Nazimuddin Ministry: Reasons for its Dismissal

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Pakistan adopted the pre-independence political system which was based on the Government of India Act of 1935. The Provisional Constitution of Pakistan, essentially a slightly modified version of the 1935 Act, remained operative from 1947 till the promulgation of a new constitution in March 1956. Under Section 10 of the Provisional Constitution, the Governor General had a Council of Minister which technically held office 'during his pleasure', but it was understood that this Council, or the Cabinet, would remain in office as long as it enjoyed the confidence of the legislature, i.e. the Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan.[1] After independence, the governors general, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (August 1947-September 1948), Khwaja Nazimuddin (September 1948-October 1951), and Malik Ghulam Muhammad till early 1953, acted strictly according to parliamentary norms, resisting any temptation to interfere with the functioning of government unless invited to do so. Quaid himself adhered to this principle until the cabinet itself formally requested him to guide the nation as the Quaid-i-Azam and take any action that he thought necessary. Henceforth, he assumed executive responsibilities and used to preside over cabinet meetings. But after his demise and during Khwaja Nazimuddin's governor generalship, the practice of the Governor General presiding over cabinet meetings was discontinued. Early in 1953, when Pakistan was seemingly faced with a crisis, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, in a proclamation issued on April 17, using discretionary power under the above mentioned section of the Provisional Constitution, dismissed the Nazimuddin Ministry, saying that it had proved entirely 'inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing

the country. In the emergency which has arisen I have felt it incumbent upon me to ask the cabinet to relinquish office so that a new cabinet better fitted to discharge obligations toward Pakistan may be formed'.[2] The Governor General's action was beyond the parliamentary norms, as the federal legislature had expressed its confidence in the Nazimuddin Ministry a few days earlier, when it had passed the annual Budget. His action shocked the constitutional circles at the time and hindered the development of parliamentary system in Pakistan. Here an attempt is made to investigate the reasons that led to the dismissal of the Nazimuddin's Ministry.

Before Khwaja Nazimuddin's dismissal, several factors eroded his influence and weakened his support-base. The rise of intense factionalism at the centre was one such factor. Its germs were clearly discernable when Khwaja Nazimuddin became the prime minister. His selection was made in an atmosphere of intrigue and power politics. At the time of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination (October 16, 1953), he was the Governor General of Pakistan, and as constitutional head of state, he was supposed to be above party politics. In that position, he should have ensured observance of democratic norms so that healthy traditions could develop in the country Instead, he lowered himself from the august position and became involved in political bargaining. The selection of governor general and prime minister was made in complete secrecy by a select few which was endorsed by the federal cabinet that had no lawful authority after the assassination of the prime minister. Khwaja Nazimuddin vacated the office of governor general to become the prime minister; later on, he was elected member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan as well as leader of the Pakistan Muslim League Assembly party. Malik Ghulam Muhammad, then federal finance minister, whom Liaquat Ali Khan had decided to remove from the cabinet due to his serious illness, was selected for the office of governor general in place of Nazimuddin.[3] Negative perceptions about the two went into their selection. Nazimuddin's supporters thought that they would have a free hand in administering the affairs of government because of the serious illness of Ghulam Muhammad and ceremonial nature of the office of governor general under the Provisional Constitution, while their opponents

perceived Nazimuddin as a weak administrator who could be easily persuaded to follow a particular course of action. An important consideration in the selection of these two personalities for these highest offices of the state was their provincial background, i.e. one hailed from East Pakistan and the other from Punjab (West Pakistan). This was a direct acknowledgement of the emerging phenomenon of factionalism. Subsequently, even the federal cabinet was reportedly factionalised and divided into the so-called 'Punjabi-Bengali' groups. However, this division was not strictly on provincial or ethnic lines. The 'Bengali Group' had in its ranks non-Bengalis (like Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Abdus Sattar Pirzada and Dr. Mahmud Husain), while the 'Punjabi Group' was supported by non-Punjabis such as General Ayub Khan and Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza. Factionalism was sharpened by differences on constitutional, political and other policy issues.

