

The Colonial State, Agrarian Policy and Peasant Response in Punjab during Nineteenth Century

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This study attempts to develop the argument that some kind of relationship existed between the colonial state¹ and response of its subject people and their strategy which ranged from constitutional methods of appeals, petitions, boycott and agitation to revolutionary warfare as demanded by the ongoing anti-imperialist struggle for freedom.² The essential issue for discussion is how the colonial state (its structure and functioning) and its agrarian policies, primarily dictated by the overarching goal of economic exploitation to feed the industrial revolution in England, fostered such conditions as led to the transformation of an apathetic, subdued and loyal people (who had saved the *raj* in the armed struggle of 1857-59 by offering their voluntary support in the form of logistics and manpower)³ into highly motivated and militant soldiers of the Indian struggle for freedom. For a clear exposition of argument, paper is divided into four sections. Section I analyses the self-image of the British *raj*, law and the ruled. Section II discusses the fashioning of the new state structure and its functioning. Section III discusses the implementation of British agrarian policy and peasant response. Section IV sums up the discussion.

I

Self-Image of the British Raj, Law and the Ruled

The self-image of the *raj* had partly been moulded by a number of assumptions about the potential threat from a high-spirited and martial local population and the border tribes, and partly by the early British administrators' perception of their

role in the newly annexed Punjab and their attitude towards the ruled. The British officers had projected themselves as saviours of the *raj* from the cataclysm of 1857. Imbued with imperial consciousness, they pursued their mission "to subdue, administer, convert and improve without halting and without question".⁴ Sense of *Angrezi Dharma* provided justification and direction to the functionaries of the British *raj*. Above all, these officers were keen to carve their image as decisive, strong and efficient but sensitive, fair and accessible to people.

Legitimacy of their rule was the vital concern of the British.⁵ Firstly, in order to legitimize their authority, the colonial state was obliged to cultivate good will and support of those institutions, social groups, religious elites, landed-aristocracy, *jagirdars*, prominent families and war-like tribes, whose help was regarded vital for political control. This major compulsion of the imperial authority was highlighted in a document on "social and political inter course with Punjabis" distributed amongst young officers.⁶ Loyalty and trust of the more numerous small peasantry was even more crucial for the expanding British empire because its willingness to pay maximum land revenue and to furnish large number of recruits only could ensure the solvency and military security of the *raj*.

Secondly, law constituted the most significant basis of legitimacy to colonial officials.⁷ That was why the writings of the spokesmen of the *raj* and even its functionaries are replete with the advocacy of extension of 'rule of law' to the each territorial constituent of the British empire in India.⁸ It was argued that the definition and codification of the law was central to the process of legitimization of colonial state's policies. For example, the Punjab settlements from 1846 to 1870, which had been undertaken without 'legal sanction', were formalised by the Land Revenue Act 1871. With the finalisation of assessment procedures under the Land Revenue Act 1887, appropriation of land-revenue, forests or natural resources became a lawful right of the colonial state.⁹ Besides, the utilitarians had assigned law a valuable role in the modernisation of despotic and oriental societies, particularly, India.¹⁰

In spite of recurrent emphasis on the manifold uses of law, occasional display of coercive power and repressive power

of the state was deemed essential for keeping alive the myth of the mighty British empire in the minds of its subjects.¹¹ However, it was punctuated by gestures of goodwill and sympathy in order to establish its image as a benevolent public authority. Undoubtedly, the Indian society as a whole had submitted to the imperial authority, its laws and codes, regulating social relations property ownership, eviction suits and exchange relations. However, they had not accepted the intellectual and moral leadership of their colonial masters. Conscious of this lacunae in their citadel of power, particularly, its liberal spokesmen such as Charles Grant and Lord Macaulay underlined the urgency of buttressing their conquest by good will and support of the people. In their view this could be done through the introduction of English education.¹²

