The Pearson Report

The aid imperative and why did it fail to trigger development in India and Pakistan

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The Pearson Report generally known as the 'Bible on aid' was released more than quarter of a century ago. In this Report the whole *Problematik* of aid was discussed threadbare. The major thrust of the Report was its recommendation to the developed countries for giving 0.70% of their GNP as aid to the developing nations. Besides, the Report strongly advocated for the transfer of technology, promotion of education and research, and the overall development of infrastructure. The Report stressed the need for building up the necessary legal and institutional wherewithal to promote the inflow of private foreign investment.

Although the Report's overall strategy became an historic success in the East-Asian countries, known as the Asian tigers, it did not, however, trigger the desired development in the highly populated South Asian countries, particularly, India and Pakistan. This happened despite the fact that the report released in 1969 was quite optimistic about the success of these two countries.

Quite strangely, the thrust for development in India and Pakistan did not take place due to paucity of natural resources or for lack of the desired expertise, but largely on account of the fact that both these countries despite good performance during the first two decades of

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1. Lester B. Pearson, *Partners in Development; Report of the Commission on International Development*, Praeger Publishers, London, 1969.

their independence — 1947-1967 — somehow became victim of bad political management. Unfortunately, this decadence on the political front is still continuing unabated. The result is that the vast economic potential found in these countries is still awaiting to be fully mobilised and developed.

What is therefore desperately needed is not primarily the factor capital and even to some extent the economic infrastructure, both of which are found available on a modest scale but an honest and competent leadership on the political front. It is the absence of this factor which alone has been the the root cause of the continued underdevelopment being witnessed in both the countries. The non-settlement of the Kashmir issue also continues to prove a scar on the body-politics of both the countries. As a consequence, the outlays on defence are allowed to eat into the very vitals of the economic strength of India and Pakistan.

In view of the above and continued decadence found on the political front, the civil service in these countries has also failed to come up to the Joneses. It is terribly generalistic and administrative in its approach, thus proving incompatible with the requirements of modern competitive environment.

Both the countries have now reached a stage where they need complete restructuring of their whole system in line with the imperatives of modern economic development. This will require a new leadership and along with it a devoted and competent civil service to manage the economy in a professional manner. Unless these changes are brought about on the wider socio-economic, administrative, and political canvas, both the countries are doomed to suffer from a perpetual stagnation. The mere upliftment of the income of 10 to 15 per cent of their population is not going to deliver the goods. On the contrary, this inequality-led mode of development will continue to ruin them.

Back in October 1967, President of the World Bank, George D. Woods, suggested a 'grand assize' to study the consequences of twenty years of development assistance. This job was assigned to L. B. Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada, in August 1968 by Robert S. McNamara, the then newly appointed President of the World Bank. Pearson co-opted seven top personalities from different countries to help him in this.

The Report deals with the rationale for 'aid' and summarises its findings. The Commission looked into the record of the past twenty years and then sought to identify the major difficulties and obstacles which stood in the way of self-sustained process of development. The main body of the Report consists of eleven chapters spread over 230 pages. The rest are two annexures. In the first chapter entitled "A Question of Will", the authors have dealt with the challenge of development in a candid and thought provoking manner. Realizing the fact that the widening gap between the developed and developing countries had become a central issue of our time, the Report admits that many a developing nation has recognised this state of 'underdevelopment' and have accordingly stepped up their efforts to mobilise their resources for economic growth and development. The Report states that the inflow of foreign aid had been a positive factor in the pursuit of development. 'The transfer of resources that give substance to the international co-operative effort began after the war and increased rapidly in the 1950's. By 1961, almost \$8 billion, or nearly 1 per cent of the GNP of the high-income, non- Communist nations had already started flowing into low-income nations. "By 1968, the quantum of this aid reached a total of \$12.8 billion in public and private resources from the non- Communist countries alone".[2]

Contrary to the apprehensions that economically under-developed countries were incapable of growth, many a developing country in fact did astonishingly well on the development front. This is evident from the fact that economic growth in many of the developing countries had proceeded at faster rates than the industrialised countries ever enjoyed at a similar stage a development in their own history. Despite this official aid however continued to stagnate. At no time during this period did it keep pace with the growth of national product in the wealthy nations. In fact, the disbursement of aid by the United States which for long had been the largest supplier of aid funds, began to decline. In case of some of the other developed countries one even encountered a spirit of disenchantment. There were many a factor leading to this disillusion. The principal being the wasteful use aid funds. The other criticism levelled against aid was that it did not promote mass participation in the process of development. On the contrary, it led to the enrichment of special groups or individuals.