One of the constitutional issues related to finding an agreeable form of federalism. Pakistan then comprised two geographic regions: East Pakistan and West Pakistan. East Pakistan was just one province, one-fifth in size as compared to West Pakistan and had a majority of the country's population. It was linguistically and ethnically homogenous, inhabited by the Bengalis with an insignificant proportion of non-Bengali migrants from India. While West Pakistan had linguistic, ethnic and administrative variety. It consisted of three Governor's provinces (Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province), one Chief Commissioner's province (British Baluchistan), ten princely states (Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Qalat, Kharan, Makran, Las Bela, Swat, Chitral, Dir and Amb), Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier and the federal capital, Karachi. The Pakistani constitution-makers had to find a federal formula for these units. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) assigned this task to a Basic Principles Committee (BPC). The first federal formula, that was evolved by the BPC and presented to the CAP in an Interim Report in 1950, provided a bicameral legislature and was based on the principle that in a federation no single unit should have a dominant position at the centre. Although the issue of franchise had not yet been decided, the Bengalis viewed this formula to be discriminatory, designed to deprive them of their legitimate majority. In response to

criticism of the Interim Report, Liaquat Ali Khan withdrew the Report in order to find a new formula acceptable to all. He convened a meeting of the Muslim members of the CAP where he presented the principle of parity at the centre between East and West Pakistan; this principle had earlier been suggested by a Bengali member, Maulana Muhammad Akram Khan, in the BPC. The Bengali members of the CAP accepted the principle of parity, but the BPC could not evolve a federal formula on its basis in the life-time of Liaquat Ali Khan.[4]

It was left to Khwaja Nazimuddin to work out a federal formula on the basis of parity. In order to win broader support for the principle of parity, he first introduced it in the composition of the Pakistan Muslim League's Council, which the Leaguers considered synonymous to the Muslim nation of Pakistan. The argument put forth was that the Muslims of West Pakistan, who constituted a majority of the Muslim population of the country, would surrender their majority and agree to give parity to the Bengali Muslims on the party Council, and in return the Bengali Muslims would agree to parity of representation between East and West Pakistan at the federal level. Consequently, the Council of the Pakistan Muslim League, in its session at Dhaka in October 1952, amended the party constitution to give effect to this decision; the East Pakistan Muslim League was allocated 327 seats on the Council and an equal number of seats were provided for the six party branches in West Pakistan.[5] Soon after this, Nazimuddin worked out a federal formula which made provision for parity separately in each of the two houses at the centre, the house of units (upper house) and the house of the people (lower house). East Pakistan had 60 seats in the upper house and 200 seats in the lower house, and an equal number of seats was distributed in the two houses among the nine units (Punjab; Sind; NWFP; Tribal Areas; Bahawalpur; Baluchistan; Baluchistan States; Khairpur; and Karachi, the federal capital) of West Pakistan. The lower house had all the real powers in matters relating to budget, money bills and motions of confidence while the upper house was merely a recommendatory body.[6] This federal formula was incorporated in the BPC Report that Nazimuddin presented to the CAP on December 22, 1952. It was criticised by the opposition parties in East Pakistan and by the party branches of

Nazimuddin's own party in West Pakistan.[7] It sharpened the division in the federal cabinet; the so-called 'Bengali Group' supported the formula while the 'Punjabi Group' opposed it, arguing that under this formula, East Pakistan could easily manoeuvre to dominate a 'fragmented' West Pakistan. This conflict in the cabinet also influenced the branches of the Pakistan Muslim League in both the wings of Pakistan which contributed to the discrediting of the Nazimuddin government.

Another aspect of constitution-making that made Khwaja Nazimuddin unpopular in influential quarters was the Islamic character of the future constitution. The Islamic provisions that the BPC had recommended in its Interim Report were totally inadequate. Besides suggesting inclusion of the Objectives Resolution, passed by the CAP in March 1949, as a directive principle of state policy, it simply thought it 'not possible' to detail Islamic provisions although it made a general observation that provision should be made in 'many spheres of governmental activities' to enable Muslims to order their lives according to the Quran and Sunnah.[8] When the Interim Report was withdrawn, proposals were invited from the public to make the future constitution Islamic. The volume of these proposals was so large that the BPC appointed a suggestions subcommittee, chaired by Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, for their evaluation. This subcommittee had completed a major part of its task in the life-time of Liaquat Ali Khan, but the BPC finalised its Report during the prime ministership of Nazimuddin. This Report included as many Islamic provisions as was possible. However, if one keeps in mind the prevailing political atmosphere and the popular support for the demand for an Islamic constitution in view, it is hard to imagine that the Islamic content of the BPC Report would have been much different had Liaquat Ali Khan been still alive. But Nazimuddin's 'intensely religious' life-style[9] and his close association with the ulama strengthened the belief that he was the one responsible for the Islamic content of the constitutional proposals. Thus, he earned the displeasure of those who were opposed to an Islamic order in Pakistan. More damaging to his image and influence as prime minister was his vacillating policy on the Ahmadiyya issue — an issue that was linked by the Islamic forces with the constitutional proposals.