While developing the idea of conquest over mind, Charles Trevelyan went to the extent of assigning an interventionist role to the colonial policy which could lead India either to the path of reform or revolution. In his view, the most effective strategy was the inculcation of colonial mentality among Indians. That was why the British *raj*, without reducing the quantum of colonial exploitation, had concentrated on the dissemination of colonial ideology through the introduction and spread of western learning and institutions.¹³ Such a step created new pockets of vested interests in the perpetuation of the *raj* as well as trained an army of western-educated Indians for fulfilling the requirements of the expanding administrative apparatus of the colonial state. the most brilliant product of the process of European improvement was the new Indian intelligentsia who rose on the crest of 'renaissance' in Bengal. In spite of their awareness of the contradiction of interests and goals between British imperialists and Indian nationalists, they had endorsed the 'civilizing mission' of England.¹⁴ Their ambivalent attitude was characteristic of the colonial consciousness¹⁵, both at the urban and rural level. Perhaps unwittingly, this reinforced the British efforts to create an illusion of permanence of the *raj*.

Was this illusion of permanence and legitimacy of the colonial state justified in view of the slow but irreversible crystallisation of anti-imperialist sentiments and revolutionary consciousness of the peasantry, mediated by the intelligentsia in Punjab? The answer is no. A curious mix of authoritarian,

paternal and democratic element, the initial policy of the colonial administration in Punjab appeared "to guarantee a strong, simple paternal rule, devoted to the welfare of a society of sturdy peasant-proprietors".¹⁶ However, the ensuing discussion would show that chiefs and jagirdars were wooed, once again, after 1857 revolt, as powerful allies of the *raj*, but the peasant-proprietors were gradually relegated to background because they had no social influence and thus no political weightage. For a proper understanding of the role of the state in driving the peasant to rebellion, an analysis of the new state structure and its functioning is relevant.

II

Colonial State-Structure and its Functioning in Punjab:

The British rulers, while fashioning a new state-structure for Punjab after the absorption of the Lahore Kingdom into the empire in 1849, were faced with a three-fold task: (i) to convert "the sullen and bitter resignation of the vanquished into honest, contented and hearty loyalty"¹⁷ (ii) infusion of the elements of civilized administration (iii) to convert Punjab into not only "a secure but also profitable possession".¹⁸ In order to execute this three-fold programme efficiently, economically and vigorously, Lord Dalhousie devised his own expedient, almost unique but temporary model, designated as the Board of Administration¹⁹, which would function under the non-Regulation System.²⁰

The Punjab Government, which drew at least half of its corps of administrators from civil service was military in form and spirit. Control over officers was achieved through the application of the Benthamite principles of personal responsibility, accountability and inspectability.²¹ A rigid system of recording, and reporting and collation of all kinds of statistics (which facilitated the compilation of information-packed document like Punjab Administration Reports), was also enforced in addition to the personal control exercised through almost the military chain of commandment. The result was an autocratic rule which could be easily grafted on the feudal system of the former Sikh State. The colonial state also incorporated such elements of customary laws and institutions in the structure of imperial authority²², and to the extent as were compatible with the

general line of bourgeois policy.²³ The retention of the institution of Panchayat was one such example.

The authoritarian element in the Punjab system was further strengthened by the implementation of Dalhousie's policy of weakening the aristocracy, implying reduction in the feudal incomes as far as political considerations permitted.²⁴ With the abolition of Board of Administration and the removal of its President Henry Lawrence, John Lawrence as the Chief Commissioner of Punjab was empowered to strike a decisive blow at the landed-aristocracy. By appropriating their right to collect land revenue including their rental share, the colonial state could act as a despot without any strong rival centres of power and as the supreme landlord without any co-sharer in enormous benefits. Thus, the Punjab system had imposed "the framework of a civilized state upon a bewildered peasantry"²⁵ in an authoritarian though energetic manner.

In spite of the authoritarian style of administration, the Punjab Government's policy of light taxation in 1850s²⁶ and the occasional projection of its sympathy and goodwill for the peasantry such as relief measures, remission or suspension of land revenue during short-term crisis of famines, drought and epidemic,²⁷ won the active support of peasants-turned-soldiers in saving the empire from the cataclysm of 1857.²⁸ Ironically, at this moment of glory for the Punjab School of administration, began the process of dismantling, not only the rule of personal discretion and unified structure of power but also of replacing 'indistinct, ill-understood and fluctuating customs by the rule of law'. The paternalist form of rule was no longer needed once the property rights had been defined and land revenue fixed in cash. In fact, ancient village communities, the core of the Punjab system, were regarded as "unfavourable to the growth of wealth, intelligence, political experience and the moral and intellectual changes", required for transforming India into a modern commercial society.²⁹ Thus, a fierce controversy raged between the paternalists and legalists³⁰ and it was resolved by Fitzjames Stephen.