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2. *Ibid.*, 3.

While commenting on the above situation, the Report observed:

> 'Recipients as well as donors .... perhaps tended to expect too much too soon from aid supplementing the national development effort. A dramatic change in the lives of hundreds of millions of people was expected from a relatively modest flow of resources, much of which was offset by unfavourable trends on the terms of international trade.[3]

The other realization found in the developing countries was that it were they who in the first instance were to look outward and strive for competitive strength. Besides, many a country also realized that the whole development thrust essentially must come from within, and that no foreign help will suffice where there was no national will to make fundamental changes.[4] Further, it had also become very clear that the contribution of resources from outside depended very largely on the efficiency with which these funds were used. Both sides had meanwhile also realized that co-operation in the regime development was more than a simple transfer of funds.[5] Another interesting question namely "why aid" was raised in the above chapter. The Report states: "In trying to answer, we must be clear not only about what aid can do, but also about what it cannot do."[6] "Development involves profound changes in national behaviour and often creates threats to national unity and cohesion which may "at times" require strong appeals to each nation's unique historical experience. Economic organisation, social policy, and the mobilisation of the will to break with the past will often require pragmatic policies appropriate to local circumstances. It has also been observed that the political evolution of developing nations did not always follow a single path, nor did it seek any other country's image."[7] The Report also states:

> Development is not a guarantee of political stability or an antidote to violence. Change is, itself, intrinsically disruptive. But active participation in necessary change offers a chance to impart a sense of direction and identification.[8]

3. *Ibid.*, 5-6.
4. *Ibid.*, 6.
5. *Ibid.*,6.
6. *Ibid.*,7.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, 7.

At one stage the Report also puts a pertinent question: "Why should the rich countries seek to help other nations when even the richest of them are saddled with heavy social and economic problems within their own borders?"[9] This may be true but is that as simple? "International development is a great challenge of our age. Our response to it will show whether we understand the implications of interdependence or whether we prefer to delude ourselves that the poverty and depreciation of the great majority of mankind can be ignored without tragic consequences for all.[10]

While assessing the performance of the developing countries, the Report seems to be satisfied: "The average rate of increase in the GNP of the developing countries had reached 5 per cent per annum in the 1960s."[11] In addition, there had emerged 'a growing network of highways, railroads, power lines, and telecommunication links in many a developing country.[12]

The aid inflow has had two consequences. While on the one hand aid led to rapid development it, at the same time also increased the debt burden. This is evident from the fact that the time the Report was released, developing countries stood indebted to the tune of $ 50 billion to the donor nations. The debt service had been growing at 17 per cent per year, thus absorbing much of the increase in export earnings which had been rising at 6 per cent per annum.[13]

As far as technology transfer is concerned, the Report seems to be satisfied. It states:

> Although external resources as a whole have only financed 15 per cent of the investment of developing countries, and foreign aid probably only 10 per cent their contribution to the transfer of tèchnology and to the broadening of bottlenecks, especially foreign exchange shortages, has been very important.[14]

The Report presents an outline of a new strategy on the development front. It makes a few recommendations, among them:

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9. *Ibid.*, 8.
10. *Ibid.*, 11.
11. *Ibid.*, 12
12. *Ibid.*, 12.
13. *Ibid.*, 13.
14. *Ibid.*, 14.

1) To create a framework for free and equitable international trade.

2) To promote mutually beneficial foreign private investment.

3) The objective of fostering development cannot be attained seriously by foreign aid. There is considerbly more to it. Without considerable efforts, development is wellnigh impossible.

4) There is the need to increase the volume of aid. Further, its terms should have a grant concessional character.

5) "Debt relief should be recognised as a legitimate form of aid. If future debt crises are to be forestalled, sound financial policies must be pursued and the terms of aid must be lenient. The co-operation of aid-givers in consortia and consultative groups also calls for greater uniformity of terms."[15]

6) To make aid administration more effective. In addition, the tying of aid to purchases in the donor countries should be critically examined and made more transparent.

7) Although technical assistance has been growing at more than 10 per cent per annum in the 1960's, there are still many a shortcoming to be overcome. It needs to be made more effective. At present, it has many shortcomings.