The Ahmadiyya issue had its origin in the pre-independence days, when at the turn of the twentieth century, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiyya community, made Messianic and, according to ulama, other heretical claims. A conflict began between the Ahmadis and the rest of the Muslim community which was expressed in print-form as well as from the public platform, and which resulted at times in violent tragic incidents. The high literacy rate of the Ahmadis, the official patronage and their substantial representation in the government services, out of proportion to their numerical strength, caused resentment among the educated Muslims whose perceptions of the Ahmadis were also influenced by Allama Muhammad Iqbal's writings on the subject.[10] The ulama's resentment was directed against Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, a staunch Ahmadi, who rose to high offices under the British including membership of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and subsequently became the foreign minister of Pakistan. After independence, the ulama slowly and tactfully built up a formidable campaign against the Ahmadis which climaxed during Nazimuddin's Ministry. In July 1952, they articulated their demands at an all Muslim Parties Convention at Lahore into three points: (i) Ahmadis should be declared as non-Muslims; (ii) Zafrullah Khan should be removed from the office of foreign minister; and (iii) all Ahmadis should be removed from key posts. This Convention appointed a committee of action (*majlis-i amal*), representing about a dozen religious organizations, to put pressure on the Nazimuddin government to accept these demands.[11] Several deputations of ulama met with Prime Minister Nazimuddin to convince him of the validity of these demands. He did express sympathy for the demands but indicated the implications if these were accepted. He raised the hopes of the ulama by his indecision on this issue. The BPC Report, that he presented to the CAP in December 1952, did not touch the Ahmadiyya issue. Therefore, in January 1953, another all-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention was called to consider the Report. The Ahmadiyya issue dominated its deliberations. The Convention authorised the committee of action to resort to direct action in case of non-acceptance of the demands.[12] When the committee started the direct action movement, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, the chief minister of the Punjab,

who disagreed with the Nazimuddin Ministry on the federal formula and other policy issues, came out publicly in support of the demands. When law and order in the Punjab deteriorated, Nazimuddin finally rejected the demands. In March 1953, martial law was imposed to control the deteriorating situation. The imposition of martial law and ruthless suppression of the anti-Ahmadiyya movement did not earn any popularity for the Nazimuddin Ministry.

Distribution of country's limited financial resources had also been a source of conflict since 1948, when the central government, in view of large defence expenditure, had taken over for two years (subsequently extended for another two years) the provinces' share of income tax and the administration of the sales tax, with 50 per cent of revenue under this head going to the provinces. East Pakistan's demand for a larger share in the export duty on jute, particularly after the rise in duty on jute following its increased demand in foreign markets, was added to this controversy. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan invited a British expert, Sir Jeremy Raisman, who evolved a formula for the allocation of revenues between the centre and the provinces. Under the Raisman Award, the provinces were allocated 50 per cent of the income tax revenue. For the sales tax, the existing arrangements were made permanent. As regards the duty on jute, East Pakistan was to get 62.50 per cent of the net proceeds, and the existing limit of 35 million rupees was waived.[13] The Nazimuddin Ministry was to implement the Raisman Award. This Award was formally accepted by all the provinces but after its acceptance, East Pakistan still claimed one half of the sales tax collected in Karachi on goods meant for East Pakistan.[14] The distribution of development funds was also a source of conflict between the centre and the provinces. The 'Bengalis' had often targeted Ghulam Muhammad, when he was federal finance minister, for an anti-Bengali bias. The continuation of this conflict also damaged the Nazimuddin Ministry.