Perceiving no contradiction between the strong paternal Government and the "rule of law", Fitzjames Stephen argued that laws, being orders and articles of war, would improve

efficiency of the Deputy Commissioners³¹, who had the duty to rule a turbulent and primitive people. The extension of 'rule of law' to the Non-Regulation provinces would also legitimize the executive action and prescribe limits of safety for the functionaries of the colonial state.³² Armed with this deep conviction in the 'civilizing mission' of law, Stephen expedited the completion of the system of codes generally applicable to the whole of India. He also reduced to formal law those subjects hitherto left largely under the direction of administrative orders. For example, in 1871, Punjab Land Revenue Act was passed to be followed by a series of laws and codes³³ for bringing cosmetic changes in the centralised structure and authoritarian functioning of the Punjab Government.

After the revolt of 1857, the state had also used law to reinforce the position of the landed-aristocracy after reassessing their political and economic weightage in the long-term colonial and imperialist goals and policies in India. That was why the Punjab Tenancy Acts of 1868 and 1887 were passed. Targeting at checking the growth of occupancy tenants, these two measures led to a fast conversion of peasant-proprietors into tenants-at-will³⁴ and agricultural labourers but to the economic advantage of the feudal classes. To add to the hold of landed-aristocracy over the peasants, feudal chiefs were given magisterial, revenue and police powers. In the capacity of Honorary Magistrates, these Jagirdars, invested with the special powers of Assistant Commissioners in Criminal and revenue cases (below Rs. 300/-), regained their power to exploit peasantry.³⁵

III

Agrarian Policy and Peasant Response

Owing to constraints of space, I have focussed my discussion on such issues/measures of the British agrarian policy as agitated the peasantry and alerted the top-brass of the colonial state and a few key functionaries in the Punjab Government regarding dangers from a disgruntled peasantry to the political stability of the *raj* and its economic stage in India. One such issue was the state revenue-demand and the second was the rural indebtedness leading to land-alienation.

In the early period of British revenue settlements beginning with summary settlements in Jullundur (1845), highpitched revenue demand and its rigorous collection on a rigid schedule (without any concession for the weak financial position of the peasants or for crop failures owing to natural calamities) created friction between the state and the high-spirited peasantry. *The Punjab Administration Report 1851-52* conceded that the militancy of the Punjab peasantry, who preferred to abandon their lands rather than accept oppressive terms and high state-demand, had noticeable impact on the shaping of the early revenue policy.³⁶ As a result of peasantry's effective 'intervention' in the colonialization of Punjab economy, the assessment terms were lowered and final loss was compensated through confiscations and resumptions of *jagirs* in Multan province where warlike Muslim peasantry lived.³⁷

The lasting impact of this 'social intervention' was visible in the Regular Settlements³⁸ which were based on the principle of 'light assessment'. Dennis FitzPatrick, while explaining the essential purpose underlying the agrarian policy in Punjab observed that low taxes and rule of law would ensure peace and contentment under British rule.³⁹

The problem of rural indebtedness was the second major issue which evoked an aggressive response from the peasantry. It was evident from the reports of looting, arson and attack upon rich Hindu money-lenders by the numerically dominant but poor Muslim Zamindars from the warlike tribes in West Punjab. From 1880s onwards, S.S. Thorburn's Minutes and publications had drawn official attention to the steady impoverishment of peasantry owing to the exhaustion of their meagre resources in fulfilling heavy debt obligations and expropriation of their lands by the *sahukar*.⁴⁰ His ominous observations, endorsed by the reports of Deputy Commissioners of Gurdaspur, Muzaffargarh, Shahpur and Ambala about the large scale sale or mortgage of land⁴¹, forced the British rulers to review their policy of *laissez faire*, only fit for highly industrialized western societies.

