Indian hands on the basis of Congress-League scheme of reforms. The AIML passed an important resolution on Jinnah's motion in which it called upon the government for "the immediate introduction of a Bill embodying the reforms contained in the Congress-League Scheme of December 1916 as the first step towards the realization of responsible government". He was also bold enough to express:

The people of this country have been loyal. The people of this country have always been satisfied notwithstanding the many disabilities, many disadvantages, and ill-treatments. What is the cause of this? The cause of it you know and the government know it, is that the people of India resent the continual sluggish conditions which prevail in this country. Instead of government meeting the complaints by the people what they do in this country? They want to puzzle you. They say: "we pass the Press Act: if you write anything we will", they say, "strangle you". They have passed the seditious meetings Act to stop meetings of the people? Is it possible for any statute to destroy the soul of the people?" (Cries of "No, No"). Instead of meeting the grievances of the people, instead of trying to remedy the defects they go on passing statutes. I say this is a short-sighted mistaken policy. It is a blunder and the sooner you realise it the better for you. The next thing we want is not a few posts. What we want is not a membership of the executive council. What we want is not that we should be sent there as elected members to advise government, but we want to have finger in the pie and very much so. We say, transfer the monopoly of power which you have denied to us hitherto, which you have denied to me and my country.⁷⁸

Similar views were expressed by Jinnah at the Calcutta Congress session. In the debate over self-government resolution in the Congress, Jinnah was out for unanimity on the Congress-League scheme of reforms. The Congress also accepted his suggestion that after the announcement of the government reforms scheme special sessions of the Congress and the League shall be convened at one place in order "to chalk out a common programme and after which there was to be no going back".⁷⁹ Thus Tilak, Pal and many others accepted Jinnah's plea.⁸⁰ This bold stance of Jinnah being accepted by other leaders was, however, disliked by the government.⁸¹

There arose certain fears in some Muslim quarters that such unified reforms as demanded in the Congress-League Scheme of reforms were detrimental to the interest of the Muslims. Jinnah had to counter this propaganda also. At the

very Calcutta Muslim League session, Jinnah declared that "the principle of adequate and effective representation of the Muslim community is made a *sine qua non* in any scheme of reform" ⁸² He also declared:

I don't think that, in the first instance in this country, there will be a Hindu Government, or Mussalman Government. I don't think that the Government will be conducted by the ballot box. If seventy millions of Mussalmans would not like a measure, I don't think that the Hindus would enforce that measure by ballot box. Then there is nothing to fear. They wanted financial control, and control over executive, abolition of sinister race distinctions and the repeal of all coercive measures.⁸³

Similar position regarding Muslims was taken up by him in his interview with Montagu. This harsh tone of Jinnah's speech seems to be due to various factors discussed somewhere else, but particularly by the hard way the government applied the Press Act on his newspaper *The Bombay Chronicle* resulting into confiscation of its security of Rs. 2,000/-.⁸⁴ Even this action could not satisfy Montagu who said: "I am led to conclusion that Mr. Horniman's attack on the present Press Act was unanswered" ⁸⁵

Thus by forceful pleadings Jinnah brought the Indians to such a stage wherefrom the government started fearing from him. His style of criticism of preponderance of British in the civil services "struck dismay into the services" and "caused most serious apprehension" amongst the civil servants.⁸⁶ Further interpreting Jinnah's intuitions Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lt. Governor of the Punjab thus wrote to the Viceroy:

The aim of Mr. Jinnah and other advanced politicians to squeeze or starve the British element out of the services has undoubtedly received strong encouragement from the wavering attitude taken by the government of India in the debate in question. The Home Member in reply to Mr. Jinnah appear to apologize for the existence of British officials in the administration and to ask that for a time at least their presence should be tolerated.⁸⁷

O'Dwyer also explained that the "advanced" politicians "are welcomed by the extremists as foreshadowing the halting down at no distant period of the British flag and all it stands for". He also took note of "Jinnah's arguments in council and else-where, that the Mohammedans had no fear of Hindu predominance", which caused concern for the government.⁸⁸