8) To slow down the growth of population.

9) To setup aid to foster education and research. There is the desperate need to increase the capacity to absorb, adapt, and develop scientific and technical knowledge in developing countries. Research institutes and development corporations should be established in potentially rewarding fields.[16]

10) To shift "the balance of international aid towards a greater multilateral component. The share of multilateral aid should be raised from its present level of 10 per cent of total official development assistance to a minimum of 20 per cent by 1975. If official aid increases to 0.70 per cent of GNP in that time, this target for aid would involve, on the average,

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15. *Ibid.*, 19.

16. *Ibid.*, 21.

> channelling less than one-third of the additional aid through multilateral agencies."[17]

While reviewing the "Two Decades of Development", the Report presents an historical account of the development process witnessed in the classical developed countries. It states: "Between 1850, and 1950 per head income rose by an average of 2 per cent per year in those countries — a rate which multiplied incomes by seven in the course of that century and produced dramatic changes in standards of living."[18] Some Asian, Latin American and African countries made significant economic progress between 1880 and 1913, caused primarily by the rapid expansion of world trade and free capital movement during that period.[19]

> After World War II, over sixty new countries gained formal independence within fifteen years. They entered political independence with a backlog of deep poverty, with little accumulated capital or experience of industrialisation, and with only a vague understanding of the complexities of rapid change in their societies and economies. Many considered political independence and economic development synonymous, unaware of the long and slow process by which the power and affluence of the industrialized countries had been reached".[20]

In addition, developing countries also found confronted with low levels of technology, high illiteracy rates, low savings ratios, high birth rates, inefficient public administration and political instability. All these formidable problems served as a vicious circle in the process of development.

Despite all these difficulties, the developing countries, however, did well between 1950 and 1967.

> They increased their total production of goods and services (GDP) by an annual average rate of 4.8 per cent. This is considerably faster than the growth rates estimated for the presently industrialized countries in the early stages of their development: 2 per cent in the United Kingdom, between 1790 and 1820; 2.7 per cent in Germany between 1850 and 1880;

17. *Ibid.*, 21.

18. *Ibid.*, 25.

19. *Ibid.*, 25.

20. *Ibid.*, 25-26.

> about 4 per cent in the United States between 1820 and 1850; and some 4 per cent in Japan between 1876 and 1900." [21]

The Report also made some optimistic remarks on the growth potential of the developing countries. It states:

> If the present rate of growth in developing countries is maintained, it will quadruple income per person in sixty to seventy years. For countries that now have a per capita income of $ 400 or more (Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, Greece and Cyprus) this would mean reaching levels of income currently enjoyed in Western Europe; for countries with present per capita income of less than $ 100 (India, Pakistan Indonesia, Mali and Nigeria), it would mean great improvement but neither affluence nor the capacity to assure a wide range of choice to their citizens."[22]

Despite the commonly held view that the poor countries are too poor to save anything, they have in fact been able to mobilise a large chunk of their investment capital. In the 1960's domestic savings, for instance, financed 85 per cent of total investment.

Savings and Gross Investment

As Per Cent of GNP Average for 1960-67[23]

	Savings	Gross Investment
Developing countries	15.0	17.8
South Asia	11.3	13.9
East Asia	11.0	15.6

Similarly, some of the developing countries also showed impressive growth in the manufacturing sector although the performance in the agricultural sector continued to leave a great deal to be desired.

Average Annual Rate of Growth %[24]

	Agriculture 1960-66	Manufacturing 1960-67	Electric Energy Productions 1948-67
Developing countries	2.1	7.3	10.5
South Asia	0.6	6.9	12.4
East Asia	3.2	7.5	12.8

21. *Ibid.*, 28.

22. *Ibid.*, 28.

23. Pearson Report, 31.

24. *Ibid.*, 32; 36; 39.