After a prolonged debate between the advocates of policy of non-interference in economic competition in rural society and paternal protection of 'irresponsible' peasant proprietors, the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 was passed.⁴² The crucial

consideration underlying this legislation (restricting peasant's right to sell or mortgage) was to avert the imminent 'political danger' of wide-spread anti-government disturbances throughout Punjab, signalled by the "animosity of the agricultural classes" directed mainly against the Hindu money-lenders. It was a protest of the premobilised peasantry, whose socio-economic behaviour was undergoing the process of fermentation in the nineteenth century.

IV

Conclusion

By using the procedure which W.H. Walsh has described as "colligation", an attempt has been made to highlight two points: (i) the role of the colonial state — its unified structure and aggressive-cum-paternalist style of functioning in reactivating the subdued militancy of the high-spirited Punjabis especially peasantry; (ii) impact of the militant 'intervention' of peasantry on the form of implementation of agrarian policies in Punjab.

While attempting multiple changes ranging from revenue settlements to social engineering for colonial exploitation of India, the State had intensified the Punjabi cultivator's predilections for violence. The provocation to his 'martial traits' was the strongest in the central Punjab where the world economic forces mediated by colonialism had the greatest affect in 1860s and 1870s. Hard-pressed between the relentless state revenue-demand in cash and the oppressive burden of indebtedness, the peasantry grew increasingly poor, discontented, and desperate. Even for the resourceful and enterprising peasant-proprietors in the Central Punjab, who managed to save their land from eviction or expropriation by utilizing their income from employment abroad for meeting revenue demand or debt-payment, the struggle for existence became nerve-racking. These premobilised masses, who had no incentive for remaining loyal, were the potential recruits in the first large scale agrarian unrest, reinforced by the urban democratic intelligentsia.

Secondly, the militancy of Punjabi peasantry possessed a certain amount of autonomy. Nurtured on the egalitarian values of *Jat* society and memories of a tradition of organised protest

against state oppression and injustice of the ruling classes under Mughal rule, the peasants expressed their discontent through threats to migrate if their demands were not conceded.

It may be argued that the intensity of militancy of peasantry in the 19th century was born out of triangular synapses between the material conditions created by the colonial rule, peasant consciousness of shared grievances and a sense of their historical mission to fight for justice and a righteous cause. But it had yet to acquire anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist stance in the twentieth century.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The colonial state's presence remained dominant in Punjab which had no legislative council upto 1897. The Legislative Council, which had eight members including four non-officials, nominated by the Lieutenant Governor, formed as much a 'department' of administration as any other. Set up under the provisions of the Indian Councils Act of 1861, its functions were not enlarged under the Councils Act of 1862. The Council could only consider proposals for legislation and discuss the financial statement. The Imperial Legislative Council could still make laws regarding all matters concerning Punjab and it did so in practice. For example, Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 was passed by the Imperial Legislative Council. Even in the limited field, it was allowed to operate, the approval of the Government of India was necessary for all its legislative proposals. A full control over the administrative and legal set up of Punjab was extremely essential in view of its crucial importance for the solvency and military security of the colonial state. The main objective of the close-fisted and graded hierarchy of Punjab administration was to further the process of social transformation and to bring Punjab in line with more developed provinces of British India.
2. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison-Note Books*, trans. & ed., Quintin Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, First Published 1971, Reprinted, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979, pp.229-30.
3. For the role of the Sikhs in the reconquest and rehabilitation of Delhi after the 'Mutiny' of 1857, see Dolores Domin, *India in 1857-59: A Study in the Role of the Sikhs on the People's Uprising*, Berlin: Akademie-verlag, 1977.