The government took a number of measures to check Jinnah's popularity but they were all doomed to fail at least in the next two years. However, it was in 1920 that they succeeded. Lt. Governor of the U.P. had already expressed his concern about Jinnah, a person of "advanced thinking" whose opinion was accepted by Dr Rash Behari Ghose, Subha Rao of Madras, B.N. Basu, Tilak, Mrs. Besant, Bepin Chandra Pal, the "avowed revolutionary", and Raja of Mahmudabad.⁸⁹ After meeting Montagu at Delhi in November 1917 when Jinnah returned to Bombay, Willingdon reported to the Viceroy: "Jinnah has returned from Delhi with his head in a most swollen condition. I rather gather that he is anxious to ask you and Montagu to dine".⁹⁰ But Montagu was so much impressed by meeting Jinnah that he recommended to Governor of Bombay that Jinnah should be appointed member of Willingdon's Executive Council. This was stated by Montagu in a telegram sent to the Governor "on the subject of Mr. M.A. Jinnah".⁹¹ As the Viceroy was not in favour of this appointment, he sent a member of his executive council, Sir Claude Hill to Bombay to check the position of Jinnah in Bombay. Hill opposed this appointment.⁹² Lionel Curtis, who designed a new scheme of reforms intended to change the politics of India, had also met Jinnah on a number of occasions and vehemently opposed the Congress-League scheme of reforms as detrimental to the continuity of the British Raj in India.⁹³ Curtis considered Gokhale's "Political Testament" alongwith Memo. of Nineteen Members and the Congress-League scheme of reforms as "leading to increasing paralysis of the Government in India, increasing friction, and in a deadlock which could only be relieved by handing over the entire administration to a community (educated class)".⁹⁴

To tackle this concerning situation for the government, Lord Willingdon had already suggested to the Viceroy to chalk out a "concerted" programme by the provincial governments, but the Viceroy was initially reluctant to take action without sanction from the Home government which was received in March 1917. Consequently, a "concerted" policy was evolved by the Government of India in a meeting of "representatives" from all the provinces. Naturally Willingdon was very happy as the new policy was devised according to his scheme for which he thanked the Viceroy. Under this policy provincial heads were

given powers to take measures to check further spread of political activity through direct or indirect means. The central government was, however, to be consulted before taking any such action.⁹⁵ In addition, the government, both at the central and provincial levels, was also to enter propaganda activity to counter the propaganda of the Home Rulers in order to show government's own sympathy with the Indian public. The services of known teachers like Prof. Rushbrook Williams of the Allahabad University were also secured for this purpose.⁹⁶ If a provincial government took action against a politician or a set of politicians its effects were to be checked in the neighbouring provinces.⁹⁷ For taking into consideration the latest political situation in the country as a whole, there were also, henceforth frequent meetings and consultations between the Viceroy and provincial governors and heads of local administration presided over by the Viceroy.⁹⁸ Despite these measures, the Secretary of State for India, E.S. Montagu was not happy with the style of policy of the Government of India. Speaking in the House of Commons on 12 July 1917, Montagu denounced the Government of India as "too wooden, too iron, too inelastic, too anti-delusion, to be of any use for the modern purposes we have in mind" ⁹⁹ In order to improve the conduct of the Indian bureaucracy towards political developments and to make it flexible Chelmsford appointed a "Committee of Inquiry".¹⁰⁰ But, as already seen, a particular watch was kept on the activities of Jinnah who could emerge into prominence despite these precautionary measures.

During the war years (1914-18) the government was not to welcome, for political purposes, the Indian politicians in their own country. Instead it sent Secretary of State for India, E.S. Montagu to India in November 1917. He proceeded back to England in March 1918 after meeting different politicians, associations and organizations from all the provinces and debating the Indian political issues with them.¹⁰¹ After his departure from India INC despatched a deputation to England headed by Tilak in April 1918 but this deputation was not allowed to reach there.¹⁰² It was returned from Egypt. Jinnah "detested" this "with profound regret".¹⁰³ According to him this deputation was required to visit England to counter "the vigorous campaign led by Lord Sydenham and other influential persons against self-government in India."¹⁰⁴ But this was all