> The total volume of exports from low-income countries grew at an average of 4.7 per cent per year between 1953 and 1968, although adverse price trends were aggravated by the simultaneous increase in the prices of goods and services imported from advanced countries. This record is good, but the fact remains that the value of exports from most developing countries grew significantly less rapidly than world trade as a whole, which increased by an average 6.9 per cent per year.[25]

Aid played an important role in providing the machinery and equipment for industry for the building of roads and railways, and for the setting up of new ports and the telecommunication facilities. But side by side with these positive-contributions to development, aid also had some shortcomings. For instance, 'much aid was given in ways which did not make it as efficient a contribution to development as it could have been. For one thing, a considerable portion was allocated on essentially political criteria without regard to general economic performance. The Report also observed:

> The role of foreign aid ... has, not been merely to supplement domestic resources, it is 'also' the essence of the dilemma of the developing countries that even when they possessed considerable potential economic resources, such as un-mined minerals or an abundance of unskilled labour, they are often not in a position to mobilise them, and transform them into goods and services which they themselves or the world's market require. In this area, aid has to a large extent been a catalyst"?[26]

The authors of the Report also went into rather delicate issue, namely the objective of rapid growth and equitable distribution. In many developing countries, increases in income have been highly concentrated in relatively few hands. The Report therefore advocated the implementation of land reforms which in its view "must be undertaken to provide incentives for future investment in agriculture and for increased production".[27]

The Report also stressed the importance of the private sector. Further, a strong aid requires private sector as an important element in the achievement of rapid growth. A strong domestic private sector also

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25. *Ibid.*, 45.
26. *Ibid.*, 51.
27. *Ibid.*, 54.

requires to attract direct investment from abroad which can greatly stimulate the 'whole' development process.[28]

The Report also criticised the various conditions governing aid funds getting more and more hardened. The role of private foreign investment (PFI) has been greatly recommended to foster development in the underdeveloped countries. But as the experience shows, except in a few countries, it has failed to prove a dynamic force in the developing countries. Here one has to blame both the richer countries for being too demanding and the beneficiary countries for being somewhat reluctant to welcome it in the desired liberal manner. According to the Report, 'investment to the developing countries averaged \$2-3 billion a year in 1957-58; it was still only \$2.4 billion a decade later (1967-68).[29] Much of this investment took place in extractive industries. Of the total cumulative direct investment in developing countries estimated at \$30 billion in 1966, 40 per cent was in the petroleum sector, and a further 9 per cent in mining and smelting; only 27 per cent was in manufacturing, and 24 per cent in utilities and other services.[30] The Report further discusses the comparative profitability of PFI's and loans: "Direct ... investment earned net profits of 10-12 per cent on capital, whereas fixed interest paid on capital stood at 7-9 per cent. With a view to promote PFI's, the Report has particularly recommended an extension on the role of the IFC, an institution, especially set up to promote private foreign investment.[31] Besides, IFC, there is also the dire need to set up capital markets in the developing countries. Not only do stock markets help mobilise certain local savings and encourage portfolio investment, they also help contain flight of capital.

The Report mentions about the role of bonds in the historical development of certain countries like the United States. But a resort to such modes of financing didn't however take place in the large majority of the developing countries during the fifties or sixties. "Only three countries outside Europe — Israel, Mexico and Argentina — were able to float bonds totalling \$392.1 million on world capital markets during 1964-68. Many an obstacle stood in the way of the

28. *Ibid.*, 64.

29. *Ibid.*, 100.

30. *Ibid.*, 100.

31. *Ibid.*, 110.

developing countries, such as, (i) lack of creditworthiness, and, (ii) legal barriers in floating bonds in many developed countries.

Among all these factors, the poor credit rating of the developing countries seems to have been the major factor hindering the floatation of bonds in the capital markets of the advanced countries.

In the chapter on 'Partners in Development', the authors of the Report have had a philosophical look at the whole process of development. The Report observes: "Economic growth is a necessary condition but by no means the only condition." [32]Although a growth rate of 6 per cent is generally assumed as the desired goal but here again what is eventually needed is self-sustaining process of development. This means that developing countries should generally become independent of the need for aid on concessional terms as soon as they can do so without reducing their rates of growth below the 6 per cent level. The Report goes on to say:

> A high level of self-sustaining growth cannot be achieved simply by foreign aid; it requires the governments of developing countries to take positive measures of their own to remove the obstacles in the way of growth. Neither does growth become self- sustaining if consumption rises as fast as income; positive measures are required to ensure that savings and tax ratios rise faster than consumption. [33]

In order to bring aid inflows under a certain discipline , a few consortia were set up, for instance Aid India Consortium in 1958, and Aid Pakistan Consortium, in 1960. As to the quantum of aid, the Report suggests the fixation of the target at 1 percent of the donors' GNP. Although in the mid-1950's the U.S.A's flow of aid which had reached more than 2 per cent at the height of the Marshall Plan, averaged 0.84 per cent of GNP during the sixties. France, the second largest supplier of resources to developing countries, exceeded the 1 per cent target. On the whole, resource flows to developing countries as a per cent of GNP began to decline from 2.1 per cent in 1960 to 1.24 per cent in 1968.[34]

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32. *Ibid.*, 124.
33. *Ibid.*, 127.
34. *Ibid.*, 145.