Another factor that made Prime Minister Nazimuddin unpopular was the state of Pakistan's economy. Pakistan was established in the least developed areas of the South Asian Subcontinent, which had prompted the Congress leadership during the Pakistan movement to declare the demand for a separate Muslim state as economically inviable. The new state's

economic survival in the early years was the result of strict financial control and its leadership's sheer determination and dedication to keep the state an independent entity. Pakistan experienced temporary economic prosperity when there was a sudden rise in the demand for its raw materials, basically jute and cotton, in the international market as a result of the Korean War. In the resultant trade boom, it earned huge amounts of foreign exchange most of which was spent on the import of industrial machinery and defence equipment, and a part of it was wasted on the import of consumer and luxury items. The government did not realise the temporary nature of this prosperity and failed to save as much as it should have for future needs. This trend continued even after the termination of the trade boom in mid-1951. The Nazimuddin government went on consuming foreign exchange on the import of unnecessary consumer and luxury goods and realised the gravity of the problem only when a financial crisis was right on its head in the last quarter of 1952.

Another important source for the depletion of foreign exchange was the import of wheat and rice to make up for the food shortages. These shortages were real as well as artificial. In 1951-52, poor rainfalls and then heavy floods seriously damaged crops in the Punjab and Sind. The prospects of land reforms also influenced the production of foodgrains. The issue of land reforms had come into focus immediately after independence. The Pakistan Muslim League had appointed an Agrarian Reforms Committee which made some radical recommendations for land reforms. Its central working committee had instructed the party governments in the provinces to implement these recommendations, since 'Agriculture' was a provincial subject. In East Pakistan, the State Acquisition of Land Act was passed by the Legislative Assembly to implement these recommendations in their true spirit. However, in West Pakistan, nothing was done to reduce the size of the land holdings, but the provincial governments in the NWFP, Punjab and Sind did try to reform the land tenure system to improve the lot of the peasantry. The big landlords opposed even these mild reforms because they apprehended more drastic land reforms in future that might reduce the size of their landed estates. They decided not only to decrease the wheat cultivated areas but also resorted to hoard-

ing to create artificial food shortages in order to discredit the governments at the centre and in the provinces. Because of these shortages, Nazimuddin was dubbed as the *quaid-i-millat* (leader of shortages). In order to meet food shortage in 1952, the Nazimuddin government had to import foodgrains worth about $ 250 million, an amount that was reportedly more than 50 per cent of the total revenues. These expenditures further reduced the already dwindling foreign exchange reserves.[15] The steps taken by the government in late 1952, were quite effective and these began to show results in the first quater of 1953. Drastic import restrictions, which affected not only luxury items but also such essentials as finished textiles, cut private imports by 60 per cent below the 1952 level.[16] In the first quarter of 1953, there was a surplus of approximately $21,000,000 in contrast to a deficit of about $25,000,000 in the last quarter of 1952. Similarly, by early 1953, the food shortages had been largely controlled and the need for wheat from abroad was overestimated partly because the quantities hoarded within the country were underestimated. Later on, the wheat requested from the US was not imported in full and a part of it that arrived in Pakistan was not distributed. The 1953-54 budget, estimated to be a surplus one, provided for more austerity measures. However, the control measures caused unemployment and inflation, and the resulting price rise and discontent made the Nazimuddin Ministry unpopular.

The Kashmir issue also damaged the image of the Nazimuddin Ministry. At the time of Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, this issue was in focus. Under his pressure, Dr. Frank Graham, the UN representative, had submitted his (first) report to the Security Council on October 15, 1951, in which he had indicated the points of disagreement between the governments of India and Pakistan regarding the quantum of forces to be kept on the two sides of the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the process of demilitarization and the timing of the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator, and recommended further negotiations between the two governments for ironing out differences within six weeks. The Security Council accepted his recommendations. During the Nazimuddin's Ministry, Dr. Graham submitted four more reports in which there was 'narrowing of gap', as a result of concessions made by

Pakistan, but not a complete resolution of the differences. In his final report submitted on March 27, 1993, he simply recommended direct negotiations between Pakistan and India on the remaining points of difference. Such a course of action had also been urged in the US-UK-sponsored resolution in the Security Council on December 27, 1952. The stalement on the Kashmir issue generated discontent against Prime Minister Nazimuddin.

The civilian bureaucracy disliked the Nazimuddin Ministry. One reason was inherent in its composition. The higher bureaucracy was then dominantly non-Bengali, and in an atmosphere of intense provincialism it could not behave differently. Besides, essentially secular in orientation, it disapproved of the Islamic colour that the Nazimuddin government was giving to the future constitution. It also resented political control on policy matters. In addition, it perceived that Nazimuddin was a weak administrator who did not pursue with vigour important administrative, political and constitutional issues; although he himself vehemently denied the charge in one of his campaign speeches during the 1964-65 elections. Whatever might be the validity of the charge and its defence, it was a fact that the law and order situation deteriorated and the main brunt of criticism had to be faced by the bureaucracy.