being done by the British Government deliberately.¹⁰⁵ Though a joint appeal to government entitled "Trust us and we will not fail you" was issued with signatures of 26 Indian leaders including Jinnah, Tilak and others¹⁰⁶, yet it was not eased by the government who were working on their own strategy. To keep the politicians further busy Imperial War Conference was arranged in Delhi on 27-29 April 1918 for the purpose of considering the question of manpower in India and to consider the question of India's resources under heads of munitions, communications, food supply, and to suggest measures designed to secure efficiency and economy in regard to production, distribution, utilization and transport of all material connected with the successful prosecution of the war and the internal prosperity of the country. The politicians, including Jinnah, were invited to the conference. In this conference Jinnah and his group tried to use the opportunity for their cause of Home Rule so that a resolution in this regard may be passed.¹⁰⁷ At this Delhi War Conference it was after "considerable difficulty" that Viceroy could "counter political pressure and could secure a unanimity without indicating India's aspirations".¹⁰⁸ But the Home Rulers' intentions were duly publicised in the national newspapers.¹⁰⁹ As a follow-up war conferences in all provinces were to be arranged. At the Provincial War Conference held in Bombay on 10 June 1918 Jinnah was able to get a chance to deliver his speech for the cause of Home Rule reducing the Governor to lame excuses of showing his inability in matters of Reforms. Insulting attitude of Willingdon towards Tilak was also duly avenged by Jinnah who threw back into Governor's "face the insult which he had thrown at" the Home Rulers.¹¹⁰ This helped in further spreading the Home Rule Movement. Willingdon's behaviour was condemned in a public meeting on 15 June 1918 at Bombay addressed by Jinnah.¹¹¹ This was a unique happening in Bombay as the provincial war conferences in other provinces were held peacefully.¹¹²

After the British ensured their victory in the first world war, Montagu-Chelmsford Report on Reforms was published in early July 1918 in order to further involve the politicians in discussions on constitutional matters.¹¹³ It was on Jinnah's instance that special sessions of AIML and INC were held at Bombay towards the close of August 1918 to discuss this

report.¹¹⁴ Though there were initially differences of opinion on certain proposals of this Report for Reform,¹¹⁵ Jinnah could maintain unity for sometime more in the Indian ranks. On his insistence, agreement developed at these sessions that joint deputation of both the parties would soon proceed to England to suggest certain amendments in the Reforms Report which were required to be incorporated in the Bill intended to be moved in the Parliament.¹¹⁶ British government was not ready to allow such Deputations to proceed to England during the war. Under these circumstances when S.N. Banerjee, a recent seceder from Congress¹¹⁷, moved a resolution on 6 September 1918 in the Imperial Legislative Council for appointment of "a committee consisting of all the non-official Members of this Council" to consider the Reforms Report and "make recommendations to the Government of India"¹¹⁸, it was clear that government still wanted to keep the Indian politicians busy in India. Now the position had changed that the government was able to enlist support in this connection from a number of non-official members like Banerjee, Dr. Sapru, Khan Zulfikar Ali Khan and others, some of whom were to work on this committee later. Resolution was adopted with the overwhelming support of 48 members. Only two were against. Jinnah, however, abstained from voting, though he delivered a long speech on this resolution and had even declared: "you want to proceed slowly, we want to go faster"¹¹⁹ It was, however, after the war that this committee interviewed politicians including Jinnah. Despite all these official endeavours Jinnah emerged successful in demonstrating public resentment against the government.

Jinnah gave "a very careful thought" to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.¹²⁰ In his expressions he was most considerate and straight-forward. Speaking in the Legislative Council, Jinnah first acknowledged the services of Montagu and Chelmsford for their labours in preparing the Report. But he differed with the authors of this report who considered it a "substantial step towards Home Rule. A 'substantial step' to some extent, he maintained, has been taken in regard to provincial autonomy but that also depended on the nature of division of "reserved" and "transferred" subjects under the system of dyarchy.¹²¹ He was of the view that as some of the provinces are quite competent to manage their affairs, therein