4. Kenneth W. Jones, *Arya Dharma: Hindu-Consciousness in the 19th Century Punjab*, Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1977, p.12.
5. For a well-argued exposition of the British strategy of cultivating the support of influential social groups see Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947*, Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988, pp.48-64.
6. Reprinted in N.G. Barrier, "How to Rule India", *Punjab Past and Present*. No. 5, 1971, pp.276-96.
7. *U.K. Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. III, 28 March, 1892 pp.63-68. As a member of Parliament, Lord Curzon had insisted that English rule rested upon the contentment of the "real" people of India, the cultivating classes.
8. A number of writings on law in colonial India have appeared in 1970s and '80s. For example see J.D.M. Derrett, *Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law*, Vol. II, Leiden, 1977. Also D.A. Washbrook, "Law, State, and Agrarian Society in Colonial India", *Modern Asia Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1981.
9. Fitzjames Stephen, "Legislation Under Lord Mayo", in W.W. Hunter, *A Life of Lord Mayo*, London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1875, pp.143-226. Hunter's footnote recorded that this chapter was actually a letter from Stephen to him. It was retained in its original shape.
10. For a brilliant exposition of utilitarian's views on law see Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians in India*, First Published 1959. Reprinted, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp.44-45.
11. Bipin Chandra, "Colonialism, Stages of Colonialism and the Colonial State", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1980. Also Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, "Notes on the Role of the Intelligentsia in Colonial Society: India from Mid-Nineteenth Century", *Studies in History*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1979.
12. For Charles Grant's "Observations, 1797 and Macaulay's Minute's 1835" see M.R. Paranjape ed., *A Source Book of Modern Indian Education*, London: Macmillan & Co., 1938.
13. For a synoptic view of the ideas of Charles Trevelyan see B.D. Basu, *History of Education Under the Rule of the East India Company*, Reprinted, Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1989, p.62.
14. For a historiographic evaluation of 'renaissance' in Bengal see V.C. Joshi ed., *Ram Mohan Roy and the Process of Modernization in India*, New Delhi: 1975.
15. Sudhir Chandra, 'Literature and Colonial Consciousness', paper presented at the seminar on *Social Transformation and Creative*

- Imagination*, Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, 1983. Sudhir Chandra argued that 'ambivalence' was not the product of pragmatic considerations but an integral part of the colonial consciousness.
16. Eric Stokes, *op.cit.*, p.243.
 17. Charles Gough and Arthur D. Innes, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, First published 1897. Reprinted, Delhi: National Book Shop, 1984, p.222.
 18. Foreign Department, Despatch No. 20, 7 April 1849-Governor-General Lord Dalhousie to Secret Committee. See also Edwin Arnold, *The Marguis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India* in 2 vols., Vol. I, London, 1862, p.325.
 19. For a detailed study of the achievements of Board of Administration in Punjab see N.M. Khilhani, *British Power in the Punjab 1839-1958*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1972, pp.157-197. See also Eric Stokes, No. 10, pp.243-8. The Board of Administration (1849-53), which had laid the foundations of the Punjab System, functioned on the principle of centralisation of judicial, fiscal and magisterial powers in the hands of each civil functionary from the Board to the *Kardar*. The military criteria of a single unified command was observed in the appointment of one officer for one territorial unit. That was why each of the seven divisions of Punjab was put under the charge of one Commissioner and each of its twenty seven districts under a separate Deputy Commissioner each. For useful comments on Punjab system see M. Naides, "John Lawrence and the Origins of the Punjab System 1849-75", *Bengal Past and Present*, Vol. LXXXI, No. 1, 1961.
 20. For detailed information see D.G. Barkley, *The Non-Regulation Law of the Punjab: Being a Collection of Rules, Laws or Regulations Made for the Province under the Punjab Administration*, Lahore: Superintendent Government Press, 1871. Already in use in the Central Provinces, Oudh and Lower Burma, this system acquired a certain aggressive quality in the hands of John Lawrence, who had been trained to operate a unitary structure of state under Metcalfe in Delhi. In fact, the modified form of this system had been introduced in Punjab to speed up the process of transforming Punjab into a model colony while keeping down the expenditure on its administration.
 21. Eric Stokes, *op.cit.*, p.248.
 22. For a well-argued account of the colonial state's use of customary law and social traditions for constructing a distinctive body of law and structure of imperial authority in India, see David Gilmartin,

Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp.11-38.

23. Eric Stokes, *op.cit.*, p.246.
24. For an analytical account of the British policy towards feudal forces see Dolores Domin, n. 3, pp.70-98.
25. Eric Stokes, *op.cit.*, p.246.
26. According to the calculations of Dolores Domin, n. 3, p.63, the Punjab peasant paid the lowest land-revenue per head in mid 1850s out of the temporarily settled parts of British India. For illustration see the following tables:

Land-tax per head of the agricultural population in British India in 1855:

Province	Incidence per head of land tax			
	R	A	P	Rs.
Punjab	1	2	10	(1.34)
North-Western Provinces (N.W.F.P)	1	5	5	(1.65)
Bombay	1	8	1	(1.97)
Bengal	0	8	1	(0.97)

In Bengal, the permanently fixed land-tax did not include the amount of rent, which was extracted from the tenants by Zamindars in addition to the official demand indicated in the table given above.