The fate of the Nazimuddin Ministry was determined especially by its attitude towards the US strategic plans. The US was then developing security arrangements for the region and was keenly interested in recruiting Pakistan for this purpose and in getting bases in Pakistan. Its policy-makers' main concern in their dealings with Pakistan was that it might not provoke the Indian leadership. The Nazimuddin government on its part was unwilling to join any defence arrangement unless all the Arab states joined it and the regional conflicts, including the Kashmir and the Palestine issues, were resolved.[17] At first, the US proposed the Allied Middle East Defence Command and then the Middle East Defence Organisation. Pakistan was actively considered for membership of these plans. These plans, however, failed to mature primarily because of the Egyptian opposition before and after the Revolution in Egypt. With Dwight Eisenhower as President and John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State, there was a change in US policy and general political atmosphere. The US Administration now embraced the

concept of a defence organisation of the countries of the 'northern tier' which any, if not all, of the Arab States could join. John Foster Dulles planned a negotiating tour of the relevant countries in the Spring of 1953. However, the Nazimuddin government, particularly the 'Bengali Group', still stuck to its earlier policy, and it was unlikely to endorse any defence plan of the 'northern tier'. The US Department of State and the Pentagon were aware of this situation. Therefore, in late 1952, instead of the political leadership, they initiated contacts with General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, and Governor General Ghulam Muhammad for negotiating military assistance and security arrangements. Both of them were supportive of close security relations with the US to acquire modern weapons and settle the Kashmir dispute. The so-called 'Punjabi Group', including Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza and other important members of the higher bureaucracy shared their viewpoint. It was this similarity of perceptions that Admiral Arther W. Radford, the US Chief of Naval Operations and member (soon after chairman) of JCS, during his visit to Pakistan, held 'satisfactory talks' with Ayub Khan and Ghulam Muhammad on Pak-US security relations.[18] The rift in the Nazimuddin government caused by differences on foreign policy was a crucial factor in the dismissal of the Ministry.

Khwaja Nazimuddin's support-base was East Pakistan and organisation of the Pakistan Muslim League. He alienated both by his policies and actions. The language controversy brought down the graph of his popularity in East Pakistan. Before independence, Urdu had been regarded as the common heritage of the South Asian Muslims and their *lingua franca*. After independence, the issue of national language demanded immediate attention. The way it was handled left much to be desired. The blame for failure to adopt Urdu as the national language must be shared by Nazimuddin more than anybody else. Despite his attachment to Urdu and his desire to give it national status, he failed to devise any dynamic strategy to give it practical shape. It all started when he was chief minister of East Pakistan (August 1947-September 1948). The protagonists of the Bengali language started a movement to put pressure on the government to make Bengali as one of the national languag-

es. Nazimuddin easily succumbed to their pressure and promised concessions which perhaps he could have easily avoided.[19] Quaid-i-Azam's visit to East Pakistan and his speeches in support of adoption of Urdu as the only national language diffused the situation. While the movement in support of Bengali continued unabated,the Muslim League governments at the centre and in East Pakistan did nothing practical to make Urdu the only state language. During Nazimuddin's time, the language controversy reached the climax when his government prepared a Six-Year National Education Plan which provided for 'Urdu as the national language'.[20] During a visit to Dhaka in January 1952, he publicly supported the cause of Urdu in pursuance of this plan. His casual comments in support of Urdu reactivated, and united, the pro-Bengali language forces. They set up an all-party state language committee of action to organise a movement in support of Bengali. This committee gave a call for a province-wide strike on February 21. The government handled the demonstrations on the strike day carelessly. The result was that several demonstrators were killed in police firing. After this tragic incident, Nazimuddin virtually dumped the language issue which pleased neither the supporters of Urdu nor those who wanted to make Bengali one of the national languages. In East Pakistan, he was identified with those who wanted 'tode-Bengalise' the Bengalis.