all the subjects should be transferred to Indian hands. He was not agreeable with the reasons advanced in the Report for division of subjects in the provinces, but as a matter of compromise he was ready to accept "police and justice" as reserved subjects, rest being transferred to Indian hands in the provinces.¹²² Clause 43 of the Report was to him the "most objectionable feature" in the Report because by it the Governor had the power to disallow the continuance or introduction of a bill or motion in the legislative assembly if it related to the reserve subjects. He was not in favour of granting power of veto against the elected assembly. According to him, the Report failed to meet those objectives promised under the announcement of 20 August 1917.¹²³ At the central level also, Viceroy enjoyed power of veto against the elected central assembly. For him all this practically meant that the Indians were at the same position as they were in 1892.¹²⁴ In the formation of central government, the overall dominance of Governor-General was also disliked by him and was considered against the will of the elected representatives. However, he hoped that "responsible government in this country is bound to come, it must come". The question under discussion is only that of speed: "you want to proceed slowly; we want to go faster".¹²⁵ And that will come in the form of federation of India. He also maintained that if the legislature is given powers over certain subjects it should be sovereign and final restricting the power of the government. For him the day when the goal of responsible government is realized in India it would be a "glorious day which will form the brightest chapter in the history of Great Britain and of India".¹²⁶

The Government benches were perturbed by the these remarks of Jinnah. Sir William Vincent leading the attack, took exception to Jinnah's opinion on the autocratic nature of government. Dr. Sapru and Bannerjee tried to twist Jinnah's expression but they were duly corrected by Jinnah himself being a constitutional expert.¹²⁷

As a political leader who always advocated positive stance in politics, Jinnah was not in favour of totally rejecting the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. Rather, he not only himself struggled hard for bringing improvements in the Report but also made other politicians to work on the same line. Those who

favoured total rejection of the constitutional report were disliked by him.

For this purpose he appeared before the Southborough Committee in January 1919 in its meeting held in Bombay.¹²⁸ Not only this: He also went to England to appear before the Joint Parliamentary Committee in August 1919. This committee had been appointed by the Parliament in order to review the Government of India Bill (1919) by interviewing various Indian leaders by inviting them to London.¹²⁹ At both these committees, Jinnah was forceful enough to plead his case for early transfer of power to the Indian politicians. For this he advocated maximum provincial autonomy, independence of legislature and judiciary and full political freedom of the country.

By reading these ideas one is struck with wonder that even at this stage when most of his colleagues were not ready for freedom of the country, he was clearly advocating his constitutional ideas with a purpose of leading the country to freedom. This was the intention for which he was explaining definition of "responsible government" as promised by the British Government's declaration of 20 August 1917. Almost all the aspects of a constitution needed for a free country were explained by him in terms of powers of Governor-General, Governors, formation of Central and provincial legislatures, division of subjects between the centre and the provinces. The role of civil services, judiciary and executive was also explained with complete mastery over the details. The formation and function of the electorate by comparing it with the position in England, Canada, United States of America and other advanced countries in the past, he advanced justification for complete responsible government in India, at least in the provinces if not at the centre.¹³⁰

He was in favour of a federal constitution in which all the residuary powers should rest with the provinces. The office of the Secretary of State for India was required to be abolished forthwith. The Governor-General and the Governors were to be deprived of their autocratic powers. As a last point, if the British government works to do so, it was only in case of public security, law and order that they could be allowed to act in a discretionary manner. They were made responsible to the legislature

which was to enjoy all the powers. The nomination in the formation of legislative bodies, central or provincial, was to be dispensed with. All the seats were to be filled in by election based on electorate of 10 to 12 percent, being the educated class, of the Indian population. The Governors were to be appointed from men of public/political life in England so that they could bring fresh life into Indian society. All the provincial subjects were to be transferred to Indian hands who were to be made responsible not before the Governor but to the provincial legislature. The services, judicial or executive, were to be provincialized.¹³¹

With the Southborough Committee on Division of Functions on 29 January 1919 he tried his best for financial, legislative and administrative devolution in favour of the provinces who were required by him to enjoy even the powers of "provincial borrowing". As judiciary, law and order and police were proposed in the reserved departments under the Montagu-Chelmsford Report as part of dual system of administration in the provinces, Jinnah tried to separate the appointment of Presidency Small Cause Court judges and Provincial Small Cause Court judges for the purpose of law and order which he desired to be transferred to the Indian ministers as transferred subjects. The making of rules and regulations was allowed to remain as reserved subjects with police administration, but its execution was required as transferred subject. Education was also required by him to be made as transferred subject. He was against the existing arrangement that a provincial government could not even transfer any officer from one district to another within the same province without permission from the central government. He desired that all services functioning in the province should be provincialized.¹³²