The Report strongly recommended that each industrialized country 'should' increase its resource transfers to low income countries to a minimum of 1 per cent of its GNP as rapidly as possible, and, in no case later than 1975. The combined GNP of the members of DAC, the Report estimated, is likely to rise from $1700 billion in 1968 to about $2300 billion in 1975 (in constant prices) and the implementation of the target would thus raise total flow of external resources from $12.8 billion in 1968 to at least $23 billion in 1975.[35] 'Elaborating further, the recommendations went on to say; "each aid-giver 'should' increase commitments of official development assistance to the level necessary for net-disbursements to reach .70 per cent of its GNP by 1975 or shortly thereafter but in no case later than 1980."[36]

Cognizant of the emergence of debt burden, the Report states: "The recorded public and publicly guaranteed debt of the developing countries stood at $47.5 billion as of June 30,1968." [37] Unlike the earlier period when aid largely carried concessional rates of interest (or the grants-in-aid) new loans started becoming more prominent as a proportion of aid. This is evident from the fact that their share in the bilateral official flow rose from 13 to 50 per cent in the course of the last ten years.[38] As far as export credits were concerned, the Report was quite pessimistic when it said: "If the resource gap is to be met with loans on relatively hard terms, called IBRD terms, debt service would reach 101 per cent of export earnings in 30 years if exports continued to grow at 5 per cent per annum. However, if exports grew by 8 per cent annually, the debt service ratios after 30 years is 43 per cent. On the softer terms, the debt service ratios will similarly be less than half as high in the fast-growth case as in the slow growth case'. [39]

Realizing the accelerated growth of debt burden, the Report recommends 'that the terms of official development assistance loans should henceforth provide for interest of no more than 2 per cent, a maturity of between 25 and 40 years, and a grace period from 7 to 10 years'.[40]

35. *Ibid.*, 147.

36. *Ibid.*, 148-49.

37. *Ibid.*, 154.

38. *Ibid.*, 153.

39. *Ibid.*, 160;162.

40. *Ibid.*, 164.

The Report also states that aid does not reach the purpose for which it is given. At times, the intended purpose is "also" poorly chosen. Side with better disciplining of the use of aid, the Report also strongly advocates for untying of aid, so that the beneficiary countries can receive full price advantage.[41]

Bilateral and remained dominant in the flow of resources to developing countries. In 1967 it accounted for almost 90 per cent of the official development assistance. As far as multilateral aid inflows are concerned, efforts were made during the sixties to set up regional banks to take over some of the new as well as some of the traditional operations of the World Bank .

While critically examining the Pearson Report, one gets the impression that it was well intended to help the third world in accelerating its economic development. It aimed at helping the third world in getting out of the under-development syndrome. The strategy chosen for this purpose was to impress upon the developed countries to part with a certain percentage of their GNP for purpose of development in the emergent countries. In addition, the authors of the Report also advocated the need for more technology transfer and a generous treatment being meted out to the import of manufactures from the developing nations. The Report also strongly recommended for the promotion of private foreign investment and the granting of special accommodation to the developing countries for purpose of offering their bonds and shares in the international capital markets. The importance of infrastructure, education and research was also strongly emphasised. Further, the Report also pleaded for the implementation of land reforms. The Report further strongly recommended for the promotion of better income distribution and greater participation of the people in the totality of the development efforts.

On the face of it, all these ideas and strategies seemed good. But if one were to look at the performance of the whole development efforts, particularly the role of aid, there are many developing countries which seem to have not achieved the desired result. Just look at the South Asian countries and the enormity of the crises in which they are at present locked up. The growth in the per capita income during the past fifty years has been too niggardly even to be cited. Not only that, countries like India and Pakistan are in fact going down the

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41. *Ibid.*, 175-76.

drain and even the enormous resource endowment possessed by them are still awaiting to be reasonably exploited. Social, economic and political institutions too are suffering from continued decadence. There is corruption all over and worst of all the badly needed technological advancement is hardly recognised. Politicians are ruling the roost and the bureaucracy too is an active partner in this pursuit.