27. Proceedings of Land Revenue & Agriculture (Famine, April 1898, A, Nos. 30-37, pp. iii, 28. Famine relief measures (introduced after 1880s), usually failed to save people from starvation and death on account of colonial state's reluctance to pronounce the existence of famine conditions in the country and take timely action. However, the district officials were anxious to monitor the positive response of the peasantry to the 'relief' measures, in order to reassure themselves about the success of the policy. For example, D. Smith, the Deputy Commissioner of Hissar, had pointed out that their efforts had been 'amply rewarded' because these had strengthened the bond of sympathy, between the *Sarkar* and the rural people. The Deputy Commissioner had also reported about the feelings of intense gratitude among the people.

28. As a reward for its spectacular hold and loyalty in times of crisis for the *raj*, Punjab was raised to the status of a Lieutenant Governor's province in October, 1858, and John Lawrence became the first incumbent of this office. This model province also gained more territory with the transfer of Delhi from North Western Provinces of Punjab. By reproducing the Punjab pattern of the centralised administration and 'simple scientific judicial laws', John Lawrence had scored another quick victory for authoritarian reform.
29. Minutes of H.S. Maine, 27 February and 3 March 1868. Cited in Eric Stokes, *op.cit.*, pp.271-72.
30. The paternalists were led by John Lawrence, the Governor-General and Viceroy (1864-1869) and the forceful lobby of legalists was headed by Henry Maine.
31. Minute by J. Stephen Fitzjames on the Administration of justice in British India in the *Selection from the Records of the Government of India*. Cited in Eric Stokes, *op.cit.*
32. J. Fitzjames Stephen, "Legislation under Lord Mayo" in W.W. Hunter, *op.cit.*
33. The Criminal Procedure Code was extended to Punjab in 1861, the Penal Code already prevalent in many parts of British India, was applied in 1862. With the establishment of Special Courts for civil suits in 1865, and the Chief Court at Lahore, in 1866, the Punjab Government had acquired a full-fledged machinery for handling cases of civil justice, including rental suits.
34. Sukhwant Singh, "Agricultural Development in the Punjab 1849-1946", Unpublished M.Phil Dissertation, G.N.D.U., Amritsar, 1979, p.191. Between 1872-73 and 1902-03, the number of tenants-at-will had increased by 360 percent.
35. Dolores Domin, *op.cit.*
36. *Punjab Administration Report 1851-52*, p.145.
37. *Ibid.*, 1849-50 and 1850-51, pp.93 ff.
38. For a detailed discussion of the development of settlement policy in Punjab from 1846-1897, see J.M. Douis, *Punjab Settlement Manual*, First published 1899, Reprinted, Delhi: Daya Publishing House, 1985, pp.24-43.
39. Note by Dennis FitzPatrick dated 23-9-1893, published in *Report of Royal Commission on Public Services in India*, Vol. X, contains evidences of officials and non-officials, p.330.

40. Minute by S.S. Thorburn entitled, "Indebtedness of Mohammedan Population of Dera Ismail Khan" in *Judicial Proceedings, Government of India*, Nos. 252-544 A, October 1885, p.3. See also S.S. Thorburn, *Musalman and Money-lenders in Punjab*, First published 1886. Reprinted Patiala, Punjabi Language Department.
41. *Selections of Papers on Agricultural Indebtedness*, Revenue and Agriculture Deptt., Government of India, Vol. II. See also Shyam Lal Bhatia, *Social Change and Politics in Punjab 1898-1910*, New Delhi: ENKAY Publishers Pvt., Ltd., 1987, pp.228-231.
42. For an analytical discussion of two opposite view-points on legislation for restriction of peasant's right to sell or mortgage, see Norman G. Barrier, "The Formulation and Enactment of the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill", *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. XIII-I, April 1979, pp.193-215.