It was with much preparation and determination that he appeared before the Joint Parliamentary Committee. As he was appearing as leader of AIML delegation he cited various League resolutions in support of his contention to improve the constitution of the country. Side by side he also explained the result of his own association with the Imperial Legislative Council since January 1910 and boldly came to the conclusion that the new constitutional proposals were not "substantial step" over the Minto-Morley Reforms, though in certain matters it was an

improved version. He resented the powers given to Governor-General and Governors under this Bill. He also expressed his protest against the dyarchy as provided in the Bill. Confronting the Joint Committee's stand that they could not go beyond the Bill, Jinnah tried his best to secure the division of subject in a manner suitable to Indian aspiration. He specifically desired the transference of subjects of Irrigation, canals, drainage, embankment, water storage, land revenue administration, Forests, land acquisition, development of mineral resources, industrial matters, inland waterways, control of newspapers and printing presses, Franchise and election of Indian and provincial legislatures, control of civil servants serving within province, new provincial taxes and borrowing of money on the sole credit of the province, subject to Indian legislation into Indian hands.¹³³ He also struggled hard that if it was not possible to transfer power from top to bottom to the popular government in India, a complete provincial autonomy at least in some advanced provinces of Bombay, Madras or Bengal should be introduced and the dyarchy be introduced at the central level. He was, however, ready to allow the control of Central Government over the autonomous provinces. He gave his own examples of working in the Imperial Legislative Council showing his disappointment with the policies of the British government functioning in utter disregard to the popular will of the Indians. Montagu, being Secretary of the Joint Committee, as well as Secretary of State for India and author of Montagu-Chelmsford Report, was very harsh on Jinnah when the latter said the whole scheme of reforms was based on "prejudice and timidity".¹³⁴ Montagu even complained that there was not even a single measure in his whole legislative and public career when Jinnah supported the government.¹³⁵ Jinnah's views were rejected when the committee submitted its report to the Parliament which passed the Bill towards the end of the year. However, on his return to India, Jinnah felt proud enough that he had projected the Indian point of view before the committee, though with a disappointment that his views were not fully incorporated in the Bill. At the same his disappointment was not to lead him to frustration. He was still prepared to work within the given circumstances.¹³⁶ He was happy with whatever he got.¹³⁷

His purpose was to grab even those opportunities offered by the Government of India Act (1919) and to prepare the nation for a better future.¹³⁸ It was with this idea that he supported the emergence of Gandhi at the Amritsar Congress in December 1919. Jinnah's support made Tilak to be defeated in the latter's plans to boycott the Bill.¹³⁹ His support also made Gandhi to assume the Presidentship of All India Home Rule League in April 1920.¹⁴⁰ After establishing himself at par with Jinnah, Gandhi felt himself secured in leadership. But as Jinnah was opposed to the government, he decided not to come in open fight with Gandhi.

As a Home Ruler, Jinnah had done his job well. He laboured a lot for the popularisation of this cause. If the people were not ready for it he was not to be blamed. If Gandhi was to betray him because of his secret designs, he was not responsible for it. He was rather caught unaware. Most of his Hindu colleagues had either joined Gandhi or they had secretly aligned themselves with the government to dodge him. As far as Muslims were concerned, they had been converted into Khilafatists and were not ready to hear any of his sane calls. As all these factors were helping causing the rise of new historical phenomena in the political field, a politician of the calibre of Jinnah's intellect who was very careful and sharp in his observation on the march of history, there could be no other better way for him than to save himself from the main political force which, according to him, was bound to meet its dead end. At the same he had not resorted to isolation, but of and on he called upon the people and politicians to realize the folly of Gandhi's foolish politics and return to the path of practical and sane political path.