While India and Pakistan are still decades away from a self-sustained path of development, there is a whole group of East Asian countries which have broken all barriers in their way of development, and, have already taken off on the economic front.

The important point that emerges here is that while foreign aid has been instrumental in helping the East Asian countries to develop themselves in a matter of 30 years or so there is a whole chunk of South Asian countries that are still stuck up in a state of underdevelopment. The East Asian countries, on the other hand, have been able to develop despite the fact that they are niggardly endowed with natural resources. One major reason which enabled the East Asian countries to achieve a quick take off was the superiority of their political leadership, as against that of the South Asian countries. It may also be mentioned here that the liberal inflow of aid into the South Asian countries not only made the political leadership corrupt, it also made their bureaucracy degenerated. The latter committed all kinds of irregularities and mismanagement. No wonder therefore they were more keen for foreign aid rather than to do something tangible to mobilise national resources. The Pearson Report although seems well intended, its greatest weakness has however been the neglect of the private sector, particularly in the South Asian context. Perhaps, it is due to liberal aid inflows, and the concomitant development of the wasteful public sector that the South Asian countries failed to develop the needed technology and the concomitant infrastructure. One can perhaps also say that because of the overwhelming role of the corrupt political leadership and the incompetent bureaucracy, even a democratic order could not develop in South Asia. The too much dependence on aid and the resultant debt burden has also made most of the South Asian countries virtually a client state of the IMF and the World Bank with the consequence that debt burden has grown even beyond their ability to service it.

The new world order demands that it is not aid which is ultimately desired in the South Asian set up (with corrupt political leadership and incompetent bureaucracy) but more competitiveness not only on the economic front but also in the wider field of politics as well. It is these strategies which alone can ultimately resolve issues concerning under-development on a permanent footing. No half-cooked and expediency led strategies will do.

The Zeitgeist demands that countries like India and Pakistan should rely more on their own efforts rather than remain stuck up in a dependency syndrome with harrowing consequences for both polity and autonomous growthmanships.

Further, the other most tragic aspect observed in the South Asian countries has been the restricted nature of development activity. Because of the oligarchic set-up found in the economic and political spheres, no more than 10 to 15 per cent of the entrepreneurial and self-employed community is permitted to take part in the mainstream of development activities. In this way, the process of development gets shrunk to only a small percentage of the oligarchy while the rest of the 'wretched of the earth' can only subsist. In this way the development potential found in the gets only marginally utilized. Unless development becomes more broad-based and activated at the totality level, the thought of having a self-sustained development will continue to go by default.

It is this major drawback on the systemic front that both India and Pakistan which otherwise are well endowed with natural resources are condemned to stagnate on the economic front.

The democratic set-up found in these countries is merely an eyewash i.e., for all practical purposes it is the oligarchic structure in the state set-up which rules the roost. Because of this situation, it seems quite clear that the so-called democratic structures found in these countries are more an instrument to deprive the electorate of their rights rather than a means to save their legitimate interests.

More than a quarter of century has passed since the publication of the Pearson report. Aid inflows have already shrunk considerably and their prospects for the future also look quite bleak. Now is the time for competitive development. This means that every nation rich or poor will have to show its competitive strength. Unless this attitude gets ingrained into the totality of the socio-economic and political order in these countries, a self-sustained process of development will not take place. India and Pakistan cannot succeed simply by manipulating on the aid front. Those times have gone; now they will have to show their strength on the basis of their own inherent ability to manage things properly. However, if they did not do so, economic ruin will surely become inevitable.

Comparative Performance of the Economies of India,[42] Pakistan and South Korea 1967-1995; Per Capita Income US $

	1967	1976	1994	1995	Increase in 1995 over 1967; by a factor of
India	100	150	310	340	3.40
Pakistan	100	170	440	460	4.60
South Korea	200	670	8220	9700	48.50

42. *Asian Development Outlook*, 1996 and 1997; ADB, Manila 11th April, 1996; *World Development Reports*, 1978, 1997; *The World Bank*, Washington, D.C.; Lester B. Pearson, *Partners in Development*, a.a.o; 360-61.