Nazimuddin lost the support of the Pakistan Muslim League by his handling of its organisation. After assuming the office of prime minister, he rejoined the Muslim League and was elected leader of its parliamentary party. Pressure was then put on him from different sections of the party to assume its presidency. But clause 6 of the party constitution which required that every office-bearer should 'have been a member of some primary branch League for at least one year past', barred his election to this office, since he did not meet this condition.[21] Besides, according to his own subsequent admission, even Liaquat Ali Khan had come to realise that one person could not perform the duties of the party president as well as those of the office of the prime minister and that he was planning to relinquish the party office. But when Nazimuddin himself got an opportunity to take a decision on this issue, he succumbed to the temptation of becoming the party president as well. The bar on his election in

clause 6 was removed by deletion of the words 'for at least one year past' from this clause. He was then elected president of the Pakistan Muslim League. What Liaquat Ali Khan had realised in his life-time was demonstrated during Nazimuddin's presidency. The latter failed miserably to perform effectively his duties as party president. According to the party constitution, the Pakistan Muslim League had a working committee of twenty-one members which functioned as its national executive. The president was empowered to nominate its members, except the five office-bearers who were its *ex officio* members. During his entire tenure as party president, Nazimuddin could not find time to nominate all the members of his working committee. The result was that the decisions taken by an incomplete working committee were often challenged, some even in courts of law. For instance, early in 1952, the central working committee empowered Nazimuddin to give a decision in the factional disputes of the Sind Muslim League. Nazimuddin waited till March 1953, when he announced removal of Muhammad Ayub Khuhru from the presidentship of the Sind League with effect from December 30, 1951. And when the latter ignored his orders, Nazimuddin recommended to then a non-existing working committee Ayub Khuhru's expulsion from the Muslim League. Ayub Khuhru went to the Chief Court of Sind and obtained restraining orders against Nazimuddin.[22]

Nazimuddin virtually immobilised the party organisation throughout Pakistan. The faction-ridden East Pakistan Muslim League was paralysed by his government's mishandling of the language issue. The grant of equal representation to the East Pakistan branch on the central council of the Pakistan Muslim League failed to revive workers' confidence in the party. In West Pakistan also, the party branches were either hostile to Nazimuddin or in limbo. The Punjab branch was under severe strains due to the anti-Ahmadiyya movement in the province. Even otherwise, its leadership held views quite opposite to those of Nazimuddin on several policy issues. The Sind party chief, as already mentioned, had exposed the authority of the party president by successfully challenging Nazimuddin's rulings in the court. As for the NWFP Muslim League, Nazimuddin failed to give a verdict in the factional disputes of this branch that were referred to him. The party branches in Baluchistan and

Karachi had been dissolved by the president and the working committee respectively, and *ad hoc* committees were in the process of conducting fresh elections. Nazimuddin was personally held responsible for this state of the party organisation; and when he needed the support of the party, it was not available to him.

Thus, by April 1953, poor state of the economy and factionalism, heightened by conflicts on constitutional, political and foreign policy issues, had weakened the position of Prime Minister Nazimuddin. Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, with the support of the alienated civilian bureaucracy and military leadership, carefully planned in complete secrecy against his Ministry. Using the discretionary power under the Provisional Constitution, he dismissed the Ministry, and installed Muhammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, who had apparently come on a private visit to Pakistan a couple of days earlier, as Prime Minister. The primary considerations that weighed in the selection of Bogra for his new office were his ethnic origin and the confidence he enjoyed of the US Administration. Nazimuddin tried to resist his dismissal. He pointed out to the Governor General that he still enjoyed the confidence of the legislature which had passed the Budget for the year 1953-54, presented by his government, and that as Governor General he himself had behaved differently with the Prime Minister, but Ghulam Muhammad did not listen to his representations. He also tried to contact the Queen in England to get Ghulam Muhammad removed from the office of Governor General, but he found that his telephone lines had been cut off. He then reconciled himself to his dismissal and simply termed the Governor General's action as unconstitutional, illegal, and undemocratic.[23] After his dismissal, he made a half-hearted attempt to control the Pakistan Muslim League, but he soon realised that it would not be a smooth sailing, and he was not prepared to put up the type of resistance required for the assertion of his authority as the party president. He virtually retired from politics, and re-emerged after the lifting of martial law in 1962 to lead one faction of the Pakistan Muslim League.

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8. See the 'Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee' in Golam Wahed Choudhury, *Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan,* Dacca, 1967, pp.32-61.

9. When Khwaja Nazimuddin became the Governor General, he instructed his staff to offer prayers regularly five times a day, and at diplomatic functions drinks would not be served in his presence.

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