The Home Rule Movement which was built at great pains, was transformed in late 1919 into the Khilafat Movement. In the next year even the Khilafat Movement was merged by Gandhi into the Non-Cooperation Movement which was also bound to fail in 1922. Despite these aspects and intrigues, Jinnah won the credit of popularising the message of freedom in the name of first freedom movement of British India during 1916-19. The grant of Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, despite its weakness, could not be possible without the Home Rule Move-

ment. Between all the political forces of this movement it was Jinnah who served as a bond of unity.

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87. *Ibid.*
88. *Ibid.*
89. Meston to Chelmsford, 11 January 1917, *Chelmsford Papers*, IO L.MSS.Eur.E.264/17.
90. Willingdon to Chelmsford, 7 December 1917, *Chelmsford Papers*, IO L.MSS.Eur. E.264/19.
91. Except this the actual telegram is neither available in the *Willingdon Papers* nor in *Montagu Papers*.
92. Sir Claude Hill to Chelmsford, 10 December 1917, *Chelmsford Papers*, IO L.MSS.Eur. E.264/19.

93. Lionel Curtis, Member of Willingdon's Executive Council, to Chelmsford, 24 January 1917, *Chelmsford Papers*, IOL.MSS. Eur. E.264/19.
94. Curtis to Chelmsford, 8 September 1917, *Chelmsford Papers*, IOL.MSS. Eur. E.264/19. For full text of Curtis proposals see his *Letters to the People of India on Responsible Govt.*, Calcutta, 1917. It was published at an opportune time of arrival of Montagu in India as underhand tactics of the government.
95. Secretary, Govt. of India (Home Deptt.) to all local Govts. and administrations, 20 March 1917, *Govt. of India (Home Deptt.) Confidential Proceedings*, July 1917, IOR P/33.
96. *Confidential Report of an Informal Committee Appointed to Consider the most suitable time of Advance Towards Responsible Govt.*, Allahabad, 1917, *Proceedings of the Home Deptt. (Confidential)*, 1918, IOR P/43. It was a result of this Committee's recommendations that official publications like *Indian Politics 1922-23*, (Supdt. Govt. Printing, Calcutta, 1923) started appearing after 1919. The *Indian Annual Register* was also started in this year. These publications carried political proceedings of the parties according to a particular point of view. For Prof. Rushbrook Williams's own version in this regard see his "The Evolution of the Quaid-i-Azam — A Personal Observation", in Dr A.H. Dani, *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, Islamabad, 1979, pp.126-133, particularly pp.128-129. Williams had tried to throw burden of change in the political situation on Gandhi by mentioning the role played by the Govt. in this regard. See *Ibid.*, p.129.
97. Willingdon to Chelmsford, 2 April 1917, *Chelmsford Papers*, IOL.MSS.Eur.E.264/18.
98. Willingdon to Chelmsford, 8 April, 1917, *Ibid.*
99. Peter Graham Robb, "The Government of India under Lord Chelmsford, 1916-1921, with special reference to the policies adopted towards constitutional change and political agitation in British India", Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1971, p.18.
100. *Ibid.*, p.24.
101. For details of deputations who met Montagu see Appendices to *Indian Diary, Montagu Papers*, IOL. MSS. Eur. D.523/41.
102. *Bombay Chronicle*, 6, 8-9, 13, 17, 24 April 1918.
103. See his telegram to Viceroy, S of S for India, and Lloyd-George, British Prime Minister in *Bombay Chronicle*, 24 April 1918.

104. *Ibid.*
105. Lord Sydenham, "The Danger in India", *Nineteenth Century and After* London, December 1918, pp.1113-1127. Similar other articles appeared in this journal later.
106. *Bombay Chronicle*, 24 April 1918.
107. *Bombay Chronicle*, 2 May 1918.
108. PS to Viceroy, to PS to S of S for India, telegram, 29 April, 1918, *Chelmsford Papers*, IOLMSS. Eur. E.264/20.
109. For instance see *Bombay Chronicle*, 2 May 1918.
110. Willingdon to Chelmsford, 11/12 June 1918, Willingdon to Montagu, 16 June 1918, *Willingdon Papers*, IOLMSS. Eur.F.93/3; *Bombay Judicial Deptt. (Confidential) Proceedings*, June 1918, 10R. P/36; *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, October 1917 — July 1918, XIV, Ahmedabad, 1965, p.470; D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, 1869-1920*, I, Bombay, 1951, p.282; *Times of India*, 11-17 June 1918, *Bombay Chronicle*, 11-17 June 1918; *Statesman*, 12 June 1918; *Englishman*, 13 June 1918.
111. *Bombay Chronicle*, 17 June 1918.
112. Robb, *op.cit.*, p.34; ed. S.L. Karandihar, *Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, Poona, 1957, p.505.
113. *Bombay Chronicle*, 8 July 1918.
114. Dr. D.D. Sathayee (pub.) *Report of the Special Session of the Indian National Congress held at Bombay on 29th, 30th, 31st August and 1st Sept. 1918*, pp.14-16; *AIML Records*, FMA, Karachi University, File No. 117.
115. *The Times*, 14, 25 & 30 July, 1918.
116. *Ibid.*, and Pirzada, I, *op.cit.*, pp.447-472.
117. Rangaswamy Ayyangar's remarks. See *Ibid.*, p.132. Jinnah said that the Council was "not the place where we can defend, justify or impeach the position of the seceders from the Congress". See *Ibid.*, p.133.
118. *Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council, From March 1918 to April 1919*, *op.cit.*, p.93.
119. *Ibid.*, pp.135, 142-144.
120. *Bombay Chronicle*, 8 July, 1918.

121. Jinnah's Speech, 21 September 1918.
122. Jinnah's Speech, 21 September 1918, *Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council*, LVII, op.cit., p.133.
123. *Ibid.*, p.134.
124. *Ibid.*, p.134.
125. *Ibid.*, p.135.
126. *Ibid.*, p.136.
127. *Ibid.*, pp.148-50.
128. *Evidence Taken Before the Reform Committee (Franchise)* Vol. II, Govt. of India, IOL V/26/261/3; and *Reforms Committee of Division of Functions Evidences*, Govt. of India, IOLR/Part/2/409-D.
129. "Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Joint Parliamentary Committee" in *Report from Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill*, published as secret document, IOLR/Part/2/405.
130. *Ibid.*, Explaining this Jinnah said, "Now what was the position of the United Kingdom when there was a complete responsible government run in this country? In England in 1835 you had 4.6 percent; in Ireland you had 1.2 percent; in Scotland, 3.2 percent; In 1871, England, 9 percent; Ireland, 32.2 percent. Scotland, 7.6 percent. In 1881, England, 9.7 percent; Ireland, 4.4 percent; and Scotland, 8.4 percent. In 1889 you had 15.8 percent in England, 16.6 percent in Ireland, and 14.2 percent in Scotland. We do not stop at England, but we go further. What do you find in other countries in Europe, you find first of all in Sweden, there was 1 percent of the population that go into the electorate, in France 25.6 percent; the Chamber of Deputies in Italy was elected by 2½ percent of the population till the Franchise was broadened in 1832; and you find as late as 1888 only 17.6 percent of the population in the United States of America took part in electing the most complete responsible government in the world. Therefore, my Lord, it is no argument that you will not be able to get more than 10 percent — if you wish to lower the Franchise, if the Southborough Committee had not put such a high qualification, you certainly would get at least 10 percent of the population in the electorate. But are we asking for responsible government today, although we have 10 percent of the population that can get into the electorate. We are not what do you find in Canada? In Canada people had no municipal franchise even, they had no municipal experience when complete responsible government was established in Canada (see Lord Durham's Report). Therefore, I say this argument that we

- have not got an electorate in without justification. There is no warrant for it". See *Ibid*.
131. *Ibid*.
 132. *Reforms Committee (Division of Functions) Evidence, op.cit.*
 133. "Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Joint Parliamentary Committee", *op.cit.*
 134. *Ibid*.
 135. *Ibid*.
 136. *Bombay Chronicle*, 17 November 1919.
 137. *Ibid*.
 138. *Ibid*.
 139. *Report of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Indian National Congress of Amritsar on the 27th, 29th, 30th, 31st December and 1st January 1920, Amritsar, 1922, pp.124-128.*
 140. Jayakar, *op.cit.*, pp.316-19.